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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the legal framework for the liberalisation of trade in 
services in MERCOSUR with a view to identifying the obstacles that stand against it and shed 
light on the best course of action for securing a realistic degree of liberalisation. The thesis 
argues that the Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in Services, the rounds of negotiations of 
specific commitments on Market Access and National Treatment and the secondary rules for 
specific service sectors adopted so far, have failed to make any significant contribution to 
ensuring effective market access conditions for MERCOSUR service suppliers and levelling 
the playing field to compete against domestic incumbents. It claims that for advancing the 
liberalisation of trade in services, it is necessary for State Parties to look beyond the 
negotiation of reciprocal concessions for the removal of existing restrictions, and engage on a 
long-term strategy aimed at bringing about the gradual convergence of domestic legislation 
affecting trade in services through regulatory co-operation. It also refers to the need for 
streamlining the operation of the current institutional system by adopting measures aimed at 
encouraging existing institutions to exercise their power in a more rule-oriented, transparent, 
accountable and efficient way, without compromising domestic sovereignty to a level 
unacceptable for State Parties. However, the thesis suggests that the absence of a matrix of 
converging national interests on MERCOSUR, and the existence of parallel forums for similar 
purposes at bilateral, regional and multilateral level, compromises its chances for success and 
wonders whether the effective integration of service markets could ever be achieved. 
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What are the chances for an architect based in Montevideo to design buildings in Sao Paulo, 
for a Brazilian national to hold a majority shareholding in an Argentinian newspaper, for an 
advertisement company based in Buenos Aires to plan a campaign for an Asuncion's Mayor 
candidate, for a driver in Paraguay to buy her car insurance on line from a Brazilian Company, 
for an Argentinian pension fund to hold assets from Companies listed in the Sao Paulo Stock 
Exchange or for a Uruguayan resident to open a current account in Brazil? Put this question to 
individuals from any of the Southern Common Market countries ("MERCOSUR") and the 
vast majority would probably agree on the virtual impossibility to carry out any of these 
transactions. 
This should not come as a surprise but for the fact back in 1991 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay signed in Asuncion, an ambitious sub-regional integration agreement aimed at 
the establishment of a common market involving the free movement of goods, services and 
factors of production, the establishment of a common external tariff and the co-ordination of 
macroeconomic and sectoral policies. ' Yet, almost two decades after the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Asuncion, MERCOSUR remains an incomplete free trade area, with a partially 
implemented Common External Tariff and with no significant degree of co-ordination of State 
Parties' macroeconomic policies. 2 
The gap between State Parties' commitments and State Parties' conduct has put MERCOSUR 
in the spotlight 3 The number of mercosceptics who no longer believe that MERCOSUR is 
I See Treaty for the Establishment of a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, The Federative Republic 
of Brazil, The Republic of Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay [Treaty of Asuncion], Mar. 26,1991, 
Arg. -Braz. -Para. -Uru., 30 I. L. M. 1041. The Treaty entered into force on 30 November 1991. Venezuela is to 
become a full member upon the entry into force of the Protocol on Venezuela's Accession to MERCOSUR, signed 
on 4/07/06. 
2 Further information about MERCOSUR's performance over the years can be found in the MERCOSUR Report 
Series produced by the institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (IADB) available at 
www. iadb. ora/INTAtfndex. asp? idioma=ena, last visited April 2008 and the economic research output produced by 
the MERCOSUR Network on Economic Research, whose publications are available at www. redmercosur. orQ. uv, 
last visited April 2008. 
3 No better evidence to illustrate this gap than the sheer number of secondary rules adopted by MERCOSUR 
decision making bodies, which State Parties have failed to incorporate into their national legal systems. Between 
1991 and September 2002, the CMC adopted 149 Decisions that needed to be incorporated into Member States' 
domestic legal systems, out of which 44 (30%) were incorporated by the four Member States. During the same 
period, the CMG adopted 604 Resolutions that needed to be incorporated into Member States' domestic legal 
systems, out of which 224 (37%) were incorporated by the four Member States. According to the MERCOSUR 
Secretariat, between January 1994 and September 2002 the MTC adopted 90 Directives that needed to be 
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capable of securing a deep degree of economic integration among its partners and that it will 
soon become another pearl on the collar of failed Latin America's integration attempts is 
growing. Most worryingly, mercoscepticism has even reached the highest political circles, 
traditionally imbued by a marked pro-integration optimism 4 
The liberalisation of trade in services is not immune to these problems. Notwithstanding the 
entry into force of the Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in Services, an international 
agreement akin to the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS") that provides a 
general framework for trade in services within the bloc, the conclusion of six rounds of 
negotiations for the removal of existing restrictions and the adoption of a considerable number 
of secondary rules for specific service sectors and modes of supply, MERCOSUR is yet to 
deliver any significant achievement in this area Most barriers to trade in services remain in s 
place and there is still a long way ahead before suppliers and consumers can move freely 
across national borders. 
incorporated into Member State's domestic legal systems, out of which 45 (50%) were incorporated by the four 
Member States. See Documents discussed in the Seminar "Las Normas de Derecho Originario y Derivado del 
MERCOSUR. Su incorporaciön a los Ordenes Juridicos de los Estados Partes" organised by Centro Argentino de 
Relaciones Intemacionales, FundaciGn Konrad Adenauer, BID and Universidad de la ROU, Montevideo, 26-27 
September 2002. The document is available at httpJ/www. cari. org. ar/pdf/normas-mercosur. pdf. 
4 According to a recent poll, 57% of La Nacibn readers, an Argentinian national newspaper, agreed with a 
quotation from the President of Uruguay, Tabare Vazquez who claimed that "As it is now, MERCOSUR is useless". 
The poll was carried out on 20 April 2006 and received 6513 answers, available at www. lanacion. com. ar. 
5 The literature on this topic is extremely limited but the studies that have been produced so far confirm the lack of 
success of MERCOSUR in liberalising trade in services. See, e. g., JOSE MARIA FANELLI (Coord. ) MERCOSUR: 
Integraci6n y Profundizaci6n de los Mercados Financieros (S XXI Red MERCOSUR, Buenos Aires, 2008), PEDRO 
DA MOTTA VEIGA, 'EI MERCOSUR frente a los acuerdos y negociaciones sobre servicios e inversiones', in Antoni 
Estevadeordal & Rambn Torrent (ads) Regionalismo global: Los dilemas pare America Latina (Fundacidn CIDOB, 
Barcelona 2005); GABRIEL GARI, 'Free Circulation of Services in MERCOSUR: A Pending Task', (2004) 10 Law and 
Business Review of the Americas 545; JULIO BERLINSKY, 'La Uberalizacibn del Comercio de Servicios an los 
Passes del MERCOSUR, in Daniel Chudnovsky & Josb Maria Fanelli (ads) El Desafio de Integrarse Pare Crecer 
(Siglo XXI Red MERCOSUR, Buenos Aires 2001); M DE OLIVEIRA JR, Un Analse da Liberalizacao do Comercio 
Intemacional de Servicios no MERCOSUL (IPEA, Rio de Janeiro 2000) available at 
htID: //www. ioea. aov. br/Dubttd/td 2000/td0727. odf; JULIO DE BRUM, Trade in services in the Mercosur area: 
economic assesment and issues for liberalization (Universidad ORT, Montevideo 1996); JULIO DE BRUM, 'Comercio 
de Servicios an all Ambito del MERCOSUR: Problemas Pendientes', in, Origen an el Comercio de Servicios, Banco 
Central del Uruguay, (Montevideo 11 y 12 de Noviembre 1996).; CARLOS A PRIMO BRAGA & JULIO DE BRUM, 
Services in MERCOSUR: Much ado about Nothing? Mimeo (The World Bank, Washington D. C. 1995). 
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There are good reasons for studying MERCOSUR disciplines on trade in services. First, it is 
an under researched topic. MERCOSUR literature has been traditionally focused on trade in 
goods, grossly overlooking other fundamental freedoms necessary for deep economic 
integration such as the free movement of services and factors of production. Secondly, the 
service sector has a strategic importance for the economies of the region, as confirmed by its 
growing participation on the GDP composition and on the proportion of the labour force 
occupied in this sector. 6 The potential contribution of efficient services to the economy is also 
very important as it stems from the greater weight of services in the sectors leading economic 
growth. 7 Not to mention the growing opportunities for trade in the service sector$ fuelled by 
an ongoing technological progress in particular on the information technology sector9, 
structural and organisational changes in modern production10 and institutional and regulatory 
changes at the national level, including the withdrawal of the State as service providers under 
monopoly conditions. Therefore, the cost of not having an open, sound and transparent 
regulatory framework for the free movement of services within the bloc can no longer be 
overlooked. " 
Against this background, the thesis examines the legal framework for the liberalisation of 
trade in services in MERCOSUR, discusses the reasons for the current state of affairs and 
proposes some alternatives for unlocking the integration process as far as its deep economic 
integration objectives are concerned. 
6 See Appendix II, MERCOSUR Statistical Information, Tables 2 and 3. 
7 On the strategic importance of services see, generally MARIA Jost AcosTA, at al., Globalizaciön y Servicios: 
Cambios Estnicturales en el Comercio Intemacional (CEPAL, Santiago de Chile 2003) and Berlinsky, ob cit., 
footnote n5. 
B See Appendix II, MERCOSUR Statistical Information, Tables 11,12,13 and 14. 
9 Technological development has also dramatically reduced transaction costs on cross-border trade in services, in 
particular, by reducing the need for physical proximity between the service supplier and the consumer. As Linders 
notes, the rise in services is concomitant to the rise in the technological complexity of the economy. See 
GERTJAN LINDERS, Thesis, Methodology and Descriptive Statistics on Services and Services Trade (2001) 
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis), p 37. 
10 Stibora and de Vaal argue that technological development has allowed for the splintering of the production 
process into various economic units, increasing the 'interdependence of industries", which in its turn is raising the 
demand for "supplier services" for linking and coordinating specialized intermediate suppliers. They also point out 
that technological development has facilitated the outsourcing of labour intensive processes to outside service 
suppliers in order to achieve efficiency gains. See JOACHIM STIBORA & ALBERT DE VAAL, Services and Services 
Trade: A Theoretical Inquiry (Netherlands Economic Institute, Rotterdam 1995) p 6. 
I' According to the WTO, during the last seven years (2000 to 2006) trade in commercial services grew at an 
annual percentage rage higher than 10% (20% in 2004). See International Trade Statistics 2007, p 117. 
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When it comes to interpret MERCOSUR's poor results, the analysis goes beyond the black 
letter of the law, taking into account the underlying socio-economic and political factors 
conditioning the integration process. Rather than taking State Parties' political will to achieve 
deep economic integration for granted, it is argued that there is a divorce between the 
objectives laid down by the Treaty of Asuncion and the national interest of each State Party 
(particularly Brazil) in the integration process. A divorce which is rooted in one of 
MERCOSUR's defining features, namely, the sharp structural asymmetries between its 
members, and in the lack of a common vision on the type and degree of integration desired 
that stems therein. 12 
Beyond a common rhetoric of "economic development with social justice", "enhancing the 
living conditions of their people" and the like, each State Party carefully makes its own 
calculations on the extent to which the cost of observing MERCOSUR commitments is being 
paid off with proportionate benefits for their national interests. This brings into the equation 
non-legal factors such as economic, social and political considerations, which have been 
conditioning the achievement of the objectives laid down in the Treaty of Asuncion since its 
entry into force. In this vein, results that from a strictly treaty-based perspective should be 
regarded as a failure, from some State Parties' national interest perspective could be seen as a 
desired outcome. Aware of this congenital weakness, the thesis discusses some alternatives 
for unlocking the current situation and securing a realistic degree of economic integration, not 
without wondering whether there is a real case for MERCOSUR with so diverse expectations 
on the integration process. 
The thesis begins with an introductory chapter on challenges and legal instruments for the 
liberalisation of trade in services. First, it identifies the sui generis challenges raised by 
barriers to trade in services (as opposed to those affecting trade in goods). It then briefly 
describes the main trade disciplines, policy-making instruments and enforcement mechanisms 
prescribed by the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("CATS") and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"). The purpose is to illustrate, from a 
comparative perspective, the menu of options available for the liberalisation of trade in 
12 By "structural asymmetries" we mean the sharp differences in population and size of State Parties' economies 
and, consequently, the differences in the relevance of MERCOSUR trade for each of its State Parties (See 
Appendix II, Table 1,6 and 9). Throughout this book it will be argued that structural asymmetries inhibit the 
demand for stronger regional institutions and a more rule-oriented integration process. 
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services focusing on two agreements which have heavily influenced the design of 
MERCOSUR. 
Chapter two examines the MERCOSUR legal system and the institutions responsible for its 
operation. The liberalisation of trade in services, just as any other integration objective is 
inextricably linked to the soundness of the institutional and legal settings that underpin the 
integration process. With this in mind, the chapter begins with an examination of the Treaty of 
Asuncion, MERCOSUR institutions, the sources of MERCOSUR law and the enforcement 
mechanisms. It then critically assesses the extent to which the institutional and legal settings 
have contributed to achieving MERCOSUR objectives and discusses some alternatives for 
reform. 
Chapters three, four and five analyse three specific instruments provided by the MERCOSUR 
legal system for the liberalisation of trade in services: a set of treaty-based general obligations 
and disciplines, the negotiation of sector-specific Market Access and National Treatment 
commitments and a number of secondary rules on specific service sectors and modes of 
supply. 
Chapter three examines the Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in Services, focusing on its 
general obligations and disciplines, which seek to further the liberalisation of trade in services 
by compelling State Parties to accord foreign services and service suppliers minimum 
standards of treatment and to regulate them in accordance with "trade-friendly" standards. The 
chapter discusses the suitability of modelling a framework agreement for trade in services in 
MERCOSUR on the basis of a multilateral instrument like the GATS and assesses the general 
obligations and disciplines' capacity to liberalise trade in services in light of their scope of 
application and the institutional framework responsible for their implementation and 
enforcement. 
Chapter four looks at the Protocol's Programme of Liberalisation, i. e. the rounds of 
negotiations of specific commitments. It examines the Programme's legal framework, reviews 
its implementation and analyses the results achieved so far in light of State Parties' current 
schedules of specific commitments. The chapter discusses the rationale for the negotiation of 
specific commitments as an instrument for the liberalisation of trade in services in the 
MERCOSUR context. 
Finally, chapter five focuses on positive integration, examining the secondary rules on 
specific service sectors and modes of supply. It critically assesses to what extent secondary 
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legislation has contributed to the liberalisation of trade in services and puts forward some 
suggestions for enhancing the quality of MERCOSUR legislative practice. 
But there is more to this thesis than a compendium of technical proposals for removing 
barriers to trade in services tailored for a specific regional bloc. At a time when States across 
the world are lining up to sign regional trade agreements containing unqualified "within the 
border" commitments, it is not uncommon to encounter serious gaps between Treaty 
commitments and States' conduct. The rhetoric of integration expressed during presidential 
summits, intergovernmental conferences and the like usually overlook the complexities of 
deep economic integration and its serious implications on the autonomy of governments to 
deal with essential governance issues such as public health, financial stability, cultural 
diversity, protection of the environment and so forth. Based on an in-depth case study, this 
thesis uncovers the reality behind the black letter of the law and argues that head of States not 
always mean what they sign. 
The research involved a detailed analysis of primary sources of information including 
MERCOSUR primary legislation (i. e. the Treaty of Asuncion, its Protocols and other 
agreements concluded within the Treaty of Asuncion's framework), secondary legislation 
(Decisions, Resolutions and Directives), arbitration awards issued by ad hoc tribunals and by 
the Permanent Review Tribunal, minutes of decision making bodies' meetings, minutes of 
meetings of auxiliary bodies to the Common Market Group with specific competence on trade 
in services (Group on Services and Sub Working Groups on Communications, Financial 
Issues and Transport) and State Parties' schedules of specific commitments on trade in 
services under the GATS and under the Protocol of Montevideo. The research also involved a 
quantitative analysis of these schedules using Hoekman's method to provide a rough idea of 
the degree of liberalisation of the various service sectors and make comparisons between State 
Parties' specific commitments. " 
The primary sources of information consulted are written in Spanish or Portuguese, the two 
official languages of MERCOSUR. There is no such thing as an "official" translation of these 
documents into English. There are unofficial translations of the Treaty of Asuncion and some 
13 See BERNARD HOEKMAN, 'Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services', in Martin Will & Alan Winters 
(ads) The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York 
1996). 
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of its Protocols14, but arbitration awards, MERCOSUR secondary rules, minutes of 
MERCOSUR bodies' meetings and other official documents are only written in Spanish or 
Portuguese. The author faced the difficult challenge to comment in English about documents 
written in another language and, when necessary, translate pieces of legislation into English. 
The task was conducted with extreme care and diligence in order to avoid distorting the 
meaning of terms of art, although, naturally, mistakes cannot be excluded altogether. 
Language barriers aside, it was very difficult to get access to some primary sources of 
information. Primary and Secondary legislation, arbitration awards and minutes of the 
decision making bodies are easily accessible from the MERCOSUR's official website. 
However, key pieces of information are missing, like minutes of the meetings of the High 
Level Group on MERCOSUR Institutional Reform, minutes of meetings of auxiliary bodies to 
the Common Market Group with competence on specific service sectors, some annexes to 
these minutes and, most notably, information about the entry into force of secondary rules. 
15 
To overcome this obstacle, the author conducted three field visits to the MERCOSUR 
Secretariat located in Montevideo, Uruguay, in December 2004, August 2005 and January 
2007. I interviewed legal and economic advisers of the Secretariat and got access to valuable 
information not published on-line. 16 I also conducted an exhaustive search of State Parties' 
governmental websites, finding some pieces of information not included in MERCOSUR's 
official website. 17 The reluctance of government officials to fully disclose relevant 
information about the integration process is symptomatic of a process that remains almost 
exclusively under the control of diplomats who struggle to understand that the establishment 
of a common market is not a task to be carried out in secrecy within the corridors of foreign 
affairs departments. '8 
U See, e. g., I. L. M. Materials, translations of MERCOSUR State Parties' communications to the WTO made by the 
WTO Secretariat and a compilation of various instruments translated by Marta Haines Ferrari in The MERCOSUR 
Codes (BIICL, 2000). 
15 As striking as it may seem, such basic data as to when or if a secondary rule has entered into force, is not 
publicly available. MERCOSUR officials regard it as "confidential information", presumably because of their 
concern about revealing which States have not been diligent enough to adopt the necessary measures to 
incorporate the secondary rule into their legal system. 
18 The Secretariat is responsible for administering MERCOSUR's archives. 
17 See Appendix V, Useful Websites about MERCOSUR. 
18 This author is not alone in this view. Various academics have harshly criticised the lack of transparency of 
MERCOSUR institutions. See, e. g. ALEJANDRO DANIEL PEROTTI, 'Estructura Insttucional y Derecho en all 
MERCOSUR', (2002) 6 Revista de Derecho Intemacional y del MERCOSUR 63, p 108 and RAMON ToRRENT, 'Una 
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The analysis of primary sources of information was complemented with an exhaustive 
literature review on MERCOSUR law, which yielded interesting findings. There is a vast 
amount of material on MERCOSUR law published in Spanish, Portuguese and some in 
English but of a very diverse quality. There are particularly difficult topics such as the 
relationship between MERCOSUR law and domestic law and the effect of MERCOSUR law 
on individuals, which the existing literature has struggled to clarify. Some writings add a dose 
of confusion by analysing the nature of MERCOSUR law using terms of art pertaining to EU 
law without fully understanding their meaning and the legal context within which they were 
coined. To make matters worse, MERCOSUR lacks an established jurisprudence capable of 
providing conclusive answers over divisive legal issues. Finally, despite the vast amount of 
published material on MERCOSUR law, there is virtually nothing available on MERCOSUR 
rules and disciplines on trade in services apart from some sectoral analysis of the transport and 
financial sector. 
Aproximaciön a la Anatomia del MERCOSUR Real', in Julio Berlinsky, at al. (ads) 15 Aifos de MERCOSUR, 
Comercio, Macroeconomia e Inversions Extranjeres (Siglo XXI Red MERCOSUR, Buenos Aires 2006), p 47. 
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Chapter I 
Challenges and Instruments for the 
Liberalisation of Trade in Services 
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This chapter examines the challenges and legal instruments for the liberalisation of trade in 
services. Based on the particularities of services and service transactions (Section A), the 
chapter identifies the sui generis character of barriers to trade in services (as opposed to those 
affecting trade in goods) (Sections B and C). It then compares the main instruments for the 
liberalisation of trade in services prescribed by the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
("GATS") and the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") (Section D), 
ending with some concluding remarks about the menu of options available for the 
liberalisation of trade in services in terms of legal instruments and degrees of liberalisation 
(Section E). 
A. Are Services "Special"? 
For a long time services failed to capture the interest of scholars. Classical economists such as 
Smith and Marx focused their attention on goods, dismissing the service sector on the 
assumption it was about "unproductive labour". ' Neoclassical economists such as Marshall 
regarded the differences between goods and services as trivial and lacking in analytical 
interest? This line of argumentation contends that both goods and services, constitute the 
output of processes of production aimed at creating economic value through the combination 
of capital and labour, and both, goods and services compete for the consumer's income. 3 
Therefore, there is no need for a specific economic model to analyse transactions in services. 
The fact that services must be consumed as they are produced, and thus cannot be put into 
stock is not, according to this view, a unique characteristic of services. Other goods such as 
perishable food share the same features. Therefore, from this perspective, services are 
considered simply as a special kind of good commonly referred to as `immaterial goods i4. 
It was not until the late seventies when Hill's seminal work challenged the predominant view 
arguing that services indeed have characteristics that differ fundamentally from goods, and 
thus belong to quite a different logical category, which deserves separate analytical attentions. 
He admits that both goods and services are transactable, namely, marketable outputs capable 
I See JOACHIM STIBORA & ALBERT DE VAAL, Services and Services Trade: A Theoretical Inquiry (Netherlands 
Economic Institute, Rotterdam 1995) p 15. 
2 See TP HILL, 'On Goods and Services', (1977) 23 The Review of Income and Wealth 315 p 315. 
3 See ANDRE SAPIR & CHANTALL WINTER, 'Services Trade', in David Greenaway & Alan Winters (eds) Surveys in 
International Trade (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford 1994), p 274. 
4 See Hill, ob cit, p 315. 
5 Ibid. 
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of being the subject of a transaction between two or more different economic units. 6 However, 
he contends that there are conceptual differences between transactions on goods and 
transactions on services related to what exactly is being transacted and how it is being 
transacted. 
For Hill a good is a `physical object which is appropriable and therefore, transferable between 
economic units'', while a service is "a change in the condition of a person, or of a good, 
belonging to some economic unit, which is brought about as the result of the activity of some 
other economic unit, with the prior agreement of the former person or economic unit". 8 Based 
on these definitions, Hill identifies the following differences between transactions on goods 
and transactions on services. 
First, the process of production of a good precedes that of consumption. As Hills puts it: "A 
good is produced within the supplier unit and initially is added to the supplier's stock. 
Subsequently, the good is acquired by the consumer in an exchange transaction which is 
totally separate from the process of production itself. "9 By contrast, services are consumed as 
they are produced in the sense that the change in the condition of the consumer unit must 
occur simultaneously with the production of that change by the supplier. 10 The service 
supplier works directly on the person (or on the goods belonging to the person) consuming the 
service. " Production and consumption cannot be separated from each other. 1213 The mere 
performance of some activity is not enough if the consumer unit is not affected in some way14. 
6 According to Hill, only items that can be produced by a different unit from that which consumes or uses it are 
transactable or marketable. He gives examples of non-transactable conditions or qualities such as good health, 
beauty or youth, and non-transactable activities such as eating, drinking or sleeping. As the author points out, this 
type of activities cannot be performed by one person on behalf of another, hence, there can be no specialized 
producer units, no industries and no markets. See Hill, ob cit, pp 316 and 326. 
7 lbid p 317. 
8 Ibid p 318. The author further distinguishes between services affecting goods: "... changes in the physical 
conditions of goods brought about by productive activities such as transportation, cleaning, repairs and 
decoration... " and services affecting persons: "... changes in the physical or mental conditions of persons brought 
about by activities such as transportation, surgery, communication, education or entertainment. " . 
9 Ibid p 320. 
10 Ibid p 337. 
11 It is worth differentiating between simultaneity of production and consumption and physical proximity of provider 
and consumer. Traditionally, simultaneity of production and consumption required the physical proximity of 
provider and consumer, like, say, in the case of a haircut or a surgery. Technological innovations are increasingly 
facilitating the physical separation between provider and consumer. But even when provider and consumer are 
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Second, the fact that services must be consumed as they are produced means that they cannot 
be put into stock by suppliers. 15 For instance, medical treatments cannot be stock piled in 
advance of the illness to which they relate. 16 This is not because services are highly perishable 
commodities. In fact, as Hill indicates, many services are permanent. " The non-storability of 
services has nothing to do with their physical durability. The non-storability of services is not 
a physical impossibility but a logical impossibility. Services cannot be put into stock because 
a stock of changes is a contradiction in terms. '8 
Third, a transaction on goods includes the transfer of the ownership of the good from one 
economic unit to the other-19 A transaction on services, by contrast, involves the performance 
of some activity by one economic unit to the benefit of the other. It does not involve a transfer 
of ownership. Services cannot be transferred from one economic unit to another. It is not 
possible for a person to exchange a change in her condition. Therefore, it is wrong to think of 
services as `immaterial goods' which can be traded on markets 2° Yet, services are 
transactable because they are produced by a different unit from that which consumes or uses 
it. 
By identifying particular characteristics of transactions on services, namely, simultaneity of 
production and consumption, non-storability and non-transferability, Hill's work made a 
physically separated, the simultaneity of production and consumption remains, for example, a concert in country A, 
broadcasted live in country B. 
12 Because of the simultaneity of production and consumption, Hill wams that special attention must be paid in 
order to avoid mistaking the process of production of the service (the activity which affects the person or goods 
belonging to some economic unit), with the output of that process (the change in the condition of the person or 
good affected). See Hill, ob cit, p 318. 
13 This characteristic has also been defined as 'joint production'. See Hoekman and Kostecki, BERNARD HOEKMAN 
& MICHEL KOSTECKI, The Political Economy of the World Trading System. From GATT to WTO (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2001), p 239. 
14 See Hill, ob cit, p 318. 
15 Ibid. p 337. 
16 Ibid. p 322. 
17 Hill strongly criticises the common tendency to regard services as highly perishable commodities. He argues that 
the benefits of certain services such as education or a surgery can last long after they are consumed. Ibid p 321. 
18 Ibid. p 337. 
19 Hill uses 'ownership' in a loose sense, including not only formal property rights but, more generally, the right to 
make use or dispose of the object. Ibid. p. 317. 
20 Ibid p 318. 
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significant contribution towards the identification of logically sound and generally applicable 
criteria to clearly demarcate goods from services. More importantly, Hill's work awakened the 
academia to the complexity underlying the nature of services and the need for developing a 
special analytical framework to analyse them, which served as a springboard for further 
research in this area. 2' 
Notwithstanding the value of Hill's contribution, there are still some grey areas for which it 
provides no clear answers. For instance, some services can be `disembodied'22 from the 
physical presence of the supplier and encapsulated in goods such as a CD holding the record 
of a live concert. Should these items be considered goods or services? Hill refrained from 
analysing these thorny cases and limited himself to stating that "... the classification of 
computer programming raises interesting problems". 3 This was in 1977, when the 
information technology revolution still was at its infancy. However, these borderline cases do 
not invalidate Hill's argument about the particularities of services and service transactions, 
which, as discussed below, have a direct impact on the structure, contestability and market 
failures affecting service markets, and on the way service suppliers compete against each 
other. 
Indeed, the structure of service markets is characterised by a high level of customisation in 
production and diversification in output. This is mainly the result of the simultaneity of 
production and consumption that characterises service transactions. Because of their direct 
contact with consumers, suppliers can tailor the service to the consumer's needs at a relatively 
lower cost than their counterparts in the goods sector. 24 Unsurprisingly, services are often non- 
standardised and the degree of product differentiation is high. 25 
The contestability of service markets, namely, the possibility of free entry and free exit of 
firms, is limited by various factors. First, the fact that the process of production is 
characterised by its flexibility and customisation links success in service industries to 
21 See Stibora and de Vaal, ob cit, p 18. 
22 See, J. BHAGWATI, 'Splintering and Disembodiment of Services and Developing Nations', (1984) 7 The World 
Economy 133. 
23 Hill refrained from analysing this thorny issue and limited himself to state that "... the classification of computer 
programming raises interesting problems". See Hill, ob cit, 330. This was in 1977, when the information technology 
revolution still was at its infancy. For a more recent analysis on the nature of 'information goods' see, Linders, 
2001, ob cit, pp 27 to 30. 
24 See Stibora and de Vaal, ob cit, pp 9 and 32. 
25 See Hoekman & Kostecki, ob cit, p 239. 
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experience, reputation and learning by doing. 26 It takes time for a firm to acquire any of these 
attributes, making it much more difficult for newcomers to entry the market. The absence of 
standardised methods means there is no shortcut to success. Secondly, economies of scale 
sometimes place incumbent service suppliers in a privileged position to compete against 
potential new entrants and can constitute an effective barrier to entry as well. Network 
externalities can also limit the contestability of service markets27. Finally, there are sectors 
where the existence of natural or public monopolies precludes the possibility of contestability 
altogether28. 
Service markets are particularly vulnerable to information asymmetries between supplier and 
consumer. The supplier has an information advantage over the consumer on the quality of the 
service to be provided because the latter cannot judge the quality of the service beforehand. 
Unlike goods, services cannot be tested before their purchase. Information asymmetries can 
generate problems of adverse selection - when low quality services drive out high quality 
services - and moral hazard - when the quality of services changes over time29. Information 
asymmetries also raise the importance of the firms' reputation on supplier - consumer 
relations. Good reputation affords market power to incumbent service suppliers and, as it has 
been noted, can become an entry barrier to potential new entrants 30 
In terms of competitiveness, non-price factors such as reputation and the capacity to meet 
consumers' specifications through flexible production and varied supply have a great 
influence on the way suppliers compete against each other. 3' As Linders puts it, the 
competitive weapon in service markets is differentiation and customisation. 32 The non- 
storability character of services prevents service suppliers from competing on the basis of the 
scale advantages of `just-in-time' stock-management techniques33 
26 See Stibora and de Vaal, ob cit, p 36. 
27 See Sapir and Winter, ob cit, p 277. Network services are those who depend on the use of networks who are not 
controlled by the service provider such as telecommunications, water distribution or electricity services. 
28 Examples of these are railroads and segments of telecommunications. See Sapir and Winter, ob cit, p 277. 
29 See Stibora and de Vaal, ob cit, p 32. 
30 Ibid p 36. 
31 Feketetuky wams that because competitiveness is based on innovation and variety, any international agreement 
with a narrow definition of services can have protectionist effects. See GEZA FExiZEKUTY, International Trade in 
Services. An Overview and Blueprint for Negotiations (American Enterprise Institute and Ballinger, Cambridge 
Massachusetts 1988), p 142. 
32 See Linders, ob cit, p 47. 
33 Ibid. p 39 
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In summary, service transactions exhibit certain sui generis characteristics that determine the 
stylised configurationTM, limited contestability, and vulnerability of service markets to 
information asymmetries, which calls for a degree of regulatory intervention more intense 
than that required for the orderly functioning of merchandise markets. 
B. Trade in Services35 
Trade in goods involves the movement of physical objects from the country of production to 
the country of consumption, without the need for the concomitant movement of the factors of 
production involved in their production or the consumer. 
Trade in services, by contrast, normally requires the cross-border movement of factors of 
production or consumers. 6 Thanks to technological progress, there is a growing number of 
services that can be provided from a distance, with the supplier residing in 'one country and 
the consumer residing in another. However, the majority of service transactions require the 
physical proximity between supplier and consumer, and consequently, the cross-border 
movement of factors of production or consumers. " According to the location of the supplier 
and consumer, and the degree and type of territorial presence which they have at the moment 
the service is delivered, it is possible to identify four modes of supply: 38 
1. Cross-border Trade 
34 Ibid. p 39. 
35 This thesis is focused on international economic transactions, therefore, when reference is made to trade, it 
must be understood as meaning transactions between parties located in different countri es, unless otherwise 
specified. 
36 KARL SAUVANT, 'The Tradability of Services', in PA Messerlin & Karl Sauvant (eds) The Uruguay Round: 
Services in the World Economy (World Bank, United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Washington, 
New York 1990). 
37 Quantitatively speaking, the proportion of international service transactions involving the movement of factors of 
production or consumers is larger than that corresponding to long-distance trade in services. In fact, the bulk of 
international service transactions are channelled through the commercial presence of the supplier in the 
consumer's country. The WTO Secretariat estimated trade flows in services for 2005 according to the mode of 
supply as follows: 35% cross-border supply, 10-15% consumption abroad, 50% commercial presence and 1-2% 
presence of natural persons. See International Trade Statistics 2005. 
38 See Guidelines For The Scheduling Of Specific Commitments Under The General Agreement On Trade In 
Services adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 23 March 2001 
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This mode of supply refers to services delivered by a supplier based in one country to a 
consumer based in another country. In this case there is no movement of factors of production 
to the consumer's place or movement of the consumer to the supplier's place. Precisely 
because trade occurs without the movement of factors of production or the consumer, services 
that can be traded in this way are referred to as "separated services" 39. 
Only those services that do not require the physical immediacy of supplier and consumer can 
be traded in this way. As said, thanks to recent technological innovations, the opportunities for 
providing cross-border trade have rocketed, particularly in relation to services based on digital 
information that can be transmitted `over the wire' like marketing intelligence services, call 
centres and some type of entertainment services. However, the use of this modality of trade is 
still modest compared to the supply of services via the commercial presence of the supplier in 
the territory where the consumer is located. Moreover, there are cases where despite the 
possibility to provide services from a distance, the supplier may still prefer to move to the 
place of the consumer to be better positioned to compete against local incumbents in a market 
where a firm's reputation and its capacity to customize the service to consumer's needs are of 
utmost importance. 
2. Consumer Movement 
This mode of supply involves the movement of the consumer to the country where the 
supplier is based for the consumption of the service. Classical examples are tourism, health or 
live entertainment services, where there is no other way for the transaction to take place than 
for the consumer to travel to the desired location. Activities such as ship repair abroad, where 
only the property of the consumer "moves", or is situated abroad, are also fall within this 
mode of supply. There are services that can be traded either by the supplier moving to the 
place of the consumer or by the consumer moving to the place of the supplier. That is the case, 
for instance, of educational services, when a lecturer travels to a foreign university to deliver a 
lecture or when students travel abroad to study in a foreign university. 
3. Commercial Presence 
39 See GARY P SAMPSON & RICHARD H SNAPE, 'Identifying the Issues in Trade in Services', (1985) 8 World 
Economy 171 p 172. 
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This mode of supply refers to services delivered by a supplier's permanent establishment in 
the country where the consumer is based. The commercial presence of the supplier involves 
the permanent transfer of the factors of production used to provide the service to the place of 
the consumer. Many service companies, typically in banking and telecommunications, choose 
to establish branches or subsidiaries abroad, not because of the technical impossibility of 
providing services through other modes, but because of other factors such as lower transaction 
costs, the need to provide customised services, marketing considerations, easier access to 
distribution networks and so forth. 
According to its ordinary meaning, international "trade" refers to arms-length transactions 
between parties established in different territories. However, some international trade 
agreements like the GATS chose to stretch the ordinary meaning of trade, giving to it an 
artificially broad scope of application so as to include transactions between consumers and 
foreign service suppliers who are permanently established in the "importing" country. This 
path was chosen as a second-best alternative to the impossibility to reach an agreement on the 
liberalisation of foreign direct investments. Other international agreements, by contrast, chose 
other alternatives. The EC treaty, for instance, limits the meaning of services to activities 
"temporarily" pursued in the State where the service is provided40, but it complements the 
freedom to provide services with other freedoms including, among others, the freedom of 
establishment. Similarly, the NAFTA restricts the concept of trade in services to cross-border 
trade but, at the same time, includes some disciplines on investment. 
4. Supplier Movement 
This mode of supply involves the temporary movement of the service supplier and the factors 
of production necessary for the provision of the service to the country where the consumer is 
based. This mode of supply covers natural persons who are themselves service suppliers, as 
well as natural persons who are employees of service suppliers. For instance, an orchestra that 
travels to perform a function abroad, or an employee of an IT consultancy that travels to the 
client's country to train its staff to operate new software. Although in this case the parties to 
the transaction are geographically located in the same place, it still is an international 
transaction in the sense that it takes place between residents of different countries. Services 
provided in this way are referred to as non-separated services, precisely because transactions 
can take place only with the movement of factors of production. 41 
40 EC Treaty, Art. 50. 
41 See Sampson and Snape, ob cit, p 179. 
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These four modes of supply of services are, by no means, mutually exclusive. It is possible, 
and indeed quite common, for a specific service to be provided by different modes of supply, 
either simultaneously or subsequently. 2 
C. Barriers to Trade in Services 
Trade may be hindered by a wide range of barriers of varying scope, purposes and sources. 
From "border" barriers, i. e. governmental measures aimed at preventing or making it more 
difficult for foreign goods or service suppliers to enter into the domestic market for 
protectionist purposes, to "within-the-border" barriers, namely, governmental measures that 
apply once foreign goods or services enter the domestic market and which deliberately43 or 
unintentionally' impair the competitive relationship between them and domestic goods or 
services. Not only governments, but also private actors can hinder the free movement of 
goods or services across national borders 45 Furthermore, general economic factors such as 
unstable macroeconomic conditions and volatile exchange rates can have serious trade 
restrictive effects. Arguably, any factor preventing goods and services from flowing across 
national borders in the same way as they flow within an internal market could be labelled as a 
trade barrier, although such a broad definition includes trade restrictions that would remain 
beyond the disciplining effect of international trade rules. 
"Trade barriers" can be provisionally defined as governmental measures46 and practices47 that 
restrict foreign goods' or services' access to domestic markets or impair the competitive 
42 For instance, an accountancy firm may set up a subsidiary abroad and provide services via its commercial 
presence on, the territory of its clients country. At the same time, staff from the headquarters may come to the 
subsidiary on a temporal basis to work on a specific project; some pieces of advice may be sent directly to clients 
from the firm's headquarters via fax or email; and every now and then, clients from the firm may also travel to the 
firm's headquarters for, say, training purposes. 
43 For instance, domestic regulations on taxes, transport, distribution or advertising that expressly discriminate 
against foreign goods or services. 
44 Even the mere duplication of home and host state regulations can have a discouraging effect on trade by 
increasing transaction costs. 
45 Business practices such as price-fixing, market sharing, concerted refusal to purchase, or exclusive dealing 
arrangements that make it difficult for new goods and services to 'break into' established business channels, 
restrain competition and thereby restrict trade. 
46 Governmental measures include any kind of laws, regulations or administrative decisions taken by government 
agencies or non-governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by government agencies. 
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relationship between foreign goods or services vis-ä-vis "like" domestic goods and services 
within the domestic market, irrespective of whether they have been adopted with a view to 
protect domestic industries or not 4849 
The main barriers to trade in goods (though by no means the only ones) are tariffs and quotas, 
i. e. measures imposed at the border for protectionist purposes, which are easily identifiable 
and easily removable, provided, of course, that there is political will to that effect. By contrast, 
services are not physical objects that cross State borders, and thus governments cannot rely on 
border measures such as tariffs and quotas to exert control over this type of trade. 
Consequently, barriers to trade in services are more disperse and less obvious. 50 
First, since trade in services may involve the cross-border movement of capital and persons, it 
becomes vulnerable to a wider range of governmental measures. For instance, services that 
require the temporary presence of natural persons on the place of the consumer can be 
affected by measures that restrict the entry and stay of foreigners such as visas and work 
permits. Likewise, services that require the physical proximity of supplier and consumer are 
particularly vulnerable to regulations that restrict the ability of foreign suppliers' right to 
47 Governmental practices refer to the way domestic regulations are interpreted, applied and enforced by the 
competent authorities. 
48 This definition is for introductory purposes only. Legal definitions of terms such as "barrier", "restriction" or 
"obstacle" to trade may vary from one trade agreement to another, depending not only on the treaty provisions 
themselves but also on the way such provisions are construed by adjudicative bodies. 
49 There are many official reports, regularly updated, which provide a useful insight on the variety of governmental 
measures and practices with trade-restrictive effects. See, e. g., WTO Trade Policy Reviews at 
http: /lwww. wto. org/english/tratop_ettpr_e/tpr_e. htm. Large trading nations also conduct regular investigations on 
trade barriers applied by their trading partners to their exports; Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
2005 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers (Mar. 30,2005), 
http: //www. ustr. govIDocument Library/Reports_Publicabons/2005/2005_NTE-Report/Secton_index. html? ht=. 
For the E. U.; European Commission, European Community Report on United States Barriers to Trade and 
Investment 2005, http: //trade-info. cec. eu. inUdoclib/docs/2006. 
50 For studies on barriers on trade in services see Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the State of the Internal Market for Services COM (2002) 441 final; CH FINDLAY &T WARREN, 
Impediments to Trade in Services: Measurements and Policy Implications (Routledge, London 2000); BERNARD 
HOEKMAN & CARLOS A PRIMO BRAGA, Protection and Trade in Services: A Survey (The World Bank, Washington 
D. C. 1997); BERNARD HOEKMAN, 'Conceptual and Political Economy Issues in Liberalizing International 
Transactions in Services', in Alan Deardorff & Robert M Stem (eds) Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global 
Trading System (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1994); UNCTAD & WORLD BANK, Liberalizing 
International Transactions in Services: A Handbook (United Nations, New York 1994). 
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establish or to invest in local facilities and to operate such facilities. 51 Services that require the 
movement of capital such as Financial Services can be affected by capital controls such as 
taxes to the inflow or outflow of short term investments, multiple exchange rate systems or 
caps on capital transfers. 
As a result, it is necessary for trade disciplines to have a broad scope of application, with a 
view to tackling any kind of measure that may affect trade in services. This includes not only 
overt quantitative restrictions or discriminatory measures against foreign services, but also 
measures affecting the right of foreign service suppliers to provide services on a temporal or 
permanent basis in the territory of the consumer and, more generally, measures that may affect 
the cross border movement of persons, capital and information. Considering the close link 
between the service and the service supplier, it is necessary for the protection against 
discrimination to cover not only the service itself but also the service supplier. That is not the 
case for trade in goods, where it suffices to protect the imported good against discrimination 
but not the producer or the factors of production. 
Secondly, service markets are more regulated than merchandise markets and therefore, trade 
in services is more vulnerable to the so-called "dual regulatory burden problem" whereby 
foreign suppliers are required to satisfy both home and host state regulatory requirements. 
Indeed, when a supplier licensed to operate in one country seeks to operate in another country, 
a regulatory conflict between home state and host state regulations on service suppliers is 
likely to occur. As Wolf puts it, "markets want to be cosmopolitan; States do not". 52 
Take for instance a financial undertaking. To be able to operate in any specific market it must 
first obtain an authorisation from the competent regulator, which is conditioned to the 
fulfilment of an extensive list of requirements including, inter alia, the adoption of a special 
type of legal entity, prudential requirements and moral and technical requirements of the 
firm's directors. The firm must fulfil those requirements in all the jurisdictions it wishes to 
operate. Despite not being informed by a protectionist purpose, the mere duplication of 
requirements and the corresponding cost faced by firms forced to satisfy them substantially 
increases the transaction costs of supplying services to foreign markets and discourages trade. 
53 Consumer protection rules, which tend to reflect local preferences influenced by social, 
51 For example, maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or on the total value of individual or aggregate 
foreign investment or requirements to set up joint ventures with domestic companies to operate. 
52 See MARTIN WOLF, Why Globalization Works (Yale University Press, New York and London 2005), p 78. 
53 Not surprisingly, a survey among service industry operators on the most frequent barriers to trade in services 
carried out by Price Waterhouse, identified as one of the most relevant barriers non-discriminatory regulations with 
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cultural and religious values, touch upon a wide range of issues from selling techniques to 
advertising and disclosure requirements. also contribute to the regulatory conflict problem, 
increasing transaction costs and discouraging trade. 
Thirdly, the higher degree of state intervention on service markets and, in particular, the 
intense and ongoing relationship between the regulator and industry operators increases the 
risk of discriminatory governmental practices against foreign suppliers. Practices such as 54 
discriminatory delays in approving licenses or discriminatory enforcement of regulations 
against foreign suppliers can result in a major obstacle to trade in services. When the foreign 
supplier operates in competition with state owned companies the risk of discriminatory 
practices such as predatory pricing55, abuse of dominant position and discriminatory 
restriction on the access to public transmission and distribution networks is even higher. 
Accordingly, trade liberalisation policies need to be as comprehensive as possible, concerned 
not only with the dismantlement of overt protectionist rules but also considering the impact of 
the wider system for the governance of service markets on trade, in particular, the degree of 
transparency, impartiality and probity of the administration. 
Finally, many service sectors touch upon sensitive public policy interests such as universal 
access to public utilities, cultural diversity, freedom of information and so forth. The 
prospects of deregulation and unfettered opening of these sectors to foreign competition 
generates fears and worries about the impact of liberalisation on the government's capacity to 
protect those vital public interests. As a result, the liberalisation of trade in services usually 
faces stronger political resistance than the liberalisation of trade in goods. sb Curbing the strong 
protectionist interests that resist the liberalisation of trade in services requires an extensive and 
participative debate about its opportunity, scope and pace, with a view to build a broad and 
discriminatory effects, i. e. that place a far greater burden on foreign suppliers than on domestic suppliers (e. g. a 
regulation that freezes the total number of companies allowed to sell securities could be highly discriminatory for 
foreign companies if they were largely excluded in the past). See Feketekuty, Geza, ob cit, p 138. 
54 In many cases the discriminatory treatment is not written into the published laws and regulations but is a matter 
of official practice, "the way things have always been done", "general bureaucratic tendency not to approve new 
activities", etc. See Price Waterhouse's survey cited by Feketekuty, Geza, ob cit, p 141. 
55 Price control systems over public utilities such as water supply, sanitation, public transport and basic 
communication services can easily degenerate into a mechanism for abuse and discrimination against the foreign 
supplier. 
56 On the particularities of the political economy associated with trade in services see Kelsey, Jane Serving Whose 
Interests? The Political Economy of Trade in Services Agreements (Routiedge-Cavendish, 2008) and Hoekman 
and Kostecki, ob cit, p 248. 
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solid political consensus about the benefits of the liberalisation process, a debate which cannot 
be confined to diplomatic forums. 
In summary, like trade in goods, trade in services may be obstructed by overtly discriminatory 
measures against foreign services and service providers, but it may also be hindered by 
measures affecting the cross border movement of capital, persons and information. Being 
essentially regulatory in character, barriers to trade in services are less obvious and more 
dispersed than barriers to trade in goods. The highly regulated character of service markets 
makes trade in services particularly vulnerable to the dual regulatory burden problem and the 
risk of discriminatory regulatory practices. 
To tackle the regulatory character of services' barriers, trade agreements should include not 
only disciplines compelling State Parties to accord foreign services and service suppliers 
minimum standards of treatment (e. g. Market Access and National Treatment standards), but 
also disciplines compelling them to regulate in a "trade friendly" way (e. g. standards of 
proportionality, transparency, reasonableness, objectivity, impartiality, due process), 
understanding regulation in its broadest sense (i. e. adoption, implementation and enforcement 
of rules). In other words, for the effective liberalisation of trade in services it is not enough to 
curb discrimination. It is equally necessary to secure a regulatory environment where 
governmental rules and practices are open, transparent, impartial and no more trade restrictive 
than necessary. 
In the light of the particular vulnerability of trade in services to the dual regulatory burden 
problem and the high chances of regulatory conflicts, trade agreements seeking to achieve a 
higher degree of liberalisation, should include mechanisms for the approximation of domestic 
laws. The trade restrictive effects of regulatory diversity can be addressed in various forms 
and degrees including, inter alia, harmonisation of disparate domestic rules, establishing 
systems for the mutual recognition of domestic standards, qualifications or licenses17 or 
setting up co-operation mechanisms between domestic regulators. The more sophisticated the 
mechanisms available, the higher the chances of ensuring convergence between highly 
regulated markets. 
57 It must be borne in mind that it is much more demanding to establish mutual recognition agreements for services 
than for goods. In the latter case, the host state must only recognise that the good has been lawfully produced, 
labelled and marketed in the home state, whereas in the former case, the host state not only must recognize that 
the service provider was lawfully authorized to operate. It must also trust on the home state country's supervision 
of the service provider on an ongoing basis. 
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Finally, a broad political consensus on the opportunity, scope and pace of the liberalisation 
process should be carefully crafted to avoid protectionist interests from derailing the 
liberalisation process. 
D. Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade in Services: A 
Comparison between GATS and the EC Treaty 
Inter-State co-operation for advancing economic integration and, in particular, the integration 
of service markets, can be channelled through different types of legal frameworks, more or 
less deferential to domestic sovereignty. 58 This section briefly describes the main trade 
disciplines, policy making instruments and enforcement mechanisms of two agreements from 
which MERCOSUR has borrowed some features: the GATS and the EC Treaty. 
It is not difficult to appreciate the marked differences that exist between, on the one hand, a 
multilateral framework of principles and rules pursuing the liberalisation of trade in services 
at a global scale and, on the other hand, a regional agreement between a reduced number of 
like-minded neighbouring countries seeking to establish an ever closer union among its 
people, involving, among other things "... an internal market characterised by the abolition, as 
between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and 
capital" 59 Differences notwithstanding, both agreements seek to facilitate trade in services 
across national borders, albeit relying on quite different institutional and legal mechanisms. " 
58 For comparative studies of agreements and policies aimed at the liberalisation of service markets see, inter alia, 
BERNARD HOEKMAN & PIERRE SAuvE, Liberalizing Trade in Services World Bank Discussion Papers (The World 
Bank, Washington D. C. 1994); AADITIYA MATTOO & FINK CORNSTEN, 'Regional Agreements and Trade in Services: 
Policy Issues', (2004) 19 Journal of Economic Integration 742; SHERRY STEPHENSON & JAVIER PRIETO, 'Evaluating 
Approaches to the Liberalization of Trade in Services: Insights from Regional Experience in the Americas', in 
Trade Policy for Developing Countries in a Global Economy: A Handbook (The World Bank, Washington D. C. 
2001); and SHERRY M STEPHENSON, 'A Comparison of Existing Services Trade Arrangements within APEC', in 
Christopher Findlay & Tony Warren (eds) Impediments to Trade in Services Measurements and Policy Implications 
(Routledge, London 2000) 
59 EC Treaty, Art. 3(c). 
60 For comparisons between GATS and EC Treaty see: PIET EECKHOUT, 'The General Agreement on Trade in 
Services and Community Law', in SV Konstadinidis (ed) The Legal Regulation of the European Community's 
External Relations after the Completion of the Internal Market (Aldershot, Brookfield 1996); PIET EECKHOUT, 
'Constitutional Concepts for Free Trade in Services', in Gräinne de Burca & Joanne Scott (eds) The EU and the 
INTO, Legal and Constitutional Aspects (Hart, Oxford 2001); and GIANLUIGY CAMPOGRANDE & CLAUS-DIETER 
EHLERMANN, 'Rules on Services in the EEC: A Model for Negotiating World-Wide Rules? ' (1987) who discuss 
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At the risk of gross over-simplification, they could be considered as the opposite ends of a 
wide spectrum of possible agreements that sovereign States can enter into with a view to 
liberalise trade, ranging from those characterised by predominantly intergovernmental features 
to those characterised by predominantly supranational features. 61 
Intergovernmentalism and supranationalism are terms hereby used in a loose sense to describe 
different legal frameworks established by sovereign States for pursuing and managing 
economic integration 62 It should be emphasised that both terms will be used to refer to 
agreements aimed at governing relations between sovereign States 63 For instance, in terms of 
policy-making instruments, trade agreements may provide for the establishment of permanent 
bodies endowed with autonomous rule-making power, and if so, their composition, regulatory 
competence and decision making system can be defined in different ways. M In terms of 
whether Community law could serve as a model for a multilateral agreement on trade in services. This paper was 
published while the GATS was being negotiated. 
61 For a brief comparison between intergovernmental and supranational institutional arrangements of international 
organizations see JuºaA SNELL, Goods and Services in EC Law. A Study of the Relationship Between the 
Freedoms (Oxford University Press, New York 2002), p 35. 
62 The specialised literature sometimes uses other terminology to refer to the various legal frameworks established 
by sovereign States for pursuing and managing economic integration. For instance, Cremona refers to a 
continuum between contractual and constitutional models of integration. She describes the contractual model 
(e. g. NAFTA, EFTA) as one which provides for the establishment of a free trade area and operates on the basis of 
treaty-based obligations with minimal institutional structure. Both cooperation and enforcement are 
intergovernmental in character. Contractual arrangements do not seek to create their own sui generis legal order 
but operate within the broader framework of international law. The constitutional model (e. g. EC), by contrast, 
impacts directly on the legal orders of its Member States (primacy of the community legal order over the laws of 
the member states and direct effect of a whole series of provisions that are applicable to their nationals and the 
member states themselves) and thus needs to provide a constitutional framework for law-making and law 
enforcement. See MARISE CREMONA, 'Regional Integration and the Rule of Law: Some Issues and Options', in 
Robert Devlin & Anthony Estevadeordal (eds) Bridges for Development: Policies and Institutions for Trade and 
Integration (IADB, Washington, D. C. 2003), p 146. 
63 Even under a predominately supranational framework such as that laid down by EC Community law, Member 
States continue to satisfy the established criteria for recognition as independent sovereign States and to be 
recognized as such by the rest of the world. See EiLEEN DENZA, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European 
Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford New York 2002), p 6. 
64 At one end of the spectrum there are intergovernmental bodies that consist only of government officials 
appointed by national administrations, with limited regulatory competence and who adopt decisions by consensus. 
At the other end of the spectrum, trade agreements may provide for a more complex web of supranational 
institutions including an independent bureaucracy representing the interests of the integration process and 
entrusted with the right of legislative initiative, a parliamentary institution with members directly appointed by State 
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enforcement, at one extreme, trade agreements may merely rely on diplomatic mechanisms for 
the settlement of disputes or, at best, provide for an arbitration procedure for sorting out 
disputes between States. At the other extreme, trade agreements may stipulate highly 
sophisticated and strictly law-based mechanisms for the interpretation of treaty provisions and 
the enforcement of obligations that stem from them. They may provide for the establishment 
of a supranational court with exclusive competence over the interpretation and application of 
the treaty, whose rulings are binding for domestic courts. The standing before the 
supranational court can be open not just to State Parties but also to private persons. Moreover, 
in certain circumstances private persons may also seek protection from domestic courts of 
rights conferred on them by the treaty. The enforcement machinery may also include an 
independent bureaucracy with power to bring actions against State Parties for failure to 
comply with their international commitments. 
The choice for a specific legal framework to govern trade relations between State Parties will 
depend on the level of economic integration State Parties may want to achieve and the degree 
of control they may want to have over the scope and pace of the integration process. In some 
circumstances, State Parties may only be willing to remove overt discriminatory measures to 
trade and, for that purpose, restrict co-operation within intergovernmental channels. In other 
circumstances, State Parties may wish to achieve a deeper level of integration and thus they 
may be prepared to go beyond intergovernmental co-operation, setting up a much more 
intrusive legal framework capable of providing rights and obligations directly to private 
parties. The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the trade disciplines, policy- 
making instruments and enforcement mechanisms laid down by the GATS and the EC Treaty. 
1. GATS 
The CATS is an agreement that regulates the relations between sovereign States exclusively 
on a basis of public international law. It aims to reduce barriers and promote the expansion of 
trade in services under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalisation subject to the 
need not to undermine the development of developing countries nor the right of Members to 
regulate in order to meet national policy objectives 65 The agreement expressly refrains from 
Parties' citizens, consultative bodies representing the interests of the private sector and so forth. Trade 
agreements may entrust these bodies with a wider regulatory competence, enabling them to adopt decisions by 
qualified majority. 
65 See GATS, preamble, Art. XIX. I which refers to the objective of achieving a progressively higher level of 
liberalisation and Art. XIX. 2 which subjects the process of liberalisation to the need to pay due respect for national 
policy objectives and the level of development of individual Members. 
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limiting a Member's autonomy to formulate and implement their domestic policy objectives. 
It does not limit Members' sovereign rights to formulate economic policies (other than by 
prohibiting discrimination against foreign service providers), because Members do not seek to 
approximate them. As put it by one commentator, the GATS is a "negative integration 
contract", where Members' obligations boil down to the fundamental principle not to 
discriminate against each other. 66 In his view, the maximum promise to trading partners is 
national treatment (non-discrimination), namely, a relative standard of treatment which by 
definition pre-supposes the unilateral formulation of policies. 67 
1.1 Trade disciplines 
GATS' general obligations, informed by the principle of non-discrimination, require Members 
to accord services and service suppliers of any other Member: a) most favoured nation 
treatment, i. e. treatment no less favourable than that accorded to "like" services and service 
suppliers of any other country (unless otherwise specified in a list of exemptions)68; b) market 
access treatment, which consists on refraining from maintaining any of the measures listed in 
a closed list of quantitative restrictions in accordance with the terms, limitations and 
conditions specified in its Schedule69; c) national treatment, i. e. treatment no less favourable 
than that accorded to is own "like" services and service suppliers in accordance with the 
conditions and qualifications specified in its Schedule70. 
The Agreement's scope of application is defined widely. It applies to any measure adopted by 
Members affecting trade in services. "Measures" include "any measure by a Member, whether 
in the form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other 
form""; "services" refers to "any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise 
of governmental authoritys72 and "trade in services" includes the supply of a service through 
any of four possible modes of supply (cross-border trade, consumer movement, commercial 
presence and supplier movement)73. The term "affect" implies a degree of connexion between 
66 See PETROS C MAVROIDIS, 'Highway XVI Re-visited: the Road from Non-discrimination to Market Access in 
GATS', (2007) 6 World Trade Review 1p 11. 
67 Ibid. p 12. 
68 GATS, Art. II. 
69 Ibid. art XVI. 
TO Ibid. Art. XVII. 
71 Ibid. Art. XXVIII (a). 
72 Ibid. Art. 1.3(b). 
73 Ibid. Art. 1.2. 
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the measure and the supply of a service which has been interpreted broadly, without a priori 
exclusions. 74 According to the Appellate Body ("AB"), this threshold may be satisfied even 
by measures which are not aimed at regulating or governing the supply of a service but 
nonetheless "have an effect on" it. 75 To check the effect it is necessary to examine all the 
relevant facts, i. e. who supplies the service, how such services are supplied, etc. 76 
By contrast, the scope of application of the three main general obligations is subject to 
important limitations. The GATS does not establish an across-the board liberalisation of trade 
in services from the outset. It rather enables Members to choose the scope and pace of the 
opening of their domestic service markets to foreign competition in accordance with their own 
considerations. Members may provisionally maintain measures inconsistent with the MFN 
standard, provided they are included in a list of exemptions" and subject to negotiation78. In 
addition, each Member owes the market access and national treatment standards of treatment 
to services and service suppliers from other Members only in sectors where it has made 
specific commitments and subject to the conditions and qualifications specified in its 
schedule. 79 
At the same time, the agreement compels Members to enter into successive rounds of 
multilateral negotiations, with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of 
liberalisation. 8° Thus, the rounds of negotiation of specific commitments become a vital 
instrument in pursuing the liberalisation of trade in services. Such negotiations "must be 
aimed at promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis and 
securing an overall balance of rights and obligations, while giving due respect to national 
policy objectives". " 
74 Panel Report, US - Gambling, para. 6.250 - 6.254. 
75 Appellate Body Report, EC-Bananas III, para. 220. 
76 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Autos, para. 165-167. 
n GATS, Art. 11.2. 
78 Ibid. Annex on Art. ll Exemptions. 
n Ibid. Arts. XVI. 2 and XVII. 1. 
80 Ibid. Art. XIX. 1. 
81 Ibid. Preamble and Arts. XIX. 1 and XIX. 2. 
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Although the case law on GATS is still at its infant stage82, the available evidence points to a 
predominantly "trade-friendly" interpretation of the main obligations and its exceptions by 
both panels and the Appellate Body. As shown below, this is reflected by adjudicative bodies' 
wide interpretation of the MFN and National Treatment standards (including the banning of 
both de iure and de facto discriminatory conduct), the narrow interpretation of the 
agreement's exceptions and the strict limitations imposed on Members seeking to invoke 
them. 
Under Art II (MFN), the obligation to provide "treatment no less favourable" is formulated in 
a more succinct way than under Art XVII (National Treatment). In the latter case, the 
provision expressly states that the standard may be breached by according to foreign suppliers 
either formally identical or formally different treatment to that accorded to domestic 
suppliers. " In the former case, however, no reference is made to this distinction. This has not 
prevented the Appellate Body from holding that the obligation imposed by Art II is 
unqualified, meaning that it includes the prohibition of both de iure and de facto 
discrimination. 84 The prohibition by Article XVII of de lure and de facto discrimination was 
confirmed in Canada-Autos. On that occasion, the Appellate Body held that even if the 
measure itself does not make distinctions on grounds of origin but, nonetheless modifies the 
conditions of competition in favour of domestic suppliers, it is bound to have a discriminatory 
effect against the foreign service suppliers. 85 
The application of the `aims and effect' test, which could have otherwise justified 
discriminatory measures pursuing legitimate policies which are not inherently discriminatory, 
was expressly rejected in EC - Bananas 86 The Appellate Body's refusal to consider the 
possible purposes of a measure (no matter how noble the purpose could be), focusing instead 
on the analysis of the measure's effect on the conditions of competition between foreign and 
domestic suppliers, marks a tough stance in favour of free trade. This interpretation leaves no 
hope to those claiming for a more lenient approach to discriminatory measures that pursue 
legitimate policy objectives rather than being merely aimed at protecting the domestic 
industry. 
82 For a comprehensive analysis of early cases on GATS see WERNER ZDOUC, 'EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PRACTICE RELATING TO THE GATS', (1999) 2 Journal of International 
Economic Law 295. 
83 GATS, Art. XVII. 2. 
84 Appellate Body Report, EC-Bananas 111, para. 233-234. 
85 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Autos, para. 10.307 - 10.308. 
86 Appellate Body Report, EC-Bananas III, para. 240-241. 
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Perhaps the most striking ruling adopted so far on CATS' trade disciplines has been that on 
United States measures affecting the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services, in 
which the Appellate Body upheld the panel finding that by maintaining the Wire Act, the 
Travel Act, and the Illegal Gambling Business Act, the US violated GATS Articles XVI. 1 and 
XVI. 2 (a) and (c). 87 The measures prohibited the supply of internet gambling in a non- 
discriminatory manner: neither domestic nor foreign suppliers were allowed to supply such 
services. At the same time, the US schedule included specific market access commitments on 
gambling and betting services, without qualifying such commitments in any way. 
Antigua and Barbuda challenged the measures arguing they amounted to a "total prohibition" 
on the supply of this type of service, equivalent to a zero number of service suppliers and a 
zero number of service operations, i. e. quantitative restrictions expressly forbidden by Art 
XVI. 88 The ruling accepted the plaintiffs argument that the measures were in violation of art 
XVI even though they were applied in a non-discriminatory manner. In a surprising move, the 
interpretation stretched the scope of application of Art XVI to the limit in order to cast its net 
over both discriminatory and non-discriminatory market access restrictions. Such an 
interpretation marked a difference with the traditional non-discrimination assessment of 
domestic measures' consistency with GATS/GATT standards, resulting in a severe 
curtailment of a States' regulatory autonomy. 89 According to this ruling, a State could 
potentially be proscribed from unilaterally limiting the total number of, say, telecom operators 
(domestic and foreign) allowed to operate in its territory, or the total number of supermarkets 
(domestic and foreign) allowed to be located within a specified area. Not surprisingly, the 
ruling was severely criticised on grounds of being in blatant contradiction with the intent of 
the founding fathers, the letter and the spirit of the GATS, an agreement which presupposes 
the unilateral definition of policies 90 
87 Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling. 
88 GATS, Arts. XVI. 2a and XVI. 2 c. 
89 This ruling illustrates the strategic role that adjudicative bodies can play in a liberalisation process. A role 
sometimes characterised by a dynamic and independent interpretation of trade disciplines, which does not 
necessarily adopts decisions instrumental to the interests of the political establishment. 
90 See, in particular Mavroidis, ob cit,. But also see FEDERICO ORTINO, 'Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate 
Body Report on US-Gambling: A Critique, (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 117; JooST PAUWELYN, 
'Rien ne va plus? Distinguishing Domestic Regulation from Market Access in GATT and GATS', (2005) 4 World 
Trade Review 131 and MARKUS KRAJEwSKY, 'Playing by the Rules? ' (2005) 32 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration 417. 
44 
The GATS recognises the existence of a closed number of overriding considerations that may 
be invoked to justify conducts contrary to its provisions, which provide Members with an 
escape valve in those exceptional circumstances where they face no alternative but to break 
their international commitments 91 As said, these exceptions have been interpreted narrowly, 
requiring the breaching Member to apply them in a strict non-discriminatory fashion. In US - 
Gambling, the Appellate Body acknowledged that the challenged measures are `necessary to 
protect public morals or to maintain public order"' under Article XN(a), but found that the US 
did not demonstrate that-in the light of the existence of the [Interstate Horseracing Act]-the 
measures were applied consistently with the requirements of Article XN's chapeau. 
According to the AB, the way in which the US applied the measures amounted to unjustified 
discrimination between domestic and foreign service suppliers. 92 
1.2 Policy malting instruments 
As a "negative integration contract"93, the GATS does not seek to approximate Members' 
economic policies and, accordingly, it does not require the transfer of regulatory competence 
from domestic to supranational institutions. It nevertheless provides for an institutional 
framework responsible for overseeing the functioning of the agreement, consisting of the 
Council for Trade in Services and its subsidiary bodies. 9' 
The Council for Trade in Services is a strictly intergovernmental body, its membership is open 
only to Members' representatives and its decisions are adopted by consensus 95 It has very 
limited functions, mainly intended to facilitate the operation of the agreement, such as 
receiving information by Members about measures taken by any other Member, which are 
considered to affect the operation of the agreement%; overseeing regional trade agreements 
aimed at liberalising trade in services97 or at establishing mutual recognition systems of 
91 GATS, Arts. XIV and XIV bis. 
92 Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling, para. 292,339,352,354 and 371. 
93 See Mavroidis, ob cit. p 11. 
94 GATS, Art. XXIV. So far the Council for Trade in Services has established the following subsidiary bodies: 
Working Party on GATS Rules and Working Party on Domestic Regulation. 
95 Agreement Establishing the WTO, Arts. IV. 5 and IX. 1 
96 GATS, Art. 111.5. 
97 Ibid. Art. V. 7(a). 
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education, licenses and experiences98; and establishing guidelines and procedures for the 
negotiation of specific commitments". 
One particular task assigned by the WTO Agreement to the Council is to develop disciplines 
on domestic regulation relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical 
standards and licensing requirements with a view to ensuring that such requirements do not 
constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services, namely, that they are based on objective 
and transparent criteria, they are not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of 
the service and, in the case of licensing procedures, they are not in themselves a restriction on 
the supply of the service. 100 In compliance with this mandate, the Council set up a Working 
Party on Professional Services (now Working Party on Domestic Regulations), which was 
originally focused on the development of disciplines in the field of professional services'°', 
but now is concerned with the development of generally applicable disciplines. So far, 
detailed disciplines have been developed for the accountancy sector. 102 
It is important to stress that the legislative capacity of the Working Party on Domestic 
Regulation is strictly limited. It has no competence whatsoever to harmonise Members' 
domestic regulations on qualifications, technical standards or licensing requirements. The 
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector apply the principles on 
domestic regulation laid down by Article VI. 4 to measures that could affect trade in 
Accountancy services. For instance, they specify what should be understood as a legitimate 
objective to introduce trade restrictive regulations (e. g. protection of consumers, quality of the 
service, protection of professional competence and integrity) and compel Members, inter alia, 
to ensure that licensing requirements and licensing procedures are pre-established, publicly 
available and objective. But the Disciplines do not prescribe harmonised standards for the 
accountancy sector nor do they provide for the review of national standards. They say nothing 
about the level of professional qualifications or standards for accountants except that they 
should not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to achieve the legitimate objective they 
seek. In addition, only those countries that have made specific commitments in the 
accountancy sector are bound by these disciplines. 103 
98 Ibid. VII. 4. 
99 Ibid. XIX. 3. 
100 Ibid. VI. 4. 
101 See Dec on Professional Services adopted by the Council on Trade in Services on 1 March 1995, Doc S/L/3. 
102 See Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, (SIWPPS/W/21) approved on 30/11/98. 
103 See AADITYA MATrOO, SAUVE, PIERRE, Domestic Regulation & Service Trade Liberalization (World Bank and 
Oxford University Press, Washington, D. C. 2003) p 3. 
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1.3 Enforcement 
The mechanism for the enforcement of the rights and obligations of Members under the 
GATS is limited to a State to State dispute settlement system operated by ad hoc panels and a 
permanent Appellate Body. 104 Although more rule-oriented than its GATT predecessor, the 
procedure for the settlement of disputes provided for by the Dispute Settlement of 
Understanding remains heavily reliant on diplomatic negotiations. Its key objective is to 
restore the overall balance of concessions achieved through negotiations rather than ensure the 
observance of the law. Remedies are limited to retaliatory measures consisting on the 
withdrawal of concessions, rather than on mechanisms aimed at forcing the wrongdoer to 
comply with treaty obligations. It has been suggested that this kind of system allows a WTO 
Member to "buy" unlawful behaviour provided it is prepared to withstand retaliatory 
measures proportionate to the nullification or impairment of concessions caused by its 
conduct to other members. 105 In practice, it is difficult for Members, particularly for 
developing and least developed countries, to enforce their rights under the agreement. The few 
cases that have been adjudicated show, however, that domestic measures have been subject to 
careful scrutinisation to determine their consistency with trade disciplines. 
In summary, the GATS pursues a gradual liberalisation of trade in services through the 
negotiation of specific commitments not to discriminate against foreign services and service 
suppliers on specific service sectors, without interfering with State Parties' autonomy to 
formulate their own public policies. The agreement provides for a basic institutional 
framework of intergovernmental character, responsible for overseeing the implementation of 
the agreement and the development of common disciplines on domestic regulation but without 
any competence for the development of common policies on specific service sectors or on any 
other area affecting trade in services. Finally, the agreement relies on a State to State dispute 
settlement system for the enforcement of rights and obligations stemming from the agreement. 
2. EC Treaty 
104 GATS, Art. XXIII, which refers to the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
105 See JUDITH HIPPLER BELLO, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More', (1996) 90 American 
Journal of International Law 416. Bello's opinion was challenged by Jackson, in JOHN JACKSON, The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Understanding - Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation', (1997) 91 American Journal of 
International Law 60. 
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The EC Treaty and the subordinate legislation adopted therein regulate the relations between 
sovereign States based on Community law. 106 The legal framework established by Member 
States for pursuing and managing economic integration is much wider and deeper than that 
prescribed by the WTO, including a common market, an economic and monetary union and 
the implementation of common economic policies in a broad range of spheres such as 
commerce, agriculture, fisheries, transport and competition. Naturally, the width and depth of 
the legal framework for integration comes along with much more demanding obligations upon 
Members that go far beyond the duty not to discriminate against each other. Under the EC 
Treaty, Members agreed to limit their sovereign rights and transfer a significant portion of 
their regulatory competence on various policy areas to supranational institutions. 
2.1 Trade disciplines 
The Treaty prohibits restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the Community in 
respect of nationals of Member States who are established in a Member State other than that 
of the person for whom the services are intended. 107 The treaty stipulates that "services" 
encompasses activities normally provided for remuneration in so far as they are not governed 
by the provisions relating to the other freedoms (goods, capital and persons). '08 The case law 
has identified a wide range of activities as services, including inter alia broadcasting109, 
construction10, education" ` and gambling services' 12. There are no a priori exclusions other 
than activities connected with the exercise of official authority 13 and Transport Services 14. 
Unlike the GATS' disciplines, the prohibition of restrictions on the freedom to provide 
services applies across the board, and thus, there is no need for rounds of negotiations of 
106 For the differences and similarities between public international law and Community law see Denza, Eileen, ob 
cit, pp 5-31. 
107 EC Treaty, Art. 49. 
108 Ibid. Art. 50. 
109 Case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409, Case 52/79 Procureur du Roi v Debauve [1980] ECR 833, Case 352/85 
Bond van Adverteerders & others v The Netherlands [1988] ECR 2085, Case C-288/89 Stiching Collectieve 
Antennevoorsiening Gouda v Commissariaat voorde Media [1991] ECR 1-8339. 
110 Case 76/81 SA Transporoute at travaux v Minister of Public Works [1974] ECR 409; Case C-113/89 Rush 
Portugesa v Office National d'Immigration [1990] ECR 1-1417, Case C-43/93 Vander Elst v Office des Migrations 
Internationales [1994] ECR 1-3803. 
ill Case 263/86 Belgium v Humbel [1988] ECR 5365, Case C-109-92 Wirth v Landeshauptsadt Hannover [1993] 
ECR 3305. 
112 Case C-275/92 HM Customs and Excise v Schindler [1994] ECR 1-8419. 
113 EC Treaty, Art. 45. 
114 Ibid. Art. 51. 
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specific commitments aimed at a progressive sector by sector liberalisation. Member States 
cannot limit the prohibition's scope of application to specific sectors nor subject it to specific 
conditions or limitations. 
The freedom to provide services covers the right of the supplier to temporarily pursue his 
activity in the consumer's State"s, the right of the consumer to go to the supplier's State' 16 
and the cross-border provision of services through technological means without the movement 
neither of the supplier or the consumer"7. Unlike the CATS' trade disciplines, the freedom to 
provide services does not cover the supplier's right to supply the service through a permanent 
commercial presence in the consumer's State. 1'8 However, the Treaty includes other freedoms 
that protect the right of nationals of Member States to work19 or set-up agencies, branches or 
subsidiaries in the territory of any Member State. 120 
The Court of Justice has played a key role on the liberalisation process by interpreting the 
meaning of prohibited "restrictions" widely. According to the Court, Article 49 entails, in the 
first place, the abolition of directly discriminatory measures such as laws or regulations that 
discriminate against a person providing services on account of his nationality or the fact that 
he is established in a Member State other than the one in which the service is provided 
including, inter alia, a provision of the French Code de Procedure Penal, which limits 
compensation for victims of crimes to French nationals or to foreigners holding a residence 
permit'. '; a Spanish law that grants licences to dub foreign films into one of Spain's official 
languages, on condition that the distributor also distributes Spanish films122; a Spanish law 
that limits the right to free admission to national museums to Spanish citizens, foreigners 
resident in Spain and nationals of other Member States under twenty one123; a Luxemburguese 
law that limits access to a governmental interest rate subsidy for housing loans, to loans taken 
115 Case 33/74 Van Binsbergen [1974] ECR 1299. 
116 Case 286/82 and 26/83 Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 377. 
117 Case C-76/90 Säger vDennemeyer & Co Ltd [1991] ECR 1-4221. 
118 As stated by the ECJ in Case 52/79 Procureur du Roi v Debauve [1980] ECR 833 para. 9, the application of the 
prohibition of restrictions on the freedom to provide services is subject to the existence of a cross-border element. 
It does not apply where all the elements of the activity in question are confined within a single Member State. 
119 EC Treaty, Art. 39. 
120 Ibid. Art. 43 
121 Case 186/87 Cowan v Le Tresor Public [1989] ECR 195. 
122 Case C-17/92 Federacibn de Distribuidores Cinematogräficos v Estado Espanol et Uniön de Productores de 
Cine y Televisiön [1993] ECR 1-2239. 
123 Case C 45/93 Commission v. Spain [1994] ECR 1-911. 
m 
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from credit institutions established in Luxembourg 124. The only way for Member States to 
justify directly discriminatory measures is to rely on express treaty derogations125, i. e. Public 
Policy (excluding economic aims126), public Security or Public Health, subject to 
proportionality requirements. 
The Court understands that Article 49 also requires the abolition of indirectly discriminatory 
measures, namely, measures which on their face are nationality-neutral (same burden in law), 
but which have a greater impact on nationals of other Member States (different burden in 
fact). In other words, measures which may not be intended to discriminate, but they 
nevertheless burden non-nationals and non-established persons more heavily than nationals or 
established persons, or they otherwise have a protectionist effect. On these grounds, the Court 
found, for example, that although Member States have the unquestionably right to require 
foreign suppliers of manpower services the possession of a licence, the licensing system must 
meet two conditions: first, it must not discriminate on grounds of nationality and secondly, it 
must take into account the evidence and guarantees already furnished by the foreign supplier 
for the pursuit of his activities in the Member State of his establishment. 127 Likewise, the 
Court found that a reduction on piloting tariffs limited to vessels permitted to carry on 
maritime cabotage indirectly discriminated against foreign undertakings. Even though on its 
face, the tariff reduction did not discriminate on grounds of nationality, in practice it did 
because at that time only vessels flying the Italian flag could obtain permission to engage in 
maritime cabotage. 128 
More recently the Court has come to the conclusion that Article 49 also prohibits genuinely 
non-discriminatory measures (i. e. rules which cannot be said to burden established providers 
of services any less than non-established providers), which are liable to prevent or 
substantially impede access to the market or exercise of the freedom to provide services. 129 
124 Case 484/93 Svensson and Gustavsson v Ministre du Logement et de I'Urbanisme [19951 ECR 1-3955. 
125 EC Treaty, Art. 46. 
126 In principle, economic aims cannot constitute a reason relating to the general interest that can justify a 
restriction on the freedom to provide services. See, for instance, Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders & others v 
The Netherlands [1988] ECR 5365, para. 33 - 34. Exceptionally, the Court has allowed some largely economic 
justifications: ensuring the coherence of a scheme of taxation, the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the 
preservation of the financial balance of a social security scheme and controlling costs. 
127 Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305. 
'28 Case 18-93 Corsica Ferries Italia SRL v Corpo dei Piloti di Genova [19941 ECR 1-1783. 
129 In earlier cases the Court considered that genuinely non-discriminatory measures did not breach Art. 49 even if 
they were liable to create market access restrictions (see, e. g. Case 52179 Procureur dur Roi v Debauve and 
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For instance, in Sager v Dennemeyer, the Court was asked to assess the consistency of 
national legislation requiring a license to supply patent renewal services, applied on a non- 
discriminatory basis to foreign and domestic suppliers alike, with Article 49. It held that 
imposing the licensing requirement on a foreign supplier of patent renewal services 
established in another Member State where he lawfully provides such type of service 
constitutes a restriction within the meaning of Article 49.130 The Court argued that: `By 
reserving the provision of services in respect of the monitoring of patents to certain economic 
operators possessing certain professional qualifications, national legislation prevents an 
undertaking established abroad from providing services to the holders of patents in the 
national territory and also prevents those holders from freely choosing the manner in which 
their patents are to be monitored". 131 
In Customs v Excise v Schindler, the Court held that national legislation which prohibits big 
scale lotteries and lottery operators from promoting their lotteries and selling their tickets, 
whether directly or through independent agents, constitutes and obstacle to the freedom to 
provide services prohibited by Article 49.132 In the Court's view, the fact that it is applied 
without distinction on grounds of nationality or place of establishment, does not place the 
measure outside the scope of Article 49 because it is still liable to prohibit or otherwise 
impede the activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where he 
lawfully provides similar services. Likewise, in Alpine Investments'33 the Court held that a 
Dutch's Ministry of Finance decision prohibiting - on a non-discriminatory basis134 - financial 
intermediaries from "cold calling" prospective clients, constitutes a restriction prohibited by 
Article 49, because it restricts the marketing of intra-community services, depriving fmancial 
suppliers from a rapid and direct technique for marketing and for contacting potential clients 
in other Member States. 
others). The fact that the over the years the Court changed its interpretation of the same provision speaks about 
the dynamism of the case law and confirms the strategic role played by the Court in the liberalisation process. The 
case law on the free movement of goods, in particular that related to the interpretation of the meaning of 
"measures of equivalent effect" to quantitative restrictions (Art. 28) provides further evidence about the key role 
played by the Court, including its significant contribution to the development of the principles of proportionality and 
functional equivalence, which turned out to be crucial for the establishment of the internal market. 
130 Case C-76/90 Sager v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd (1991] ECR 1-4221. 
131 Ibid. para. 14. 
132 Case C 275/92 HM Customs and Excise V Schindler [1994] ECR 1-1389. 
133 C 384/93 Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiön [1995] ECR 1-1141. 
134 The prohibition was applied to all firms established n the Netherlands, foreign and domestic alike, and it 
prohibited cold calling any prospective clients, whether residing in the Netherlands or abroad. 
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These rulings shift away from a purely discriminatory test, focusing on a market access test to 
determine the existence of "restrictions". Under Community law, the fact that a domestic 
measure does not in any way discriminate (in law or in fact) against foreign suppliers does not 
put the measure outside the scope of Article's 49 prohibition. The key test is the effect of the 
measure on the establishment or functioning of the internal market. If the measure 
substantially impedes the ability of persons to provide intra-community services or restricts 
consumer's access to Community services, it constitutes a restriction prohibited by Article 49. 
Naturally, the market access approach strikes down a wider range of barriers, enabling the 
integration process to reach deeper levels of integration but, at the same time, it is much more 
intrusive on Member States' regulatory autonomy. It requires the host Member State not just 
to avoid adopting measures that discriminate against foreign suppliers, but also to recognise 
the foreign suppliers' right to operate in its territory by the sole fact they comply with the 
legislation of the Member State in which they are established, without imposing on them 
further requirements to operate, even when the provision of such services would not normally 
be lawful under the laws of the host Member State. 135 
To avoid over intrusiveness on domestic regulatory affairs the Court has recognised - in 
addition to the express treaty derogations - circumstances where there are imperative reasons 
in the public interest that may justify a breach of the Article 49 prohibition, subject to 
proportionality requirements. Reasons already recognised by the Court as overriding reasons 
relating to the public interest include, inter alia, protection of consumers136, protection of 
workers13', conservation of the national historic and artistic heritage'38, protection of the 
139 reputation of financial markets, protection of fundamental values such as human dignity'40 
135 This approach contains the essence of the three 'structural' principles that provide the foundations for the 
construction of the internal market: home country control, mutual recognition and minimum harmonisation. It must 
be noted that when the activity concerned is lawful in the home Member State but not in the host Member State 
(e. g. abortion or gabmling services), the Court is much more deferential to the host State when qualifying the 
lawfulmess of imperative reasons of public interest that may be invoked to justify the restriction. 
136 Case 205/84 Commission v Germany [1986] ECR 3755. 
137 Case 279/80 Webb [1981] ECR 3305.. 
138 Case C-180/89 Commission v Italy [1991 ] ECR 1-4705. 
139 C 384/93 Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financien [1995] ECR 1-1141. 
140 C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen-UND Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberburgermeisterin des Bundesstadt Bonn 
[2004] ECR 1-9609. 
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and prevention of gambling and avoiding the risk of crime or fraud14'. The Court has applied 
the public interest requirements with a considerable degree of flexibility. In moral sensitive 
cases (services legal in the majority of Member States but illegal in some Member States), the 
Court has afforded Member States a considerable margin of appreciation (Schindler, 
Grogan'42) in order to avoid imposing the values of the majority on the minority. In non- 
sensitive issues it has engaged in a detailed scrutiny of the justifications advanced by the 
Member State (broadcasting, retransmission of programmes and advertising cases). 143 
2.2 Policy Making Instruments 
As stated above, the purpose of the EC Treaty goes well beyond the removal of restrictions on 
cross-border trade, establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union 
which involves the approximation of laws and the development of common economic policies 
in a broad range of areas. Accordingly, the Treaty provides for a sophisticated institutional 
system for policy-making and management of the common market characterised by 
predominantly supranational features, which has been described as "decisional 
supranationalism". ' Community institutions include intergovernmental bodies that co- 
legislate in co-operation with an independent bureaucracy which has a near monopoly to 
propose new legislation and a Parliament directly accountable to European citizens. In certain 
subject areas, decisions may be adopted by qualified majority, ensuring a certain degree of 
independence for the development of Community law. 
The Treaty provides for two main types of secondary legislation instruments for the 
approximation of laws and the implementation of common policies, i. e. Regulations14' and 
141 Case C 275/92 HM Customs v Excise v Schindler [1994] ECR 1-1389. 
142 Case C-159/90 SPUC v Grogan [1991] ECR 1-4685. 
143 CATHERINE BARNARD, The Substantive Law of the EU: the Four Freedoms (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2004). 
144 See JOSEPH WEILER, 'The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism', (1981) 1 Yearbook of 
European Law 267. Weiler describes the dual character of the Community System in terms of decisional 
supranationafty and normative supranationality. "Decisional supranationalism relates to the institutional framework 
and decision making process by which Community policies and measures are in the first place initiated, debated 
and formulated, then promulgated and finally executed" p 271. He contends that the responsibilities of the 
Commission and the way the Council of Ministers work define the decisional supranationalism of the Community 
law-making process that distinguishes it from other international organisations. 
145 EC Treaty, Art. 249 states that Regulations have general application, are binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States. 
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Directives'". A highly structured process must be followed for the adoption of any of these 
instruments. The legislative initiative belongs to the European Commission, an independent 
body made up of members chosen "on the grounds of their general competence", which 
represents and serves no interests other than those of the Community. 147 Member States' 
national interests are voiced through the Council, while the participation of the European 
Parliament adds a democratic representation to the process. National parliaments have no 
direct power over the content of secondary. legislation. With the Directives, there is some 
technical room to decide the "form and methods" to achieve the results required, but no 
authority is conferred for modifying its content. On matters directly affecting the 
establishment or functioning of the internal market, the decision making system departs from 
the principle of consensus, enabling the adoption of decisions according to qualified 
majorities. 148 Overall, this policy making system requires the transfer of a significant portion 
of Member States' regulatory autonomy to Community institutions, which carries with it a 
permanent limitation of their sovereign rights to formulate policies unilaterally on a wide 
range of areas. 
The Treaty expressly mandates the Community Institutions to issue directives in order to 
achieve the liberalisation of specific service sectors, prioritising those services which directly 
affect production costs or the liberalisation of which helps to promote trade in goods. 149 In 
compliance with this mandate a profuse body of directives has already been adopted for the 
approximation of laws and the elimination of trade barriers in various sectors including, inter 
alia, Professional Services, Financial Services, Postal Services and Audiovisual Services. '50 In 
general terms, the purpose of secondary legislation on services has been to achieve a degree of 
harmonisation of domestic laws necessary and sufficient to secure the mutual recognition of 
domestic standards, the implementation of single passports and the principle of home state 
supervision. 
2.3 Enforcement 
146 Ibid. Art. 249 states that Directives are 'binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to 
which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. " 
147 Ibid. Art. 251. 
148 Ibid Arts. 95 and 251. 
149 Ibid Art. 52. 
150 Secondary legislation on services is vast. See generally, Directive on Services in the Internal Market 
2006/123/EC. In addition, there is a huge number of sector-specific Directives too long to be listed here, available 
at httD: //ec. eurooa. eurntemal market/top laver/index 19 en htm (last visited April 2008). 
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The EC Treaty provides for highly sophisticated and strictly law-based mechanisms for the 
enforcement of Community law. The enforcement system is headed by a supranational Court 
of Justice, completely independent from national administrations. The Court's jurisdiction 
prevails over any other method of settlement of disputes between Member States. 15' 
Community Institutions, Member States and Individuals have locus standi before the Court of 
Justice. 152 The Commission may bring actions before the Court of Justice against Member 
States who fail to fulfil obligations under the Treaty. '53 The Court is endowed with ample 
power to impose remedies, being entitled to require the failing Member State to adopt any 
measure necessary to comply with the judgment, including penalty payments. '54 There is no 
chance for the wrongdoer to "buy" the failure to comply with its obligations under 
Community law by withstanding retaliatory measures. The Court has recognised that some 
treaty provisions or even provisions included in secondary rules have direct effect'ss, creating 
individual rights which national courts must protect, regardless of Member States' 
constitutional provisions relating to the reception of international law in domestic legal 
systems. Accordingly, individuals can rely on these provisions to bring actions before 
domestic courts against Member States156 or other individuals'57. Individuals can also seek 
damages against Member States for breach of Community law. 158 The Court has also held that 
in case of conflict, Community law prevails over domestic law, no matter what the legal rank 
151 EC Treaty, Art. 292 and Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR-4635, where the ECJ reaffirms its 
exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation of the Treaty, which takes precedence over the system for the 
resolution of disputes contained in Part XV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
152 EC Treaty, Arts. 220-245. 
163 Ibid. Art. 226. 
154 Ibid. Art. 228. 
156 The leading case on direct effect is Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belasingen 
[1963] ECR 13, where the Court stipulates that some Community law provisions, which meet certain conditions 
(clarity, precision, unconditional) confer rights to individuals, which national courts must protect. 
156 On vertical direct effect against the host state see, for instance, Case 33/73 Van Binsbergen v Bestuur van de 
Bedrijfsvereniging Metaaln#verheid [1974] ECR 1299 and Cases 110-111178 Ministdre Public v Van Wesemael 
[1979] ECR 5 and against the home state Case C 384/93 Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financi8n [1995] 
ECR I-1141. 
157 On Art. 49 horizontal direct effect against other individuals or organisations see Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch 
v Association Union Cycliste [1974] ECR 1405, para 18-9 & para 34 and Cases C-51/96 and 191/97 Delidge v 
Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines Associ6es [2000] ECR 12549. It must be noted that the direct effect of 
provisions included in secondary legislation is only vertical, i. e. enables a private party to bring a claim against the 
State but not against other private party. 
158 Joined Cases C-6/90 and 9/90 Francovich v Italy [1991 ] ECR i-5357. 
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of the domestic provision. 159 Weiler has described the direct effect and primacy of 
Community law as "normative supranationalism. s160 
In summary, the EC Treaty bestows on individuals and companies an across the board 
freedom to provide services (along with a right of establishment) within the Community and 
prohibits Member States from imposing restrictions on them. In the Court's eyes this 
prohibition includes any kind of restriction, discriminatory or not, liable to impede the ability 
of persons to provide intra-community services or restrict consumer's access to Community 
services. In accordance with its purposes, the Treaty also establishes a sophisticated policy- 
making system for the approximation of laws and formulation of common economic policies, 
which has produced a profuse body of Community legislation. The operation of the 
Community system is backed up by a strictly law-based enforcement mechanism, where a 
supranational Court along with domestic courts control breaches of Community law 
effectively. Overall, the system ensures a considerable degree of independence of Community 
law-making and the enforcement process from national governments. 
E. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter examined the challenges and legal instruments for the liberalisation of trade in 
services. It identified a series of sui generis challenges raised by barriers to trade in services, 
which are essentially regulatory in character and thus, less obvious and more dispersed than 
barriers to trade in goods, scattered all over the regulatory system and more fiercely resisted 
because of the fact they touch upon sensitive public interests. 
Like trade in goods, trade in services may be obstructed by overtly discriminatory measures 
against foreign services and service suppliers aimed at protecting domestic incumbents. But 
unlike trade in goods, this type of trade may also be hindered by measures affecting the cross- 
border movement of capital, persons and information. Trade in services is also particularly 
vulnerable to the dual regulatory burden problem caused by the disparity of domestic 
regulations between highly regulated markets, which increases the transaction costs of cross- 
159 See in particular Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 and Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze 
dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629, which ensure that Community Law has priority over any conflicting 
law of the Member States, including not only ordinary national laws but also national constitutional laws. 
160 See Weiler, J, ob cit,. p 271. Normative supranationalism" is "concerned with the relationships and hierarchies 
which exist between Community policies and legal measures on the one hand and competing policies and legal 
measures on the Member States on the other". According to Weiler, the hallmarks of normative supranationalism 
of Community law are the doctrine of direct effect, supremacy of Community law and the principle of pre-emption. 
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border operations and discourages trade. Furthermore, due to the intense and ongoing 
relationship between the regulator and the industry, there are higher risks for governmental 
discriminatory practices, while the sensitivity of the policy issues at stake fuels strong 
protectionist interests against liberalisation. Accordingly, for an effective liberalisation of 
trade in services it is not enough to curb discrimination. It is equally necessary to avoid 
duplication of regulatory requirements, to secure a regulatory environment where 
governmental rules and practices are open, transparent, impartial and not more trade 
restrictive than necessary and to build up a broad political consensus about the need for trade 
liberalisation. 
States can enter into a wide spectrum of possible agreements to further the liberalisation of 
trade in services. Some of them may include trade disciplines, policy-making instruments and 
enforcement mechanisms more deferential to domestic sovereignty than others, and thus, 
capable of ensuring a less advanced degree of liberalisation. In principle, the GATS and the 
EC Treaty can be viewed as the two extremes of this spectrum. On the one hand, an 
agreement characterised by predominantly intergovernmental features, which pursues the 
gradual liberalisation of trade in services through the negotiation of specific commitments not 
to discriminate against foreign services and service suppliers on specific service sectors, 
without interfering with State Parties' autonomy to formulate their own public policies. On 
the other hand, an agreement of a predominantly supranational character, based on an across 
the board prohibition of any type of restrictions, discriminatory or not, liable to impede the 
ability of persons to provide intra-community services or restrict consumers' access to 
community services, with policy-making and enforcement processes relatively independent 
from Member States. This agreement involves the transfer of a significant portion of 
domestic regulatory autonomy to Community institutions for the approximation of laws and 
the formulation of common economic policies. 
The analysis of the case law under the GATS and EC Treaty suggested a more dynamic 
scenario, with adjudicative bodies playing a strategic role in the liberalisation process. In both 
contexts there are examples of rulings favouring a trade-friendly reading of treaty provisions, 
which sometimes upsets the political establishment. As the fathers of the agreements, 
politicians view with contempt rulings such as US-Gambling that stretch the interpretation of 
treaty provisions beyond what they understand as the limits of State Parties' commitments 
carefully crafted through diplomatic negotiations. 
At the end of the day, the liberalisation of trade and, in particular, the liberalisation of trade in 
services, requires a redistribution of regulatory competence over cross-border economic 
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transactions between the host State, the home State and regional bodies (legislative and 
adjudicative), which admits a wide range of expressions, some more deferential to domestic 
sovereignty than others. Any group of States willing to integrate their service markets will 
have to make choices along the following lines: How broad should be the right of a State to 
impose conditions on those wishing to provide services in its territory? To what extent should 
the host State be bound to recognise the standards, permissions and licenses issued by the 
home state? To what extent should it be required to rely on the supervision of the home state 
over firms operating in its territory? Which issues should be internationalised and which 
issues should be kept under strict domestic sovereign autonomy? What mechanisms should be 
established for the enforcement of treaty provisions and secondary rules? 
There are no inherently right or wrong answers to these questions. There is a continuum of 
institutional choices for channelling inter state co-operation that ranges from predominantly 
intergovernmental to predominantly supranational legal frameworks, rather than binary 
options between purely intergovernmental or purely supranational models. The policy-making 
and enforcement mechanisms can always be adjusted for different subject matters according 
to their political sensitivity, in order to avoid establishing institutional arrangements that 
compromise domestic sovereignty to levels unacceptable for State Parties. The 
appropriateness of a specific legal framework for economic integration and, in particular, for 
the integration of service markets must be judged according to its capacity to foster integration 
and to discipline protectionist conduct in light of the particular circumstances underlying the 
integration process. 
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Chapter II 
MERCOSUR Legal System 
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This chapter examines the MERCOSUR legal system and the institutions responsible for its 
operation and discusses to what extent they have contributed to achieving MERCOSUR 
objectives. The chapter is divided into six sections. It begins with a review of MERCOSUR's 
background (Section A). It then examines the Treaty of Asuncion (Section B), MERCOSUR 
institutions (Section C), sources of MERCOSUR law (Section D) and enforcement 
mechanisms (Section E). Finally, the chapter critically assesses the MERCOSUR legal system 
and discusses some proposals for reform (Section F), ending with some concluding remarks 
(Section G). 
A. MERCOSUR Background 
Regional integration initiatives have a long tradition among Latin American countries, 
although successful integration has remained elusive. ' During the XIX Century, military 
heroes and political leaders such as Andres Bello and Simon Bolivar fought for the political 
and economic integration of the newly independent Latin American States, but their efforts 
succumbed to internal rivalries and external influences. British diplomacy, then a strong 
advocate of multilateralism, pressed against the conclusion of "protectionist" agreements that 
could undermine the British Empire's trade interests in the region. 2 In the late 1890s the 
Americans came into the scene putting forward the first of a large number of unsuccessful 
initiatives for integration with their Latin American neighbours? During the first half of the 
XX Century, there were no significant attempts to pursue regional integration, with most Latin 
American nations pleased with placing their commodities at good prices in northern markets. 
During the post war period, influenced by an inward looking development strategy based on 
import substitution industrialisation, Latin American countries concluded a first wave of 
south-south regional agreements 4 The best known example was the Latin American Free 
1 See, generally, GREGORIO RECONDO, EI Sueno de Ia Patria Grande: Ideas y Antecedentes Integracionistas an 
America Latina (Ediciones CICCUS, Buenos Aires 2001); JORDI VILASECA REQUENA, Los Esfuerzos del Sisifo: 
Integracibn Econömica an America Latina y el Caribe (Los Libros de la Catarata, Madrid 1994) and VICTOR 
BULMER-THOMAS, The Economic History of Latin America since Independence (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2003) 
2 See JORGE ABELARDo RAMOS, Historie de la Naciön Latinoamericana (A. Pefla Lillo, Buenos Aires 1968). 
3 See Samuel SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, A Diplomatic History of the US (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York 1955), 
p. 732. 
4 See in particular the influence of the Latin American school of structuralist economics, with Raul Prebisch as it 
most prominent representative. As director of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
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Trade Association (LAFTA). 5 The underlying rationale to these agreements was to expand 
national markets as a means for accelerating the industrialisation process, but subject to high 
levels of external protection. Commonly described as "closed regionalism", these agreements 
maintained high tariffs against third countries' products, imposed restrictions on foreign direct 
investments and exercised strong interventionism over market fanctioning 6 The high 
transaction costs associated with the adoption of a common external tariff for countries with 
dissimilar economic structures, and the central allocation of economic activities conspired 
against their effective implementation. Sooner rather than later the agreements were 
disregarded amid criticisms of creating inefficiencies and failing to secure an even distribution 
of results, with smaller partners complaining about the bulk of benefits being reaped by the 
more industrialised ones. 
The 1970s, also referred to as the lost decade, was characterised by financial crises, social 
upheaval and the emergence of authoritarian regimes, which exacerbated nationalism, fuelled 
distrust and hostilities and even posted States to the brink of war over territorial disputes. ' 
Despite the unfriendly environment for regionalism, by the end of this period eleven Latin 
American countries signed the Treaty of Montevideo establishing the Latin American 
Integration Association (LAIA). 8 After LAFTA's disappointing experience, State Parties to 
LAIA opted for more modest but realistic integration goals pursued through more flexible 
integration mechanisms. The LAIA aims at the gradual and progressive establishment of a 
Latin American Common Market, but as a long-term objective, not tied to pre-set deadlines -9 
For this purpose, the Treaty of Montevideo creates an area of economic preferences1° 
providing a legal umbrella under which LAIA members may offer each other tariff 
preferences" and may also enter into different types of agreements in which all members 
Prebisch promoted policies for economic development shaped by his structuralist ideas and the dependency 
theory. 
5 See Treaty Establishing a Free-Trade Area and Instituting The Latin-American Free-Trade Association, 
Montevideo, Arg. -Bra: Chi. -Par. -Per. -Uru., 18 February 1960,35 Intl' Conciliation (1963-1965) 63. 
6 See ROBERT DEVLIN & ANTHONY ESTEVADEORDAL, What's New in the New Regionalism in the Americas? (IADB- 
INTAL, ITD-STD, Washington, D. C. 2001). 
7 See, e. g., the dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Islands. 
8 See Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association Arg. -Bol. -Bra: Chi. -Col. -Ecu. - 
Mex. -Par. - Per. -Uru. -Ven., 12 August 1980,20 I. L. M. 672 [hereinafter Treaty of Montevideo]. 
9 ToA, Art. 1. 
10 Ibid. Art. 4. 
11 Ibid. Art. 5. 
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participate (Regional Scope Agreements'2) or only some members participate (Partial Scope 
Agreements)". The latter are open to accession to other LAIR members subject to negotiation 
with a view to facilitating the progressive multilateralisation of preferences. 14 
By the mid 1980s fresh winds were blowing in the southern cone of South America. The 
return to democracy left behind a decade of totalitarian regimes. Newly elected governments 
in Argentina and Brazil faced the common challenge to ensure political stability and to 
resuscitate their wrecked economies. These common challenges paved the way for the 
resurgence of bilateral integration initiatives. " The process was kicked off by the Iguazu 
Declaration, issued in November 1985 by the then Presidents of Argentina (Alfonsin) and 
Brazil (Sarney), in which they expressed their desire to strengthen `friendship and solidarity 
ties' between them, establishing a High level Commission to plan bilateral integration. '6 
Various declarations", the establishment of a Programme for Integration and Economic Co- 
operation (PIECAB)18 and even a Treaty for Integration, Cooperation and Development19 
followed suit, covering a wide range of issues, well beyond the mere concession of trade 
preferences, including, inter alia, cooperation on Transport, Energy and Communications, 
12 Ibid. Art. 6. 
13 Ibid. Art. 7. 
14 Ibid. Art. 9. 
15 See, e. g., PR DE ALMEIDA, 'A Evolucao do MERCOSUL: Antecedentes, Desenvolvimento e Crise: Uma 
Avaliacao Analltico-Descritiva do Periodo 1986 - 2002', (2002) 6 Revista de Derecho Intemacional y del 
MERCOSUR 69 and ALCIDES COSTA VAZ, Cooperacao, lntegracao e Processo Negociador. A Construcao do 
MERCOSUL (Insftuto Brasileiro de Relacoes Intemacionais: Fundacao Alexandre de Gusmao: PETROBRAS, 
Brasilia 2002). For a critical view of the traditional assumptions about the genesis of MERCOSUR see GIAN LucA 
GARDINI, 'Two Critical Passages on the Road to Mercosur', (2005) 18 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 
405. For in-depth studies tracing the origins of regional integration in the southern cone back to the XIX Century 
see Luis ALBERTO MONIz BANDEIRA, Conflito e Integracao na America do Sul: Brasil, Argentina a Estados Unidos: 
da Triplice Alianca ao MERCOSUL, 1870 - 2003 (Revan, Rio de Janeiro 2003) and OSCAR ABADIE - AICARDI, 
Fundamentos Histöricos y Politicos del MERCOSUR (Melibea, Montevideo 1999). 
16 See Iguaz6 Declaration, signed on 30 November 1985 available (in Portuguese) at 
hptt: //www2. mre. aov. br/daVb arat 256 733. htm (last visited 23/01/08). 
17 See the 'Argentinian - Brazilian Friendship Act on Democracy, Peace and Development' signed on 10 December 
1986 in Brasilia. 
18 The PIECAB was established by the Argentina - Brazil Integration Act signed on 29/07186. 
19 Signed on 29 November 1988 and in force since 29/11/98. The Treaty established a 10 years period for the 
gradual removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and services, and the gradual co-ordination of 
macroeconomic policies through additional protocols and ad hoc agreements. Available, in Portuguese, at 
httD"//www2. mre. oov. br/daVb argt 281 758. htm, last visited 23/01/08. 
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Infrastructure, Co-ordination of Foreign Policy, Defence and Nuclear co-operation, to name 
but a few. 
In July 1990, with two strong advocates of liberal economic principles taking office (Menem 
in Argentina and Collor de Mello in Brazil), both countries decided to accelerate the pace of 
the integration process by halving the period for the establishment of a common market - to be 
ready by 31/12/94 - and by replacing the hitherto product by product tariff reduction strategy 
with a plan for the general, linear and automatic reduction of the whole tariff range. 20 It is at 
this stage, with the conditions for advancing integration already agreed, that Paraguay and 
Uruguay put forward a formal request to join in 2' Therefore, MERCOSUR was not an 
agreement negotiated from scratch by its four members on an equal basis, but rather the result 
of bilateral negotiations between Argentina and Brazil initiated in the mid 1980s, which took 
on board Paraguay and Uruguay at the very last minute. The late comers had little opportunity 
to exert any significant influence during the drafting process of the Treaty of Asuncion to 
ensure provisions favourable to their national interests 22 
The Treaty of Asuncion was designed in line with new development policies prevalent during 
the early 1990s. By contrast to the 1960s, these new policies sought to pursue economic 
growth through private-led, market oriented and outward looking strategies sponsored by 
international financial institutions. 23 Within this new conceptual framework, regional 
integration agreements were seen as a vehicle for facilitating the insertion of local economies 
20 See Buenos Aires Act signed on 6 July 1990. The commitments under this Act were registered in the LAIA's 
Secretariat as PSA No 14 on 20/12/90. 
21 The first meeting of the Bi-national Working Group for the establishment of a common market was held on 4 
September 1990 with the participation of Paraguay and Uruguay as observers. At the meeting these two countries 
expressed their interest to join the integration process, following the automatic and across the board tariff reduction 
methodology. Therein, meetings were held on a quadripartite basis. It must be noted that Uruguay had been 
negotiating with Argentina and Brazil co-operation mechanisms for the Transport sector since 1988. 
22 The strong emphasis of the Treaty of Asuncion on the principle of reciprocity of rights and obligations between 
State Parties, without including significant special and differential treatment provisions for the smaller partners 
somehow reflects the inability of Paraguay and Uruguay to shape the conditions of the integration process in light 
of their national interest. 
23 These policies were encouraged by International Financial Institutions based in Washington, which used 
conditionality as a vehicle to promote a package of reforms based on trade liberalisation, liberalisation of inward 
foreign direct investment, privatisation and deregulation, commonly known as the "Washington Consensus". 
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into global markets -a strategy commonly known as "open regionalism" - rather than a 
mechanism for protecting against foreign competition. 4 
However, the economic motivations behind the birth of MERCOSUR should not be 
overestimated. Rather than a private-led process supported by domestic industries desperate to 
compete against foreign producers and thus actively demanding for the removal of trade 
barriers, MERCOSUR was very much a government-led process, conducted by high-profile 
presidents willing to be seen as the fathers of a new era of inter state co-operation. For the 
larger partners, non-economic considerations such as insurance against military conflict, 
protection of fledging democracies and political stability, lock in effect of domestic reforms 
and self-interest of high ranked government officials played a major role in pushing the 
25 integration process forward. 
It has even been suggested that MERCOSUR was born as a result of a tacit trade-off between 
the two biggest partners: preferential access to the Brazilian market in exchange for 
Argentina's alignment with Brazil in foreign policy. 26 Probably State Parties' interest in 
MERCOSUR is more sophisticated than this, but what there can be no doubt about is that 
those interests differ and they do so, to a large extent, due to the sharp structural asymmetries 
between States? ' These asymmetries conspire against the definition of common objectives 
and common strategies for achieving them. For smaller State Parties, the economic relevance 
of the bloc is crucial, but for the largest one it is only of marginal importance. 28 While smaller 
State Parties may be willing to pay the price for having strong regional institutions capable of 
ensuring effective market access, larger State Parties, particularly Brazil, are more likely to 
support loose regulations and shallow institutions, which do not cut too deep into States' 
24 See Devlin & Estevadeordal, ob cit, for a detailed analysis on the differences between "closed regionalism" and 
"open regionalism". 
ZS See KARL KALTENTHALER & FRANK MORA, 'Explaining Latin American Economic Integration: the case of 
MERCOSUR', (2002) 9 Review of International Political Economy 72. 
26 PEDRO DA MOTTA VEIGA, MERCOSUR's Institutionalization Agenda: The Challenges of a Project in Crises 
MERCOSUR: In Search of a New Agenda (BID - INTAL, Buenos Aires 2003), p3 
27 One State Party alone represents over 75% of the bloc's gross domestic product. See Appendix II MERCOSUR 
Statistical Information, Tables 1 and 6. 
28 This is best illustrated by "trade encapsulation" indexes (ratio of regional exports to total exports). In 1991 this 
percentage was around 35% for Paraguay, 44.2% for Uruguay, 16.5% for Argentina and just over 7% for Brazil. 
Compare this with an average of 45% for NAFTA countries and 64% for EC countries. See Appendix II, Tables 8,9 
and 10. 
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economic policy autonomy. 29 This congenital weakness conditioned and will continue to 
condition the success of MERCOSUR and therefore must be taken into account as a backdrop 
for the analysis that follows. 30 
B. Treaty of Asuncion 
1. Purpose and Principles 
The Treaty of Asuncion was signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay on 26 March 
1991.31 According to Article 1, the purpose of the Treaty was to establish a common market 
by 31 December 1994 involving the free movement of goods, services and factors of 
production, the establishment of a common external tariff and the co-ordination of 
macroeconomic and sectoral policies 32 
Despite the complex and demanding tasks necessary for the establishment of a common 
market and the short period prescribed for its completion, the Treaty only stipulates broadly 
defined commitments and a flexible, minimalist and intergovernmental institutional structure. 
Such an imbalance between means and end reflects State Parties' contradictory attitude to 
integration, which on the one hand vow to achieve ambitious integration objectives, but on the 
other hand refuse to delegate sovereignty in favour of community institutions able, through 
their independent action, to build up the common market. 
Close to the end of the five-year transitional period, the status of integration was not anywhere 
close to a common market. Conscious about their inability to meet their original goal, State 
Parties opted for rephrasing their integration objectives, focusing on the completion of a 
29 See Kaltenthaler and Mora, ob cit, who analyse the impact that state Parties' motivations on MERCOSUR had 
on its institutional development. 
30 See MARCELO HALPERIN, 'MERCOSUR: Algunos Indicadores de Inviabilidad', in, II Jomadas Intemacionales 
MERCOSUR - ALCA Colegio de Abogados de La Plata (9 Junio 2005). 
31 See above Introduction footnote n 1. For a detailed analysis of the Treaty of Asuncion, see, e. g. RICARDO XAVIER 
BASALDOA, MERCOSUR y derecho de la integraciön (Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires 1999). 
32 The objective to establish a common market in such a short period of time constitutes a significant innovation 
compared to previous regional trade agreements signed by State Parties, which were mainly concerned with tariff 
concessions. For instance, Art. 1 of the ToM aims to establish a common market, but only as a long-term goal 
subject to a gradual process with no deadlines attached to it. 
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customs union as an essential step prior to the establishment of a common market, which 
became an objective subject to negotiation and with no specific deadline attached to it 33 
The Treaty's full title expressly states that it is an agreement for the establishment of the 
Common Market of the South, emphasising its instrumental character. 34 Its succinct style, 
with only twenty four Articles that formulate general principles and guidelines instead of 
detailed provisions has led some commentators to describe it as a "framework agreement". 35 
The framework idea suggests that the legal loopholes left by the Treaty would be filled up 
with secondary legislation adopted at a later stage by decision making bodies. However, this 
description is somehow inaccurate, because alongside broadly defined lines of action, the 
Treaty also imposes specific and unconditional obligations on State Parties to eliminate tariffs 
and non tariff restrictions to intra regional trade 36 In this sense, it seems more precise to 
describe the Treaty as a legal instrument that oscillates between "directive law", establishing 
general legal foundations for an integration programme and "operative law", including a 
number of concrete legal commitments of a provisional character. 37 In addition, many pieces 
of "filling up" legislation that have been later adopted are not really secondary legislation but 
pure public international law, namely, annexes, protocols and amendments to the Treaty of 
Asuncion. 8 In fact, if all its protocols had come into effect, a consolidated version of the 
Asuncion Treaty would be much larger than the European Community Treaty or even 
NAFTA. 39 
33 See Dec 13/93 which approves the document "Consolidation of the Customs Union and Transition to a Common 
Market". This document formally refers to the "redefinition of the integration process". It replaces the objective to 
establish a Common Market by 1/1/95 with the objective to establish a Customs Union by the same date and 
enumerates a series of measures to be adopted by that date. 
34 See SERGIO ABREU BONILLA, MERCOSUR e INTEGRACION (Fundaciön de Cultura Universitaria, Montevideo 
1991), p 47. 
35 See Basaldüa, ob cit, p 90. 
36 See Annex I Trade Liberalisation Programme. 
37 See Abreu Bonilla, S., ob cit, p 47. 
38 For a critique on the use of primary law for regulating specific trade issues see below pp 90 - 91. 
39 See RAMON TORRENT, 'Una Aproximacion a la Anatomia del MERCOSUR Real', in Julio Berlinsky, et al. (eds) 
15 Affos de MERCOSUR, Comercio, Macroeconomia e Inversions Extranjeras (Siglo XXI Red MERCOSUR, 
Buenos Aires 2006), p 36. 
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The preamble to the Treaty indicates that the integration of domestic markets is a vital 
prerequisite for accelerating State Parties' economic development with social justice 40 It also 
refers to the need for State Parties to secure "a proper place in the international community". 
A declaration made by State Parties' Foreign Ministers fu ther elaborates on this point by 
stating that one of the reasons for signing the Treaty was to increase trade flows and to 
facilitate the competitive inclusion of their economies into global markets 41 
The preamble also specifies that the expansion of domestic markets through integration must 
be based on the principles of gradualism, flexibility and equilibrium. These principles are also 
found on the bilateral instruments signed by Argentina and Brazil that preceded the Treaty of 
Asuncion. The Act for Integration42 which lays down the bilateral Programme for Integration 
and Economic Co-operation expressly refers to these principles. It provides that integration 
must be gradual, through the completion of consecutive stages, subject to negotiation, 
implementation and evaluation on an annual basis. It must be flexible in order to enable the 
adjustment of the Programme's scope, pace and objectives. Finally, it prescribes that 
integration must be balanced, aiming at a progressive equilibrium of exchanges - quantitative 
and qualitative - through the expansion of trade and that it must foster an intra-sectoral 
specialisation of domestic economies rather than an inter-sector specialisation. 43 Similarly, the 
Treaty for Integration, Cooperation and Development"`' provides in Article 2 that its 
implementation must be subject to the principles of gradualism, flexibility and equilibrium 
with a view to effecting the progressive adjustment of individuals and enterprises to the new 
conditions of competition and economic legislation. 
The principle of gradualism has been invoked in some trade disputes, to justify State Parties' 
lack of compliance with MERCOSUR trade disciplines. 45 It has been argued that the 
provisions of the Treaty have a programmatic character and as such they are subject to further 
negotiations before becoming binding on State Parties. However, when it comes to tariff 
reductions, the Trade Liberalisation Programme imposes detailed obligations on State Parties 
aimed at the complete removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers by the end of the transition 
40 Although the preamble of a Treaty does not contain rights and obligations, it forms part of the context for the 
purpose of the interpretation of the Treaty. See VCLT Art. 31.2. 
41 See Declaration of Ministers No 1, point 4,26 March 1991. 
42 See above footnote n 16. 
43 This contrasts with the strategy followed by LAFTA, based on centrally planned policies which aimed, inter a1ia, 
to promote the development of heavy industry in some countries as opposed to agricultural production in others. 
44 See above footnote n 17. 
45 See AHAA Uruguay - Processed Wool para. 28 to 31. 
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period. Ad hoc tribunals have recognised the unconditional binding effect of these obligations, 
rejecting the argument that gradualism suggests nothing is binding unless expressly agreed by 
the four State Parties 46 
The principle of flexibility is clearly reflected by the Treaty's institutional provisions. The 
drafters of the Treaty, mindful of past integration experiences based on elaborated but rigid 
and inefficient institutional system, opted for a flexible and minimalist approach, capable of 
being adjusted to institutional demands as the integration process progressed. In this vein, 
Chapter II of the Treaty establishes a basic intergovernmental structure of a provisional 
character, subject to review by the end of the transitional period. 47 
Article 2 of the Treaty provides that the common market must be based on the reciprocity of 
rights and obligations between States Parties, a concept which suggests the equality or 
equivalence of commitments 48 Article 6 recognises different and specific rates of 
liberalisation in favour of Paraguay and Uruguay, but only effective during the transitional 
period. The Treaty does not recognise any State Party a special status of a permanent 
character. The strict adherence to the principle of reciprocity contrasts with the LAIA's 
approach which expressly provides for special and differential treatment in favour of countries 
at a relatively less advanced stage of economic development on a non-reciprocal basis 49 
Paraguay and Uruguay always resisted an orthodox interpretation of the principle of 
reciprocity. Conscious of the sharp structural asymmetries between State Parties they feared, 
justifiably, that such asymmetries could compromise the objective of securing an even 
distribution of the costs and benefits of the integration process. Consequently, they have been 
arguing for a broad understanding of reciprocity, based on the equivalence of concessions as a 
whole rather than a tit-for-tat approach seeking strict equivalence for every single trade 
concession. They have also suggested the need for interpreting the principle of reciprocity 
alongside the principle of balance, which connotes the idea of a harmonious integration 
process that contemplates the various - sometimes disparate - interests at stake. S° Over time, 
State Parties gradually began to acknowledge that it has been much more difficult for the 
smaller State Parties than for the larger ones to reap the benefits of economic integration and 
46 See, e. g., AHAA Argentina - Poultry para. 134 and 139, AHAA Brazil-Remoulded Tyre s pp 14 and 19. 
47 See below Section C. 
48 See ROBERT 0 KEOwwE, 'Reciprocity in International Relations', (1986) 40 International organization 1. 
49 ToA, Arts. 3d and 9d. 
50 See Basaldüa, ob cit, p 293. 
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that it is necessary for trade rules to impose different rights and obligations on State Parties to 
somehow redress the disparities that exist among them. s' 
Last, but not least, State Parties agreed from the outset that a strict adherence to democratic 
values and the protection of human rights constitutes a sine qua non condition for 
participating in the integration process. Although the Treaty of Asuncion itself does not 
contain any express reference to democratic principles, State Parties issued various 
declarations and adopted international instruments that refer to the observance of democratic 
principles and the protection of human rights as an essential component of the integration 
process prior to and after signing the Treaty. 52 
2. Instruments for the Establishment of a Common Market 
The Treaty provides for some instruments for the establishment of the common market to be 
used during the transition period, namely, a trade liberalisation programme, a common 
external tariff, the co-ordination of macroeconomic policies and the adoption of sectoral 
agreements. 53 The following paragraphs examine each of these instruments and briefly discuss 
what have they have achieved so far. 
The Trade Liberalisation Programme 
The Trade Liberalisation Programme imposed specific obligations on State Parties consisting 
on progressive, linear and automatic tariff reductions accompanied by the elimination of non- 
51 The Preamble of the Protocol of Ouro Preto reaffirms the principles and objectives of the Treaty of Asuncion 
"mindful of the need to give special consideration to the less developed countries and regions of MERCOSUR". 
Likewise, the preamble of the Protocol of Montevideo refers to "the need to ensure the increasing participation of 
less developed countries and regions in the service market", but "on the basis of the reciprocity of rights and 
obligations". Less ambiguously, the Protocol for the Establishment of MERCOSUR Parliament provides that one of 
the Parliament's principles shall be the defence for conditions based on a special and differential treatment and a 
sustainable development, and the promotion of regions at a relatively less advanced stage of economic 
development. More recently, State Parties have set up a fund to finance projects aimed at promoting structural 
convergence, competitiveness, and social cohesion, particularly in the smaller economies and less advanced 
regions, but the budget they provided for such fund is almost insignificant (US$ 100). See Dec 45/04. 
52 See in particular, the Protocol of Ushuaia about Democratic Commitment in MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile 
adopted on 24 July 1998 and coming into force on 17 January 2002 and the Protocol of Asuncion for the 
Protection and Promotion of Human Rights adopted on 19 June 2005 and ratified so far by Argentina, Paraguay 
and Uruguay. 
53 ToA, Art. 5. 
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tariff restrictions or measures of equivalent effect, as well as any other restrictions on trade 
between the States Parties, with a view to the attainment of a zero tariff and the elimination of 
non-tariff restrictions by 31 December 1994.54 
In practice, the Trade Liberalisation Programme achieved mixed results. On the one hand, it 
contributed to the substantial elimination of tariffs, with more than eighty five percent of 
intra-regional trade flows benefiting from zero-tariff by the end of the transition period. 55 This 
achievement was coupled with an impressive growth in intra-regional trade, which increased 
from 1991 to 1994 at an average annual rate of twenty five percent. 56 On the other hand, its 
contribution to the elimination of non-tariff restrictions was much less convincing. 
By the end of the transition period, a remaining group of sensitive products which had not yet 
been liberalised was subject to a final adjustment regime, which basically provided State 
Parties with additional time to phase them into the tariff free area, namely, four additional 
years for Argentina and Brazil and five additional years for Paraguay and Uruguay, starting 
from 1 /01 /95.57 Hence, formally speaking, since 1 January 2000 MERCOSUR is a free trade 
area involving the free circulation of goods across national borders. The flipside of the right to 
the free movement of goods involves the prohibition of custom duties, charges of equivalent 
effect, non-tariff restrictions such as administrative, financial, foreign exchange or any other 
measure of equivalent effect by which a State Party unilaterally prevents or impedes 
reciprocal trade. 58 
Various arbitration awards have consistently and uncompromisingly recognised the absolute 
character of the prohibition against applying tariffs and non-tariff restrictions to infra regional 
54 ToA, Annex I, Art. 1 refers to State Panties' obligation to eliminate any kind of duties or restrictions applied in 
their reciprocal trade. Art. 2 defines "duties" including customs duties and any other chargers of equivalent effect 
and "restrictions" including any measure of an administrative, financial, or foreign exchange character or of any 
other nature by which a State Party unilaterally prevents or obstructs reciprocal trade, but not including measures 
taken in the situations provided for by Art. 50 of the Treaty of Montevideo. 
55 See RoeERTO BOUZAS, 'El MERCOSUR Diez Anos Despues: Proceso de Aprendizaje o Deja Vu? (2001) 41 
Desarrollo Econömico. Revista de Cfencias Sociales 179. 
56 See Centro de Economia Intemacional, Cuadros Estadisticos MERCOSUR, at 
htta: //www. cei. qov. ar/htmi/estadistica. htm#mer. 
57 See Dec 5/94, Dec. 24/94 and Res 48/94. 
58 ToA, Annex I, Art. 2. 
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trade in goods. 59 By contrast, decision making bodies adopted various Decisions and 
Resolutions that provide State Parties with a degree of flexibility for dealing with non-tariff 
barriers, which does not seem in line with those awards 60 In any event, in practice, infra 
regional trade remains severely curtailed by a wide range of non-tariff restrictions, including 
import and export restrictions, incentives and other type of domestic policies that distort the 
conditions of competition, not to mention countless duplications of sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, technical regulations and conformity assessment tests. b' 
Establishment of a Common External Tariff 
To set up a Common External Tariff (CET) "which encourages the foreign competitiveness of 
the States Parties" 62 proved to be a much more arduous task than the dismantling of tariffs to 
intra regional trade. By the end of the transitional period, State Parties reached only a partial 
agreement on the CET, covering approximately eighty five percent of products imported into 
the region. 63 The CET did not cover Capital goods, Information Technology goods and 
Telecommunications goods nor sensitive products included in national lists of exceptions, but 
State Parties agreed on a convergence period towards a customs union to be completed by 
59 See, e. g., AHAA Brazil - Restrictive Measures to Reciprocal Trade, para. 85: "[... j The delay of the date for the 
establishment of the common market does not derogate the obligation agreed by the State Parties to totally 
eliminate tariffs and non-tariff restrictions, although the obligation is no longer exigible by 31-12-94. After 
MERCOSUR re-evaluation, the obligation to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff restrictions must be completed by 31- 
12-99, when the Final Adjustment Regime must be completed. " See also AHAA Argentina - Textiles, p. 20, 
Argentina - Poultry, para. 134 and 139, and Brazil - Remoulded Tyres, p. 14 which prescribes that the prohibition 
on imposing non-tariff restrictions or measures of equivalent effect has an absolute character, namely, "that the 
measure cannot be adopted by a State Party, even if the measure is not aimed at discriminating against the 
foreign product" and p 19; Uruguay- Cigarettes, p. 5; and Argentina - Blocked Highways para. 104. 
60 The most recent of a large number of Decisions aimed at dealing with non-tariff barriers is Dec 27/07, which 
compels State Parties to list the non-tariff restrictions applied to their exports by other State Parties and then 
invites State Parties to put forward proposals on how to deal with them which should be implemented at the latest 
by 31/12/2010, for measures applied by Argentina and Brazil and by 31/12/2012 for measures applied by 
Paraguay y Uruguay. 
61 See, e. g., JULIO BERLINSKY, 'La integraciön profunda en ell Mercosur; perspectivas desde Argentina, Brasil, 
Paraguay y Uruguay', in Julio Berlinsky, et at. (eds) 15 Ahos de MERCOSUR, Comercio, Macroeconomia e 
Inversions Extranjeras (Siglo XXI Red MERCOSUR, Buenos Aires 2006), pp 137-200. 
62 ToA, Art 5(c). 
63 See CARLOS SEPULVEDA & ARTURO VERA AGUIRRE, MERCOSUR: Achievements and Challenges (IADB, 
Washington D. C. 1997). 
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1/1/2006, which basically provided them with extra time for the adoption of a CET for the 
excluded products 64 
At present, having completed the term for the convergence period towards a CET, 
MERCOSUR is still not working as a customs union. 65 Bitter disagreements remain as to what 
should be the rate of a CET "conducive to encourage the foreign competitiveness of State 
Parties' economies", in particular in relation to Capital goods, Information Technology goods 
and Telecommunications goods. As a result, State Parties routinely perforate the CET, 
sometimes with the MERCOSUR Trade Commission's ("MTC") authorisation, sometimes 
without it. The supposedly "common commercial policy" coexists with a myriad of special 
free trade zones and ad hoc special customs regimes unilaterally managed by each State Party. 
And most importantly, the CET is charged on third country's products every time they cross 
national borders within MERCOSUR and there is no mechanism in place for the redistribution 
of the CET's proceedings. 
Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies and Sectoral Agreements 
The other two instruments stipulated by the Treaty for the establishment of a common market 
are the co-ordination of macroeconomic policies, "which shall be carried out gradually and in 
parallel with the programmes for the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of non-tariff 
restrictions... 47 and the adoption of sectoral agreements "in order to optimize the use and 
mobility of factors of production and to achieve efficient scales of operation"68. 
64 See Decisions 13/93,17/01/94; 7/94,5/08/94 and 22/94. The measures to be adopted during the convergence 
period included the following: a) a linear and automatic convergence towards a 14% CET for Capital goods to be 
completed by Argentina and Brazil in 2001 and by Paraguay and Uruguay in 2006; b) a linear and automatic 
convergence towards a 16% CET on Information Technology and Telecommunications goods to be completed by 
all State Parties in 2006; c) Each State Party is allowed for to keep 300 exceptions to the CET until 2001 
(Paraguay 399 exceptions until 2006). 
65 See JULIO BERLINSKY, et at, Hacia una Polltica Comercial Comün en el MERCOSUR (Siglo XXI, Red 
MERCOSUR, Buenos Aires 2005). 
66 Several legislative measures have been adopted with a view to establish the functioning of the customs union. 
Dec 54/04, aimed at the elimination of double charges and the establishment of a mechanism for the redistribution 
of the CET proceedings is one of the most significant. The Decision envisages a MERCOSUR Customs Code to 
be in force by 2008. Whether that Decision will enter into force or not is another matter. Back in 1994 the CMC 
adopted Dec 25/94 approving a Customs Code which never entered into force. 
67 ToA, Art. 5(b). 
68 Ibid. 
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No significant progress has been achieved so far on the co-ordination of macroeconomic 
policies and there is no evidence to suggest that in the near future State Parties will be willing 
to agree on anything more than the exchange of economic information and the harmonisation 
of economic statistics. 69 With respect to sectoral policies, the most significant agreements that 
have been adopted so far are those for the automotive and the sugar sector. State Parties have 
also adopted agreements for the iron and steel, textiles and leather industries. 
In summary, eighteen years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Asuncion, MERCOSUR 
lacks the essential functioning components of a common market. It remains an incomplete 
free trade area, with a partially implemented CET and with no significant degree of co- 
ordination of State Parties' macroeconomic or sectoral policies. 
3. The Treaty of Asuncion and the Latin American Integration Association 
State Parties to the Treaty of Asuncion are also parties to the broader Latin American 
Integration Association (LAIA) established by the Treaty of Montevideo. 70 The preamble to 
the Treaty expressly states that it must be viewed "... as a further step in efforts gradually to 
bring about Latin American integration, in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty of 
Montevideo of 1980". " 
The Treaty of Montevideo prescribes the MFN treatment for any concession granted by a 
LAIA Member to another LAIA member or to a third country. 72 But at the same time, the 
Treaty envisages the possibility for a reduced number of members to confer each other 
reciprocal concessions on a non-MFN basis by celebrating a Partial Scope Agreement 
(PSA). 73 PSAs may refer to trade, economic complementarity, agriculture, trade promotion, or 
other matters such as scientific and technological co-operation, tourism promotion and 
69 On the obstacles for an effective co-ordination of macroeconomic policies between State Parties, see, inter alia, 
FERNANDO LORENZO (COORD), Fundamentos pars, 18 Coordinacibn Macroeconömica en el MERCOSUR (Siglo XXI 
Red MERCOSUR, Buenos Aires 2006). 
70 See above footnote n 7. 
71 See ToA, preamble. See also Declaration of Foreign Ministers No 1, which ratifies State Parties' commitment 
with the ToM and clarifies that the ToA is a step forward towards the advancement of the objectives of the ToM 
72 ToM, Art. 44. Note than on 13 June, 1994, LAIA Members signed an interpretative protocol of art 44 whereby 
Members are no longer obliged to automatically extend concessions granted to Non-members to other LAIA 
Members. The purpose of this protocol was to allow Mexico to enter the NAFTA. 
73 According to Art. 7 PSAs are those wherein all member countries do not participate. The rights and obligations 
established by PSAs only bind the signatory member countries and those adhered thereto. 
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preservation of the environment. The Treaty of Asuncion falls under the category of a PSA on 
Economic Complementarity74 and as such, it is subject to the provisions of the Treaty of 
Montevideo applicable to this type of agreement. 
The Treaty of Montevideo seeks to ensure, in the long-term, the convergence of PSAs into a 
common market. For this purpose, the right to PSAs is subject to certain conditions, namely, 
to be open for accession to the other member countries; to contain clauses promoting 
convergence in order that their benefits reach all member countries; to include provisions on 
special and differential treatment provisions for less advantaged countries; and to be in force 
for a period of no less than three years 75 In accordance with LAIA's requirements, the Treaty 
of Asuncion is open to accession, through negotiations, by other LAIA members. 76 By 
contrast, the requirement to include provisions on special and differential treatment for less 
advantaged countries collides with the Treaty of Asuncion provisions on the reciprocity of 
rights and obligations between State Parties. " 
State Parties to the Treaty of Asuncion are also parties to other PSAs concluded under the 
LAIA umbrella. It is not clear to what extent the participation in others agreements with some 
objectives overlapping those of the Treaty of Asuncion, helps or hinders the integration 
process. 8 What is clear is that for State Parties to the Treaty of Asuncion, MERCOSUR is not 
the only forum where they negotiate trade concessions. In particular, Brazil and Argentina 
74 It was registered in the LAIA's Secretariat as PSA on Economic Complementarity No 18 signed on 29 November 
1991. 
75 ToA, Art. 9. This article also prescribes, the provisions that a Partial Scope Agreement may contain, i. e. clauses 
promoting convergence so as to extend their benefits to all member countries, tariff reductions, specific rules 
regarding origin, safeguard clauses, non-tariff restrictions, withdrawal of concessions, renegotiation of 
concessions, denouncement, coordination and harmonization of policies, among others. 
76 ToA, Art. 20. So far, Venezuela is the first non-founding member in the process of getting full MERCOSUR 
membership status. In addition, Chile and Bolivia became associates members to MERCOSUR in June and 
December 1996 respectively. Associate members seek to establish a free trade area with MERCOSUR but do not 
aim to agree a CET. 
n ToA, art 2. 
78 ToA, Art. 8 compels State Parties to avoid "affecting the interests of the other State Parties or the aims of the 
common market in any agreements they may conclude with other LAIA Members during the transition period". Dec 
32/00 stipulates that from 30/06/01 onwards State Parties will not be allowed to sign new preferential agreements 
or grant new trade preferences in agreements in force under LAIA, unless they have been negotiated by 
MERCOSUR. 
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have their own bilateral PSA79 where they negotiate conditions for their bilateral trade, 
sometimes in line with MERCOSUR objectives, sometimes in stark contrast with them. 80 
4. The Treaty of Asuncion and the WTO 
State Parties to the Treaty of Asuncion are also parties to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). Since Regional Trade Agreements constitute an exception to the Most Favoured 
Nation obligation, State Parties to the Treaty of Asuncion had to notify the agreement to the 
WTO and seek its approval. The agreement was notified under the provisions of the Enabling 
Clause 81 82 83 At present, the Treaty of Asuncion remains under factual examination by the 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements but so far no report has been adopted 84 
There are additional reasons that make WTO law particularly relevant for State Parties to the 
Treaty of Asuncion. First, there are various WTO agreements that have been imported into the 
sub-regional context with minimum or no adjustments at all. " Secondly, disputes between 
State Parties regarding the interpretation, application or breach of the Treaty and its Protocols 
may be subject either to MERCOSUR procedures for the settlement of disputes as prescribed 
79 See PSA No 14. 
80 One example of a very significant measure that affects MERCOSUR trade but was decided outside 
MERCOSUR is the recent adoption of the bilateral Mechanism for Competitive Adjustment between Argentina and 
Brazil. This Mechanism enables each Party to impose safeguards against import surges from the other party. As 
Torrent notes, this mechanism was adopted under the PSA No 14 rather than under the MERCOSUR umbrella so 
as not to extend this benefit to the smaller parties. See Torrent, ob cit, p 53. 
81 See Decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES Parties of 28 November 1979 (26S/203) "Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries", commonly known as the 
Enabling Clause. 
82 A text of the Treaty of Asuncion was first distributed to the Contracting Parties of GATT 1947 on 2 July 1992. 
See GATT Document L/7044,9/07/92- On 22 December 1993, State Parties to the ToA requested that the Treaty 
and its annexes be circulated as official documents of the Working Party on the MERCOSUR Agreement set up by 
the Committee on Trade and Development. See GATT Document 1J7370,18/01/94. On 5 April 1995 State Parties 
presented a document to the Committee on Trade and Development with the answers to a questionnaire on 
MERCOSUR. See WTO Document WTICOMTDl1,2/05/95. 
83 The US criticised the notification path chosen by MERCOSUR to justify its departure from Art. I (MFN) and 
requested the agreement to comply with the more stringent conditions imposed by Art. XXIV GATT 1994. See US 
request on GATT Document L17029,5 June 1992. 
84 See http: //www. wto. orQ/enqlish/tratoD e/region e/status e. xls, last visited 21/01/08. 
B5 See, e. g., Dec 13/97 "approving" the Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in Services, Dec 11/97 on Antidumping 
Measures, Dec 17/96 on the application of Safeguard Measures to Imports from Third Countries. 
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by the Protocol of Olivos or, alternatively, to the dispute settlement system of the WTO, 
provided the parties to the dispute jointly agree on such forum. 86 Finally, to settle the disputes 
between State Parties, ad hoc tribunals must apply not only the Treaty of Asuncion, its 
protocols and the rules adopted by its decision making bodies, but also "applicable principles 
and provisions of international law"87, which logically include those principles of international 
economic law developed by the WTO panels and its Appellate Body. 88 
C. MERCOS! JR Institutions 
The Treaty of Asuncion laid down a provisional institutional structure to administer and 
implement the treaty during the transition period, 89 to be replaced by a "final" one upon its 
completion 90 In December 1994, in compliance with Article 18 of the Treaty, State Parties 
adopted the Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion about MERCOSUR Institutional 
Structure, better known as the Protocol of Ouro Preto (POP)91, which forms an integral part of 
the Treaty of Asuncion. 2 The POP sought to upgrade MERCOSUR institutions to the new 
status of the integration process after the conclusion of the transition period, but keeping the 
adjustments within the intergovernmental parameters laid down by the Treaty of Asuncion-9' 
It established three bodies with decision making power - Common Market Council, Common 
Market Group and MERCOSUR Trade Commission - and two bodies of a consultative nature 
-a Joint Parliamentary Commission (now replaced by the MERCOSUR Parliament) and an 
Economic and Social Consultative Forum plus an Administrative Secretariat. 94 The following 
paragraphs look at the decision making and non-decision making bodies in greater detail. 
86 POL art 1.2. 
87 Ibid. Art. 34. 
88 On the relationship between MERCOSUR law and WTO law see AHAA Brazil - Pork Subsidies, para. 56 and 
AHAA Argentina - Poultry, paras. 127 -130 and 159. Other arbitration awards that refer to WTO case law include, 
e. g., AHAA Argentina - Remoulded Tyres para. 84. 
89 ToA, Arts. 9 to 16. 
90 ToA, Art. 18. 
91 See Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion about MERCOSUR Institutional Structure, signed by the State 
Parties on 17 December 1994 and entering into force on 15 December 1995,34 ILM 1249. 
92 POP, Art. 48. 
93 Ibid. preamble. 
94 The POP does not include provisions on adjudicative bodies, but art 43 refers to the Protocol of Brasilia (now 
replaced by the Protocol of Olivos) for the settlement of disputes between State Parties. The dispute settlement 
system is examined in section E below. 
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1. Decision making Bodies 
1.1 Common Market Council 
The Common Market Council (CMC)95 is the highest body of MERCOSUR, responsible for 
the political leadership of the integration process and the adoption of decisions aimed at 
ensuring the observance of the objectives of the Treaty of Asuncion and the final 
establishment of the Common Market . 
96 It meets at ministerial level, consisting of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Finance of the State Parties 97 It adopts measures by 
way of Decisions, which are binding upon the State Parties 98 Decisions are adopted by 
consensus in the presence of all State Parties " 
The Presidency of the CMC is held in turns by State Parties, in alphabetical order, for periods 
of six months. 10° The CMC formulates policies and adopts the necessary measures for the 
establishment of the common market. In this vein, it expresses its views on the proposals 
submitted by the CMG. It holds MERCOSUR's legal personality and negotiates and signs 
agreements on behalf of MERCOSUR with third countries and international organisations. 10' 
The CMC also performs a supervisory function, having responsibility for monitoring 
compliance with the Treaty of Asuncion, its Protocols and agreements concluded within its 
framework, but it does not have specific enforcement powers against wrongdoers. Finally, it 
has the administrative power to adopt financial and budgetary decisions and to appoint the 
Director of the MERCOSUR Secretariat. 
96 See, generally, POP, arts 3 to 9 and CMC Internal Regulation approved by Dec 2/98. 
96 POP, Art. 3. 
97 POP, Art. 4. As Torrent notes, State Parties opted for having plural representation before decision making 
bodies with a view to ensure the direct involvement of high ranked government officials responsible for economic 
and finance issues and thus avoiding a purely diplomatic design of integration policies with little influence on 
domestic policies. However, the author rightly notes that this plural representation opens the possibility for inter- 
ministerial disputes within national representations that could run against the efficacy of MERCOSUR bodies in 
adopting decisions, in particular when compromises over divisive issues are necessary. See Torrent, ob cit, p 70. 
The overt differences between the Uruguayan Ministries of Finance and Foreign Relations over the Uruguayan 
strategy towards MERCOSUR during 2005-2007 appears to confirm this view. 
98 POP, Art. 9. 
99 Ibid. Art. 37. 
100 Ibid. Art. 5. 
101 Ibid. Art. 8. iii and iv. 
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The CMC meets whenever it deems appropriate, and at least once every six months with the 
participation of the Presidents of the States Parties. 1°2 Its meetings are generally co-ordinated 
by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, with overall responsibility for each meeting lying with 
the State Party that holds the rotating presidency of MERCOSUR. 103 Delegations to the CMC 
meetings can consist of government officials only, 104 although, depending on the agenda, 
representatives from international organisations or group of countries and even representatives 
from the State Parties' social and economic sectors may also be invited to attend. 105 
The CMC established various bodies to provide assistance with particular aspects of the 
integration process106, including, inter alia, a number of specialised Ministerial Meetings, the 
MERCOSUR Commission of Permanent Representatives and the Forum for Consultation and 
Political Agreement. 
Ministerial Meetings provide a forum for Ministers or other high ranked officials to discuss 
and analyse policy issues within their sphere of competence with a view to strengthening 
cooperation and coordination of State Parties' policies. They must operate in accordance with 
the purposes, principles and institutional modalities laid down by the Treaty of Asuncion and 
its Protocols. Ministerial Meetings express themselves via Agreements which must be 
approved by the CMC. 107 Meetings of Ministries of Finance and Presidents of Central Banks 
must take place at least every six months. The CMG participates and coordinates those 
meetings, controls the implementation of the measures adopted and puts forward their 
Agreements and Draft Decision proposals to the CMC. '°8 At least one member from the 
CMG participates in other Ministerial Meetings, except those with competence on non- 
economic or commercial issues which are followed up by the Forum of Consultation and 
Political Agreement. Currently there are fourteen Ministerial Meetings functioning. 109 
102 Ibid. Art. 6. According to Torrent, considering the extension of the agenda, the frequency of CMC meetings is 
too low, in particular for an integration process that was supposed to be filled up by "secondary legislation". See, 
Torrent, ob cit, p 61. 
103 CMC Internal Regulation, Art. 7. 
104 Ibid. Art. 12. 
105 Ibid. Art. 10. In practice, it is common to invite representatives from international organisations such as ECLAC, 
IADB and so forth, but private sector representatives have never been invited to attend CMC meetings. 
106 POP, Art. 1, Art. 8 vi and vii. 
107 CMC Internal Regulation, Art. 17. 
108 CMG Internal Regulation, approved by Dec 4/91, Art. 13. 
109 The Ministerial Meetings include the followings: Ministries of Finance and Central Banks, Ministries of 
Education, Ministries of Justice and Ministries of Labour (since 1991), Ministries of Agriculture (since 1992), 
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The MERCOSUR Committee of Permanent Representatives (MCPR) consists of the 
permanent representatives of the State Parties for MERCOSUR and a President. ' 10 It assists 
the CMC and the MERCOSUR rotating presidency on any tasks that may be requested by any 
of them. It attends CMC meetings and Ministerial meetings. ' 11 It operates in Montevideo, with 
the logistical and technical support provided by MERCOSUR Secretariat. Due to budget 
restrictions, the activities of the MCPR are very much limited to the activities of its president, 
who has been focused on the dissemination and promotion of MERCOSUR (within and 
outside the bloc) and on lobbying State Parties for the incorporation of selected MERCOSUR 
rules of particular relevance for the integration process. 12 
The Forum of Consultation and Political Agreement ("FCPA") consists of State Parties' high 
ranked foreign affairs officials. "' It is responsible for examining and coordinating 
MERCOSUR political agenda, including the examination of international issues of common 
political interest relating to third countries and international organisations. ' 14 It formulates 
recommendations to the CMC for the implementation of MERCOSUR political agenda, 
which must be adopted by consensus and prepares draft Presidential Communications on 
areas within its competence. It must follow up the Ministerial Meetings with competence on 
non-economic or commercial issues (Education, Justice, Culture, Home Affairs, Social 
Development)"' and the Specialised Meetings on Drugs, Women, Legal Aid, Public 
Prosecutors and High Authorities on Human Rights. At least one member of the Forum must 
participate in these meetings. Finally, the Forum must also coordinate with the CMG on 
political issues to be included in the CMC agenda and must participate in the GMC meetings 
that consider these issues. 1 t6 
1.2. Common Market Group 
Ministries of Culture and Ministries of Health (since 1995), Ministries of Home Affairs (since 1996), Ministries of 
Industry (since 1997), Ministries of Mining and Energy and Ministries of Social Development (since 2000), 
Ministries of the Environment and Ministries of Tourism (since 2003), Ministries of Science and Technology (since 
2005). 
110 Created by Dec 11 /03,6/10/03. 
'11 Dec 11/03, Art. 4. 
112 See first MCPR Report on the MCPR activities during the first semester of 2006. 
113 Created by Dec 18/98. 
114 See FCPA Internal Regulation approved by Dec 23/03. 
115Dec 2/02, Art. 3. 
116 FCPA Internal Regulation, art 3. 
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The POP describes the CMG as MERCOSUR executive body' 17 , although the accuracy of this 
expression is questionable in light of the fact that in addition to its executive functions the 
CMG is also an active legislative body. 18 It consists of four members and four alternates for 
each country, appointed by their respective governments including representatives of the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Central Banks and it is co-ordinated by the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs-'19 It adopts measures by way of Regulations that are binding 
upon State Parties120 and it also proposes draft Decisions to the CMC. '2' Regulations are 
adopted by consensus in the presence of all State Parties. 122 
The GMC executive functions include organising the meetings of the CMC and preparing the 
reports and studies that may correspond 123, as well as taking the measures necessary for 
implementing the Decisions adopted by the CMC. 124 It can negotiate agreements with third 
countries and adopt financial and budgetary resolutions, but within the limits of a mandate set 
by the CMC. 125 It supervises the MERCOSUR Secretariat, approving its budget and the 
annual statement of accounts. 126 It also approves the rules of procedures of the MTC and of 
the Economic and Consultative Forum. 127 But the GMC also has its own policy-making 
functions. It may draw up working programmes to ensure progress towards the establishment 
of the common market and express its views on any proposals or recommendations submitted 
to it by other MERCOSUR bodies within their sphere of competence. 128 Finally, the GMC 
must monitor, within the limits of its competence, compliance with the Treaty of Asuncion, its 
Protocols and agreements signed thereunder129 
117 POP, Art. 10. 
118 See generally POP, arts 10 to 15 and CMG Internal Regulation. 
119 POP, Art. 11. Article 12 stipulates that when drafting specific measures in the performance of its tasks, the 
CMG may call on representatives from other MERCOSUR institutional bodies or other authorities or public entities. 
120 POP, Art. 13. 
121 POP, Art. 14 ii. In practice, most Decisions adopted by the CMC are originated by CMG proposals rather than 
by the CMC's self-initiative. 
122 POP, Art. 37. 
123 Ibid. Art. 14 xi. 
124 Ibid. Art. 14 iii. 
125 Ibid. Art. 14 vii and ix. 
126 Ibid. Art. 14 viii, xii, xiii. 
127 Ibid, Art. 14 xiv. 
128 Ibid. Art. 14 v and vi. 
129 Ibid. Art. 14 i. Like the CMC, it has no specific enforcement powers against wrongdoers 
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The GMC holds ordinary meetings at least every three months and extraordinary meetings at 
any time at the request of any State Party. Meetings take place on each State Party on a 
rotating basis. 130 State Parties' delegations to CMG meetings must consist of government 
officials only. 
The CMG may establish, modify or abolish auxiliary bodies in compliance with its duties. 131 
These bodies provide the CMG with the technical input necessary for the adoption of policy 
measures pertaining to specific issues. The CMG uses this power on a regular basis, having 
already created a wide range of auxiliary bodies to support its activities, including Groups, Ad 
hoc Groups, Sub-working groups and Specialised Meetings. 132 Auxiliary bodies to the GMC 
consist of government officials only and also adopt decisions by consensus. They may issue 
Recommendations to the CMG adopted by consensus with the presence of all State Parties . 
133 
They must meet at least one time per semester. '34 
1.3 MERCOSUR Trade Commission 
130 Ibid. Art. 13 and CMG Internal Regulation, Art. 5. 
131 POP, Art. 14 v. 
132 Auxiliary bodies to the CMG include four Groups (Government Procurement in MERCOSUR, Services, 
MERCOSUR Secretariat's Budget, Support for small and medium enterprises), twelve Ad-hoc Groups 
(Concessions, Consultation and Coordination for WTO Negotiations, External Relations, Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary, Sugar, Farming and Livestock Biotechnology, Cigarettes' Trade, Border Integration, MERCOSUR 
Customs Code, Productive Integration in MERCOSUR, Bio. fuels, MERCOSUR domain), fourteen Sub-working 
groups (Communications, Institutional Aspects, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment, Financial 
Issues, Transport, Environment, Industry, Agriculture, Energy, Labour and Social Security, Health, Investments, E- 
Commerce and Mining), fifteen Special Meetings (Family-based Agriculture in MERCOSUR, Cinematographic and 
Audiovisual Authorities in MERCOSUR, Drug Prevention, Science and Technology, Social Communications, Co- 
operatives, Legal Aid, Infrastructure for Integration, Youth, Gender, Public Prosecutors, Governmental bodies for 
internal controls, Common Trade Promotion, Tourism, Governmental bodies for nationals living abroad), one 
Commission (Labour and Social Issues), two Committees (Automobiles and Technical Co-operation) one 
Technical Meeting (Incorporation of MERCOSUR Rules) and one Consultative Forum for Municipal, Provincial, 
and State Authorities, a Macroeconomic Monitoring Group. 
133 CMG Internal Regulation, Art. 21. For further details on its decision making process see above Ch V, Section B. 
134 Dec 59/00, Art. 13. 
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The MTC135 is the body responsible for assisting the CMG to monitor the application of the 
common trade policy instruments agreed by the State Parties in connection with the operation 
of the customs union, 136 as well as to follow up and review questions and issues relating to 
common trade policies, intra-regional trade and trade with third countries. 137 It consists of four 
members and four alternates for each State Party and is co-ordinated by the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs. 138 The MTC adopts Directives, which are binding upon State Parties. 139 Like 
the other decision making bodies, decisions are taken by consensus with the presence of all 
State Parties; however, the MTC Internal Regulation introduces some flexibility to this rule. 140 
The MTC must consider and rule upon requests submitted by the States Parties related to the 
application of and compliance with the common external tariff and the common trade 
policy. 14' It must adopt decisions relating to the administration and application of the CET and 
other instruments of the common trade policy agreed by the State Parties and it must also 
report to the CMG on the development of the application of the common trade policy 
instruments, on the consideration of requests received and on the decisions made with respect 
to such requests. 142 The MTC also operates as a consultation forum where State Parties can 
consult with each other on issues within the MTC's sphere of competence143 and may also 
135 See POP, arts 16 to 21 and MTC Internal Regulation approved by Reg. 61/96. This body was not included in 
the provisional organisational structure laid down by the Treaty of Asuncion. It was originally set up by the CIVIC in 
an irregular way since the CMC did not have power to create new bodies with decision making power. 
136 The main common trade policy instruments are the common external tariff, rules of origin, non-tariff restrictions, 
unfair trade practices, defence of competition, special trade regimes, automotive regime and sugar regime. 
137 POP, Arts. 16 and 19 i, iii, iv, v, x. 
138 POP, Art. 17. It is up to each State Party to choose its representatives before the MTC. They are usually mid- 
rank civil servants from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Economy and from the Customs Authorities. 
139 POP, Art. 20. 
140 Art 13 MTC Internal Regulation prescribes that in the case of absence of representatives from one State Party, 
the Directives and the proposals agreed by the delegations present in the meeting shall be adopted ad-referendum 
the absent State Party agreement and shall be considered approved if within 30 days after the meeting, the absent 
State Party does not formulate objections to its adoption. Therefore, although the consensus rule remains, it is not 
necessary for Directives to be adopted with the presence of all State Parties. Art. 14 stipulates that Directive 
proposals which do not secure consensus or are not able to be considered due to lack of quorum must be 
submitted to the CMG for its consideration. 
141 POP, Art. 19, ii. 
142 Ibid. Art. 19, v, vii. 
143 See Directive 17/99. 
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perform a quasi-adjudicative role, considering complaints referred to it by the National 
Sections of the MTC lodged by State Parties or individuals! 
It holds ordinary meetings at least once a month and extraordinary meetings whenever so 
requested by the CMG or any of the State Parties. 145 Meetings may take place with the 
presence of at least three State Parties. '46 Both ordinary meetings and follow up meetings take 
place in Montevideo at the premises of the MERCOSUR Secretariat. 147 
The MTC may set up technical committees necessary for the adequate performance of its 
duties. 148 Technical Committees consist of members appointed by each State Party. Each 
MTC National Section gives the MTC Rotating Presidency a list of the national coordinators 
for each Committee. Their role is focused on the administration and compliance with specific 
common trade policy instruments. To this end, they compile information, produce technical 
opinions and undertake other technical adyisory duties as requested by the MTC. 149 Technical 
Committees do not have decision making power, but they can submit Recommendations and 
Opinions to the MTC Rotating Presidency. 15° They adopt reports, Recommendations and 
Technical Opinions by consensus, but if consensus is not reached they must still submit the 
144 See Annex to the POP and Dec 18/02. For further details on the consultations and claims procedure before the 
MTC see below Section E. 
145 POP, Art. 18 MTC Internal Regulation, Art. 9. According to Dec 30/03,16/12/03, from 2004 onwards the MTC 
must also hold follow up meetings between ordinary meetings on a regular basis, the objective being to 
strengthening the continuity of its tasks. 
146 MTC Internal Regulation, Art. 11. 
147 Dec 30103, art 3. 
148 POP, Art. 19 ix. Originally ten technical committees were established although currently there are seven 
technical committees in place: Tariffs, Nomenclature and Tariff Classification (deals with the Common External 
Tariff, nomenclature and tariff classification issues); Customs Issues (deals with customs control and 
administration and customs valuation issues); Trade Rules and Disciplines (deals with rules of origin, foreign trade 
zones, export incentives and special importation regimes); Public Policies that Distort Competition (identifies public 
policy measures that distort competition with a view to harmonise or eliminate them), Defence of Competition 
(entrusted with the task of creating and monitoring the implementation of an instrument for the defence of 
competition); Trade Defence and Safeguards (entrusted with the task of creating a common regulatory framework 
on unfair trade practices and safeguards against third countries) and Consumer Protection (entrusted with the task 
of creating a common regulatory framework for consumer protection). 
149 MTC Internal Regulation, Art. 17. 
160 Ibid. Art. 17. 
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different opinions to the MTC for its consideration. 15' They must meet at least one time per 
semester. 
' 52 
2. Non Decision Making Bodies 
2.1. MERCOSUR Parliament 
The MERCOSUR Parliament is the newest of MERCOSUR institutions. 153 It replaced the 
Joint Parliamentary Commission (JPC) established by the POP. 154 Its purpose is to represent 
the interests of the peoples of MERCOSUR, to promote and defend democracy, freedom and 
peace; to advance the sustainable development of the region, respecting the cultural diversity 
of its people; to ensure the participation of private actors in the integration process and to 
contribute with the consolidation of the Latin American integration process. '55 
The Parliament's duties include monitoring and legislative tasks. Its monitoring duties are 
defined broadly, including monitoring compliance with MERCOSUR rules156, monitoring the 
observance of democracy and human rights in State Parties 15' and monitoring the integration 
process and the role played by other MERCOSUR bodies. For this purpose, the Protocol 
entrusts the Parliament with a wide range of powers to seek information from decision making 
bodies, but it does not confer powers on it to approve, disapprove or block in any way their 
decisions. '58 
151 Ibid. Art. 19. For further details on its decision making process see supra Ch V, Section B. 
152 Dec 59/00, art 13. 
153 See Protocol for the Establishment of MERCOSUR Parliament, signed on 9 December 2005 (Dec 23/05). The 
Protocol has been ratified by all State Parties, but in Uruguay, the Supreme Court of Justice is currently 
considering an action for the annulment of the Act of Parliament that ratified the Protocol (Ley No 18.063) on 
grounds of its incompatibility with the Constitution. 
154 See POP, Arts. 22 to 27. The JPC consisted of equal number of members of parliaments representing the 
State Parties appointed by the respective national parliaments and it was responsible for speeding up the internal 
procedures to ensure the prompt entry into force of the rules adopted by MERCOSUR bodies and to assist, as 
required, with the harmonisation of legislation to advance the integration process. 
155 PMP, Art. 2. 
156 Ibid. Art. 4.1 
157 Ibid. Arts. 4.2 and 4.3. 
158 The Parliament's monitoring powers include the power to request reports and opinions from MERCOSUR 
bodies on issues relating to the integration process (Art. 4.1); power to invite, through the CMC Rotating 
Presidency, representatives from MERCOSUR bodies to inform about or assess the development of the 
integration process (Art. 4.5); power to receive a delegation from the State Party holding MERCOSUR Rotating 
84 
The MERCOSUR Parliament's legislative role includes three different types of actions. First, 
it must work in conjunction with national parliaments with the aim of ensuring compliance 
with MERCOSUR objectives, in particular with those relating to legislative activity! " The 
main objective here is for the MERCOSUR Parliament to liaise with national parliaments with 
a view to speed up the entry into force of MERCOSUR rules that require an act of parliament 
to take effect within national legal systems. Secondly, the Protocol imposes on MERCOSUR 
decision making bodies the duty to consult the MERCOSUR Parliament prior to adopting 
secondary rules that would require approval from national parliaments for their incorporation 
into national legal systems-160 The Parliament's opinion is not binding on the decision making 
body proposing the rule, who may decide to adopt it disregarding such opinion. 161 If that is the 
case, the entry into force of the rule remains subject to the normal procedure applicable to 
MERCOSUR rules in general. 162 Thirdly, contrary to what is the essence of a parliamentary 
institution, the MERCOSUR Parliament simply has the right to propose draft rules to the 
CMC, in particular rules dealing with the harmonisation or mutual recognition of State 
Parties' national legislation. 163 But this is completely different from the co-decision procedure 
established by the EC Treaty because the CMC is not bound in any way to adopt the 
Presidency at the beginning and end of its tenure for the presentation of a report about the activities planned 
executed during the period (Arts. 4.6 and 4.7); power to receive from MERCOSUR Secretariat a report on the 
execution of its budget on an annual basis (Art. 4.19); power to receive, examine and, eventually, to forward to the 
decision making bodies, petitions from individuals of the State Parties relating to MERCOSUR bodies' actions or 
omissions (Art. 4.10); and power to request consultative opinions to the Permanent Review Tribunal (Art. 4.13). 
159 Ibid. Art. 4.15. 
160 This measure aims to prevent decision making bodies from adopting rules at MERCOSUR level that may end 
up not being incorporated in national legal systems due to national parliaments' refusal to incorporate them. 
161 Ibid. Art. 4.12 stipulates that before adopting a rule that requires parliamentary approval, MERCOSUR decision 
making bodies must request an opinion from MERCOSUR Parliament, which must be issued within 90 days 
following the request. If the draft rule is approved in accordance with the Parliament's opinion, the Executive 
Power in each State Party must submit the rule for the approval of the national parliament within 45 days of its 
adoption by the MERCOSUR decision making body. The Protocol requires national parliaments to implement a 
special procedure for the consideration of MERCOSUR rules adopted in accordance with MERCOSUR's 
Parliament opinion. Such procedure should not be longer than 180 days. If the national parliament rejects the rule, 
it must be re-sent to the Executive who, in its turn, will present it on the corresponding MERCOSUR body for its 
reconsideration. 
162 Ibid. Art. 4.12. 
163 Ibid. Art. 4.13 and 4.14. 
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Parliament's proposed draft rules. The CMC simply has to report back to the Parliament 
informing about the way the proposal is being dealt with. " 
Until 31 December 2010, the MERCOSUR Parliament shall consist of 18 members for each 
State Party appointed by their domestic parliaments. 165 From 2011 onwards the members of 
MERCOSUR Parliament shall be elected directly by State Parties' citizens through direct, 
universal and secret vote in accordance with a criterion for citizenship representation which 
has not yet been defined. 166 The Parliament will meet on ordinary sessions at least once a 
month in Montevideo. 167 Decisions will be adopted by simple, absolute, special and qualified 
majorities. 168 The Parliament will decide on its budget, but during the transition period until 
31/12/10, the Parliament's budget will be financed by State Parties in equal parts. 169 
In substance, the Parliament's monitoring and legislative powers are strictly limited and do 
not alter the intergovernmental character of the law-making process laid down by the POP, 
which concentrates the decision making power on bodies consisting of government officials 
only. On paper, the "parliament" label, which brings to mind ideas of citizenship participation, 
decision making and accountability, seems to be disproportionate to the powers effectively 
conferred on this particular institution. But it remains to be seen how this novel institution will 
perform and what impact it could have on the integration process. 
2.2. Economic-Social Consultative Forum 
The Economic-Social Consultative Forum (ESCF) 170 is a consultative body representing the 
economic and social sectors. It consists of equal numbers of representatives from each State 
Party. "' Each ESCF National Section is free to choose the organisations representing the 
social and economic sectors. The organisations chosen must be truly representative and of a 
164 Ibid. Art. 4.13. 
165 Ibid. second transitional provision. 
166 Ibid. Art. 5.1. 
167 Ibid. art 17. 
168 Ibid, sixth transitional provision prescribes that until the end of the first transition stage. Parliament's opinions for 
the purposes of Art. 4.12 must be approved by special majority, i. e. two thirds of the total number of MERCOSUR 
Members of Parliament. 
169 Ibid. seventh transitional provision. 
170 POP, arts 28 to 30 and ESCF Internal Regulation approved by Res 68/96. 
1» POP, Art. 28. 
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national Character. 172 In general, each National Section consists of trade unions and business 
organisations. 
The ESCF functions are defined broadly, including, issuing its views on MERCOSUR 
internal issues or on the relationship between MERCOSUR and third countries, monitoring 
the social and economic impact of integration policies, fostering the participation of the civil 
society on the integration process and promoting MERCOSUR "real" integration and 
disseminating its socio-economic dimension. ' 73 
ESCF structure consists of a Plenary Session14 and an Administrative Co-ordination. 175 Each 
ESCF National Section is entitled to nine delegates and nine substitutes to the Plenary 
Session. 176 The ESCF Plenary Session expresses its views by way of Recommendations to the 
CMG, "' which are adopted by consensus of all National Sections. Recommendations may be 
issued by self-initiative or as a result of a consultation by the CMG or other MERCOSUR 
bodies18, but as the name suggests, they are not binding on the CMG. When the Plenary 
Session meets to consider a consultation by the CMG and does not reach an agreement, all 
different views must be submitted to the consulting body. 179 
The ESCF Plenary Session holds at least one ordinary meeting per semester. It must approve 
the ESCF budget, but so far it has not been approved. In the meantime, the organisations that 
form each National Section are responsible for their own functioning costs. It is the only 
MERCOSUR body that does not receive any kind of financial support from State Parties' 
governments. The National Section that hosts the Plenary Session meeting must bear the costs 
of its organisation. 180 
In practice, the ESCF has failed to channel the civil society's views about the integration 
process to MERCOSUR decision making bodies, which, in its turn, have never consulted the 
172 ESCF Internal Regulation, Arts. 3.1 and 3.2. 
173 Ibid. Art. 2. 
174 Ibid. Arts. 5 to 8. 
175 Ibid. Arts. 9 to 11. 
176 Ibid. Art. 6. 
177 POP, Art. 29. 
178 ESCF Internal Regulation, Art. 2.1 
179 Ibid. Art. 16. 
180 Ibid. Art. 23. 
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ESCF nor have taken into account the few Recommendations the ESCF has issued. ' 81 On the 
contrary, the ESCF has been more a vehicle of ex post communication of decisions already 
adopted by MERCOSUR decision making bodies than an instrument of ex ante 
participation. 182 
2.3. MERCOSUR Secretariat 
The MERCOSUR Secretariat was originally envisaged by the Treaty of Asuncion to perform 
purely administrative duties for the CMG. 183 The POP assigned the Administrative Secretariat 
new responsibilities including, inter alia, serving as the official archive for MERCOSUR 
documentation; publishing and circulating the decisions adopted within the framework of 
MERCOSUR including the publication of the MERCOSUR Official Gazette; providing 
logistical support for the meetings of MERCOSUR bodies; reporting to State Parties about the 
measures taken by each member to incorporate the decisions adopted by MERCOSUR bodies in 
national legal systems; 184 and performing any other tasks requested by the CMC, CMG and the 
MTC. 185 The POP stipulates that the Secretariat must have a budget that must be funded by 
equal contributions from the State Parties. 186 The Secretariat drafts the proposed budget and 
submits it for the CMG approval. 18' The Secretariat is headed by a Director appointed by the 
CMC for a non-renewable two-year period. 188 
18' See comments by CELINA PENA & RICARDO ROZENBERG, MERCOSUR: An Experience in Sustainable 
Institutional Development? ' in, Second Annual Conference of the Euro-Latin Study Network on Integration and 
Trade (ELSNIT) (2004), p8 and comments made by Juan Jose Fraschini, Uruguayan Representative of Business 
Organisations before the ESCF, in a MERCOSUR Conference held in Rio de Janeiro 28-29 August 2006, available 
at www. esaectador. com, last visited 11/04/08. For a critical analysis of the private sector's participation (or lack of 
it) in the MERCOSUR process see JORGE FERNANDEZ REYES, 'El Sector Privado en el MERCOSUR', (2001) 2 
Revista de Derecho del MERCOSUR 157. 
182 See ROBER7o BOUZAS, et at., In-depth analysis of MERCOSUR integration, its prospectives and the effects 
thereof on the market access of EU goods, services and investment (Observatory of Globalization, Universidad de 
Barcelona, Barcelona 2002), p 11. 
183 ToA, Art. 15. 
184 For further details of the Secretariat's monitoring role see below Section E, numeral 1. 
185 POP, Art. 32. 
186 POP, Art. 45. 
187 POP, Art. 32. VII and 14. Vlll. 
188 POP, Art. 33. 
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In 2002, the CMC adopted a Decision initiating a process for the transformation of the 
Administrative Secretariat into a Technical Secretariat. 189 The Decision's preamble refers to the 
need for a technical body able to act from a common perspective and from there contribute to 
the consolidation of MERCOSUR. 190 It also acknowledges that the transformation of the 
Secretariat must be gradual, in light of the evolution of the integration process and of the 
availability of human and material resources. 191 
The modifications introduced by the CMC Decision consist on the creation of a Technical 
Advice Sector (TAS), consisting of four experts entrusted with the following duties: a) provide 
technical advice to MERCOSUR decision making bodies at their request; b) monitor the 
evolution of the integration process and produce bi-annual assessment reports to this effect, 
which should identify - from a common perspective - regulatory deficiencies and other specific 
obstacles to the integration process, and suggest proposals to address these obstacles to the 
decision making bodies; c) carry out studies of general interest for the integration process, 
subject to the CMC approval and d) control the consistency of draft rules proposed by auxiliary 
bodies with existing rules. 192 
The limited significance of the step taken for the establishment of a much needed technical 
bureaucracy independent from national administrations is clear. 193 The TAS has no power to 
carry out studies on its own initiative or to make unsolicited recommendations to the decision 
making bodies. It has no financial autonomy and the size of its budget is ludicrously small for 
the tasks assigned to it. '94 Furthermore, the CMG has recently decided to suspend the 
consistency control of draft rules assigned to the Secretariat and not resume it until an 
exhaustive assessment and further regulation of its procedure is carried out. 195 Not to mention 
189 See Dec 30/02. 
190 Ibid. preamble. 
191 Ibid. preamble. 
192 Ibid. Annex I. As for the legal consistency control, the TAS' legal opinion is not binding on decision making 
bodies and the absence of an opining does not preclude MERCOSUR decision making bodies from adopting 
Decisions, Regulations or Directives. 
193 See MARIO FluwDOt0, 'Eficacia de las instituciones en el MERCOSUR: el caso de la Secretaria T6cnica', (2006) 
Anuario de Derecho Constitucional Latinoamericano - Fundaclön Konrad Adenauer 667. 
'9" For the first budget approved by the CMG for the 1997 fiscal year State Parties contributed on equal parts to a 
total sum of US$ 980,887 (Res 67/96,21/6/96). For the 2007 fiscal year, State Parties contribution amounted to 
US$ 980,896 (63/06,24/11/06), which means that ten years later the contributions remained the same in absolute 
terms. 
195 See minutes of GMC XXIX extraordinary meeting, point 8. 
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the fact that the first technical report produced by the TAS remained in the MERCOSUR 
website for no more than a couple of months until the decision was taken to remove it. 196 Since 
then technical reports have not been made public. 
In summary, the POP established bodies with decision making power but such bodies consist of 
government officials only who adopt decisions by consensus. Subsequent institutional reforms 
relating to the transformation of the Administrative Secretariat into a Technical Secretariat and 
to the replacement of the JPC by the MERCOSUR Parliament did not alter the 
intergovernmental patterns of the decision making system. Rhetoric aside, State Parties are not 
willing to give up their capacity to exert strict control over the scope and pace of the integration 
process. However, the process of institutional development has not yet concluded. The POP 
envisages the possibility for State Parties to convene a diplomatic conference for the purpose of 
reviewing MERCOSUR institutional structure. 197 Although this conference has not yet been 
convened, in December 2005 the CMC set up a high level ad hoc group consisting of 
representatives from State Parties with the task of preparing a proposal for a substantial reform 
of MERCOSUR institutional structure, which is currently under negotiations. 198 
D. Sources of MERCOSUR Law 
The Protocol of Ouro Preto lists three sources of MERCOSUR law: "The Treaty of Asuncion, 
its protocols and the additional or supplementary instruments"199; "The agreements concluded 
within the framework of the Treaty of Asuncion and its protocols"200; "The Decisions of the 
196 See SECRETARIA DEL MERCOSUR, Primer Informe Semestral de Is Secretarfa del MERCOSUR (Secretarla del 
Mercosur, Montevideo 2004). Luckily, this author downloaded the report before it was removed from the 
MERCOSUR official website. 
197 POP, Art. 47. 
198 See Dec 21/05. According to its terms of reference, the ad hoc group must prepare a proposal for reform that 
covers, inter alia, a restructure of decision making bodies, including their auxiliary bodies and their sphere of 
competence; a new system for the incorporation, entry into force and implementation of MERCOSUR derived law; 
optimisation of competences and functions of the MERCOSUR Secretariat; analysis of the possibility to establish 
new bodies for the administration of common policies; improvement of the system for the settlement of disputes; 
and the adoption of a budget suitable for financing the operation of MERCOSUR institutions. The original deadline 
for the presentation of the proposal was December 2006, but it has been postponed on several occasions by 
Decisions 22/06,29/06,17/07 and 56/07. The current deadline is 30 June 2009. Unfortunately, the meetings of 
the ad hoc group on MERCOSUR's institutional reform are not public. 
199 POP, Art. 41 i. 
2 Ibid. Art. 41 ii. 
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Council of the Common Market, the Resolutions of the Common Market Group and the 
Directives of the MERCOSUR Trade Commission adopted since the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Asuncion"201. The expressions "Original Law" 202 or "Primary Law" 203 are used to 
refer to the rules mentioned by numerals I and II of Article 41 POP, and "Derived Law" or 
"Secondary Law"204 to refer to the rules mentioned by numeral III. 
Most commentators agree that Article 41 POP does not prescribe an exhaustive enumeration of 
legal sources, arguing that, should it be necessary, there is nothing that prevents the interpreter 
of MERCOSUR law from resorting to international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law; general principles of international law and awards from ad hoc tribunals or the 
Permanent Review Tribunal ("PRT")205 In addition, the Protocol of Olivos stipulates that 
disputes must be settled on the basis of the rules mentioned by Article 41 POP, as well as the 
principles and rules of international law applicable to the subject matter unless the parties have 
agreed for the Tribunal to decide the case ex aequo et bono206 The following paragraphs 
examine the characteristics of MERCOSUR primary law and secondary law. 
1. Primary Law 
MERCOSUR primary law consists of the Treaty of Asuncion, its protocols, additional or 
supplementary instruments and other agreements concluded within its framework. 207 All of 
these instruments are treaties, that is, international agreements concluded between States in 
201 Ibid. Art. 42 iii. 
202 See, e. g., Basaldüa, ob cit, p 667; Perez Otermin, JORGE PEREZ OTERMIN, El Mercado Comün del Sur. Desde 
Asunciön a Ouro Preto. Aspectos Jurldico-Institucionales (Fundacibn de Cultura Universitaria, Montevideo 2000), 
p 104; LUTZ OLAVO BAPTISTA, MERCOSUR, its Institutions and Juridical Structure (1998)., p 60, available at 
www. ctrc. sice: oas. ora/Qeoaraah/southmsät2 e. Ddf last visited 9/09/07. 
203 See, e. g., ALEJANDRO FREELAND LOPEZ LECUBE, Manual de Derecho Comunitario, Anälisis Comparativo de la 
Uniön Europea y el MERCOSUR (Editorial Abaco de Rodolfo Depalma, Buenos Aires 1996), p 182. 
204 These are merely doctrinal classifications, which, to some extent have been recognised by the case law (e. g. 
see AHAA Brazil - Pork Subsidies, para. 53). However, some authors suggest other classifications. For instance, 
Olavo Batista speaks about "internal" and "external" sources (see Olavo Batista, ob cit, p 59), whereas Haines- 
Ferrari refers to numerals I and II of Art. 41 as "sources of conventional character" and numeral III as "sources of 
unilateral character". See MARTA HAINES FERRARI, The MERCOSUR Codes (BIICL, London 2000), p 46. 
205 See, in this vein, Basaldüa, ob cit, p 668. 
2w See Protocol of Olivos, Art. 34. The arbitral awards themselves do not set a binding precedent but in practice 
arbitrators rely heavily on previous decisions. Also, it is not uncommon for arbitrators to refer to the case law of the 
WTO, Andean Court of Justice and of the ECJ. 
207 POP, Art. 41 i, ii. 
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written form. As such, their conclusion, entry into force, observance, application and 
interpretation is governed by international law. 208 
These agreements confer rights and impose obligations on State Parties at international law, and 
must be performed by them in good faith. 209 However, for these instruments to be given effect in 
national law they must follow the procedure prescribed for the reception of international law 
prescribed by each State Party's constitution, which normally requires an act of the national 
Parliament. 210 Some of these international instruments have been "approved" by Decisions of 
the CMC, but this is nothing more than an unnecessary formality, since it is not the CMC but the 
State Parties themselves who negotiate and conclude the agreements, with the CMC simply 
providing a forum for its negotiation. 11 State disputes that may arise as a result of the 
interpretation or application of MERCOSUR primary law, must be dealt with through the 
arbitral procedure provided for by the Protocol of Olivos. 212 
In terms of its subject matter, MERCOSUR primary law includes, first of all, those agreements 
that establish the objectives of MERCOSUR, its principles and the main institutions for the 
governance of the integration process, namely, the Treaty of Asuncion, the Additional Protocol 
on MERCOSUR Institutional Structure (Protocol of Ouro Preto), the Protocol of Olivos for the 
Settlement of Disputes on MERCOSUR, and the Protocol on the establishment of the 
MERCOSUR Parliament. All these instruments have been ratified by all State Parties and are 
currently in force. 
However, MERCOSUR primary law is not limited to those agreements laying down the 
constitutional foundations of the integration process. It also includes various international 
instruments focused on a wide range of issues of a particular character. First, there are those 
additional and supplementary instruments to the Treaty of Asuncion directly related to its 
economic integration objectives, which contain specific trade disciplines on particular issues 
208 See in particular the Viena Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT). 
2W VCLT, Art. 26. 
210 For an exhaustive analisis of State Parties' constitutional requirements for the reception of international law see 
ALEJANDRO DANIEL PEROTTI, Habilitacion constitucional para IS integraciön comunitaria: estudio sobre los Estados 
del MERCOSUR (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Montevideo 2004). 
211 See, for instance, the Protocol of Colonia for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments in 
MERCOSUR "approved" by Dec 11/93. 
212 See below Section C. 
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such as intellectual property, services, investment, competition and government procurement. 213 
Secondly, there are a number of agreements concluded within the framework of the Treaty of 
Asuncion, which are focused on non-economic aspects of the integration process, such as 
education, culture, judicial affairs, security, defence and environmental protection. 214 Finally, 
there are some international agreements particularly relevant for private persons that address 
specific issues arising from cross-border transactions such as conflict of laws and international 
arbitration. 215 
The use of primary law for regulating specific trade disciplines and other non-constitutional 
aspects of the integration process is incorrect. It has been rightly pointed out that primary law 
should be reserved for laying down the objectives of the integration process, institutional 
arrangements to bring integration forward and manage it, and the permanent values informing 
the integration process; whereas the details about specific trade disciplines or co-operation 
agreements on non-trade matters should be regulated through secondary law216 To 
"constitutionalise" issues such as the MERCOSUR Customs Code or the various Protocols on 
the mutual recognition of educational degrees, is unnecessarily costly and inefficient because it 
confers an undesirable level of rigidity to legislation that deals with specific and changing 
circumstances 217 
2. Secondary Law 
MERCOSUR secondary law consists of "Decisions" of the CMC, "Resolutions" of the CMG 
and "Directives" of the MTC adopted since the entry into force of the Treaty of Asuncion. 218 
213 See, e. g., Protocol of Fortaleza for the Defence of Competition in MERCOSUR, Protocol of Harmonisation of 
Norms of Intellectual Property in MERCOSUR on Matters of Trademarks, Geographical Indications and 
Denominations of Origin, Protocol on Government Procurement in MERCOSUR. 
214 See, e. g., various agreements on co-operation and reciprocal assistance between domestic judicial authorities 
on civil and criminal affairs such as extradition or interim measures, or the various protocols on the mutual 
recognition of primary and secondary education and university degrees. 
215 See, e. g., Protocol of San Luis on Matters of Civil Responsibility Arising out of Road Accidents between the 
State Parties of MERCOSUR, Protocol of Buenos Aires on international Jurisdiction for Contractual Matters, 
Agreement on International Commercial Arbitration in MERCOSUR. 
216 See Torrent, ob cit, pp 58-59. 
217 See also Ch V, where the use of primary law for regulating matters on specific service sectors is also criticised. 
218 POP, Art. 41 iii. 
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The intergovernmental character of decision making bodies confers State Parties direct control 
over the development of secondary law. 219 
The Protocol stipulates that secondary rules shall be binding upon State Parties. 20 At the same 
time it provides that "when necessary secondary rules must be incorporated in the domestic 
legal systems through the procedures provided for in each country's legislation". 22 1 For those 
rules that must be incorporated into domestic legal systems, the Protocol stipulates a three-step 
procedure to ensure their "simultaneous entry into force". 22 First, once the rule has been 
adopted by the decision making body, each State Party has to take all the necessary measures for 
its incorporation into their domestic legal systems and notify the MERCOSUR Secretariat 
accordingly. 223 Secondly, when all State Parties have reported this incorporation, the Secretariat 
notifies this fact to each State PartyZ24 Finally, the MERCOSUR rule enters into force 
simultaneously in the States Parties thirty days after the date of the communication made by the 
MERCOSUR Secretariat. Within this period, State Parties must publish the entry into force of 
the MERCOSUR rule in their respective official journals. 225 
The above provisions touch upon two complex and controversial legal issues that lie at the heart 
of any integration agreement, namely, the reception of secondary rules on domestic legal 
systems and their applicability to natural and legal persons. Not surprisingly, these provisions 
have spurred extensive litigation before MERCOSUR ad hoc tribunals and domestic courts. At 
219 To put it in Weiler's terms, there is no element of "decisional supranationality" as in the community pillar of the 
EU. See above Ch I, footnote n 144. 
220 POP, arts 9,15,20,38 and 42. 
221 Ibid. Art. 42. 
222 Ibid. Art. 40. Officially, the rationale for the so-called doctrine of "simultaneous entry into force" is to protect the 
diligent State Party who completes the incorporation process quickly and therefore has to apply the more onerous 
MERCOSUR rule to its own citizens, from finding itself in a disadvantageous position compared to those less 
diligent States which have failed to incorporate such rule. A more cynical understanding of this provision 
suggested by Torrent claims that its objective is simply to confer State Parties a second opportunity to veto 
MERCOSUR rules (the first being at the time of its adoption through the consensus rule). The author points out 
that this second veto exacerbates MERCOSUR decision making bodies' irresponsible legislative practice, because 
governmental officials know that no matter what they agree at the MERCOSUR level, should they wish to change 
their mind afterwards they can always do so simply by not incorporating the rule into the national legal system. See 
Torrent, ob cit, p 52. 
223 Ibid. Art. 40 i). 
224 Ibid. Art. 40 ii). 
225 Ibid. Art. 40 iii). 
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the doctrinal level, opinions differ sharply. 226 The following paragraphs examine these two 
issues in further detail. 
As mentioned, Article 40 provides that "... when necessary secondary rules must be 
incorporated in the domestic legal systems through the procedures provided for in each country's 
legislation" 227 There is no difficulty in inferring from the "when necessary" expression that not 
all secondary rules need to be incorporated into domestic legal systems. It remains to be clarified 
which ones must be incorporated into domestic legal systems and, more importantly, where 
should one look at for an answer, namely, at MERCOSUR law or at State Parties' national legal 
systems. 
Some secondary rules have been adopted with a view to clarify the point . 
22' Decision 23/00 
anticipates two hypotheses in which the incorporation is not necessary: a) when all State Parties 
agree that the rule in question refers to the organisation or internal functioning of 
MERCOSUR. 229 In this case, the norm must expressly indicate that it does not need to be 
incorporated into State Parties' legal system and the rule will enter into force upon its 
adoption; 23° b) when there is a domestic rule that contemplates the MERCOSUR rule on 
identical terms. In this case, the State Party must communicate the existence of that rule to the 
Secretariat, within the term prescribed for the incorporation of the rule and the Secretariat will 
inform the other State Parties accordingly. 231 Decision 20/02 further specifies that in order to 
ensure uniformity, State Parties must incorporate the entire text of the MERCOSUR rule232 It 
226 At one extreme, there are those who claim that MERCOSUR law - both primary and secondary - has a purely 
international character and therefore, if it is to become enforceable in national territories it must be incorporated 
into the domestic legal systems in accordance with the State Parties' constitutional requirements for the reception 
of international law (see, e. g. Haines Ferrari, ob cit, p 48; Olavo Baptista, ob cit, p 61, Perez Otermin, ob cit, p 
118). At the other extreme, there are those who have argued in favour of the direct applicability and direct effect of 
MERCOSUR secondary law in national legal systems (In this author's view, the strongest argumentation in this line 
is provided by PEROrn, 'Estructura Institutional y Derecho en el MERCOSUR', (2002), 6 Revista de Derecho 
Intemacional y del MERCOSUR 63. 
227 POP, Art. 42. 
23 The practice of using secondary rules to clarify the meaning of treaty provisions is, to say the least, 
questionable. 
2n See, e. g., Decisions relating to the MERCOSUR Agenda such as Dec 26/03,16 Dec 2003 establishing 
MERCOSUR Working Programme for 2004 -2006 or Decisions and Regulations establishing or modifying auxiliary 
bodies to the CMC or the CMG. 
230 Dec 23/00, Art. 5 a). 
231 Ibid. Art. 5 b) on its version given by Dec 20/02, Art. 10. 
232 Dec 20/02, Art. 7. 
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also prescribes that it is for the State Parties acting together to decide in which cases the 
MERCOSUR rule, by reason of its nature or content, needs only to be incorporated by one or 
some State Parties in accordance with art 42 POP233 
Ad hoc arbitration awards have so far confirmed the indirect applicability of secondary rules and 
the need for their incorporation into domestic legal systems to have effect on private parties. For 
instance, in Brazil - Pork Subsidies the ad hoc tribunal held that Decision 10/94 is not directly 
applicable to the CONAB system, but requires to be implemented and therefore cannot be 
invoked as creating specific rights and obligations . 
234 In the same vein, in Argentina - Textiles, 
the ad hoc tribunal held that secondary rules do not enter into force until they have been 
incorporated by all state Parties in accordance with Article 40235 In Argentina - Poultry, the ad 
hoc tribunal followed previous interpretations, but also suggested that State Parties become 
bound to incorporate secondary rules upon their adoption. 236 It justified the lack of direct 
applicability in the following terms: "MERCOSUR decision making bodies have an 
intergovernmental nature, which in itself excludes the possibility for the direct and immediate 
applicability of their rules in each of the State Parties.... The direct applicability of 
MERCOSIJR rules would not have been compatible with some of State Parties' constitutional 
regimes... "237 The award also held that it falls to each State Party to decide when and how it is 
necessary to incorporate a secondary rule. 38 It submitted that the answers to the "when" and 
"how" will depend on State Parties' constitutional systems, the interpretation of which 
corresponds to each State Party, since they have not delegated this power to MERCOSUR 
decision making bodies. 39 Similar considerations were put forward in the Brazil - 
Phytosanitary Products240 and in Uruguay - Cigarettes, where it was held that both 
MERCOSUR primary and secondary rules must be incorporated into national legal systems in 
accordance to the procedures established by State Parties' constitutions 24' 
233 Ibid. Art. 12. 
2% See AHAA Brazil - Pork Subsidies, para. 76. 
235 See clarification to AHAA Argentina - Textiles, p. 2. The Award, however, acknowledges the Argentinian 
submission that in practice, a secondary rule enters into force in a State Party when incorporation measures have 
been adopted and published in the official journal, regardless of whether other State Parties have incorporated the 
rule or not. 
236 AHAA Argentina - Poultry, para. 114 - 119. 
237 Ibid. para. 114. 
238 Ibid., para. 119. 
239 Ibid. para. 119. 
240 AHAA Brazil - Phytosanitary Products, para. 7.3,7.5,8.2. 
241 AHAA Uruguay - Cigarettes, p. 5. 
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The Protocol prescribes that, once adopted; secondary rules shall be binding upon State 
Parties242, whereas at the same time, it conditions their entry into force to the adoption by State 
Parties of the necessary measures for their incorporation into their domestic legal systems 243 
The harmonious interpretation of these provisions is not straightforward. The Protocol leaves 
two important issues open for f uther consideration. First, what are the normative implications 
of a secondary rule that has been adopted by a decision making body but has not yet been 
incorporated into national legal systems and who is bound by them, and secondly, at what point 
do secondary rules reach private parties, i. e. when can natural and legal persons rely on those 
rules and seek protection for the rights conferred by them from domestic courts. 
In the course of litigation proceedings some State Parties have suggested that a secondary rule 
that has not been incorporated into national legal systems is merely a "programmatic 
commitment"244 or a "baseline for further negotiations"245 without any binding effect on State 
Parties. But various arbitration awards have rejected these claims, arguing instead that 
unincorporated rules do have relevant normative implications at international law, albeit for 
State Parties only. In Argentina - Poultry the ad hoc tribunal held, on the one hand, that 
secondary rules are binding upon State Parties since the moment they are adopted, compelling 
them to adopt the necessary measures for the incorporation of secondary rules into their national 
legal SySteMS. 246 The State Party who fails to comply with this obligation is liable at 
international law to those State Parties that did comply with it 247 The complying States can seek 
compensatory measures by resorting to the dispute settlement procedure. 248 On the other hand, 
the Tribunal held that the rule enters into force and thus its provisions become applicable to 
natural and legal persons upon completion by all State Parties of the incorporation requirements 
stipulated by Article 40 . 
249 This interpretation was confirmed in Brazil - Phytosanitary 
Products250 and in Uruguay - Cigarettes? 
s' 
242 POP, Arts. 9,15,20,38 and 42. 
243 Ibid. Art. 40 i. 
244 See Brazilian defence in relation to the nature of Dec 10/94 in AHAA Brazil - Pork Subsidies, para. 26. 
245 See Argentinian defense in relation to Dec 11/97 in AHAA Argentina - Poultry para. 53. 
246 Ibid. para. 116-118. 
247 Ibid. para. 116-118. 
248 Ibid. para. 116-118. 
249 Ibid. para. 116 - 118. It seems that the Tribunal used the word "applicable" to refer to the application of the 
secondary rule to natural and legal persons. 
250 AHAA Brazil - Phytosanitary Products, para. 7.5-7.8. 
251 AHAA Uruguay - Cigarettes, p 5. 
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The Protocol does not specify a term within which the incorporation process must be completed. 
Occasionally, this loophole is filled up by the secondary rule itself, which expressly states a term 
for this purpose. Some State Parties have argued that when the secondary rule does not stipulate 
a term, it falls within each State Party's discretion to decide when to adopt the measures 
necessary for their incorporation. But this argument was rejected by the ad hoc tribunal in Brazil 
- Phytosanitary Products based on the principles of good faith and reasonableness, suggesting 
that when the rule does not provide a term for its incorporation State Parties must incorporate it 
within a reasonable period of time 252 
In summary, so far, the prevailing interpretation is that secondary rules are not directly 
applicable in national legal systems. For them to make their way into national legal systems, 
State Parties must adopt the necessary measures except for the two situations mentioned by 
Decision 23/00 above. 53 Unless the secondary rule stipulates otherwise, it is for each State Party 
to decide whether it is necessary to incorporate it or not in light of the requirements of its own 
legal system. 254 With respect to the applicability of secondary rules to natural and legal persons, 
the dominant understanding suggests that unincorporated rules are binding at international law 
upon State Parties, 255 but they cannot apply to private parties until all State Parties comply with 
the incorporation and publishing requirements prescribed by Article 40. 
252 AHAA Brazil - Phytosanitary Products, para. 8.6 and 8.16. 
253 The type of measures that must be taken may vary depending on the content of the measure and the State 
Party's constitutional arrangements. If under the State Party's constitution, the rule's content falls within the sphere 
of competence of the Executive Branch - say for instance, rules on the harmonisation of technical regulations or 
sanitary and phitosanitary measures - the adoption of a Decree a Ministerial Resolution or any other regulatory act 
of administrative nature will suffice for incorporating that rule in the national legal system. If, by contrast, under the 
State Party's constitution, the rule's content falls outside the sphere of competence of the Executive Branch, then 
the parliament's intervention will be necessary. It is for each State Party to decide the procedure for incorporating 
MERCOSUR rules into its national legal system. 
254 According to Perez Otermin, ob cit, p 118, this mechanism does not differ from the traditional mechanism 
applied for the entry into force of treaties. 
255 This contrast sharply with the doctrine of direct effect that characterises Community law according to which 
certain provisions included in community legislation can give rise to rights and obligations upon private persons 
directly, i. e. without the need to be implemented by national law. Private persons may seek protection of such 
rights before domestic courts, who are bound to protect them. Traditionally, the ECJ has recognised direct effect to 
those provisions whose wording is precise, dear and unconditional. The leading case in this matter is Case 26/62 
Van fiend an Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belasingen [1963] ECR 13. 
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These considerations stem from State Parties' practice and some arbitration awards that have 
touch upon these issues, but they are not set in stone. Many interpretative questions remain 
unanswered 256 Considering the highly complex and controversial nature of these issues, and the 
precarious nature of the current consensus257, it is not unreasonable to expect future changes on 
what so far constitutes the dominant interpretation about the nature of MERCOSUR law. It 
remains to be seen to what extent the recent implementation of a procedure entitling domestic 
courts to request Consultative Opinions from the PRT on the interpretation of MERCOSUR 
law, can introduce certainty to this situation. Z58 
E. Enforcement of MERCOSUR law 
The relevance of effective enforcement mechanisms for the success of regional integration 
cannot be emphasised enough. 259 This is particularly pertinent for Latin American countries, 
256 For instance, the problems that arise at both domestic and regional level when some but not all State Parties 
fulfil the incorporation and publication requirements prescribed by Art. 40 POP. 
257 The majority of the doctrinal studies contend that MERCOSUR law has a purely international character but, as 
mentioned above, there are studies of high calibre that suggest there is no reason for not to recognising in 
MERCOSUR law the attributes of direct applicability, primacy and direct effect, which characterise EC Community 
law. See Perotti, above footnote n. 223. 
258 There is already some evidence to suggest changes in the traditional interpretation of the nature of 
MERCOSUR law. In its first (non-binding) Opinion, the PRT considered that MERCOSUR rules incorporated into 
national legal systems prevail over other internal rules. The PRT's argumentation is focused on the nature and 
purpose of MERCOSUR law, freeing itself from the legal obstacles that stem from national legal systems which 
have traditionally prevented interpreters from recognising this attribute to MERCOSUR law. It was a decision 
adopted by majority rather than by the unanimity of arbitrators, but nevertheless, constitutes an unprecedented 
breakthrough towards the recognition of MERCOSUR law's special attributes, different from purely public 
international law. See Opinion 1/2007,3/04/07. 
259 As Pena notes, the effectiveness of legal rules is critical for an integration process for two reasons: a) with 
respect to internal relations, an effective rule-based system protects the reciprocity of national interests necessary 
for the long-term sustainability of the agreement. It is the alternative to power-based systems, where the balance 
of national interests is always at risk of being derailed in favour of the more powerful partners; b) with respect to 
external relations, when vales are observed, a message is conveyed to outsiders (i. e. companies, investors and 
third countries) that State Parties' commitment to merge their markets and to act as a bloc is for real. This 
enhances the external credibility on the integration project and facilitates the achievements of its goals (the 
attraction of foreign investments, enhanced bargaining power when dealing with third countries, etc. ). See FELIX 
PENA, Consensual Integration Alliances: The Importance of Predictability and Efficacy in the MERCOSUR 
Institutional Experience Jean MonnetlRoberth Schuman Paper Series (Jean Monnet Chair - University of Miami, 
Miami 2003). 
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which have a strong record in setting up impressive integration agreements, which gradually 
become irrelevant due to lack of enforcement. 260 MERCOSUR is not immune to this risk. On 
the contrary, there are worrying sings such as the huge incorporation gap of secondary rules and 
State Parties' disregard to some arbitral awards that raise questions about its viability and 
credibility. 261 
MERCOSUR enforcement mechanisms include an intergovernmental dispute settlement system 
based on consultations, direct negotiations and, when necessary, arbitration procedures aimed at 
solving disputes between State Parties regarding the interpretation, application or breach of the 
Treaty of Asuncion, its Protocols and secondary rules adopted therein. The dispute settlement 
system deals with State Parties' rights and obligations at international law, apply international 
law principles and limit the standing to initiate legal actions to State Parties only. 262 Private 
persons do not have direct access to the dispute settlement system. The system does not provide 
mechanisms for dealing with disputes between a State Party and a MERCOSUR body or 
disputes between MERCOSUR bodies themselves. The POP assigns decision making bodies the 
duty to monitor compliance with MERCOSUR law within their sphere of competence, but it 
does not entrust them with any kind of enforcement power to bring actions against those State 
Parties that have failed to comply with their commitments 263 In other words, there is no 
supranational machinery responsible for the enforcement of MERCOSUR law. 
MERCOSUR law seeks not only to regulate States but also private persons. However, to reach 
private persons, MERCOSUR law must be incorporated into national legal systems. Once 
MERCOSUR rules are duly incorporated into national legal systems, the domestic enforcement 
machinery can be activated. It is then and only then that a private person may base a claim in, 
and be granted relief from, the domestic courts of a State Party against another private person or 
the State itself on the basis of the incorporated MERCOSUR rule? " Of course, the enforcement 
2w Echandi has eloquently argued that dispute settlement mechanisms have been more important to the success 
of Latin American regional integration agreements than the establishment of supranational decision making 
bodies. See ROBERTO ECHANDI, 'Regional Trade integration during the 1990s: Reflections of Some Trends and 
Their Implication for the Multilateral Trading System', (2001) 3 Journal of International Economic Law 367. 
261 See, e. g., MICHAEL MECHAM, 'MERCOSUR: A Failing Development Project? ' (2003) 79 international Affairs 389. 
262 The Protocol of Olivos contains some provisions regarding claims by private persons which, as explained 
below, are a far cry from conferring them complete locus standi before an international tribunal. 
2 POP, Arts. 8.1,14.1 and 19.1. 
2R Note the difference with the doctrine of direct effect developed by the ECJ, by which the private party may base 
her claim before a domestic court directly on the international norm, without the need for its incorporation into the 
national legal system. 
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of the MERCOSUR rule - now purely internal law - will be subject to the same interpretation 
rules and procedural requirements applicable to the enforcement of any other domestic rule, 
unless the domestic legal system provides otherwise 265 In this vein, the most common obstacles 
against an effective enforcement of MERCOSUR rules are hierarchical considerations (conflicts 
between the MERCOSUR rule and domestic Mies of higher hierarchy) and temporal 
considerations (conflicts between MERCOSUR rule and subsequent domestic rules). 
It stems from the above considerations that the incorporation of MERCOSUR rules into national 
legal systems is crucial for the efficacy of the MERCOSUR legal system. The following 
paragraphs examine the mechanisms available for encouraging State Parties to incorporate 
MERCOSUR rules into their national legal systems. It then examines the mechanisms for the 
settlement of disputes between State Parties. The section concludes with a brief examination of 
the recently implemented system for requesting Consultative Opinions from the PRT on the 
interpretation of MERCOSUR law and considers the extent to which this mechanism could 
enhance compliance with MERCOSUR law. 
1. Enforcement of the Obligation to Incorporate Secondary Rules 
State Parties have recurrently failed to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the prompt 
incorporation of secondary rules into national legal systems in accordance with the requirements 
prescribed by Article 40 POP, provoking a wide incorporation gap. 267 The lack of incorporation 
of secondary rules hits directly at the efficacy of the MERCOSUR legal system. It prevents 
m Under the Argentinian Constitution (Arts. 31,75 par 22 and 24) and Paraguayan Constitution (Arts. 137,141, 
143-145), treaties are, generally speaking, recognised as having a higher status than ordinary legislation. By 
contrast, the Brazilian and Uruguayan courts have consistently denied the primacy of treaties over domestic rules, 
holding that, in case of conflict between a treaty and a legislative act adopted after the ratification of the treaty, the 
latter prevails. See the case law to this respect in PEROTTI, Habilrtaciön constitucional pare Is integraciön 
comunitaria: estudio Bobre los Estados del MERCOSUR . But also see the first (non-binding) Opinion issued by 
the PRT (Opinion 1/07), which understands that MERCOSUR rules incorporated into national legal systems prevail 
over other national rules. 
2w See, generally, SECRETARIA DEL MERCOSUR, Primer Informe Sobre la Aplicacibn del Derecho del MERCOSUR 
por los Tribunales Nationales (2003) (Secretaria del MERCOSUR, Foro Permanente de Cortes Supremas del 
MERCOSUR y Asociados, Fundaci6n Konrad Adenauer, Montevideo 2005) and SECRETARIA DEL MERCOSUR, 
Segundo Informe Sobre la Aplicaciön del Derecho del MERCOSUR por los Tribunales Nationales (2004) 
(Secretaria del MERCOSUR, Foro Permanente de Cortes Supremas del MERCOSUR y Asociados, Fundaci6n 
Konrad Adenauer, Montevideo 2006). 
267 See Introduction, footnote n2. 
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MERCOSUR law from penetrating national legal systems, aborting its applicability to natural 
and legal persons. Even when secondary rules confer specific rights on private persons, they 
cannot invoke them before national courts unless and until they have been duly incorporated' 
into the national legal system. 
State Parties that fail to comply with the incorporation requirements are liable at international 
law to those States that comply with them. 268 Theoretically, State Parties can resort to the 
arbitration procedure and seek compensatory measures against the wrongdoers for breach of 
their international commitments, but in practice this never happened. Neither MERCOSUR 
institutions nor private parties can bring actions against the wrongdoers 269 This limits the 
possible mechanisms for addressing the incorporation gap to the adoption of preventive 
measures and the implementation of non-binding monitoring actions, both of which are 
examined below. 
Over the years, several measures have been adopted to prevent the further widening of the 
incorporation gap 27° The main strategy has been to establish consultation requirements prior to 
the adoption of secondary rules with a view to avoid adopting instruments that could later on 
face incorporation difficulties. One of the most relevant measures adopted to this effect is Dec 
20/02, which established an internal consultation requirement to be fulfilled within each State 
Party prior to the decision making bodies' adoption of MERCOSUR rules? " The purpose of 
this consultation procedure is to confirm the opportunity for adopting the rule, to ensure the 
proposed rule is consistent with State Parties' domestic legal system, to establish the procedure 
necessary for its incorporation and the term within which the incorporation must be completed. 
20 AHAA Brazil-Phytosanitary Products, para. 7.8. 
269 Again, theoretically, if the State that has failed to incorporate the secondary rule is a State. other than her State 
of residency, the private party could request her National Section to the CMG to initiate arbitral proceedings 
against the wrongdoer but, so far, this has never happened. Arguably, the private party that resides in the territory 
of the State that has failed to incorporate the secondary rule, could explore whether the domestic legal system 
provides any remedial action for individuals against damages caused by a State's violation of its international 
obligations. By contrast, in the EC context, there is no doubt about the right of private persons to seek 
compensation against the Member State that has failed to comply with Community law. See Joined Cases C-6/90 
and 9/90 Francovich v Italy [1991 ] ECR 1-5357. 
270 See, inter alia, Decisions 3199,23/00,55/00,20/02,56/02,8/03,22/04,31/04; Resolutions 23/98 and 56/02 and 
PMP, Art. 4.12. 
271 Some commentators have argued that it is not valid to create through secondary legislation a system for prior 
internal consultations, which was not envisaged by the POP. See JORGE FERNANDEZ REYES, Curso"da Derecho de 
la Integraciön (Universidad de Montevideo, Montevideo 2006), p 255. 
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Dec 20/02 establishes that a draft proposal can only be adopted after each State Party has 
informed the decision making body, in writing, what measures is going to take for the 
incorporation of the proposed rules and within which term. Similarly, the recently adopted 
Protocol establishing the MERCOSUR Parliament imposes on MERCOSUR decision making 
bodies the duty to consult the MERCOSUR Parliament prior to adopting secondary rules that 
would require approval from national parliaments for their incorporation into national legal 
systems. 72 
The second mechanism provided by the MERCOSUR legal system for encouraging State 
Parties' to observe their obligation to incorporate secondary rules into national legal systems 
consists on non-binding monitoring and transparency duties assigned by the POP to the 
MERCOSUR Secretariat. The POP stipulates that the Secretariat must publish the MERCOSUR 
official journal273 and must "regularly inform State Parties about the measures taken by each 
country to incorporate in its legal system the decisions adopted by MERCOSUR decision 
making bodies" 274 Dec 23/00 further stipulates that the Secretariat must elaborate a league table 
with information received from State Parties' national sections about the measures adopted for 
the incorporation of MERCOSUR rules into national legal systems. 275 The Decision also 
provides that the Secretariat must update the table on a monthly basis and that the CMG shall 
include in the agenda for ordinary meetings - as a matter of the highest priority - the analysis of 
such league table 276 In practice, the efficacy of these non-binding monitoring actions has been 
nullified by the lack of resources allocated to the Secretariat to discharge its duties and by the 
reluctance of government officials to disclose information about incorporation. 27 
The preventive measures and non-binding monitoring actions adopted so far are very cautious 
not to move away from the system of indirect applicability of MERCOSUR rules 278 They leave 
State Parties' autonomy to decide how secondary rules must be incorporated into their legal 
systems intact, without even prescribing a common term within which State Parties must 
complete the incorporation process, but only requiring each State Party to self impose an 
272 PMP, Art. 4.12. 
273 POP, Art. 32 ii. Due to lack of funds, in 2004 the publication of the Official Journal has been discontinued. 
274 POP, Art. 32.4. 
275 Dec 23/00, Art. 4. 
276 Ibid. Art. 7. 
277 See above Introduction, footnote n11. 
278 State Parties are currently negotiating a Protocol stipulating the direct applicability of secondary rules that do 
not require parliamentary approval for their incorporation into national legal systems, but so far no agreement has 
been reached on this matter. See Dec 07/03. 
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incorporation term. 279 There is no evidence to suggest these measures have been effective. The 
incorporation gap is far from being bridged and the debate on how to solve the problem is 
nowhere near reaching a consensus280 
2. Disputes between State Parties 
The MERCOSUR system for the settlement of disputes between State Parties has evolved from 
a purely diplomatically-based scheme to a more rule-based one 28' The Treaty of Asuncion 
sketched a basic system based on direct negotiations between the State Parties to the dispute 
and, when necessary, intervention of the CMG as a conciliator. 282 State Parties agreed to adopt a 
permanent system before the end of the transition period. By the end of 1991 State Parties 
adopted the Protocol of Brasilia. The new system included an ad hoc arbitration procedure for 
dealing with those cases where direct negotiations and conciliation failed to settle the dispute. 
The Protocol of Brasilia remained in place until 2002, when it was replaced by the current 
2n The exception being the 180 days term for the incorporation of rules relating to technical regulations, standards 
and conformity assessment procedures as prescribed by Res 56/02, Annex, Art. 4 b). Additionally, on some 
occasions, the CMC or the CMG may prescribe specific terms within which State Parties must incorporate the 
norm into their legal systems. See, for instance, Res 21/99,10/06/99 stipulating a 30 days term for the 
incorporation of a Resolution concerning postal services between cities situated in border areas. 
280 See, e. g., DAISY VENTURA, 'Asimetrias cruzadas o cubismo normativo: la incorporacion de normas en el 
MERCOSUR', in, Profundizacion del MERCOSUR y el Desaflo de las Disparidades 2005).; ALEJANDRO PEROTTI, 
'Algunas Precisiones de Cubndo Resuita Necesario Incorporar la Norma MERCOSUR', (2001) 5 Revista de 
Derecho Intemacional y del MERCOSUR 188; ALEJANDRO DANIEL PEROTTI, 'MERCOSUR: Proceso Legislativo. 
Sobre algunos inconvenientes que presenta el mecanismo de intemalizacibn', (2007) Revista de Derecho Privado 
y Comunitario . 
281 There is a vast literature that examines MERCOSUR system for the settlement of disputes is vast. In English 
see, inter alia, NADIA DE ARAUJO, 'Dispute Resolution in MERCOSUR: The Protocol of Las Leflas and the Case law 
of the Brazilian Supreme Court, (2001) 32 University of Miami Interamerican Law Review 25; RICARDO OLIVERA 
GARCIA, 'Dispute Resolution Regulation and Experiences in MERCOSUR: The Recent Olivos Protocol', (2002) 8 
NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas 535; CHRISTIAN LEATHLEY, The MERCOSUR Dispute 
Resolution System (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 2002); GABRIELLA GIOVANNA LUCARELLI DE 
SALVIO & JEANINE SA CABRAL, 'Considerations of the MERCOSUR Dispute Settlement Mechanism and the Impact 
of its Decisions in the WTO Dispute Resolution System', in, Fifth Annual Conference of the Euro-Latin Study 
Network on Integration and Trade (ELSNIT) 2007).; RAUL EMILIO VINUESA, 'The MERCOSUR Settlement of Dispute 
System', (2006) 5 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 77. 
282 ToA, Annex III. 
dispute settlement system established by the Protocol of Olivos ("POL"). 283 Its main innovations 
with respect to its predecessor include the establishment of a Permanent Review Tribunal that 
hears appeals from the ad hoc tribunals and the extension of the latter's jurisdiction over the 
period of compliance with the award. 
2.1 Arbitral Procedure 
The arbitral procedure provided for by the POL applies to all disputes between State Parties 
regarding the interpretation, application or breach of MERCOSUR law. 284 The POL includes a 
"choice of forum" provision for those disputes that can also be submitted to the dispute 
resolution system of the WTO, or other preferential trade systems of which State Parties may 
individually be members. 285 In these cases, the party making the claim must choose to submit to 
one forum or the other, without prejudice to the fact that the parties may, by mutual agreement, 
choose the forum. 286 
State Parties involved in a dispute must, first of all, try to resolve it through direct 
negotiations. 87 If direct negotiations are unsuccessful, they may resort either directly to the 
arbitral procedure or to the CMG. 288 The CMG, acting as a conciliator, will assess the situation, 
hear the parties and, if it deems necessary, request the assistance of specialists. It will then 
formulate recommendations for a solution to the dispute, which are not binding upon State 
Parties. 89 If the dispute cannot be resolved by the intervention of the CMG, any party to the 
dispute may communicate to the Secretariat of the PRT its intention to resort to the arbitral 
M See Protocol of Olivos for the Settlement of Disputes in MERCOSUR, 42 ILM 2 (2003) amended by Protocol 
adopted on 19/01/07, not yet in force. 
284 POL Art. 1.1. Dec 26/05 introduces slight variations to the arbitral proceedings specified by the POL for 
disputes arising as a result of the interpretation of an international agreement adopted by a Ministerial Meeting. 
M Ibid. Art. 1.2 and, Regulation P0, Art. 1. This contrasts with the ECJ's exclusive jurisdiction on the 
interpretation of Community law (EC Treaty, Art. 292). Some bilateral trade disputes between Argentina and Brazil 
have been heard before WTO panels rather than by MERCOSUR ad hoc Arbitral Tribunals. See, for example, 
Panel Report, Argentina - Poultry; Mutually Agreed Solution, Argentina - Cotton; and Request for Consultations, 
Brazil- Anti - Dumping Measures on Resins. 
M The duplicity of forums increases the risks of contradictory rulings on similar (but not identical) disputes such as 
the Poultry dispute between Argentina and Brazil, which was judged by both a MERCOSUR Arbitration Panel, 
which rejected the claim (AHAA Argentina - Poultry) and a WTO panel which condemned the defendant (Panel 
Report Argentina - Poultry). 
287 P0, Art. 4. 
20 Ibid. Art. 6. 
289 Ibid. Art. 7. 
procedure290 The Secretariat notifies this to the other party or parties concerned and to the 
CMG 291 It will also provide administrative support to the arbitral tribunal throughout the 
proceedings. 92 
The arbitration procedure is held before an ad hoc tribunal, consisting of three arbitrators, one 
appointed by each State Party and the third by mutual agreement between them. 293 State Parties 
recognize the jurisdiction of the Tribunals as binding, ipso facto and with no need for a special 
agreement between them. 294 Each Tribunal establishes its own rules of procedure taking into 
account the model of procedural rules approved by the CMC. 295 The Tribunal must deliver its 
decision within sixty days from the date of appointment of its chairperson. This period may be 
extended by thirty days. 296 Any of the parties to the dispute may appeal the award before the 
PRT. 297 Only matters of law raised and the legal interpretation developed in the arbitration 
award can be subject to an appeal. An arbitration award made in equity (ex aequo et bono) 
cannot be appealed. 298 
Arbitral awards must be adopted by a majority vote of the arbitrators and the reasons for the 
award must be provided. It must be signed by all the arbitrators. A dissenting arbitrator may not 
explain his/her vote, and the deliberations will be confidential and closed to the parties 299 An 
arbitral award is binding on the parties to the dispute and they are required to comply with it.; 0° 
In order to ensure compliance with the arbitral award, the Protocol of Olivos provides for the 
application of temporary compensatory measures (i. e. the suspension of concessions or other 
equivalent obligations). 30' The claimant State may adopt such measures for a period of one year 
290 Ibid. Art. 9.1 
291 Ibid. Art. 9.2. 
292 Ibid. Art. 9.3 
293 Ibid. Art. 10. 
294 Ibid. Art. 33. 
m Ibid. Art. 51.2 and Dec 30/2004. Broadly speaking, the procedure must ensure that each party has full 
opportunity to be heard and to present its arguments and evidence and that the proceedings must be expeditious. 
296 Ibid. Art. 16. 
297 Ibid. Art. 17.1 
296 Ibid. Art. 17.3 
299 Ibid. Art. 25. 
300 Ibid. Art. 26. 
301 See PRT Award, Uruguay - Compensatory Measures. 
from the date the award becomes res judicata. 302 Compensatory measures should in principle be 
taken in the economic sector that constitutes the object of the dispute, but if they prove to be 
ineffective they may be applied in another economic sector. 303 The claimant must inform the 
defendant fifteen days in advance of the application of the measures. 3U4 
The ad hoc tribunals and the PRT must decide the dispute on the basis of MERCOSUR law and 
the applicable principles and provisions of international law. 305 The Tribunals may also decide 
"ex aequo et bond' if the parties so agree. 306 
The POL delegates to the CMC the authority to establish an expeditious mechanism to settle 
disputes between State Parties as to technical aspects regulated in common trade policy 
instruments307 and a special procedure to deal with exceptionally urgent cases that may cause 
irreparable damage to the Parties 308 
Claims by Private Persons 
Chapter XI of the POL includes some provisions that enable private persons to bring claims 
against a State Party in relation to the application of legal or administrative measures that have a 
restrictive or discriminatory effect, or have the effect of unfair competition, in violation of 
MERCOSUR primary or secondary law. 309 
302 Ibid. Art. 31.1. 
303 Ibid. Art. 31.2. See Ch I, footnote n 105on the possibility provided by the WTO DSU to "buy" unlawful behaviour. 
3 Ibid. Art. 31.3 
3 Ibid. Art. 34. Arbitration awards include, inter alia, references to the principles of pacta sunt servanda (AHAA 
Brazil - Restrictive Measures to Reciprocal Trade, para. 56 and AHAA Brazil - Phytosanitary Products, para. 
8.11), good faith (Clarification to AHAA Brazil - Phytosanitary Products, para. III), proportionality (AHAA Brazil - 
Remoulded Tyres, p. 15) and reasonableness (AHAA Brazil - Remoulded Tyres, p. 15). It is fair to say that ad hoc 
tribunals have also refused to apply certain principles of public international law on grounds of their incompatibility 
with an economic integration agreement. Such is the case of the principle of estoppel (AHAA Brazil- Restrictive 
Measures to Reciprocal Trade, para. 21 and PRT appeal award Argentina Remoulded Tyres, para. 23) and 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus (AHAA Uruguay - Cigarettes, p. 5-6, AHAA Uruguay - Processed Wool, para. 
63 and 65). 
3 Ibid. Art. 34.2 
307 Ibid. Art. 2.1 
308 Ibid. Art. 24. This procedure has been established by Dec 23104. 
m Ibid. Art. 39. 
The private person must address the complaint to the National Section of the CMG of the State 
Party where the claimant has its habitual residence or its place of business. 3'0 The petition must 
include evidence showing the damage suffered or the threat of damage, and the effective 
violation of a MERCOSUR rule.; " The National Section of the CMG has absolute discretion to 
decide whether it brings the claim forward or not. If it decides to bring the claim forward, it 
must request direct consultations with the National Section of the State Party against which the 
complaint is made, with the aim of finding an immediate solution to the matter raised. ' 12 If 
consultations end without reaching a solution, the claim must be forwarded directly to the 
CMG. "' 
The CMG can reject the claim if it concludes that there are insufficient grounds to sustain it. 314 
If the claim is accepted, the GMG convenes a group of three experts, one of whom must not be a 
national of the States Parties to the dispute. 315 The private person and the States involved have 
the right to be heard and to submit evidence at a joint hearing316 
The conclusions of the panel of experts must be issued within thirty days of their designation, a 
period which cannot be extended. 317 If, in their opinion, the claim is without merits, the CMG 
must conclude the proceedings. 318 Conversely, if the decision is in favour of the claimant, the 
State Party who sponsored the claim or any other State Party has the right to request the 
adoption of corrective measures within fifteen days. 3'9 If the request is not met, the claimant 
State can then resort directly to the arbitral procedure. 
In other words, Chapter XI does not confer unconditional locus standi on private persons. What 
private persons can do is to submit a claim to the relevant National section of the CMG, but the 
latter is not bound to bring the claim forward. Only if it decides to do so, will the private person 
be able to present evidence in a hearing before a panel of experts. This is not part of the arbitral 
proceedings, which is strictly limited to State Parties only. Moreover, Chapter XI only works in 
310 Ibid. Art. 40.1. 
311 Ibid. Art. 40.2. 
312 Ibid. Art. 41.1. 
313 Ibid. Art. 41.2. 
314 Ibid. Art. 42.1. 
3151 bid. Art. 42.2. 
316 Ibid. Art. 42.3. 
317 Ibid. Art. 49. 
318 Ibid. Art. 44.1. 
319 Ibid. Art. 44.1. 
favour of those private persons who want to challenge a measure adopted by a State Party other 
than the State where they live or have their place of business. But it does not provide any 
solution for those private persons who want to challenge measures adopted by the State where 
they actually live or have their place of business 320 
So far, only ten arbitration awards have been issued under the Protocol of Brasilia, and six under 
the Protocol of Olivos, four of which were made by the PRT. Certainly not impressive figures 
for an integration process fraught with controversies and a dispute settlement system with more 
tan h fifteen years in existence. 32' If anything, they confirm State Parties' preference for sorting 
out their disputes through ongoing diplomatic negotiations, with the involvement, when 
necessary, of the highest political authorities, instead of submitting their disputes to legal 
adjudication. During the early stages of the integration process, the diplomatic approach 
contributed to settle conflicts in a quick and cost-effective way, but in the long run, when 
conflicts got more complex and the enthusiasm for trade liberalisation began to peter out, the 
"presidential diplomacy" strategy ended up over exposing top political leaders and ultimately 
damaging their credibility. 322 Yet, State Parties continued to be extremely reluctant to forfeit 
control over the management (or mismanagement) of their trade disputes. 
2.2 Claims Procedure before MERCOSUR Trade Commission 
In addition to the duties relating to monitoring the implementation of the common trade policy, 
the POP assigns to the MTC a quasi-adjudicative role, namely, to hear claims referred to it by 
the National Sections of the MTC originated by State Parties or private persons, which fall 
within its sphere of competence 323 The consideration of these claims does not prevent the 
complainant party from taking action under the POL. 
320 For further comments about the legal framework for the protection of the interest of private persons see MARTA 
HAINES FERRARI, 'MERCOSUR: Individual Access and the Dispute Settlement Mechanism', in James Cameron & 
Karen Campbell (eds) Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization (Cameron May, London 1998) and 
DANTE MARCELO RAMOS, 'Protecci6n juridica para los particulares en el Mercosur', (1999) 16 Contribuciones / 
CIEDLA; Fundacibn Konrad Adenauer 79. 
321 The argument that the small number of arbitration awards confirms the efficacy of the system in preventing 
disputes can be easily rebutted by looking at the sheer number of consultations brought before the MTC that 
remain unresolved. 
322 See ROBERTO BOUZAS & HERNAN SOLTZ, 'Institutions and Regional Integration: The Case of MERCOSUR', 
in, Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Political Economy of Open Regionalism (Institute 
of Latin American Studies, London 2001), p 102. 
323 POP, Art. 21. 
The procedure for submitting a claim is set out in the annex to the POP, as specified by Dec 
18/02.324 States or private persons must bring the claim before the National Section of the MTC, 
which submits the matter to the Chairperson of the MTC for the dispute to be included in the 
next meeting's agenda. 325 If no decision is taken at that meeting, the MTC submits the claim to a 
technical committee, which issues a joint opinion or, failing this, individual conclusions by its 
members within thirty days. 326 Private persons can request the national section of the MTC 
authorisation to present their case before the technical committee. 327 The MTC must take into 
account the opinion of the technical committee when it decides the matter in the next meeting 
following its reception. 328 
In case no consensus is reached to settle the dispute in the MTC, the matter is then submitted to 
the GMC with the different proposed alternatives, as well as with the technical committee's 
opinion, to be decided within a thirty days term. 329 If a consensus is reached in favour of the 
complaining State, the defendant must implement the measures approved by the MTC or by the 
CMG, within the term fixed for that purpose. 330 When no consensus is reached or if the time 
expires without implementation, the claimant State may resort to arbitration proceedings.;; ' 
23 Consultations Procedure before MERCOSUR Trade Commission 
Directive 17/99 stipulates a procedure by which a State Party may address consultations to any 
other before the MTC on issues that fall within the MTC's sphere of competence. 332 It is an 
amicable procedure aimed at preventing disputes rather than settling them, based on dialogue 
and exchange of technical information between government officials that are experts on the 
issues at stake. It is not a compulsory stage of the dispute settlement process and by no means 
precludes the right of a State Party to bring a claim before the MTC or to resort directly to the 
324 See also the procedure for the urgent consideration of non-tariff barriers by the MTC provided by Res 21/05. 
325 Annex POP, Art. 2. 
3m Ibid. Art. 3. Dec 18/02, Art. 5 stipulates that technical committees shall consist of government officials appointed 
by the State Parties. 
327 Dec 18/02, Art. 7. 
328 Ibid. Art. 3. 
-m Ibid. Art. 5. 
Ibid. Art. 6. 
331 Ibid. Art. 7. 
See Directive 17/99. 
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arbitral procedure 333 In practice, the consultations' mechanism is widely used, although there is 
no hard evidence to suggest that it has made an effective contribution to prevent disputes. 33a 
3. Consultative Opinions to the Permanent Review Tribunal 
The possibility to establish a procedure for requesting Consultative Opinions from the PRT was 
originally envisaged by the Protocol of Olivos335 and subsequently implemented by the CMC. 
336 
Its objective is to develop a uniform, consistent and coherent interpretation and application of 
MERCOSUR law. Similar procedures are provided for by many other integration treaties 337 
There is compelling evidence suggesting that the establishment of this type of procedure allows 
regional tribunals to play a key role in shaping the scope and effect of regional law. 338 
Under the MERCOSUR system there are two types of institutions entitled to request 
Consultative Opinions from the PRT. 339 First, all State Parties acting together and MERCOSUR 
decision making bodies may request a Consultative Opinion from the PRT "on any legal issue" 
relating to MERCOSUR primary and secondary law. 
40 Secondly, State Parties' high courts or 
tribunals may also request a Consultative Opinion from the PRT, but only on the interpretation 
of those areas of MERCOSUR primary or secondary law connected to cases being heard by 
them 341 The PRT must issue an opinion in writing within forty five days of receiving the 
3m Ibid. Art. 11. 
334 For a analysis of the performance of the Claims Procedure and the Consultations Procedure between 1995 and 
2001 See MARCEL VAILLANT, 'Profundizaci6n del Proceso de Integraci6n Econ6mica en Bienes', in Daniel 
Chudnovsky & Jose Maria Fanelli (eds) El Desaffo de Integrarse Para Crecer (Siglo XXI Red MERCOSUR, 
Buenos Aires 2001). 
335 POL, Art. 3. 
336 See Dec 37/03 (Regulations of the POL); Dec 30/05 (Rules of Procedure of the PRT) and Dec 02/07 (Rules of 
Procedure for the Request of Consultative Opinions). 
337 See, e. g., Andean Court of Justice, European Court of Justice, Central American Court of Justice and the 
Caribbean Court of Justice. 
338 Perhaps the best known example in this matter is the ECJ preliminary rulings regarding primacy and direct 
effect. These two unique features of Community law, which are key for its effectiveness, are entirely case-law 
made. 
339 For a thorough analysis of the Consultative Opinion Procedure see ALEJANDRO DANIEL PEROni, Tribunal 
Permanente de Revision y Estado de Derecho on el MERCOSUR (Marcial Pons, Madrid - Buenos Aires 2008). 
3 POL Regulations, Art. 3.1 
341 Ibid. Art. 4.1. By way of comparison, the ECJ has jurisdiction to issue preliminary rulings concerning not only 
the interpretation of the Treaty, but also the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community 
and of the European Central Bank (EC Treaty, Art. 234). 
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request. 342 It must decline to issue an opinion when there is a pending procedure for the 
settlement of disputes on the same matter. 343 The opinions must be published in the 
MERCOSUR official joumal344. So far, the PRT has issued only one Consultative Opinion. 345 
The Rules of Procedure for the Request of Consultative Opinions do not compel domestic 
supreme courts to request a consultative opinion from the PRT, but rather delegates to them the 
discretionary authority on this matter. Therefore, it will be for each State Parties' Supreme 
Court to decide whether and how consultative opinions should or could be requested. 347348 
The Rules of Procedure also stipulate that PRT's opinions do not have binding effect upon the 
domestic court that requests it 349 The PRT confirmed the lack of binding effect of its opinions, 
and at the same time exhorted decision making bodies to amend this situation 35° In its first 
opinion, the PRT held that it only has authority to interpret the MERCOSUR norm, but it 
corresponds to the domestic court to apply it to the facts of a particular case and when applying 
the MERCOSUR law, the domestic court is not bound by the PRT's interpretation 3sß 
342 Ibid. Art. 7. 
343 Ibid. Art. 12. b. 
344 Ibid. Art. 13. 
30 See Opinion 1/2007,3/04/07. 
M Dec 02/07, Art. 1. This contrasts sharply with other comparative regimes. For instance, the EC Treaty 
prescribes that when issues about the interpretation of Community law arise before domestic courts or tribunals 
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal must bring the matter 
before the ECJ. See EC Treaty Art. 234. 
347 In its first opinion, the PRT severely criticised this provision. It rightly pointed out that domestic courts' 
unfettered discretion to decide whether and how consultative opinions should or could be requested runs against 
the main purpose of this procedure, which is ensuring a uniform interpretation of MERCOSUR law. One arbitrator - 
voting in dissidence - declared the inapplicability of Arts. 1,6 and 11 of the Rules of Procedure for the Request of 
Consultative Opinions. See Opinion 1/2007. 
348 So far, the only supreme court that has regulated the procedure for the request of consultative opinions has 
been the Uruguayan Supreme Court of Justice, by Acordada No 7604 24108/07. This norm enables all domestic 
courts to request Consultative Opinions from the PRT via the Supreme Court of Justice. The latter must check 
whether the request meets all the procedural requirements stipulated in the norm and, if so, the Supreme Court 
must pass on the request to the PRT (emphasis added). 
319 Regulations of the POL, Art. 2. 
350 Opinion 1/2007, p 4. 
351 Ibid. p 4. 
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Finally, the Rules of Procedure stipulate that the expenses incurred in delivering Consultative 
Opinions (Arbitrators' fees, travel and accommodation costs; administration costs, etc. ) 
requested by Supreme Courts must be paid for by the State of the Supreme Court that requests 
the Opinion. 352 The PRT rightly pointed out that this financing system is seriously flawed 
because, among other reasons, the Opinions will benefit the entire MERCOSUR legal system 
and all those that interact within it, not just the domestic court that requests them. 353 It has also 
been prescribed that each State Party must make an initial contribution of fifteen thousand 
dollars to this effect. 354 The irrisory amount proposed to finance what should be the core 
mechanism for shaping the scope and effect of MERCOSUR law needs no further comment. 
The way the Consultative Opinion procedure has been designed and the means stipulated for 
financing its implementation speak quite clearly about State Parties' feeble commitment to 
strengthening integration of the legal system. MERCOSUR badly needs a Tribunal with 
authority to have the last say on the interpretation of its rules, but in light of the above 
considerations, it is fair to say that the Tribunal will face serious difficulties in discharging its 
functions. It would be desirable that the reluctance in diplomatic circles to support the PRT 
could be counterbalanced by the readiness of domestic courts to seek guidance from the PRT on 
the interpretation of MERCOSUR law. 
F. Critique of MERCOSUR Legal System and Proposals for Reform 
The MERCOSUR legal system and the institutions responsible for its operation have a strong 
intergovernmental bias at both policy-making and enforcement level. Decision making bodies 
consist of government officials only who adopt decisions by consensus, there is no technical 
bureaucracy independent from national administrations, and to reach private persons, 
MERCOSUR law must be incorporated into national legal systems. There is no supranational 
enforcement machinery. Once MERCOSUR rules make their way into national legal systems, 
they become subject to State Parties' domestic enforcement machinery like any other domestic 
rule, while disputes between State Parties are sorted out through arbitration. 
The underlying rationale for this minimalist institutional choice is, according to some 
commentators, essentially practical: haunted by the poor results of past integration experiences, 
State Parties opted for assigning the formulation of integration policies to decision making 
352 Dec 02/07, Art. 11. 
39 PRT Opinion 1/07, p. 12. 
3m Dec 2/07, Art. 11. 
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bodies consisting of hands-on national administrators rather than to "integration bureaucracies" 
de-linked from domestic policy-makers. 355 It was assumed that this option should result in the 
formulation of more realistic integration policies, with greater chances of being implemented at 
national levels, providing State Parties, with a flexible and cost-effective mechanism for 
adjusting the integration process to its ongoing challenges. 
Though flexible and cost-effective, an integration process directly led by government officials 
also has shortcomings. Political establishments tend to have short-term perceptions about the 
benefits of integration and are more easily captured by protectionist lobbies. When difficult 
times arrive, the adherence to the common project is quickly diluted and national 
administrations face few restrictions in resorting to unilateral defensive measures. That was 
exactly what happened in MERCOSUR in the late 1990s 356 During the initial stages of the 
integration process, at a time when economic interdependence was low and there was a strong 
consensus in favour of opening domestic economies to foreign trade, this institutional model 
proved to be quite effective 35' But once the tariff elimination process concluded giving way to 
more sensitive and complex barriers to economic integration, and the economic context 
deteriorated, the efficacy of the institutional system rapidly deteriorated. Since then, 
MERCOSUR institutions have repeatedly failed to deliver effective solutions for its core 
problems, i. e. the proliferation of non-tariff barriers that obstruct the functioning of the free trade 
area and unilateral actions that conspire against the implementation of a common trade policy. 
State Parties reacted half-heartedly against the growing ineffectiveness of MERCOSUR 
institutions, introducing some ad hoc reforms, most notably, a half-way transformation of the 
Administrative Secretariat into a Technical Secretariat, the establishment of a new arbitral 
procedure including a Permanent Review Tribunal with jurisdiction to hear appeals and to issue 
Consultative Opinions on the interpretation of MERCOSUR law and, more recently, the 
replacement of the Joint Parliamentary Commission with a MERCOSUR Parliament. These 
reforms did not alter the predominantly intergovernmental patterns of MERCOSUR policy- 
making and enforcement processes. But more importantly, they did not manage to reverse the 
growing gap between State Parties' commitments and State Parties' conduct. 
355 See Bouzas and Soltz, ob cit, p 101. 
M The paradigmatic example of a unilateral measure adopted to cope with the financial crisis that hit the region in 
the late 1990s was the Brazilian's currency devaluation of January 1999. This measure turned the conditions for 
intraregional trade upside down in favour of Brazilian exports. There was little other State Parties could do, 
particularly Argentina, which at that time had the Peso pegged to the dollar by law. 
357 Bouzas and Soltz, ob cit, p 103. 
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Most commentators agree that there is an institutional imbalance between MERCOSUR 
predominantly intergovernmental institutional structure and its objective to establish a common 
market. 358 What remains under discussion is the path that should be taken to address this 
problem. Questions about the right institutional choice for MERCOSUR remain open: what is 
the best policy-making structure? How should the interface between regional policy-making and 
domestic-policy making be defined? Which is the most appropriate mechanism for ensuring 
State Parties' compliance with MERCOSUR law? 
Part of the specialised literature suggests the need for a major institutional overhaul aimed at 
replacing MERCOSUR's predominantly intergovernmental institutional framework by a 
supranational one. For instance, Gonzalez Floreal argues that it is necessary to set up a 
permanent body, independent from national governments with the exclusive function of 
formulating policies to improve the functioning of the customs union. 359 To avoid proliferation, 
the author argues, such body could be created by reforming the MTC, which could continue to 
assist the CMG but independently of governments and with purely technical functions in 
proposing initiatives and in following up policies 360 
The problem with proposals aimed at the supranationalisation of MERCOSUR institutions is 
their lack of political feasibility. Due to the sharp structural asymmetries between State Parties, 
it is highly unlikely that Brazil would be willing to pay the costs of supranational institutions in 
terms of sovereignty curtailment in exchange for the type of benefits supranationality can offer, 
i. e. an independent voice representing the interests of the integration process in the policy- 
making structure, stronger capacity to discipline State Parties' unlawful behaviour, better 
conditions for accessing other State Parties' markets and so forth. The costs for Brazil to subject 
itself to powerful centralised institutions, capable of constraining domestic policy makers' 
358 See, inter alia, JOHN AE VERVAELE, 'Mercosur and Regional Integration in South America', (2005) 54 
International and Comparative Law Quaterly 387, p 408; ANTONIO MARTINEZ PUNAL, 'La estructura institucional de 
MERCOSUR: hipbtesis de reformas', (2004) 8 Revista de Derecho Intemacional y del MERCOSUR 65; DA MoTrA 
VEIGA, MERCOSUR's Institutionalization Agenda: The Challenges of a Project in Crises, p 11; Basaldüa, ob cit, p 
31; FLAVIO FLOREAL GONZALEZ, 'MERCOSUR: The Incompatibilities between its Institutions and the Need to 
Complete the Customs Union. A Proposal Reform', (1999) 9 Integration and Trade 83; PABLO LABANDERA IPATA, 
'Aspectos juridico-institutionales que operan como freno Para la integraci6n', (1998) 2 Revista de Derecho 
Intemacional y del MERCOSUR 63; ADRIANA DREYZIN DE KLOR, 'La Dinfimica Institutional del MERCOSUR', (1998) 
2 Revista de Derecho Intemacional y del MERCOSUR 65 p 84; MARTA HAINES-FERRARI, 'MERCOSUR: A New 
Model of Economic Integration', (1993) 25 Case W Res J lnt Law Rev 413, p 448. 
359 See Floreal Gonzalez, ob cit.; Labandera Ipata, ob cit. and Martinez Pupal, ob cit. 
° Floreal Gonzalez, ob cit. 
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flexibility and discretion are too high considering the modest benefits expected in return. 361 In 
other words, MERCOSUR's dilemma is that demands for stronger institutions are weak, and the 
regional leader does not seem willing to supply the conditions necessary for accommodating 
such demands, limiting the choices available for reform. 161 
In light of these circumstances, this thesis suggests that the way forward should avoid 
grandiloquent reforms aimed at a "supranationalisation" of MERCOSUR institutions, focusing 
instead on streamlining the operation of the current system. 363 The underlying idea is that there 
is still plenty of room - within the boundaries of a predominantly intergovernmental approach to 
integration - for improving the efficacy and efficiency of existing policy-making and 
enforcement mechanisms. The measures suggested below are geared to improve the functioning 
of decision making bodies; strengthen the role of the Secretariat and empower individuals' 
participation in the integration process. 64 But they are mindful not to undermine MERCOSUR 
decision making bodies' capacity to exert direct control over the scope and pace of the 
integration process. They rather suggest institutional re-arrangements and procedural 
requirements that should encourage MERCOSUR institutions to exercise their power in a more 
rule-oriented, transparent, accountable and efficient way. 
1. Improving the functioning of decision making bodies 
To start with, the CMC, CMG and MTC are resourceless bodies that meet every now and then, 
composed of overburdened government officials that combine their ordinary domestic tasks 
with their participation in these international bodies. The first and most obvious way to improve 
361 See Appendix II MERCOSUR Statistical Information Table 9. For a detailed analysis of Brazilian interests on 
MERCOSUR see P DA MOTrA VEIGA, 'Brazil in MERCOSUR. Reciprocal Influences', in Riordan Roett (ad) 
MERCOSUR: Regional Integration, World Markets (Lynne Rienner, London 1999). 
362 See JOSE RAUL PERALES, 'A Supply-Side Theory of International Economic Institutions for the MERCOSUR', in 
Finn Laursen (ed) Comparative Regional Integration. Theoretical Perspectives (Ashgate, Aldershot 2003) and 
ROBERTO BOUZAS, 'MERCOSUR: Regional Governance, Asimetrias e Integraci6n Profunda', in, Profundizaci6n del 
MERCOSUR y el Desaflo de Ids Disparidades 2005). 
363 Other authors that argue in favour of strengthening the current institutional system and put forward proposals to 
this effect include Torrent, R, ob cit; Celina Pena & Ricardo Rozenberg, Una Aproximaci6n al Desarrollo 
Institutional del MERCOSUR: sus Fortalezas y Debilidades Documento de Divulgaci6n 31 (INTAL, Buenos Aires 
2005); FESUR, Desaflos Institutionales para el MERCOSUR. Las Relaciones entre Estados, Instituciones 
Comunes y Organizaciones de la Sociedad (FESUR, Montevideo 2006). 
364 See, in addition to these measures, the proposals for improving MERCOSUR legislation, suggested in Ch V, 
Section E. 
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their capacity to deliver sound and timely policies is by allocating more administrative, human 
and technical resources to support their activities. At the very least, each State Party should 
establish a team of governmental officials solely dedicated to support the activities of these 
bodies and to liaise with their counterparts in between the bodies' meetings. 
Secondly, while the CMC is the highest body of MERCOSUR, the CMG and the MTC are not 
simply auxiliary bodies to the CMC. They too have autonomous regulatory power for adopting 
rules within their sphere of competence. In other words, there is a "polycentric" system for the 
adoption of rules365, which can lead to overlaps and inconsistencies. The problem is exacerbated 
by the lack of a procedure for the judicial review of MERCOSUR rules. Some commentators 
have suggested concentrating the rule-making authority in the CMC' hands to counteract the 
disadvantages that stem from of a plurality of legal production centres. This, they argue, should 
also enhance the legitimacy of MERCOSUR secondary rules which would be adopted only by a 
ministerial level body rather than by middle-ranked unaccountable bureaucrats, and should 
encourage a more active participation of Ministers in the integration process since they would 
become directly responsible for all MERCOSUR rules. 366 Of course, to prevent backlogs, this 
proposal should be accompanied by measures aimed at increasing the CMC's working capacity, 
including more resources and higher frequency of meetings. 
Thirdly, the risk of inconsistent policy outcomes is aggravated by the elevated number of 
auxiliary bodies that operate, rather autonomously, under the umbrella of each decision making 
body. Formed by public officials with direct responsibility for specific policy areas, auxiliary 
bodies were originally created to provide decision making bodies with technical support, and to 
facilitate the implementation of MERCOSUR rules falling within their sphere of competence. 
But the difficulty in reaching consensus at the decision making level left auxiliary bodies 
without clear political mandates 367 As a result, many of them have taken the initiative in 
suggesting a working agenda for their specific sector and proposing draft rules to the decision 
30 Da Motta Veiga claims there is an "inflation" of structures with the power to make rules". See Da Mota Veiga, ob 
cit, p12. 
Torrent, ob cit, p 69. 
367 For instance, Bouzas et al suggest that "At the startup of MERCOSUR, the GMC and the activities of the SGTs 
stimulated personal knowledge and mutual trust among national officials, contributing to the development of 
motivation and team spirit. Consequently, they helped to the advancement of negotiations and their acceptance by 
national agencies. Since the mid-1990s, however, the effectiveness of the GMC decreased as a result of the 
increasing number of questions that found neither a "political" solution at a higher level nor were solved at SGT'S 
"technical" level". See BouzAS, et al., In-depth analysis of MERCOSUR integration, its prospectives and the effects 
thereof on the market access of EU goods, services and investment p 10. 
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making body, which normally approves them without putting too much effort in consolidating 
the different proposals received. What makes matters worse is the fact that there are various 
auxiliary bodies with overlapping competences and there are not proper mechanisms in place for 
co-ordinating their activities. 68369 This has resulted in a rather chaotic development of 
secondary rules, led by the most active auxiliary bodies, which are not necessarily those with 
competence on strategic areas for the economic integration process 370 To tackle this problem it 
is necessary to streamline the number and competence of auxiliary bodies, improve the co- 
ordination mechanisms between them (or at least observe existing procedures37) and, above all, 
adopt a single and coherent working programme at the highest political level that allocates tasks 
and responsibilities to each auxiliary body in a clear, detailed and consistent manner. 372 
2. Strengthening the MERCOSUR Secretariat 
Intergovernmental institutions and a technical Secretariat are not incompatible. On the contrary, 
a strong technical body with the capacity to issue an independent and non-binding opinion about 
the main concerns of the integration process can make a valuable contribution to 
intergovernmental decision mating bodies. 
368 Consultations between auxiliary bodies are normally channelled through the CMG according to the following 
procedure: the pro-temporary president of one auxiliary body requests the CMG to forward a consultation to 
another auxiliary body. That body then considers the consultation and prepares a reply. The reply must be 
channelled back to the consulting body through the CMG. 
369 Pena y Rozenberg note that the multiplicity of auxiliary bodies involving officials of nearly all areas of 
government has resulted in a widespread diffusion of the integration process within the public administration. The 
great diversification of these increasingly autonomous technical bodies led to significant coordination problems. 
See CELINA PENA & RICARDO ROZENBERG, MERCOSUR: A Different Approach to Institutional Development Focal 
Policy Paper (Focal, Ottawa 2005), p 3. 
370 See a quotation from Didier Opertti, former Uruguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs: "to those of us who have 
been involved with MERCOSUR..., we get the sensation of participating in a game somewhat automatized in 
decision making in which technical will in many cases acquires a marked autonomy or a certain dimension of its 
own that carriers along with it the risk of distancing it, or even of divorcing it, from the political will" (cited by Pena y 
Rozenberg, footnote n 360, p 7. 
371 See Dec 59/00 and Resolutions 36/00 and 05/01. 
372 The CMC has already adopted a number of working programmes, but they have failed to fill in this vacuum. For 
instance, the working programme for 2004-2006 (Dec 26/2003) lists a number of objectives in a wide range of 
areas but does not establish any kind of priorities among them. The working programme does not seem to 
articulate policy measures in a coherent fashion, but rather seems to merely collate in one piece of paper a 
number of independent working agendas unilaterally suggested by different auxiliary bodies. 
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Government officials tend to see the integration process from the narrow lenses of national 
administrations' interests, and decide accordingly. As a result, policy-making is driven by 
competing short-termed domestic demands, rather than by co-operative efforts towards long- 
term common goals. Not surprisingly, policy outcomes tend to be little more than the least 
common denominator of competing national interests on a specific issue at any given moment. 
The views of an independent technical body can contribute to unlock this vicious circle. By 
looking at the big picture from an independent standpoint, a technical body is better positioned 
for identifying actions that are damaging the integration process and suggesting the best courses 
of action to address them. 
One need not go all the way on to the creation of an EC Commission type of body, which 
monopolises the right of legislative initiative. It is perfectly possible to maintain intact the right 
of intergovernmental bodies to regulate and, at the same time, have a strong Technical 
Secretariat with power to make recommendations to decision making bodies. As mentioned, 
State Parties already adopted some measures aimed at transforming the Administrative 
Secretariat into a Technical Secretariat, but their obsession for having an absolute control over 
the integration process, prevented them from introducing significant changes. 
To strengthen the MERCOSUR Secretariat, first of all, it is necessary to fully implement the 
measures that have already been adopted to this effect as prescribed by Decision 30/02, 
reversing the CMG's decisions to suspend the Secretariat's consistency control of draft rules and 
to prohibit the dissemination of the reports produced by the TAS. In addition, decision making 
bodies' duty to consult the Secretariat about the consistency of proposed rules with existing 
rules, should be replaced by a more comprehensive consultation requirement contemplating the 
merits of adopting the rule. While the Secretariat's opinion should not have binding effects, it 
should be made public ensuring its technical input is known by the general public and not just 
by the government officials that happen to be sited at the decision making bodies at any given 
time. 
The Secretariat's duty to monitor State Parties' actions taken to incorporate MERCOSUR rules 
into their national legal systems should also be enhanced, without the need to go all the way on 
to confer specific enforcement powers. For instance, it should be possible to entitle the 
Secretariat to require information about incorporation directly from any domestic regulators, 
without the need to go through State Parties' diplomatic channels. The Secretariat should also 
have absolute independence to produce and publish reports about incorporation, giving an 
impartial and accurate view about how State Parties are or are not complying with their 
obligations. 
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Last, but not least, the Secretariat should have absolute discretion to set up a research agenda in 
those areas it deems of maximum concern for the integration process. It should be allowed to 
carry out the research activities with independence, including the right to consult various 
stakeholders and the right to widely disseminate the relevant findings. To be able to carry out all 
these tasks, the budget of the Secretariat should be substantially increased and perhaps minimum 
thresholds limiting the discretion of budgetary decisions should be introduced, for instance, a 
percentage of State Parties' GDP. 
3. Empowering the role of individuals 
As mentioned above, given MERCOSUR underlying socio-economic and political 
circumstances, State Parties' intergovernmental approach to integration seems to be a reasonable 
institutional choice. However, strictly intergovernmental policy-making and enforcement 
processes may lead to an undesirable degree of decision making bodies' impermeability to 
individuals' concerns, referred to as "government encapsulation". 373 The more impermeable 
decision making bodies become to the general public, the higher the risk of being captured by 
specialist interest groups, or, at least, of failing to adopt the right policy measures in the interest 
of the general good. Moreover, in the long-run, an integration process led only by government 
officials, typically foreign affairs diplomats, behind closed doors will struggle to get support 
from the general public, and private persons, who ultimately should be the leading actors of an 
integration process, may simply lose interest in it. 
The MERCOSUR legal system already contemplates some degree of participation for private 
persons in the policy-making and enforcement processes. Below some measures are suggested 
to expand this participation, empowering the role of individuals in the integration process 
without modifying the predominantly intergovernmental patterns of these processes 3'a 
First, decision making bodies should encourage the participation of private parties in the policy- 
making process by opening some of their meetings to the public. It is a possibility already 
envisaged by law although in practice it is rarely used. 375 More importantly, it is crucial to 
373 See Bouzas and Soltz, ob cit, p 103. 
374 For additional ideas on how to empower the role of the. individual and the civil society in the integration process 
see FESUR, . 
375 For instance, the CMC may, depending on the agenda, invite representatives from social and economic sectors 
to attend its meetings (Dec 2198, Art. 10). Auxiliary bodies to the CMG and Technical Committees that operate 
under the MTC umbrella may decide, by consensus, to call representatives from the private sector to attend their 
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increase the level of transparency of decision making bodies' activities. This requires, among 
other things, to adopt elemental but still stubbornly resisted measures such as the publication on 
the MERCOSUR website of all the minutes of decision making' and auxiliary bodies' meetings, 
annexes, policy documents and any other relevant information that may correspond. Also any 
initiative aimed at bringing the debate on integration outside diplomatic rooms, should be 
welcomed. 
Secondly, at the enforcement level, the arbitral procedure contemplates the possibility for 
private persons to request government officials to bring claims on their behalf, although, as 
mentioned above, government officials have absolute discretion to decide whether or not to 
bring the claim forward. There are mechanisms that could be adopted to enhance the protection 
of private persons' interests without going all the way to conferring on them locus standi to 
bring actions against State Parties. For instance, the discretion of National Sections to the CMG 
to decide whether or not to pursue private persons' claims could be limited by objective 
standards. Say that when the claim refers to a "manifest violation" of a MERCOSUR provision, 
government officials should be bound to bring the claim forward or, at least, they should provide 
the private person with a full explanation for the reasons not to do so. Also, the possibility to 
confer on private persons the right to submit amicus curiae to the Tribunal hearing an inter-State 
dispute should be explored. 
The procedure to request Consultative Opinions from the PRT should also play a pivotal role in 
the protection of private persons' interests, even without the need to go all the way to confer on 
the PRT power to annul MERCOSUR rules. But for this to be possible it is essential to 
implement this procedure in accordance with the suggestions issued by the PRT in its first 
Opinion, namely, when the issue about the interpretation of MERCOSUR law reaches the 
highest court, the request for consultation should be compulsory and the opinion should have 
binding effects on the requesting domestic court. In addition to these procedural requirements, 
State Parties should provide the PRT with the resources necessary to discharge its functions. 
More generally, an effective protection of private persons' interests is directly linked to the 
understanding of MERCOSUR law by the legal profession, judges and other legal operators. 
Therefore it is necessary to promote wide reaching training programmes on MERCOSUR law 
with a view to creating a cadre of legal operators trained in this area. 
meetings. They may also organise seminars with representatives of the private sector to discuss relevant issues or 
request the advice from specialists (see CMG Internal Regulation, MTC Internal Regulation and Dec 59/00). 
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Finally, when discussing measures for strengthening MERCOSUR institutional system it is 
important not to overlook the fact that, to some extent, its faults reflect the weakness of domestic 
institutions. 36 As Campbell has rightly put it: "no supranational structure could have made 
MERCOSUR a more serious, orderly, or predictable structure than are the countries which 
comprise it,,. 37 Therefore, the proposals put forward above aimed at streamlining the operation 
of the current system should be accompanied by credible efforts aimed at enhancing the 
soundness of domestic institutions and improving domestic regulatory practices in terms of 
transparency, impartiality and due process. 78 
G. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter examined the MERCOSUR legal system and the institutions responsible for its 
operation and discussed to what extent they have contributed to achieving MERCOSUR 
objectives, including, inter alia, the establishment of a common market involving the free 
movement of services. 
Generally speaking, institutions are necessary for formulating integration policies and for 
implementing them, including, when necessary, forcing wrongdoers to abide by their 
commitments. They constitute a horizontal matter that cut across all dimensions of an 
integration process. The success of the liberalisation of trade in services, just like any other 
dimension of the integration process, is inextricably linked to the soundness of the institutional 
and legal settings which underpin it. This is valid for any kind of institutional architecture, 
whether it consists of predominantly intergovernmental or supranational arrangements. 
State Parties to MERCOSUR opted for a minimalist and predominantly intergovernmental 
institutional structure. Decision making bodies consist of government officials only who adopt 
decisions by consensus, there is no technical bureaucracy independent from national 
administrations, and to reach private persons, MERCOSUR law must be incorporated into 
national legal systems. There is no supranational enforcement machinery. Once MERCOSUR 
rules make their way into national legal systems, they become subject to State Parties' domestic 
376 See Appendix II MERCOSUR Statistical Information, Tables 4 and 5. 
377 Cited by Pena and Rozenberg, above footnote n 360, p 3. 
378 For an objective and comparable measurement of the quality of State Parties' rules and institutions see their 
scores according to the World Bank Index on Governance and Institutional Quality available at 
http: //go worldbank. orgNZOP230230. 
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enforcement machinery like any other domestic rule, while disputes between State Parties are 
sorted out through arbitration. 
During its early stages, MERCOSUR's lean institutional framework satisfied the demands of an 
integration process characterised by a low level of economic interdependence, concerned with 
border issues (i. e. the elimination of tariffs) and operating in a low contentious environment. But 
since the tariff elimination process concluded, giving way to more sensitive and complex 
barriers to economic integration, MERCOSUR institutions have repeatedly failed to deliver 
effective solutions for its core problems. Eighteen years after the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Asuncion, MERCOSUR remains an incomplete free trade area, with a partially implemented 
CET and with no significant degree of co-ordination of State Parties' macroeconomic policies. 
There is an institutional imbalance between MERCOSUR predominantly intergovernmental 
institutional structure and its objective to establish a common market. But, at the same time, the 
sharp structural asymmetries between State Parties block any possibility to introduce 
supranational features to existing policy making and enforcement mechanisms. It has been 
suggested that the best -if not the only- path available for overcoming this institutional dilemma 
is to focus on streamlining the way the current system operates. 
It is not controversial to suggest that there is plenty of room for improving the efficacy and 
efficiency of existing policy-making and enforcement mechanisms without the need to go 
beyond a predominantly intergovernmental approach to integration. In this vein, a series of 
measures have been suggested for improving the functioning of decision making bodies, 
strengthening the role of the MERCOSUR Secretariat and empowering individuals' 
participation in the integration process. All the measures proposed are mindful not to undermine 
MERCOSUR decision making bodies' capacity to exert direct control over the scope and pace 
of the integration process. They rather suggest institutional re-arrangements and procedural 
requirements that should encourage them to exercise their power in a more rule-oriented, 
transparent, accountable and efficient way. 
State Parties are currently engaged on negotiations to reform MERCOSUR institutions but 
unfortunately, such negotiations are being carried out behind closed doors. It is difficult to 
anticipate the exact outcome of these negotiations, but lessons from past reform experiences 
should serve as a warning not to be terribly optimistic. Today, the tension between, on the one 
hand, the need for a more rule-based system, grounded in sound legal principles to deepening 
the integration process and, on the other hand, the lack of incentives for the largest country of 
the bloc to subject itself to anything more than an international framework for diplomatic co- 
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operation, remains as valid as it was eighteen years ago. Moreover, in the years to come, the 
achievement of MERCOSUR objectives, including the successful liberalisation of trade in 
services will no doubt continue to be conditioned by this tension. 
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Chapter III 
The Protocol of Montevideo on Trade 
in Services 
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This chapter examines the Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in Services, focusing on the 
analysis of its general obligations and disciplines. The Protocol's Programme of Liberalisation 
and the rounds of negotiations of specific commitments are analysed in Chapter IV. The chapter 
is divided into six sections. First, it reviews the background to the Protocol (Section A). It then 
analyses the Protocol's purpose and scope of application (Section B), its obligations and general 
disciplines (Section C), the institutional provisions (Section D) and its annexes (Section E), 
ending with some concluding remarks (Section F). 
A. Background 
State Parties to the Treaty of Asuncion originally envisaged the establishment of a common 
market to be in place by 31 December 1994. ' No matter the variety of objectives spelled out by 
the Treaty, for State Parties the immediate priority was to ensure the liberalisation of trade in 
goods. Such priority stems from the Treaty itself, which included an entire annex specifying in 
great detail State Parties' obligations relating to the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
but made no reference whatsoever to mechanisms for the liberalisation of the movement of 
services and factors of production or the co-ordination of macroeconomic policies. 
Despite not being the main concern, the liberalisation of trade in services did occupy a place in 
the MERCOSUR agenda since the initial stages of the integration process. In June 1992, the 
Common Market Council approved a broad and ambitious working programme3 for the 
transition period, which scheduled the adoption of a wide variety of measures necessary for the 
effective functioning of the common market by 31 December 1994. Some of those measures 
were aimed at advancing the liberalisation of trade in services either by way of negotiating 
general obligations and disciplines or by way of harmonizing legislation or adopting mutual 
recognition agreements for specific service sectors. 
The working programme entrusted a Commission on Trade in Services created under the 
umbrella of Sub-working group No 10 - Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies with the task 
I ToA, Art. 1. 
2 Annex V to the Treaty of Asuncion established ten Sub-Working Groups ("SWGs") auxiliary to the CMG for the 
purpose of co-ordinating macroeconomic and sectoral policies". Some of those SWGs were responsible for the co- 
ordination of policies in specific service sectors like SWG4 on Fiscal and Monetary Policies Relating to Trade with 
competence on the liberalisation of Financial Services, SWG5 on Inland Transport, SWG6 on Maritime Transport 
and SWG9 on Energy Policy. Prior to the signature of the Treaty of Asuncion Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay were 
already negotiating co-operation mechanisms on the transport sector. 
3 See "Las Lef as Schedule", approved by Dec 01/92, amended by Dec 01/93. 
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of drafting a framework agreement on trade in services by December 1993. Notwithstanding the 
efforts made, the agreement was not completed on time. The Commission's institutional status 
was upgraded to an Ad Hoc Group on Services ("ARGS") and the mandate for the conclusion 
of the framework agreement was extended until September 1996,4 but it was not until November 
1997 that the Protocol of Montevideo ("PM") was adopted. ' Seven additional months were 
necessary for completing the drafting of the sectoral annexes to the Protocol and for the 
negotiation of State Parties' initial schedules of specific commitments. ' One reason put forward 
by a diplomat involved in the drafting process to explain the delay in adopting a framework 
agreement in trade in services was the novelty of the issue and the lack of experience on how to 
deal with it. 7 
During the drafting stage, the AHGS faced difficulties in co-ordinating their work with other 
auxiliary bodies to the CMG with competence on specific service sectors such as the SWGs on 
Communications, Transport and Financial Issues. Some of these auxiliary bodies had been 
working in parallel to the AHGS for a long time on topics that necessarily required some degree 
of co-ordination. ' Overall, the co-coordination between the AHGS and other SWGs and 
Specialised Meetings with competence on specific service sectors was jeopardised by the 
structure and modus operandi of the auxiliary bodies to the CMG. ' 
It took a considerable time for State Parties to ratify the Protocol of Montevideo, its Annexes 
and their initial schedules of specific commitments. The Protocol finally entered into force on 7 
4 See Res 38/95 laying down the negotiating mandate for the AHGS. The mandate expressly stipulated the need 
for the Protocol to meet the requirements prescribed by the GATS for the adoption of regional trade agreements 
on trade in services. GATS Art. V prescribes that regional trade agreements liberalising trade in services must 
have substantial coverage and must provide for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination 
between or among the parties in the sectors covered by the agreement. 
5 See Dec 13/97 "approving" the Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in Services in MERCOSUR, hereinafter Protocol 
of Montevideo. 
6 See Dec 09/98 Annexes to the Protocol of Montevideo and Initial Schedule of Commitments. 
7 See MARIO ANTONIO MARCONINI, 'Estado Actual de las Negociaciones en Materia de Comercio de Servicios en el 
MERCOSUR', in, Origen en el Comercio de Servicios, Banco Central del Uruguay, (Montevideo 11 y 12 de 
noviembre 1996). p 63. 
8 For instance, the drafting of the Protocol's disciplines on mutual recognition required to take into account the 
work carried out by auxiliary bodies involved on the development of mutual recognition agreements of university 
degrees such as the Specialised Meeting of Ministries of Education. Similarly, the decision whether or not to 
include sector specific annexes to the Protocol and to discuss the content of such annexes required a joint effort 
between the AHGS and the various SWGs with competence on specific service sectors. 
9 See above Ch II, Section F, Numeral I. 
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December 2005.10 During the period between the adoption of the Protocol and the date it entered 
into force, State Parties conducted six rounds of negotiations of specific commitments although 
the results have not been incorporated into State Parties' legal systems. " In compliance with 
Article V: 7 of the CATS, the entry into force of the Protocol was officially notified to the 
Council of Trade in Services on 5 December 200612, and is currently under examination by the 
Committee on Regional Trade Agreements. 13 
Most of the Protocol's provisions are a replica of the CATS' provisions. However, aware of the 
differences between the Protocol's objectives and the GATS' objectives, the draftsmen modified 
some CATS provisions creating GATS-plus disciplines, while a small group of GATS 
provisions were not incorporated into the Protocol at all. The draftsmen also looked at the North 
American Free Trade Agreement's ("NAFTA") provisions on domestic regulations and on 
mutual recognition. But notwithstanding the similar objectives pursued by MERCOSUR and the 
European Community to establish a common market, the draftsmen did not consider the EC 
Treaty's provisions on the liberalisation of the free movement of services. 14 
Like the GATS, the structure of the Protocol of Montevideo rests on three pillars: a) a set of 
general concepts, principles and rules that apply to all measures affecting trade in services, b) a 
set of annexes containing specific rules on the movement of natural persons supplying services 
and on specific service sectors, and c) State Parties' schedules containing specific commitments 
on Market Access, National Treatment and additional commitments. 
10 So far the Protocol has been ratified by Argentina (Ley 25623,17 July 2002, published by the OJ 8 August 2002. 
Instrument of Ratification deposited 8/10/02), Brazil (Decreto Legislativo 335/2003,24 July 2003 and Decreto 
Legislativo 926/2005,15 September 2005, Instrument of Ratification deposited 7/11/05) and Uruguay (Ley 17885, 
20 December 2004, Instrument of Ratification deposited 2/08/05). According to Art. XXVII. 1, the Protocol shall 
enter into force thirty days after the deposit with the Government of the Republic of Paraguay of the third 
instrument of ratification. when three countries deposit the ratification instruments before the Paraguayan 
Government, the Protocol will enter into force. This occurred on 7 December 2005. 
11 So far, Argentina (Ley 25623) and Uruguay (Ley 17885) have incorporated their initial schedules of specific 
commitments, while Brazil has incorporated its schedule of commitments approved by the first round of 
negotiations (Decreto Legislativo 926/2005). State Parties have pledged their best efforts to observe those 
commitments included in the schedules of specific commitments not yet incorporated into their legal systems. See 
minutes GS meeting 01/99. 
12 See WTO Document S/C/N/388,18 December 2006. 
13 See WTO Document WT/REG/M/48 containing the minutes of the CRTA meeting held on 29/12/07 which states 
that all the necessary data relating to the Protocol has been received and the factual presentations are currently 
being drafted or had been sent to the parties for comment. 
14 EC Treaty, Arts. 49 to 55. 
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Finally, it is important to bear in mind that by the time the Protocol of Montevideo was signed, 
State Parties were already party to a number of agreements with third countries aimed at the 
promotion of trade, development of infrastructure and international co-operation in specific 
service sectors such as tourism, telecommunications, education and, above all, transport. Many 
of these agreements were concluded as Partial Scope Agreements under the LAIA umbrella 
between one or more parties to MERCOSUR and other LAIA Members. '5 The Annexes on 
Land and Water Transport and on Air Transport Services contain provisions expressly 
stipulating that the entry into force of the Protocol shall not affect these agreements. 16 
B. Purpose and Scope of Application 
1. Purpose 
According to Article I, the purpose of the Protocol is to promote free trade in services within 
MERCOSUR, which, if interpreted in isolation, suggests a parallelism between its purpose and 
that of the GATS. However, there are qualitative differences between them that must be 
clarified from the outset. 
As mentioned, the GATS, like all the other WTO's multilateral trade agreements, is primarily 
concerned with the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations. It 
aims to promote the expansion of trade in services under conditions of transparency and 
progressive, liberalisation, an objective qualified by the need not to undermine the right of 
Members to regulate in order to meet national policy objectives. As a "negative integration 
contract" the GATS does not require Members to forfeit their sovereignty on the formulation of 
economic policies simply because it does not seek to approximate them. 17 
Like the GATS, the Protocol of Montevideo seeks to consolidate in a single instrument a set of 
general rules and principles with a view to promote free trade in services and to ensure the 
15 See Annex IV to minutes AHGS meeting 04/96. This annex includes a list of bilateral and plurilateral agreements 
concluded separately between one or more parties to MERCOSUR and other countries. The list identifies nineteen 
PSAs on specific service sectors concluded under the LAIA umbrella, although many of them are co-operation 
agreements which do not confer market access or national treatment preferences. 
16 See below Section E, Numeral 3. 
17 See PETROS C MAVROIDIS, 'Highway XVI Re-visited: the Road from Non-discrimination to Market Access in 
GATS', (2007) 6 World Trade Review 1p 11. 
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increasing participation of less developed countries and regions in the services market. '8 But that 
is where the similarity of purposes between the two ends. Placing the Protocol of Montevideo in 
its broader context helps to understand the particularities of its purpose as compared to those of 
GATS. 
First, as a preferential trade agreement between four WTO members, the Protocol must comply 
with the GATS' conditions for economic integration, which essentially require from preferential 
trade agreements to have "substantial sectoral coverage" and to provide for the elimination of 
"substantially all discrimination". 19 
Secondly, and more importantly, the Protocol constitutes an integral part of the Treaty of 
Asuncion20, an agreement that seeks a degree of economic integration that goes beyond the 
elimination of discrimination on international trade relations, which certainly . cannot be 
described as a "negative integration contract" 2' The Protocol seeks the progressive liberalisation 
of trade in services as part of a broader process whose ultimate goal is the establishment of a 
common market. 22 As a result, the use of provisions extracted from a "negative integration 
Is Although the two instruments refer to the need to encourage the participation of less developed countries in 
trade in services, there are differences between the two in the way they formulate this objective. The GATS 
includes a specific provision (Art. VI) relating to the adoption of special measures aimed at facilitating the 
participation of developing countries in trade in services. During the drafting stage of the Protocol, Paraguay 
advocated, unsuccessfully, for the inclusion of a provision equivalent to Art. VI GATS. In the end, State Parties 
only agreed to include a reference to "the need to ensure the increasing participation of less developed countries 
and regions in the services market" in the preamble of the Protocol, subject to reciprocity. Indeed, the latter part of 
the preamble's recital ("on the basis of reciprocal rights and obligations") water downs the impact that such 
reference could have on the development of an effective special and non-reciprocal treatment in favour of less 
developed countries and regions. 
19 GATS, Art. V. For an assessment of the Protocol of Montevideo compliance with this provision see WALDEMAR 
HUMMER & ANDREA SCHMID, 'Liberalizacao do Comercio de Servicicos no MERCOSUL e na Comunidade Andina A 
luz do Artigo V GATS', in Waldemar Hummer (ad) MERCOSUR y UNION EUROPEA (Marcos Lemer Editora, 
Cordoba, Argentina 2008). 
20 PM, Art. XXVII. 1. 
21 See Mavroidis, ob cit, p 11. 
22 The protocol's preamble first recital refers to the Treaty of Asuncion and the free movement of services. The 
second recital refers to the importance of liberalizing trade in services for "... expanding the customs union and for 
the gradual creation of the Common Market". Similarly, the Protocol's Programme of Liberalisation prescribes that 
State Parties must hold rounds of negotiations of specific commitments aimed at the progressive inclusion of 
sectors and sub sectors 'until the completion of the Programme of Liberalisation within ten years from the entry 
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contract" in the context of a more ambitious integration agreement creates several 
inconsistencies which are analysed below. 
2. Scope of Application 
This section analyses the various provisions that define the boundaries of the Protocol of 
Montevideo's scope of application. The broader the service sectors and types of measures 
subject to the agreement's scope of application, the stronger its capacity to liberalise trade. By 
contrast, a priori exclusions of service sectors or narrow definitions of "measures" affecting 
trade in services constrain the agreements' capacity to liberalise trade. 
2.1 Services 
Like the GATS, the Protocol of Montevideo stipulates that "services" include any service in 
any sector, except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority but does not 
define the meaning of "services". 3 The lack of a legal definition for services may create 
interpretative difficulties in deciding whether or not a particular activity falls within the scope 
of application of the Protocol 24, in particular when it comes to classify services embodied in 
goods as a medium for their delivery, such as TV serials or films included in magnetic support 
devices for their distribution. Should they be subject to rules on trade in goods or to rules on 
trade in services? The increasing capacity to digitalise information powered by the 
information technology revolution will certainly keep lawyers busy in finding answers to that 
and similar cases in the near future. 
into force of the Protocol", i. e. until the elimination of Market Access and National Treatment restrictions on all 
service sectors. See PM, Art. XIX. 1. 
23 GATS Art. 11.3 (b). NAFTA does not provide a legal definition of services. The EC treaty, by contrast, does 
include a definition of services in Art. 50, albeit a residual one: "Services shall be considered to be 'services' within 
the meaning of this Treaty where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed 
by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons. " It then provides particular 
examples of services: " 'Services' shall in particular include: (a) activities of an industrial character; (b) activities of 
a commercial character; (c) activities of craftsmen; (d) activities of the professions. " 
24 In US-Gambling the defendant argued that gambling fell under the "sports" category of the Services Sectoral 
Classification List (a sector where it had undertaken no commitments) and not under the "Other recreational 
services (except sporting)" category (a sector where it had undertaken commitments). In order to make a decision, 
the Appellate Body looked at the context of the Treaty, examined its object and purpose and reviewed GATS 
Members' subsequent practice in the application of the Treaty. 
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2.2 Services Provided in the Exercise of Governmental Authority 
Like the GATS, the Protocol of Montevideo expressly excludes from its scope of application 
"services provided in the exercise of governmental authoritys25, meaning services that are 
supplied "... neither on a commercial basis nor in competition with one or more service 
suppliers"26. It is not immediately clear whether such expression covers public services such 
as health, education, basic utilities or postal services. A careful interpretation is necessary 
because of the possible implications of such expression on Governments' autonomy to design, 
implement and enforce public policies in these politically sensitive sectors. 
Analysing the GATS, Krajewsky contends that it is likely for the expression "services 
provided in the exercise of governmental authority" to be interpreted narrowly and, 
consequently, for most public services to fall within the CATS scope of application. 27 In 
support of his statement, Krajewsky argues that for defining the meaning of "services 
provided in the exercise of governmental authority" the agreement relies on the economic 
basis and circumstances under which the service is supplied rather than on the characteristics 
of the supplier or the nature of the service itself . 
29 Therefore, the fact that the service supplier 
is a public authority or that there is a public interest at stake, is not sufficient to bring the 
service in question outside the scope of application of GATS disciplines. It is the 
circumstances in which the service is supplied that matters and such circumstances are 
extremely narrow, encompassing only very few type of services. 29 In other words, the 
majority of services, even when provided by public authorities, are supplied on a commercial 
basis or in competition with one or more service suppliers, and thus fall under the scope of 
30 application of GATS disciplines 
25 Compare GATS, Arts. 1.3 (b) with PM, Art. 11.3 (b). 
26 Compare GATS, art 1.3 (c) with PM Art. 11.3 (c). 
27 See MARKUS KRAJEWSKI, 'Public Services And Trade Liberalisation: Mapping The Legal Framework', (2003) 6 
Journal of International Economic Law 341. 
28 Ibid. p 353. 
29 By contrast, Krajewsky points out that in the Annex on Financial Services "services supplied in the exercise of 
Governmental authority" are defined by reference to the supplier (central bank, monetary, or other public authority) 
and the nature of the service itself (social security) rather than the circumstances under which the service is 
supplied. See ibid p 355. 
30 For instance, Krajewsky considers that public services supplied through public private partnerships include a 
profit-seeking element and therefore would fall under the scope of application of GATS disciplines. Similarly, it 
could be argued that public education also falls within the GATS scope of application since it is supplied "in 
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So far, no disputes have arisen between State Parties in relation to the interpretation of the 
meaning of services provided in the exercise of governmental authority. It is nonetheless a 
complex issue. A too protectionist interpretation may insulate poor performing public service 
suppliers from the fresh competition that implementation of the Protocol's disciplines bring 
along with, precisely when they are most needed. By contrast, a too liberal interpretation 
could unduly constrain domestic regulatory authorities' capacity to address market failures 
affecting sensitive sectors for the population such as basic public utilities like water 
distribution and sanitation. 
2.3 Trade in Services 
Like the GATS, the Protocol applies to measures adopted by the States Parties affecting "trade 
in services"31. For the purpose of the Protocol, trade in services means the supply of a service 
according to any of four possible modes of supply: cross-border supply, consumption abroad, 
commercial presence and presence of natural persons. 32 The four modes of supply are 
essentially defined on the basis of the origin of the service supplier and consumer, and the 
degree and type of territorial presence which they have at the moment the service is 
delivered. 33 
The GATS draftsmen knew that no effective liberalisation of international service transactions 
could be achieved if service providers were to be prevented from establishing themselves in 
foreign markets on a permanent basis, but, at the same time, they were constrained by the lack 
of consensus for the adoption of a multilateral agreement for the liberalisation of investments. 
As an alternative, they opted for a broad definition of trade in services, including the supply of 
services through the commercial presence of the foreign supplier in the territory of any other 
State Party as a modality of trade in services. 34 
competition" with private education, meaning that there is a certain degree of elasticity of substitution. See 
Krajewsky, ob cit, p 352. 
31 Compare GATS art 1.2 with PM, Art. 11.2. 
32 PM, Art. 11.2 
33 See above Ch I, Section B. 
34 GATS, Art. XVII. 1 (c) defines "commercial presence" as "... any type of business or professional establishment 
inter alia through the constitution, acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person, as well as through branches 
and representative offices located within the territory of a State Party for the purpose of supplying a service". 
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The Protocol's draftsmen, by contrast, did not face such limitation since State Parties had 
already agreed to establish a common market involving the free movement of goods, services 
and factors of production. Moreover, at the time the Protocol of Montevideo was adopted, 
MERCOSUR already had in place instruments for the promotion and protection of 
investments. 35 Nonetheless, the Protocol's draftsmen chose to incorporate the GATS' 
unusually broad definition of trade in services into the Protocol. As a result, the MERCOSUR 
legal system includes overlapping regulations on investments stemming from different 
agreements, which undermine its clarity and consistency. 36 
There is no doubt that rules for disciplining measures affecting the right of establishment are a 
necessary component of a legal framework aimed at ensuring the effective liberalisation of 
trade in services. However, the method chosen by the Protocol's draftsmen to protect the right 
of establishment is questionable because of the inconsistencies it generates. It would have 
been more suitable to establish specific provisions for the protection of the right of 
establishment along with a set of different provisions for the protection of the freedom to 
supply services, similar to what is provided by other regional integration agreements. " 
2.4 Measures Affecting Trade in Services 
As mentioned, barriers to trade in services, contrary to tariffs or quotas, are within-the-border 
measures, embedded in domestic regulations scattered all over the legal system, which do not 
necessarily pursue a protectionist purpose, are not always easy to identify and whose trade 
36 See the Protocol of Colonia for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments in MERCOSUR or the 
Protocol of Buenos Aires for the Promotion and Protection of Investments Originating from States Non-Parties of 
MERCOSUR, 
36 For instance, the Protocol of Colonia allowed State Parties to maintain temporary exceptions to their national 
treatment obligations in specific sectors. Some of the sectors that State Parties chose to exclude from the 
disciplines of the investment protocol refer to service sectors such as Insurance (Argentina); Health Assistance, 
Sound Broadcasting Services, Telecommunication Services, Financial Services and Construction (Brazil); 
Telecommunications, Audiovisual Services, Postal Services (Paraguay); Electricity, Brokerage Services, Railway 
Trasnport, Telecommunications, Broadcasting, Press and Audiovisual Media (Uruguay). By contrast, these service 
sectors are included in State Parties' schedules of specific commitments, which form an integral part of the 
Protocol of Montevideo. 
37 See the EC Treaty, which contains, on the one hand, a set of standards for the protection of the right of 
establishment (Arts. 43 - 48) and, on the other hand, a set of standards for the protection of the freedom to 
provide services (Arts. 49 - 55). Similarly, NAFTA also contains specific disciplines for cross-border trade in 
services distinct from those for investment. 
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restrictive effect is difficult to measure. 38 Therefore, to provide an effective protection of the 
freedom to provide services, international rules and disciplines should address the widest 
possible spectrum of measures directly or indirectly affecting trade in services. That is 
precisely what the Protocol does: it provides a broad definition of "measures" and establishes 
a loose relationship between such measures and trade in services. 
First, the Protocol defines "measures" broadly, including "any measure adopted by a State 
Party, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative 
action, or any other form" 39 Measures adopted by State Parties may fall within the Protocol's 
scope of application, regardless of their hierarchy (e. g. constitutional provisions, statutes, 
administrative decisions, etc. ), their effects (e. g. a statute having general effects or an 
administrative decision affecting an individual company) or their nature (e. g. substantive rules 
or procedural rules). 40 The Protocol clearly states that not only measures affecting the sales 
transaction itself fall under its scope of application, but also measures affecting: 
(i) "the supply of a service41; 
(ii) the purchase, payment or use of a service; 
(iii) access to services which the States Parties prescribe shall be 
offered to the public in general and use thereof for the purpose of 
supplying a service; 
(iv) the presence of persons from a State Party in the territory of 
another State Party in order to supply a service, including 
commercial presence. , 42 
Secondly, the Protocol specifies that the regulatory authorities bound by the treaty include not 
only Central authorities but also, state, provincial, departmental or local authorities and non- 
38 See above Ch I, Section C. 
39 PM, Art. XVIII (a). 
40 In Argentina - Blocked Highways, para. 116,123 and 175 the Ad-hoc tribunal considered that the failure of the 
Argentinian Government to adopt measures to prevent or discipline the block of international motorways by 
environmental activists is incompatible with its international obligations to ensure the free circulation of goods and 
services stemming from the Treaty of Asuncion and the Protocol of Montevideo. Thus, "measures" includes both 
positive actions and omissions to adopt prescribed conduct. The award also made it clear that there are 
circumstances where a State Party can violate its commitments under MERCOSUR law, not just as a result of its 
own actions but also as a result of private parties' conduct. 
41 PM, Art. XVIII (b) specifies that the supply of a service includes the production, distribution, marketing, sale and 
delivery of a service. 
42 Ibid. Art. 11.1. 
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governmental bodies in the exercise of delegated powers 43 The inclusion of non- 
governmental bodies exercising delegated regulatory powers as subjects bound by the 
Protocol's disciplines is quite relevant in light of the growing number of independent 
regulatory agencies as a result of reforms inspired by a "regulatory state" model44 and because 
in many service sectors it is common for the government to delegate regulatory power to the 
industry itself, e. g. for the regulation of the Professions or the conduct of business of financial 
intermediaries. 
Thirdly, the Protocol prescribes that to fall within its scope of application, it is sufficient for 
the measure to "affect" trade in services. The cause and effect relationship is not qualified by 
any specific standard, which means that provided a connection between the measure and trade 
in services is established, the measure will fall within the Protocol's scope of application, 
regardless of the scale of its impact on trade flows 45 
The breadth of the definition enables the Protocol to cast its net over a wide range of 
"measures" that may affect trade in services. However, as it is shown below, it is important to 
bear in mind that the scope of application of some of the Protocol's disciplines is narrower 
than the scope of application of the Protocol itself. Most notably, State Parties are bound to 
observe the National Treatment and Market Access standards of treatment only in those 
service sectors where they have undertaken specific commitments and subject to the terms and 
limitations specified in their schedules of commitments. 
2.5 Subjects Benefiting by the Protocol's Rules and Disciplines 
As in any preferential trade agreement, each State Party is bound to accord the standards of 
treatment prescribed by the Protocol only to service suppliers from the State Parties to the 
43 Ibid. Art. 11.3. In Argentina - Blocked Highways para. 156, the ad hoc tribunal rejected the Argentinian argument 
that put forward issues relating to the division of competence between federal and provincial authorities to justify 
its inaction with respect to the demonstrations that blocked international motorways. In this vein, the Tribunal 
clearly stated that any action or omission of a governmental body is attributable to the State, no matter the 
administrative rank of that body and regardless of the division of competences between governmental bodies 
within such State. 
44 See in Uruguay, e. g., the recent creation of an independent regulator for the Telecommunication Sector by Law 
17296 on 21 February 2001 and an independent regulator for the energy and water sectors by Law 17.598 on 13 
December 2002. 
45 In the GATS context see EC-Bananas, para. 220. The Appellate Body held that the term "affecting" implies a 
loose degree of connection between the measure and the supply of a service, including measures which are not 
aimed at regulating or governing the supply of a service but nonetheless "have an effect on" it. 
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Agreement. Conversely, State Parties may refuse to accord such preferential treatment to 
service suppliers coming from third countries. For that purpose, the Protocol includes rules 
that identify who are the service suppliers entitled to the preferential treatment provided by the 
Protocol, which are an equivalent to the rules of origin on trade in goods. 
According to Article XVII, each State Party is entitled to deny the benefits of the Protocol to 
service suppliers in another State Party if it demonstrates that the service is supplied by "a 
person from a country that is not a MERCOSUR State Party". Contrary to GATS, the Protocol 
subjects the denial of benefits to notification and the holding of consultations "6 
Articles XVIII (i), (j) and (k) define "natural" and "legal persons". According to Article XVIII 
(i), "natural persons" are those who reside in the territory of any State Party and who, under 
the law of that State Party, are nationals of that other State Party or have the right of 
permanent residence in that State Party. According to Articles XVIII (j) and (k), "legal 
persons" are those who are constituted or organised in accordance with the law of any of the 
State Parties, which have their seat there, and are engaged in or plan to engage in substantive 
business operations in the territory of that State Party or any other State Party. Contrary to 
GATS, the Protocol does not require ownership or control conditions as an additional criterion 
for determining the origin of a legal person. 47 In other words, the Protocol's rules of origin are 
more flexible than those of GATS, covering any company which has invested within the 
territory of State Parties, no matter who are they owned by, as long as they are registered there 
and have a real economic presence. This broad approach contributes to minimise the potential 
trade diverting impact the Protocol may have on trade in services with third countries 48 
In summary, the scope of application of the Protocol of Montevideo is defined broadly. By 
casting its net over a wide range of measures affecting trade in services, it appears that the 
Protocol is well suited for removing trade barriers and promoting free trade in services. 
However, the scope of application of its two main disciplines - the National Treatment and 
46 See PM, Art. XVII in light of GATS, Art. XXVII. 
47 The GATS stipulates that for a legal person to be entitled to the preferential treatment prescribed by the 
agreement, it not only needs to satisfy the constitution and real seat requirements. It must also be "owned" or 
"controlled" by persons from a GATS Member. In this vein, a legal person is "owned" by persons of a Member if 
more than fifty per cent of the equity interest in it is beneficially owned by persons of that Member. A legal person 
is "controlled" by persons of a Member if such persons have the power to name a majority of its directors or 
otherwise to legally direct its actions. See GATS, Art. XXVIII(n). 
48 See SHERRY STEPHENSON, Can Regional Liberalization of Services go further than the Multilateral Liberalization 
under the GA TS? (OAS, Washington, D. C. 2002), p 11. 
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the Market Access standards - is limited to those service sectors where State Parties have 
undertaken specific commitments. As a result, the capacity of the Protocol to liberalise trade 
in services will largely depend on the successful completion of the rounds of negotiations, 
which determine the scope of application of the Protocol's main obligations. 
C. Obligations and General Disciplines 
General obligations and disciplines further the liberalisation of trade in services by compelling 
State Parties to accord foreign services and service providers minimum standards of treatment 
and to regulate in a more `trade friendly' way, fostering more open, transparent and non- 
discriminatory domestic laws. As such, they provide adjudicative bodies with a legal basis to 
review whether domestic measures are in conformity with the treaty or not. 49 
1. Most Favoured Nation Treatment 
The Most Favoured Nation standard ("MFN") is a principle of non-discrimination. Contrary 
to what its name suggests, its purpose is not to accord a more favourable treatment to a 
specific nation over the others. On the contrary, its purpose is to maintain equality of 
treatment by ensuring that each State will be treated at all times as favourably as the State 
which is most favoured. 
Under Article III of the Protocol, State Parties must extend immediately and unconditionally 
to services or service suppliers of all other State Parties "treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like services and service suppliers of any other country". In other words, a State 
Party cannot accord preferential treatment to services or service suppliers from certain State 
Parties but refrain from according such treatment to services or service suppliers from other 
State Parties. It can neither make the provision of preferential treatment subject to reciprocity 
provisions whereby preferential treatment to foreign service suppliers is granted only if the 
trading partner grants similar treatment to domestic service suppliers. 50 Contrary to GATS51, 
the Protocol does not allow derogations to the MFN standard. 
ae As already stated, by specifying the normative content and scope of application of the treaty's general 
obligations and disciplines, adjudicative bodies can play a strategic role in defining the scope and pace of the 
liberalisation process. See Ch I, Section D, Numerals 1.1 and 2.1 for evidence about the strategic role played by 
adjudicative bodies in the GATS and EC context 
50 PM, Art. III. 
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The MFN standard is one of the cornerstones of the multilateral trading system. Arguably, the 
very existence of a multilateral trading system depends on its capacity to ensure the 
observance of the MFN standard, precluding the emergence of discriminatory practices that 
could break the system into pieces. For a sub-regional agreement aimed at the establishment 
of a common market though, the obligation not to discriminate prescribed by the MFN 
standard is just one element of a complex web of negative and positive obligations. For 
instance, State Parties to the Treaty of Asuncion agreed not just to eliminate discrimination 
between each but to adopt a common trade policy in relation to third States and to co-ordinate 
sectoral policies in specific service sectors such as Transport and Communications. 
At the time the Protocol of Montevideo was adopted, State Parties were already part of 
various bilateral and plurilateral agreements on transport and communications, many of which 
are still in force. 52 Even after the Protocol was signed, some State Parties continue to adopt 
measures which arguably are not in conformity with the MFN standard. 53 Therefore, it seems 
that the MFN standard still has an important role to play in compelling State Parties to refrain 
from according preferential treatment to certain services or service suppliers and to negotiate 
the convergence of those bilateral and plurilateral agreements including preferential treatment 
for services or service suppliers. 
2. Market Access and National Treatment 
The Protocol does not define Market Access, but circumscribes it by reference to a list of six 
types of measures that State Parties may neither maintain nor adopt (in those service sectors 
where specific Market Access commitments have been made): a) measures restricting the 
number of service suppliers; b) measures restricting the total value of services transactions; c) 
measures restricting the total number of service operations or the total quantity of service 
output; d) measures restricting the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a 
particular service sector or by a service supplier; e) measures regarding the specific type of 
51 Under GATS, Art. 11.2, Members are allowed to maintain measures inconsistent with the MFN standard, which 
were in force at the time the agreement entered into force. Such measures should, in principle, not last longer than 
ten years after the entry into force of the Agreement. 
52 See above footnote n 15. 
63 See, for instance, the Free Trade Agreement between Uruguay and Mexico, signed in 2004 including a chapter 
on preferential treatment in services. Uruguay obtained a waiver from the other State Parties to sign this 
agreement. See also various bilateral agreements between Argentina and Brazil on residency and circulation of 
persons and on digital television. 
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legal person or joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a service and f) 
measures that limit the participation of foreign capital. 54 The adoption of these measures is not 
absolutely prohibited. Even in those service sectors where specific commitments have been 
undertaken, a State Party wishing to adopt any of the measures listed by Article VII. 2 may do 
so by recording the inconsistent measure in its schedule of specific commitments. " 
The national treatment standard ("NT") compels State Parties to accord to services and service 
suppliers of any other State Party treatment no less favourable than that accorded to its own 
`like' services and service suppliers in respect of all measures affecting the supply of 
services. " The provision is clear in stating that what matters is not just what the measures 
says, but whether or not the measure impairs the conditions of competition in favour of 
domestic incumbents. 57 Conditions of competition may be impaired not only by measures that 
accord to domestic suppliers a treatment more favourable than that accorded to foreign 
suppliers (i. e. de lure discrimination), but also by measures that despite formally according an 
identical treatment to both domestic and foreign suppliers, in practice, they discriminate 
against the latter because they face greater difficulties to comply with them (i. e. de facto 
58 discrimination). 
Together with the MFN standard, the NT standard reinforces the principle of non- 
discrimination on trade relations with a view to prohibiting any kind of discrimination against 
services or service suppliers on grounds of nationality or ownership. While the MFN standard 
prohibits discrimination as between services or service providers from different exporting 
countries, the NT standard prohibits discrimination as between domestic services or service 
providers and like foreign service or service provider. 
While the Market Access standard relates to market entry conditions, NT refers to standards 
of treatment relevant after market entry. The purpose of the NT standard is to promote non- 
discriminatory conditions of competition among services and service suppliers, irrespective of 
nationality or ownership. The NT standard cuts deeper into State Parties' policy autonomy, 
disciplining its fiscal, transportation and cultural policies, to name just a few. However, its 
liberalisation capacity is diminished by the fact that, like the Market Access standard, its 
scope of application is constrained to those service sectors included in each State Party's 
64 PM, Art. IV. 2. 
55 Ibid. Art. VII. 2(b). 
56 PM, Art. V. 1. 
57 PM, Arts. V. 3 and V. 4. 
58 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Autos, para. 10.307 and 10.308. 
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schedule of specific commitments and subject to the terms, limitations and conditions set out 
therein. 59 
The Protocol, following the GATS model, does not impose an across-the board obligation to 
accord Market Access and National Treatment to service suppliers from other State Parties. 
State Parties are bound to observe these standards of treatment only in those service sectors 
included in their schedules of specific commitments. This positive list approach enables State 
Parties to choose the service sectors they want to include in their schedules and to specify the 
terms, limitations and conditions to their specific Market Access and National Treatment 
commitments. At the same time, the Protocol compels State Parties to hold annual rounds of 
negotiations aimed at the gradual inclusion of sectors, sub sectors, activities and modes of 
supply of services in the schedules of specific commitments until the completion of the 
Programme of Liberalisation of Trade in Services in MERCOSUR within a maximum period 
of ten years from the entry into force of the Protocol. 60 
3. Transparency 
Transparency standards can make a significant contribution towards the liberalisation of trade 
in services. A more transparent rule-making process provides State Parties with the 
opportunity to scrutinise the compatibility of new regulations with treaty provisions at an 
early stage. It also forces domestic regulators to consider the possible costs and benefits of 
their decisions and, ultimately, it encourages better regulation and greater compliance. 
Transparency also facilitates foreign service providers' access to updated information about 
domestic regulations currently in force that affect trade in services. b' 
The Protocol compels State Parties to observe the following transparency disciplines: a) to 
publish promptly national measures and international agreements that pertain to or affect trade 
in services; b) to keep the MERCOSUR Trade Commission ("MTC") updated on regulatory 
changes that may affect significantly trade in services62; c) to respond promptly to requests by 
-% PM, Art. VI1.2. 
60 PM, Art. XIX. 1. 
61 On the benefits and costs of transparency in domestic regulation see KEIYA LIDA & JULIA NIELSON, 'Transparency 
in Domestic Regulation', in Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauve (eds), Domestic Regulation and Service Trade 
Liberalization (World Bank and Oxford University Press, Washington, D. C. 2003). 
62 See also Res 24/94 forcing State Parties to disclose draft rules aimed at regulating new technologies to their 
counterparts and Dec 11/01, Art. 1 forcing State Parties willing to regulate on sectors not yet regulated to 
141 
any other State Party on any of its measures that may affect trade in services 63 The Protocol 
also enables State Parties to notify the MTC of any measure taken by any other State Party, 
which allegedly affects the operation of the Protocol. State Parties are entitled not to comply 
with the transparency disciplines in those circumstances where the disclosure of information 
`would impede law 'enforcement, or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, or which 
would prejudice legitimate commercial interests of public or private enterprises' 65 
4. Domestic Regulation 
As mentioned, barriers to trade in services are more complex and less obvious than barriers to 
trade in goods. Every legal system includes a wide range of domestic regulations that may 
affect trade in services, which do not necessarily pursue an explicit protectionist purpose, 
most notably, but not limited to, licensing requirements and qualification standards. Trade in 
services may also be affected not only by the regulations themselves, but also by the way they 
are implemented and enforced. The Protocol includes a sophisticated provision on Domestic 
Regulation aimed at minimising the impact of domestic rules and domestic regulatory 
practices on trade in services 66 The provision includes both substantive and procedural 
requirements, each one of which deserves separate examination. 67 
Requirements for the Administrations of Measures of General Application 
Article X. 1 prescribes that State Parties must ensure that all measures of general application 
affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner. 
Contrary to GATS, the Protocol does not limit the scope of application of this requirement to 
sectors where specific commitments have been undertaken. This requirement is particularly 
relevant for the liberalisation of trade in services, which is frequently obstructed not only by 
discriminatory rules per se but also by the discriminatory application of non-discriminatory 
rules such as discriminatory delays in dealing with governmental approvals, licenses and 
clearances; discriminatory access to data collected by the government and discriminatory 
exonerate their counterparts from the Market Access or National Treatment restrictions that the new regulation 
may include. 
63 PM, Art. VII. 
64 Ibid. Art. VII. 
65 Ibid. Art. IX. 
66 Ibid. Art. X. 
67 For a comprehensive analysis of this provision in the GATS context see MARGARETA DJORDJEVIC, 'Domestic 
Regulation and Free Trade in Services: A Balancing Act, (2002) 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration . 
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enforcement of regulations against foreign service providers can result in a major obstacle to 
trade in services 68 A survey among service industry operators on the most frequent barriers to 
trade in services found that in many cases the discriminatory treatment is not written into the 
published laws and regulations but it is a matter of official practice, i. e. `... the way things have 
always been done... ' or the `general bureaucratic tendency not to approve new activities'. 69 
Procedural Requirements for the Adoption of Administrative Decisions Affecting Trade in 
Services 
Service markets tend to be heavily regulated and in some sectors service industries operate 
under the close supervision of administrative agencies, which are usually endowed with 
extensive powers to control their business and the market in which they operate. 70 In order to 
minimise the risk of a discriminatory exercise of administrative powers, the Protocol requires 
State Parties to observe minimum procedural standards for the adoption of administrative 
decisions affecting trade in services, which ultimately should encourage more sound and 
even-handed administrative practices. 
Article X. 2 prescribes that State Parties must grant all service providers affected by 
administrative decisions, the right to have access to an impartial and objective procedural 
review of those decisions and, where necessary, to the application of appropriate remedies. 
Article X. 3 prescribes that applications relating to licenses, registrations, certificates or other 
kind of authorisation required for the supply of a service must be dealt with by the competent 
authority "within a reasonable period of time" and that the authorities must make a decision 
and if they consider the application to be incomplete, they must inform the applicant of the 
status of the application "without undue delay". 
Specific Requirements for the adoption of Technical Standards, Qualification and Licensing 
Requirements 
68 See below, Ch V, footnote n55 about the contradictions incurred by different Brazilian consulates in Argentina 
about the interpretation of the Agreement for the Simplification of Business Activities. 
69 See GEZA FEKETEKUTY, International Trade in Services. An Overview and Blueprint for Negotiations (American 
Enterprise Institute and Ballinger, Cambridge Massachusetts 1988), p 141. 
70 In the financial sector, for instance, firms must obtain a licence prior to operate and the regulator is entitled to 
suspend or withdraw the licence on prudential grounds, it may also conduct investigations into the financial health 
of the undertaking and request the adoption of contingency measures. Similarly, utilities regulators may fix 
administrative prices for tariffs, impose fines for anticompetitive behaviour or request the service provider to ensure 
the universal access to the service it provides. 
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In many sectors, service suppliers must first obtain a licence or satisfy technical or 
qualification requirements before being allowed to operate. Technical standards, qualifications 
and licensing requirements can be used as effective entry barriers to preclude foreign suppliers 
from competing in a particular market. In order to prevent their protectionist use, the Protocol 
prescribes an open list of standards that they must meet, inter alia: 
"i. based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and ability to supply the 
service; 
ii. not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service; and 
iii. in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the 
service. "'' 
These standards are far more demanding than the non-discriminatory standards of treatment 
seen above (MFN, NT, Market Access). To meet these standards it is not only necessary to 
avoid discrimination, but also to regulate in the least trade restrictive way. For instance, the 
necessity test allows for the review of the appropriateness of the regulatory means employed 
to secure the quality of a service in the light of their trade restrictive costs. This opens the door 
to go beyond a discriminatory test and to strike down measures that, despite being indistinctly 
applicable in character, may nonetheless create more trade restrictions than necessary to attain 
their regulatory goals. 
Again, as opposed to GATS, the Protocol does not limit the scope of application of these 
standards to sectors where specific commitments have been undertaken, which constitutes a 
relevant "GATS plus" step, placing the Protocol ahead a strictly non-discrimination 
agreement, at least in relation to technical standards, qualifications and licensing 
requirements. 72 
Strangely enough, Article X. 5 provides that each State Party may provide for adequate 
procedures to verify the competence of professionals of any other State Part y. The effective 
liberalisation of Professional Services is inextricably linked to the harmonisation or mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications. Therefore, it should be an obligation for State 
71 PM, Art. X. 4. 
72 The relationship between, on the one hand, the specific requirements for technical standards, qualification and 
licensing requirements and, on the other hand, State Parties' specific sector commitments was widely discussed 
during the drafting stage. Paraguay was one of the State Parties most reluctant to accept the universal application 
of these regulatory standards. See minutes AHGS meetings held during 1996 and 1997. 
144 
Parties to establish adequate procedures to verify the competence of professionals of any other 
State Party, rather than just an option. 73 
5. Recognition 
There is an unavoidable tension underlying the recognition of qualifications, experience or 
licenses obtained by service suppliers abroad. On the one hand, State Parties want to set their 
own standards for the recognition of qualifications, experience or licenses obtained outside 
their territory. On the other hand, the proliferation of mutual recognition agreements 
containing different standards can create significant obstacles to trade in services 74 Article XI 
of the Protocol seeks to manage this tension in two ways: first by qualifying the exercise of 
State Parties' right to recognize foreign qualifications, experience and licenses and secondly, 
by encouraging the development of mutually acceptable standards. 
Article XI. 1 allows State Parties to recognize unilaterally or through an agreement the 
education, licenses, registration or certifications obtained by a service provider in the territory 
of any other State Party or in a third State, without compelling them to extend that recognition 
to other State Parties. At the same time, to avoid mutual recognition practices from 
constituting a means of discrimination against service suppliers with non-recognised 
education and experience, the provision prescribes that each State Party must give any other 
State Party the opportunity to demonstrate that the education and experience obtained in their 
territory could be recognized on the same footing as others. 75 
Article XI. 2 compels State Parties to encourage the competent authorities in their respective 
territories to work together with a view to developing mutually acceptable standards and 
criteria for the practice of relevant services and professions and to make recommendations on 
mutual recognition to the CMG. 
Article XI. 3 suggests areas where mutually acceptable standards and criteria may be 
developed including, inter alia, education, examinations, experience, conducts and ethics, 
professional development and renewed certification, protection of consumers, nationality, 
73 GATS, Art. VI. 6 prescribes that each Member shall provide for adequate procedures to verify the competence of 
professionals of any other Member. 
74 Mutual Recognition Agreements facilitate trade-in services among the parties to the agreement, but works to the 
disadvantage of service providers from third countries, for whom it becomes more difficult to access the service 
market of the parties to the agreement 
75 PM, Art. XI. 1 is based on NAFTA, Art. 1210.2. 
145 
residence or domicile requirements. 76 
Finally, Article XI. 4 imposes on the CMG the obligation to consider the recommendations 
made by the competent authorities and analyse their consistency with the Protocol within a 
reasonable period of time, and, if suitable, adopt them as binding disciplines for State Parties. 
6. Defence of Competition, Government Procurement and Subsidies 
The Protocol of Montevideo does not include specific disciplines for trade in services on the 
defence of competition, government procurement and subsidies, but refers to MERCOSUR 
general disciplines in those areas. " At the time the Protocol was adopted, the MERCOSUR 
legal system already included a Protocol on the Defence of Competition 71, but there were no 
common disciplines on Government Procurement or Subsidies. 
The first MERCOSUR instrument on Government Procurement was adopted in 2003 and 
subsequently replaced by the current instrument in 2004.79 The Protocol of Montevideo 
excludes the application of the MFN, NT and Market Access standards to the laws, 
regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of services 
purchased for governmental purposes. 80 However, the scope of application of the Protocol on 
Government Procurement covers the procurement of goods and services and expressly refers 
to the observance of the disciplines established by the Protocol of Montevideo. 8 ' The rules and 
76 So far, there are negotiations under way for the mutual recognition of professional standards (See above Ch V. 
Section C Numeral 1.2 ). In addition, various instruments have already been adopted on the mutual recognition of 
certificates, diplomas, and studies at primary, secondary, and university levels (See e. g. Protocol on Educational 
Integration and Recognition of Primary and Secondary Level Certificates and Studies of a Non Technical 
Character, approved by Dec 4/94; Protocol on Educational Integration, and Recognition of Diplomas, Certificates, 
and Studies on Technical Education, approved by Dec 7/95; Protocol on Educational Integration on the 
Recognition of University Degrees for the Purpose of Undertaking Postgraduate Studies in MERCOSUR 
Universities, approved by Dec 8/96. ) 
n PM, Arts. XII, XV and XVI. 
78 See Protocol of Fortaleza for the Defence of Competition in MERCOSUR "approved" by Dec 18/96 of Dec. 16, 
1996. This protocol entered into force on 8 Sep 2000, thirty days after the deposit of the second instrument of 
ratification with the Government of Paraguay. It has been ratified by Brazil, Decreto Legislativo No 6,15 Feb 2000 
and by Paraguay Ley No 1143,15 Oct 1997. 
79 See Protocol on Government Procurement in MERCOSUR "approved" by Dec 27/04 of Dec. 17 2004, as 
modified by Dec 23/06,20 July 2006. So far, no State Party has ratified this Protocol. 
80 PM, Art. XV. 1. 
81 Protocol on Government Procurement, Art. 2.5. 
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disciplines included in the Protocol on Government Procurement apply only to those service 
sectors mentioned by State Parties' lists included in Annex III to the Protocol. The application 
of these rules and disciplines is also subject to the limitations on Market Access and NT 
included in State Parties' schedules of specific commitments annexed to the Protocol of 
Montevideo 82 
In 2002 MERCOSUR adopted the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures relating to trade in goodsß3, but so far no specific disciplines on subsidies relating to 
trade in services have been adopted. Like in the GATS, a State Party which considers that it is 
adversely affected by a subsidy of another State Party may request consultations with that 
State Party, who must accord sympathetic consideration to the consultation. 84 
7. Exceptions to Obligations and General Rules 
The Protocol of Montevideo recognises the existence of overriding considerations that may 
justify conduct contrary to its provisions. The grounds for invoking a general exception can be 
one or more of the following: a) those `necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public 
order; b) those `necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health'; c) those `necessary to 
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Protocol'; d) those `inconsistent with national treatment standard, provided that the difference in 
treatment is aimed at ensuring the equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes 
in respect of services or service suppliers of the other State Parties; and e) those `inconsistent 
with MFN standard, provided that the difference in treatment is the result of an agreement on the 
avoidance of double taxation or provisions on the avoidance of double taxation in any other 
international agreement or arrangement by which the State Party applying the measure is 
bound., " The word `necessary', which qualifies the first three grounds for exceptions, rightly 
limits their use to those situations where there is no other less trade-restrictive alternative but 
to adopt the non-conforming measure to protect the non-trade interests at stake. 
To prevent abuses, the chapeau of Article XIII sets the standards that State Parties must observe 
when applying the exceptional measures, namely, that the measures must not be applied "in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination where like 
82 Ibid. 
83 See Dec 14/02 of July 5,2002 which adopts the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures as 
part of the MERCOSUR legal system. 
84 PM, Art. XVI. 2. 
86 Ibid. Art. XIII. 
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provisions prevail between countries", or a "disguised restriction on trade in services". 86 Thus, 
measures inconsistent with the Protocol's obligations and general disciplines must satisfy a 
two-tier test. First, a provisional justification by reason of characterisation of the measure 
under one or another of the particular exceptions, and secondly, a justification that the manner 
in which the measure is applied satisfies the requirements of the chapeau. 87 
The security exceptions provide an escape valve to treaty obligations when complying with 
them goes against State Parties' security interests or State Parties' obligations under the 
United Nations Charter. 88 Contrary to Article XIII, the chapeau of Article XIV does not set 
any standard to be observed by State Parties invoking the exceptions contained in it. In this 
sense, it is easier for State Parties to justify an exception on security grounds than, say, on public 
morals or environmental grounds. By contrast, the Security Exceptions' provision places on 
State Parties invoking them, the duty to inform the MERCOSUR Trade Commission of the 
measures adopted and of their termination. This duty is not required from State Parties adopting 
non-conforming measures justified on general exception grounds. 
The Protocol of Montevideo is an integral part of the Treaty of Asuncion. In its turn, the Treaty 
of Asuncion is part of a broader regional integration framework established by the Treaty of 
Montevideo, which has its own provision on exceptions 89 There is no doubt that State Parties to 
86 Comparative integration experiences indicate that the risk of using lawful exceptions for unlawful purposes is 
high. Both EU case law and WTO case law are fraught with cases where defendant States adopted trade 
restrictive measures based on lawful exceptions but applied them in a discriminatory way against foreign products 
or services or as a disguised restriction on trade between Member States. 
87 In the GATS' context see Appellate Body Report, US-Gambling; in the GATT's context see, e. g., Appellate Body 
Report, US-Shrimp. 
88 PM, Art. XIV. 
89 ToM, Art. 50 reads as follows: 
"No provision under the present Treaty shall be interpreted as precluding the adoption and observance of 
measures regarding: 
a. Protection of public morality; 
b. Implementation of security laws and regulations; 
c. Regulation of imports and exports of arms, munitions, and other war materials and, under exceptional 
circumstances, all other military equipment; 
d. Protection of human, animal and plant life and health; 
e. Imports and exports of gold and silver in bullion form; 
f. Protection of national treasures of artistic, historical or archeological value; and 
g. Exportation, use and consumption of nuclear materials, radioactive products or any other material used for the 
development and exploitation of nuclear energy. ' 
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the Treaty of Asuncion may rely on Article 50 of the Treaty of Montevideo to justify measures 
incompatible with the obligations on the free movement of goods stemming from the Treaty of 
Asuncion 90 No ruling has yet confirmed whether State Parties could also rely on the same 
provision to justify non-conforming measures with the obligations prescribed by the Protocol of 
Montevideo. In any case, the question has relevant legal consequences, first, because Article 50 
of the Treaty of Montevideo includes some grounds for exceptions such as the `protection of 
national treasures of artistic, historical or archaeological value', which are not included in the 
Protocol. Secondly, because the chapeau of Article 50, unlike Article XIII of the Protocol, 
does not include any standard to be observed when invoking the exceptions it prescribes, 
suggesting a more liberal approach for State Parties' use of such exceptions. 
By contrast to GATS, the Protocol makes no reference to restrictions to safeguard the Balance 
of Payments or to emergency safeguard measures. During the drafting stage of the Protocol, 
State Parties discussed the possibility to include these two exceptional mechanisms finally 
decided not to do it. In relation to the Balance of Payments exception, it was argued that State 
Parties had not agreed such a mechanism for trade in goods and there was no reason to adopt a 
different view for trade in services. In relation to safeguards, it was argued that the Protocol 
already included a mechanism allowing State Parties to modify or suspend their specific 
commitments and opted for relying on that mechanism alone to deal with unexpected surges on 
the import of services that could pose threats to domestic service industries 91 
D. Institutional Provisions 
As mentioned, the Protocol of Montevideo is not a stand alone agreement but an integral part 
of the Treaty of Asuncion. Accordingly, it does not stipulate a particular set of institutions for 
the implementation and enforcement of its obligations and general disciplines, but relies on 
the existing MERCOSUR institutional framework. 92 The following section examines the role 
90 See ToA, Annex 1, art 2 (b) and AHAA Brazil - Phytosanitary Products para. 9.6. 
91 PM, Art. XX. The convenience of adopting this provision was also discussed at length. Argentina, for instance, 
argued against its adoption. See minutes GS meeting 03196. 
92 During the drafting stage, State Parties discussed the possibility to create a new body with the exclusive 
responsibility for assisting with the implementation of the Protocol and the possibility to establish a specific 
procedure for consultations on service relating issues, but they finally decided to entrust the functions relating to 
the implementation and enforcement of the Protocol's obligations and general disciplines to existing MERCOSUR 
institutions. 
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of MERCOSUR institutions in relation to the implementation and enforcement of the 
obligations and general disciplines prescribed by the Protocol of Montevideo. 93 
1. Common Market Council and Common Market Group 
The Protocol assigns the CMC and the CMG dit%rent tasks relating to the implementation of 
its Programme of Liberalisation for advancing the liberalisation of trade in services through 
the negotiation of specific commitments on Market Access and National Treatment. 94 The 
CMG is responsible for calling and supervising the rounds of negotiations of specific 
commitments, a task now delegated to the Group on Services95, while the CMC is responsible 
for approving the results of the negotiations as well as any modification or suspension 
thereof. % The CMG is also responsible for receiving notifications and the results of the 
consultations on the modification and/or suspension of specific commitments97, examining 
proposals on mutual recognition of standards and criteria for the practice of relevant activities 
and professions in the service sector, developed by governmental bodies and/or associations 
and professional entities98 and for evaluating, on a periodical basis, the development of trade 
. in services in MERCOSUR99 
2. MERCOSUR Trade Commission 
The MTC bears the overall responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the 
Protocol. 10° For this purpose, the Protocol assigns the MTC a variety of tasks: "a) to receive 
information provided, at least annually, by State Parties relating to the modification or 
adoption of new laws, regulations or administrative guidelines, which significantly affect 
trade in services; 10' b) to hear allegations formulated by any State Party relating to measures 
93 See Ch II for a detailed analysis of MERCOSUR institutions. 
94 See Ch IV for a detailed analysis of the Programme of Liberalisation of Trade in Services. 
95 PM, Art. XXII. 1(a) and Res. GMC NO 31/98. 
96 Ibid. Art. XXI. 
87 Ibid. Art. XXII (b). 
90 Ibid. Art. XXII (c). 
99 Ibid. Art. XXII (d). 
100 During the drafting stage, State Parties discussed the possibility to create a new body with the exclusive 
responsibility for assisting with the implementation of the Protocol, but in the end they decided to assign this task 
to the MTC. 
101 PM, Arts. XXIII a) and VII. I. 
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taken by another State Party, which allegedly affects the operation of the Protocol; ' 02 C) to 
receive information about measures adopted by State Parties under Article XIV for the 
protection of essential security interests; 103 d) to receive information from the States Parties on 
actions that might constitute abuse of a dominant position, or a practice distorting 
competition, and to bring it to the attention of the national bodies responsible for 
implementing the Competition Protocol; 104 e) to hear questions and claims transmitted by 
States Parties relating to the implementation or interpretation of, or non-compliance with, this 
Protocol or the commitments undertaken in the Schedules of Specific Commitments, applying 
the mechanisms and procedures in force within the MERCOSUR; 105 and f) to perform other 
services-related tasks that the CMG may assign. , 1°6 
So far, no procedures have been established for State Parties to inform the MTC, at least 
annually, about the modification or introduction of new regulations affecting trade in services 
or to inform the MTC about measures adopted under Article XIV. It is unlikely that these 
procedures will be set up in the near future and no high expectations should be placed on the 
MTC' role as the overall guardian of the Protocol. The MTC meets on average once a month, 
has no resources and is already overloaded by its responsibilities relating to assisting the 
CMG with the supervision of the application of the common trade policy. However, as is 
explained below, State Parties already began to use the MTC as a forum to request 
consultations from other State Parties relating to measures allegedly breaching the obligations 
stemming from the Protocol. 
3. Dispute Settlement 
The settlement of disputes that may arise between State Parties relating to the application, 
interpretation or non-fulfilment of the commitments established by the Protocol of 
Montevideo is entrusted to the procedures and mechanisms for dispute settlement provided by 
the MERCOSUR legal system, most notably, the arbitral procedure prescribed by the Protocol 
of Olivos. 1°7 In addition, State Parties may present claims before the MTC relating to the 
implementation or interpretation of, or non-compliance with the Protocol or the commitments 
102 Ibid. Arts. XXIII a) and VII. 5. 
103 Ibid. Art. XXIII. b). 
104 Ibid. Art. XXIII. c). 
105 Ibid. Art. XXIII. d). 
106 Ibid. Art. XXIII. e). 
107 Ibid. Art. XXV. 
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undertaken in the schedules of specific commitments108 and domestic courts may request 
Consultative Opinions from the Permanent Review Tribunal relating to the interpretation of 
the Protocol of Montevideo and the schedules of specific commitments that form part of it. 109 
The effectiveness of the dispute settlement system is limited by various factors including, 
amongst others, the lack of standing for private persons, the lack of effective remedies to 
redress the consequences derived from the violation of MERCOSUR law and State Parties' 
marked preference for diplomatic means over arbitral proceedings to settle disputes. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the capacity of the dispute settlement system to force State 
Parties to comply with their obligations stemming from the Protocol's general obligations and 
disciplines and with their schedules of specific commitments should not be underestimated. 
In terms of claims brought before the MTC, Argentina requested consultations from Brazil in 
relation to domestic legislation that allegedly breaches Brazil's specific commitments on 
Advertising Services. Indeed, law 10.454,13/05/02 creates a tax on advertisements which 
imposes differential rates according to the origin of the advertisement. Argentina alleged this 
is in breach of Brazil's unrestricted Market Access and National treatment commitments on 
the cross-border supply of Advertising Services. Brazil replied that the measure was adopted 
to promote the development of the national cinematographic industry and that it is currently 
reviewing the compatibility of this measure with its commitments under the Protocol. 1° So 
far, further actions followed suit. 
In terms of the arbitral procedure, in Argentina - Blocked Highways the ad hoc tribunal 
confirmed the binding effect of the Protocol of Montevideo on State Parties. "' The award 
holds, amongst other things, that the free movement of services, particularly Transport and 
Tourism, were affected by the persistent and continuous blocking of motorways that link 
Uruguay and Argentina caused by environmental activists on the Argentinian bank of the 
River Uruguay. "2 Furthermore, the award prescribes that the failure of Argentinian authorities 
to adopt the necessary measures to prevent or at least to put an end to those blockings of 
100 Ibid. Art. XXIII. d). 
109 See P0, Art. 3 and Rules of Procedure for the Request of Consultative Opinions, Art. 4. 
110 See Consulta No 01/07 presented at the MTC meeting 03/07,9/05/07. 
+11 See AHAA Argentina - Blocked Highways, para. 105. For a very similar case in the EC context see Case C- 
112/00, Schmidberger Internationale Transporte und Planzuge v Austria, [2003] ECR 1-5659 and, more recently, 
C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, [2007] ECR I. 
112 AHAA Argentina - Blocked Highways, para. 111-114. 
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motorways is not compatible with State Parties' commitment to secure the free movement of 
goods and services across their territories. ' 13 
The award rejects the Argentinian argument that the Protocol of Montevideo only compels 
State Parties not to adopt governmental measures that affect the free movement of services. 
Instead, it holds that the authorities of a State Party are under the obligation to prevent or to 
put an end to the obstructions to the free movement of goods and services caused by private 
parties, even in the absence of an express rule that prescribes such conduct. The Tribunal 
argues that such obligation stems from the commitment on free movement undertaken by 
State Parties, which also involves the obligation to adopt the necessary means to secure such 
commitment. 114 Previous awards relating to measures affecting the free movement of goods 
have also held that Article 1 of the Treaty of Asuncion prescribes a clear, defined and self- 
executing obligation that custom duties, charges of equivalent effect and other restrictions on 
regional products are absolutely prohibited. 115 
The evidence stemming from the arbitration awards suggests that when a dispute reaches the 
arbitration stage, the competent ad hoc tribunal looks at the claim carefully and examines the 
compatibility of the challenged measure with the MERCOSUR legal system in light of a 
broad understanding of State Parties' free trade commitments, whether expressed or implied 
by the law applicable to the dispute. ' 16 Therefore, in theory, the dispute settlement system 
could be an effective mechanism for the enforcement of the Protocol's general obligations and 
disciplines. In practice, however, only a tiny proportion of State Parties' measures and 
practices incompatible with MERCOSUR law, end up being challenged before a 
MERCOSUR ad hoc tribunal. "7 
In terms of Consultative Opinions, the procedure for requesting them has entered into force 
very recently and so far the PRT has issued only one Opinion which is not related to the 
Protocol of Montevideo. "8 However, as it stems from comparable integration experiences, the 
113 Ibid. Tribunal's decision, second consideration. 
114 Ibid. para. 117 -118. 
115 AHAA Uruguay - Cigarettes, p 14. 
116 On previous awards on trade in goods' disputes, arbitration tribunals have applied tests to assess the 
conformity of domestic measures with international free trade commitments that go beyond the discriminatory test, 
including, e. g. reasonableness (Brazil-Remoulded Tyres, p 15), proportionality (Brazil-Remoulded Tyres, p 15) and 
power deviation (Argentina - Poultry, para. 161,163 and 168). 
117 See above Ch II, Section E, Numeral 2. 
118 See Opinion 1/2007. 
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consultative mechanism plays a vital role in developing a uniform interpretation of the law of 
integration and there is no reason to suggest the PRT may not contribute with the 
interpretation of the obligations and general disciplines prescribed by the Protocol of 
Montevideo. 
In summary, instead of establishing a new set of institutions with exclusive competence on 
trade in services, the Protocol's draftsmen chose to rely on the existing MERCOSUR 
institutional framework for the implementation and, eventually, the enforcement of its 
obligations and general disciplines. Thus, the capacity of the Protocol to liberalise trade in 
services is inextricably linked to the efficacy of MERCOSUR institutions, whose design and 
performance is not optimal. 119 However, in line with MERCOSUR gradual and flexible 
approach to its institutional development, the Protocol leaves the door open for future 
amendments in order to meet the institutional demands of an evolving integration process. 120 
E. Annexes 
The balance between general rules and principles on trade in services and annexes including 
special rules for specific service sectors raises a number of difficult questions: for which 
service industries should sector specific annexes be included? How detailed should the 
annexes be? How should the relationship between the general framework and its annexes be 
established? 
On the one hand, innovative business practices such as financial conglomerates are blurring 
the boundaries between service sectors, there are many measures affecting trade in services in 
various service sectors such as authorisation requirements that share common characteristics, 
and there are reasons of consistency and legal succinctness that call for a horizontal regulatory 
framework with general obligations and disciplines. On the other hand, the "services" label 
encompasses a wide range of industries, raising different types of regulatory challenges which 
are difficult to tackle by only using a common set of rules and principles. 121 
119 See above Ch II, Section F. 
120 PM, Art. XXVI. 
121 For instance, for network service industries (e. g. telecommunications, energy and water supply), it is important 
to ensure reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions for the access to and use of networks. For Professional 
Services it is necessary to ensure that qualifications are based on objective and transparent criteria and not used 
as a means for arbitrary discrimination. For Financial Services, the regulatory framework requires to carefully 
balance the liberalisation of trade with the need to ensure the stability of the system and the protection of 
investors. 
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A too general framework may not provide an effective mechanism for tackling the disparity of 
barriers that undermine trade in different service sectors. By contrast, a complete 
sectoralisation of disciplines may overlook the common regulatory challenges that underlie all 
service sectors, increasing the transaction costs to implement, administer and enforce a series 
of unconnected sector-specific regulatory frameworks. 
Delegates to the AHGS sought inspiration from the annexes to the GATS and consulted the 
auxiliary bodies to the CMG with competence on specific service sectors to evaluate whether 
the need for a sector specific annex was justified or not. 122 Eventually, they agreed on three 
broad guidelines for drafting the annexes. First, that the overall purpose of the sectoral 
annexes should be to facilitate the application of the Protocol's obligations and general 
disciplines to specific service sectors by clarifying the meaning and scope of those obligations 
and general disciplines in light of the specificities of the service sector in question. Secondly, 
that special care should be taken to avoid adopting provisions that could end up creating 
difficulties for the interpretation of the provisions of the Protocol. Thirdly, that sector specific 
provisions should aim at ensuring the compatibility of the Protocol with those existing legal 
instruments on specific service sectors that State Parties were already part of . 
123 
The drafting of the Annexes evidenced the problems of co-ordination between the AHGS and 
other auxiliary bodies with competence on specific service sectors. 124 These problems delayed 
the drafting process and forced the AHGS'to request the CMG for an extension of its 
mandate. Seven additional months were necessary to complete the annexes. The Protocol 
includes annexes on the movement of natural persons supplying services, Financial Services 
and Air Transport Services that save for minor differences reproduce the text of the GATS' 
annexes for these specific sectors. It also includes an Annex on Land and Water Transport 
Services, which finds no parallel on the GATS. 125 The annexes constitute an integral part of 
the Protocol. 126 
122 See minutes AHGS meeting 04/97. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 SWG1 on Communications viewed favourably the idea to have an annex for telecommunications, radio and 
television transmission services and postal services. A text for the annex was drafted but in the end delegates to 
SWG1 could not reach a consensus on its final version. See minutes AHGS meeting 05/98. The absence of an 
annex on Telecommunications is an important shortcoming, because there are particular challenges that affect the 
conditions of competition in this sector that require from specific regulatory disciplines to address them. Later on, 
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1. Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services 
The Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services applies to "measures 
affecting natural persons who are service suppliers of a State Party, and natural persons of a 
State Party who are employed by a service supplier of a State Party, in respect of the supply of 
a service". 127 
First, the Annex clarifies that the Protocol only covers the temporary and not the permanent 
movement of natural persons. To this end, it excludes "measures affecting natural persons 
seeking access to the employment market of a State Party" and "measures regarding 
citizenship, residence or employment on a permanent basis" from the Protocol's scope of 
application. '28 
Secondly, the Annex seeks to balance the promotion of trade in services supplied by the 
movement of natural persons with State Parties' interest in preserving their autonomy to 
regulate at will on the entry and stay of foreigners in their territory. To this end, the Annex 
shields a State Party's right to regulate "the entry of natural persons into, or their temporary 
stay in, its territory, including those measures necessary to protect the integrity of, and to 
ensure the orderly movement of natural persons across its borders", from the Protocol's 
obligations and general disciplines. 129 At the same time, it stipulates that the right to regulate 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay included in their schedule of specific commitments a GATS-like annex on 
Telecommunications in the form of an additional commitment. 
126 PM, Art. XXV. 
127 Annex Movement Natural Persons, Art. 1. This Annex reproduces the GATS' Annex on Movement of Natural 
Persons Supplying Services. The only difference is Art. 5, not contemplated in the GATS' Annex, which refers to 
the applicable law to labour-related situations affecting natural persons from one State Party supplying services in 
the territory of another State Party. During the drafting stage, State Parties analysed the implications of the 
Protocol on existing agreements between State Parties aimed at facilitating business activities, e. g. the Arg-Brazil 
one. They considered the possibility to include a provision stipulating that those agreements should remain in force 
until the entry into force of State Parties' schedules of specific commitments, previous registration of those 
agreements in the schedules. See minutes AHGS meeting 03/98. In the end, the provision was not included. 
Neither is the ARG-BRA Agreement on the Facilitation of Business Activities recorded in the Argentinian or 
Brazilian schedule of specific commitments. 
128 Ibid. Art. 2. 
129 Ibid. art 4. 
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on these issues must not be exercised "in such a manner as to nullify or impair the benefits 
accruing to a State Party under the terms of a specific commitment". 130 
Thirdly, the Annex stipulates that State Parties may negotiate specific commitments relating 
to the movement of natural persons supplying services. 131 It is up to each State Party to define 
the desired degree of liberalisation of the movement of natural persons supplying services. 
They do so by undertaking a horizontal commitment applied to all the service sectors covered 
by a schedule of specific commitments. The horizontal commitment specifies with respect to 
which categories of natural persons the State Party will be bound by the Protocol's Market 
Access and National Treatment standards of treatment. The State Party may specify in its 
schedule the terms and conditions that qualify its Market Access and National Treatment 
commitments in relation to those categories of natural persons. 1' 
Finally, the Annex expressly stipulates that the law that applies to regulate labour-related 
situations affecting the supply of services by natural persons of one State Party in the territory 
of another State Party is the law of the place in which the service is supplied. 133 
2. Annex on Financial Services 
The Annex on Financial Services, which applies to "measures affecting the supply of financial 
services", 134 seeks to clarify the meaning and scope of application of some of the Protocol's 
obligations and general disciplines for Financial Services. 135 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. art 3. 
132 For a detailed analysis of State Parties' commitments on the movement of natural persons supplying services 
see Ch IV, Section C, Numeral 1. 
133 Annex on the Movement of Natural Persons, Art. 5. The reference to the law of the place where the contract is 
provided is not included in the GATS' Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services. 
13 Annex on Financial Services, Art. 1. 
135 Save for minor textual and structural changes, it reproduces the GATS' Annex on Financial Services. The 
Annex was drafted by the SWG4 on Financial Issues. During the drafting stage, the Brazilian delegation proposed 
to include a provision addressing the particularities of the concept of legal person in the financial sector. The 
proposal did not get through into the final text of the Annex but State Parties decided to continue working on the 
harmonization of concepts relating to the commercial presence of foreign financial service providers a State Party. 
See AHGS meetings 3/98 and 5/98. 
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First, the Annex specifies the scope of application of the Protocol in relation to Financial 
Services by providing sector-specific definitions of "services", "service suppliers , 136 and 
"services supplied in the exercise of governmental authoritys137. 
Secondly, the Annex introduces sector-specific limitations to State Parties' transparency 
duties prescribed by Article VIII of the Protocol relating to the disclosure of sensitive 
financial information in possession of public entities. Indeed, in addition to the general 
limitations prescribed by Article IX of the Protocol, the Annex specifies that State Parties are 
not under the obligation to disclose information relating to the affairs and accounts of 
individual customers or any confidential information or proprietary information in possession 
of public entities. 138 
Thirdly, the Annex expressly shields State Parties' right to adopt or maintain reasonable 
measures for prudential reasons from the Protocol's obligations and general disciplines. '39 
This provision, commonly known as the "prudential carve out", preserves State Parties' 
autonomy to regulate for prudential reasons as they see fit, regardless of the Protocol's 
obligations and general disciplines. On the one hand, "prudential measures" are broadly 
defined, including measures aimed at "protecting investors, depositors, participants in the 
financial market, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial 
service supplier" as well as measures aimed at ensuring "the solvency and liquidity of the 
financial system". 140 On the other hand, the right to regulate for prudential reasons is limited 
by -a standard of reasonableness and by the need not to use prudential measures as a means of 
avoiding commitments or obligations undertaken by the State Parties under the Protocol. '4' 
136 The concept of financial service supplier is broader than the general concept of service supplier under the 
Protocol because it covers not only persons already engaged in the supply of Financial Services but also persons 
wishing to supply a financial service. Compare PM, art XVIII (f) with Annex on Financial Services, art 5(b). The 
extension of the scope of application of the Protocol's disciplines to the activities of "would be" financial service 
suppliers is a relevant tool to ensure effective market access because it means that promotional activities such as 
mailing distribution and cold calls for the purpose of building a client portfolio from scratch are also covered against 
discriminatory practices. In the context of EC law, a ruling of the ECJ expressly protects the right of would be 
financial service suppliers to engage on cross-border promotional activities of its financial products and services, 
See C-384193 Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financiön [1995] ECR 1-1141. 
137 Annex on Financial Services, para 1(b) and 1(c). 
138 Ibid. Art. 2. 
139 Ibid. Art. 3. 
140 Ibid. Art. 3(a). 
141 Ibid. 
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Fourthly, the Annex includes a provision with sector-specific disciplines on State Parties' 
right to recognise prudential measures of other State Parties, which complement the general 
disciplines on mutual recognition prescribed by Article XI of the Protocol. This provision 
enables each State Party to recognise prudential measures of another State Party without 
breaching the MFN standard of treatment. 142 The recognition can be made unilaterally, 
through harmonisation or in accordance with an agreement or arrangement with the State 
Party concerned. 143 If the recognition is made unilaterally, the State Party must afford other 
interested parties the opportunity to show that its own prudential measures also are worthy of 
the same recognition. 144 If the recognition is made on the basis of an agreement, the State 
Party must afford other interested parties the opportunity to negotiate their accession to the 
agreement or to negotiate a comparable agreement. 14' The provision also compels State 
Parties to notify promptly, and at least annually, to the CMG and the MTC agreements or 
arrangements on the mutual recognition of prudential measures. 146 
Finally, the Annex compels State Parties to continue working on the harmonisation of 
prudential regulations and on the exchange of information on Financial Services. 147 This 
provision acknowledges and further encourages the development of secondary rules on 
Financial Services, which started long before the adoption of the Protocol of Montevideo, led 
by the Sub-working group on Financial Issues. '48 
3. Annexes on Land and Water Transport and on Air Transport Services 
At the time the Protocol of Montevideo was signed, State Parties were already part to various 
multilateral and bilateral transport agreements. 149 The purpose of the Annex on Land and 
142 Ibid. Art. 3(b). 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. art 3(c). 
145 Ibid. Art. 3(d). 
146 Ibid. art 3(e). 
147 Ibid. art 4. 
148 For further details on secondary legislation on Financial Services see Ch V, Section C, Numeral 2. 
149 See, amongst others, the Agreement on International Road Transport between Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, signed on 1 January 1990; Agreement on Waterway Transport on Paraguay - 
Parana Waterway signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in Las Leffas, 26/06/92 and registered 
before LAIA as a PSA; International Multimodal Transport Agreement between MERCOSUR State Parties, 
approved by Dec 15/94,17/12/94 also registered before LAIA as a PSA, and various bilateral maritime and 
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Water Transport is to ensure, at least temporarily, that the Protocol of Montevideo does not 
affect the rights and obligations stemming from those multilateral15° and bilateral' S' 
agreements. In this vein, the Annex expressly states that State Parties' specific commitments 
on Transport Services shall not affect those multilateral and bilateral agreements signed prior 
to the entry into force of the Protocol. 152 The Annex also includes a review clause that assigns 
the CMG with the task of examining on an annual basis its implementation and assessing the 
progress made in bringing those instruments into conformity with the objectives and 
principles of the Protocol. '53 
Likewise, the purpose of the Annex on Air Transport Services is to ensure, at least 
temporarily, that the Protocol of Montevideo does not affect the rights and obligations 
stemming from bilateral, plurilateral and multilateral agreements signed by the State Parties 
relating to Scheduled, Non-scheduled and Ancillary Air Transport Services in force at the 
time the Protocol entered into force. 154 Further provisions specify in greater detail which type 
of Air Transport Services agreements shall not be affected by the Protocol. '55 In relation to 
dispute settlement, the Annex specifies that State Parties can only resort to the MERCOSUR 
dispute settlement system only when no other specific settlement mechanism has been 
decided upon by the State Parties concerned. '56 The Annex also includes a review clause157 
and leaves the door open for possible amendments that could be necessary for adjusting the 
Protocol to measures adopted by Multilateral Conventions on Air Transport Services. "' 
In summary, the annexes to the Protocol constitute the first attempt to strike the difficult 
balance between general and sector specific disciplines for the liberalisation of trade in 
services in MERCOSUR. As mentioned, the Protocol relies heavily on the GATS' structure, 
with three out of its four annexes reproducing GATS' annexes in almost exact terms. 
Unavoidably, the importation of multilateral sector-specific disciplines on trade in services 
waterway transport agreements between State Parties on both passenger and freight transportation. See also, 
above, footnote number 15. 
150 Annex on Land and Waterway Transport Services, Art. 2. 
151 Ibid. Art. 3. 
152 Ibid. Art. 4. 
153 Ibid. Art. 5. 
154 Annex on Air Transport Services Art. 2. 
155 Ibid Arts. 3 and 4. 
156 Ibid Art. 5. 
157 Ibid Art. 6. 
158 Ibid Art. 7. 
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into a sub-regional agreement generates problems of compatibility that affect the overall 
coherence of the MERCOSUR legal system. Most notably, it is difficult to reconcile an 
adamant protection of State Parties' regulatory autonomy on the entry and stay of foreigners 
in their territory with the long-term objective to establish a common market involving the free 
movement of services and persons. Equally difficult is to reconcile the broad protection of 
State Parties' right to regulate for prudential reasons (and the potential disparity of prudential 
requirements that the exercise of this right may generate) with the objective to eliminate all 
obstacles to trade in services and to ensure effective access of foreign suppliers to the 
domestic market. Finally, the draftsmen of the Protocol failed to include annexes prescribing 
more rigorous disciplines that go beyond the non-discrimination test in order to tackle sector- 
specific regulatory challenges affecting sectors such as Telecommunications or Professional 
Services. As the integration process deepens, it will be necessary to amend these annexes in 
search of a combination of general and sector specific disciplines more suitable for the needs 
of a common market. ' 59 
F. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter examined the Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in Services, focusing on the 
analysis of its general obligations and disciplines. It discussed the suitability of modelling a 
framework agreement for trade in services in MERCOSUR on the basis of a multilateral 
instrument like the GATS and assessed the general obligations' and disciplines' capacity to 
liberalise trade in services in light of their scope of application and the institutional framework 
responsible for their implementation and enforcement. 
The Protocol was designed in light of the GATS, adopting most of its provisions without 
modifications. Like the GATS, the Protocol seeks to further the liberalisation of trade in 
services by compelling State Parties to accord foreign services and service suppliers minimum 
standards of treatment (e. g. Market Access and National Treatment standard) and to regulate 
in accordance with trade-friendly disciplines (e. g. transparency; reasonable, objective and 
impartial administration of measures affecting trade in services; objective and impartial 
review of administrative decisions; technical standards, qualification and licensing 
requirements no more trade restrictive than necessary). Also, like the GATS, the Protocol 
provides for a Programme of Liberalisation, based on the negotiation of reciprocal 
159 PM, Art. XXVI stipulates that the Protocol may be revised, "taking account of the development and regulation of 
trade in services in MERCOSUR, as well as the progress made in relation to services in the World Trade 
Organization and other specialized forums. " 
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concessions, which accords State Parties the right to control the scope and pace of their 
liberalisation commitments. 
The Protocol entered into force just over two years ago and there is still little evidence 
available to assess its performance. The analysis of the black letter of the law reveals blatant 
contradictions between, on the one hand, a "negative integration contract" primarily 
concerned with the elimination of discrimination and mindful not to interfere with State 
Parties' right to regulate and, on the other hand, an integration process whose ultimate goal is 
the establishment of a common market involving, amongst other things, the free movement of 
goods, services and factors of production and the co-ordination of macroeconomic and 
sectoral policies. 
In practice, however, there appears to be no urgency for major reforms, at least not for the 
short and medium term. There is no evidence to suggest that the Protocol's protection of State 
Parties' right to regulate is obstructing a liberalisation process that is still in its infancy. On the 
contrary, the Argentina - Blocked Highways award suggests that, if properly enforced, the 
Protocol's general obligations and disciplines could still make a valuable contribution to the 
liberalisation of trade in services within the bloc. But two conditions are necessary for this to 
be possible: a) a successful completion of the rounds of negotiations of specific commitments, 
which determine the scope of application of the Protocol's main obligations and b) a sound 
institutional framework, capable of enforcing those obligations and disciplines effectively. 
In the long run, provided economic interdependence intensifies, a thorough reform of the 
Protocol will be unavoidable with a view to reconcile its narrow concern about the elimination 
of discrimination and its excessive deference to domestic sovereignty with MERCOSUR's 
objective to establish a common market involving, inter alia, the free movement of services. 
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Chapter IV 
Negotiation of Specific Commitments 
on Trade in Services 
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This chapter examines the rounds of negotiations of specific commitments conducted under 
the umbrella of the Protocol's Programme of Liberalisation and assesses its contribution to the 
liberalisation of trade in services in MERCOSUR. The chapter is divided into five sections. 
First it analyses the main legal features of the Programme and discusses the rationale for 
advancing the liberalisation of trade in services through the negotiation of specific 
commitments in the MERCOSUR context (Section A). It then reviews the implementation of 
the Programme (Section B), examines State Parties' current schedules of specific 
commitments (Section C) and assesses the results achieved so far (Section D) ending with 
some concluding remarks (Section E). 
A. The Legal Framework 
Following the CATS model, Part III of the Protocol establishes a Program of Liberalisation on 
Trade in Services, i. e. a mechanism for advancing trade liberalisation through the negotiation 
of specific commitments on Market Access and National Treatment. The Programme is based 
on a "positive list" approach consisting of a gradual liberalisation strategy by which State 
Parties set out in national schedules of commitments the sectors which they wish to make 
specific commitments on Market Access and National Treatment. ' At the same time, the 
programme compels State Parties to hold successive rounds of negotiations aimed at the 
progressive inclusion of sectors, sub-sectors, activities and modes of supply of services in 
their schedules, as well as the reduction or elimination of trade-restrictive measures, with a 
view to ensure effective market access. 2 
The Protocol stipulates that negotiation rounds must be held on a yearly basis until the 
completion of the Programme within a period no longer than ten years from the Protocol's 
entry into force. 3 Upon the conclusion of each negotiation round, new concessions are 
recorded in each State Party's schedule of specific commitments, which by virtue of Article 
VII. 4 must be annexed to the Protocol and form an integral part thereof. 
The Program of Liberalisation is governed by the principle of reciprocity which provides that 
negotiations must be aimed at promoting trade in services on the basis of the reciprocity of 
rights and obligations, advancing the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous 
1 PM, Art. VII. 2. 
2 Ibid. Art. XIX. 1. 
3 Ibid. Art. XIX. 1. 
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basis and securing an overall balance of rights and obligations4. During the drafting stage of 
the Protocol, Paraguay advocated, unsuccessfully, for the need to qualify the principle of 
reciprocity in light of the special needs of less developed countries and regions, including a 
provision authorizing differences in the level of commitments. ' In the end, State Parties only 
agreed to include a reference to "the need to ensure the increasing participation of less 
developed countries and regions in the services market" in the preamble of the Protocol, 
subject to reciprocity. 6 Clearly, the latter part of the reference - "on the basis of reciprocal 
rights and obligations"- water downs the impact it may have on the development of a 
genuinely special and non-reciprocal treatment in favour of less developed countries and 
regions. 
Like the GATS, the Program of Liberalization is subject to two important limitations. First, 
the need for the liberalisation process to respect the right of each State Party to regulate, and 
to introduce new regulations within their territories with a view to meet national policy 
objectives on specific service sectors. 7 The right to regulate is defined broadly, covering, inter 
alia regulations affecting Market Access or National Treatment, although its exercise is 
subject to the condition not to annul or impair the obligations arising from the Protocol and 
from a State Party's schedule of specific commitments! 
It is understandable to find a qualification of this kind in the context of a multilateral 
agreement among over one hundred and forty countries characterized by sharp differences in 
their level of development. It seems less compelling though, to include such qualification in 
the context of a sub-regional agreement between few countries with relatively similar levels of 
development. In particular, it is difficult to reconcile the express recognition of State Parties' 
right to regulate and to pursue their own national policies with MERCOSUR's purpose to 
establish a common market involving the free movement of services and the coordination of 
See PM preamble and Art. XIX. 1. It must be noted that it is much more difficult to apply the principle of reciprocity 
in the context of services than in the context of goods because of the inherent difficulty to estimate the value of 
concessions in services. Accurate information about the value of concessions is an essential requirement for 
enabling negotiators to engage in a reciprocal bargaining process. 
5 During the drafting stage of the Protocol Paraguay unsuccessfully advocated for the inclusion of provisions 
providing special and differential treatment contemplating Paraguay's developmental needs and, in particular, the 
regulatory asymmetries that exist between Paraguayan legislation and other State Panties' legislation on services. 
6 PM, preamble, third recital. 
Ibid. Art. XIX. 4. 
8 Ibid. 
165 
macroeconomic and sectoral policies, including services sectoral policies like transport and 
communications. 
The second limitation refers to the State Parties' right to modify or suspend their specific 
commitments during the Programme's implementation. Article XX of the Protocol enables a 
State Party to take back something it has given in past negotiations, but only at a price and 
after due notice. The right to suspend or modify specific commitments can only be exercised 
in exceptional circumstances and its effects are subject to the principle of non-retroactivity in 
order to protect acquired rights. 9 In addition, the State Party wishing to suspend or modify its 
commitments must notify the CMG and duly justify its decision. It must also hold 
consultations with affected State Parties, with a view to reach an agreement on the specific 
measures to be applied and their period of application. 10 
During the drafting stage of the Protocol, State Parties discussed extensively the opportunity 
of importing this provision into the Protocol. " Argentina in particular expressed its 
reservations about the compatibility of a provision of this kind with the MERCOSUR legal, 
system. 12 In the end, State Parties not only decided to include this provision in the Protocol, 
but they did so adopting a more flexible version, which imposes less stringent conditions for 
the exercise of the right to modify or suspend commitments than those stipulated by Article 
XXI of the GATS. 13 In practice, all State Parties have already exercised their right to modify 
their schedules of commitments. 14 
The Protocol entrusts the CMG with the task of calling and supervising the rounds of 
negotiations of specific commitments. 15 The CMG has delegated this task to the Group on 
Services ("GS"), one of its auxiliary bodies. 16 The CMG is also responsible for receiving 
9 Ibid. Art. XX. 1. 
10 Ibid. Art. XX. 2. 
» See minutes GS meetings 03/96,05/96,02/97,03/97,04/97. 
12 See minutes GS meeting 03/96. 
73 For instance, it does not require a period of at least three years after a commitment has entered into force before 
it can be modified. In addition, unlike GATS Art. XXI, the Protocol's provision does not specify the details that 
compensatory agreements must meet nor the consequences stemming from the failure to reach a compensatory 
agreement with affected Members. On the other hand, contrary to GATS, the Protocol does not include a provision 
on safeguard measures. 
14 See below footnotes n 46 and 79. 
15 PM, Art. XXII (a). 
16 Res. 31/98. 
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notifications and the results of the consultations on the modification and/or suspension of 
specific commitments. " The CMC is the body responsible for approving the results of the 
negotiation rounds as well as any modification or suspension thereof. 18 
For their entry into force, the schedules of specific commitments must be incorporated into 
national legal systems in accordance with the procedures provided for in each State Party. 19 
All State Parties consider that parliamentary approval is required for the incorporation of their 
schedules of specific commitments into their national legal systems. 2° So far, only Argentina, 
and Uruguay have completed the incorporation process for their initial schedules of specific 
commitments and Brazil for the schedule of commitments approved by the first negotiation 
round. State Parties have nevertheless pledged to make their best efforts to observe the 
schedules of specific commitments which have not yet been incorporated into their legal 
systems. 21 
One of the main reasons invoked in favour of importing a GATS's style Program of 
Liberalization for the opening of services markets is its gradualism. Indeed, the Programme's 
positive list approach enables each State Party to control, within its ten years time frame, the 
scope of its liberalisation commitments and the pace of the liberalisation process, according to 
the particular strengths and weaknesses of its various service sectors. Pefia, for instance, 
claims that this approach is in line with the principles of gradualism, flexibility and balance 
that have guided MERCOSUR integration process from its very beginning 22 She argues that 
the Program is particularly useful for State Parties that are starting out with dissimilar degrees 
of regulatory development of their various service sectors, facilitating a gradual convergence 
of liberalisation commitments. 23 
17 PM, Art. XXII (b). 
18 PM, Art. XXI. 
19 PM, Art. XXVII. 3. 
20 See minutes GS meeting 01/04. 
21 See minutes GS meeting 01/99. 
22 See MARIA ANGELICA PEt1A, 'Services in MERCOSUR: The Protocol of Montevideo', in Sherry Stephenson (ad) 
Services Trade in the Western Hemisphere (Brookings Institutions, Washington, D. C. 2000), p 155. 
23 Ibid. p 155. 
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Political economy reasons suggest that the opening of services markets should be gradual24, in 
particular for a fledgling integration process conditioned by unstable macroeconomic 
circumstances and sharp structural and policy asymmetries among participant States. What 
remains questionable is whether the choice for a CATS-style Program of Liberalization based 
on rounds of negotiations over positive lists of specific commitments constitutes the best 
alternative for securing the gradualism that MERCOSUR's liberalisation process needs . 
2' The 
following reasons question the wisdom of this choice. 
First, the GATS does not provide for a specific degree of integration for its Members. Its 
objective is to achieve "progressively higher levels of liberalisations26. The Treaty of 
Asuncion, by contrast, provides for a specific type and depth of integration, namely, the 
establishment of a common market involving, amongst other things, the free circulation of 
services. 7 Therefore, in the MERCOSUR context, it is fair to ask whether the liberalisation of 
trade in services (up to a common market degree) should be a matter subject to negotiation or 
rather an implementation issue. 
Secondly, a comparative review of other integration agreements reveals the existence of a 
variety of strategies that can be followed in order to secure the gradualism of the liberalisation 
process. For instance, during the European Community's early stages of integration, various 
programs were designed and implemented for the progressive abolition of restrictions to the 
movement of services 28 These programs were elaborated on the basis of a common 
understanding that the ultimate objective was the establishment of a common market. They 
consisted on the adoption or removal of a detailed list of measures subject to a binding 
24 See, for instance, HoEKww & KosTEcKI, 2^d ed The Political Economy of the World Trading System. From 
GATT to WTO (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) ,p 238. The authors contend that because of the sensitivity 
of the public policy issues at stake, the liberalisation of trade in services tends to be more resisted than the 
liberalisation of trade in goods and thus, require a gradual and carefully negotiated liberalisation process, more 
palatable to domestic constituencies. 
25 Torrent criticises this GATS-style Programme of Liberalisation on the ground that the negotiations of specific 
commitments focus exclusively on market access and national treatment restrictions, overlooking regulatory issues 
which are the key challenge for the liberalisation of trade in services. See TORRENT, in ,p 44. 
26 GATS, Art. XIX. 1. 
27 ToA, Art. 1. In line with this provision, the first recital of the Protocol's Preamble reaffirms that "... pursuant to the 
Treaty of Acuncion the Common Market implies, among ather commitments, the free movement of services in the 
enlarged market. " 
28 See, e. g., the General Programme for the abolition of restrictions of freedom to provide services and the General 
Programme for the abolition of restrictions of freedom of establishment, OJ No2 of 15 January 1962. See also the 
Commission White Paper for the Completion of the Internal Market COM (85) 310 Final, 14 June 1985. 
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timetable. Gradualism was secured by fixing the deadlines for the adoption of the liberalizing 
measures in accordance with their implementation costs. 29 Another alternative is the "negative 
list approach" followed by NAFTA and NAFTA-type agreements, whereby parties to the 
agreement commit themselves from the outset to grant Market Access and to accord National 
Treatment to all foreign services and services suppliers in all sectors unless otherwise 
specified in a closed list of exemptions or non-conforming measures, set out in an annex. In 
this case, what State Parties may have to negotiate is the phase out of the exceptions rather 
than the phase in of positive commitments on Market Access and National Treatment. 30 
Finally, apart from the difficulties faced by nbgotiators in measuring the value of concessions 
for reciprocal bargaining purposes, the logic underlying the negotiation of specific 
commitments tends to prioritize short-term interests and individualistic negotiation strategies 
over long-term interests and co-operative actions towards the establishment of a common 
market. 
B. The Negotiation Rounds 
The negotiation rounds on specific commitments started in 1998, soon after the Protocol of 
Montevideo was approved (December 1997), but long before the Protocol entered into force 
(December 2005). Between 1998 and 2006, State Parties participated in six negotiation 
rounds. The seventh round has been already launched although not yet concluded. The 
negotiation modalities and procedures closely follow those used at the multilateral level 31 
1. Initial Commitments 
29 See EC Treaty Art. 15: "When drawing up its proposals with a view to achieving the objectives set out in Art. 14, 
the Commission shall take into account the extent of the effort that certain economies showing differences in 
development will have to sustain during the period of establishment of the internal market and it may propose 
appropriate provisions [... I'. 
30 For a comparison on the advantages and disadvantages of the "positive list" and the "negative list" approach see 
STEPHENSON & PRIETO, 'Evaluating Approaches to the Liberalization of Trade in Services: Insights from Regional 
Experience in the Americas', in p 1. 
31 For example, negotiations are conducted by way of exchanging request and offer lists, service sectors are 
classified according to the WTO Secretariat's Services Sectoral Classification List (See WTO Secretariat's 
Document MTN. GNS/W/120). Where it is necessary to refine further a sectoral classification, State Parties rely on 
the UN Provisional Central Product Classification (See Statistical Papers Series M No. 77, Statistical Office of the 
UN, NY, 1991). Specific commitments are inscribed in State Parties' schedules in accordance with WTO 
Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments (See WTO Document S/U92,28/03/2001). 
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Negotiations for the initial commitments took place between January and July 1998 32 State 
Parties agreed to take their GATS schedules of commitments as a baseline for the negotiations 
with a view to broaden their scope and depth. 33 During this period, no substantive exchanges 
of request and offer lists took place34 and, as a result, the initial schedules of specific 
commitments approved in July 199835 repeated, in general terms, State Parties' GATS 
schedules of commitments. 36 
2. First Round 
The first negotiation round took place between January 1999 and June 2000. The negotiation 
mandate exhorted State Parties to broaden the scope and depth of their GATS' commitments 
by way of inscribing commitments on new sectors and modes of supply and by progressively 
eliminating the limitations to the commitments already inscribed in their schedules 37 It called 
State Parties to ensure, that new commitments reflect, to the extent possible, the current status 
of their domestic legislation. 38 The negotiation mandate was broadly drafted, without 
specifying specific negotiation targets or deadlines. 
32 Res 67/97. 
33 Ibid. Art. 4. 
34 Argentina was the only State Party to make a conditional offer to deepen its GATS specific commitment on Data 
Transmission Services subject to reciprocal concessions from other State Parties. Since no counter-offers were 
made, Argentina withdrew its offer. See minutes GS meeting 06/98. 
35 See schedules of specific commitments approved by Dec 9/98. 
3e see minutes GS meeting 04/99. 
37 Res 73/98, Annex, Art. 2. 
38 Ibid. Art. 3. Even if it includes restrictions on market access and national treatment, recording current legislation 
in a schedule of commitments constitutes an important liberalisation step because of its "lock in effect", i. e. binding 
State Parties not to introduce new limitations to trade in services in the future. It also contributes to the 
transparency of the process by preventing gaps between bound commitments and applied commitments. In the 
GATS context, it is an extended practice to record in the schedule commitments that are more restrictive than the 
current legislation. State Parties do this in order to preserve some manoeuvring room for future negotiations, 
namely, to make "new" offers without having to adopt fresh de-regulatory measures. During the drafting stage of 
the protocol, Argentina suggested to include, as a GATS plus standard, i. e. a provision prohibiting State Parties to 
include in their schedules of specific commitments terms, limitations or conditions more restrictive than those 
stipulated by their current legislation (See Annex V to minutes GS meeting 07/97). The proposal was not 
approved, although the objective to consolidate the status quo was reintroduced by this negotiation mandate, not 
as a legal obligation but as an exhortation to State Parties to observe it "to the extent possible". 
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State Parties exchanged request and offer lists39, most of them relating to the Telecom sector. 
Brazil presented a "new offer" in accordance with its new telecom legislation 40 Other State 
Parties rejected the offer arguing it included new restrictions relating to Mobile Services, 
Private Leased Circuit Services and Paging. As a result, Brazil resorted to Article XX of the 
Protocol and notified to the CMG the modification of its initial schedule of commitments 
relating to this sector. 41 
Professional Services also attracted a number of requests but no offers were made. Brazil 
submitted requests to other State Parties for concessions on various professional services, but 
they were rejected. The argument put forward was that Brazil's horizontal restrictions on 
Mode 4 (movement of natural persons providing services) limited the value of its own 
commitments on Professional Services, where Mode 4 is one of the most relevant modes of 
supply. At this stage it became clear for State Parties that the negotiation of specific 
commitments was not an efficient method for tackling restrictions on the movement of natural 
persons. The asymmetries between their regulations prevented State Parties from exchanging 
concessions and as a result they began to consider the possibility to resort to the development 
of secondary legislation instead of further negotiations 42 
The exchanges of request and offer lists yielded meagre results. 43 Most requests for 
concessions were denied on similar grounds: the need for further consultations at domestic 
level, the lack of a domestic regulatory framework in place for the sector concerned, the need 
to wait until the culmination of a domestic regulatory reform processes under way or the lack 
of reciprocal concessions from the requesting State. Only a limited number of new 
concessions were made including Argentina's fresh commitments on General Construction 
Work for Civil Engineering and on Life, Accident and Health Insurance Services and 
Paraguay's and Uruguay's improved commitments on marginal telecom sub-sectors. 
3. Second Round 
39 See State Parties' request lists and reply letters on various annexes to minutes GS meetings 01/99,02/99, 
03/99 and 04/99. 
40 General Telecommunications Act NO. 9472,16 July 1997. 
41 See Brazil's notification to the CMG on Annex VII to the minutes CMG XXXXVII Ordinary Meeting, Buenos Aires, 
4-5 April 2000. 
42 See, in particular, Brazilian reply to other State Parties' requests, Annex IV to minutes GS meeting 04/99. 
43 See schedules of specific commitments approved by Dec 1/00. 
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The second negotiation round took place between January and December 2000.44 In light of 
the meagre results achieved during the first round, state parties adopted the Guidelines for 
Deepening Specific Commitments on Services, which contained precise and time-framed 
negotiation targets. 45 
The Guidelines called State Parties to consolidate in their schedules, within a two-years time 
frame, the status quo of their domestic legislation on sectors and sub-sectors already regulated 
which included restrictions to Market Access and National Treatment46; to clarify the 
"unbound" entries included in their schedules47; to include in their schedules autonomous 
liberalisation measures48 and to eliminate existing Market Access and National Treatment 
restrictions on the commercial presence of foreign service suppliers (Mode 3) for all service 
sectorS49. 
By the end of the negotiating period, State Parties managed to make moderate progress on the 
consolidation of the status quo of their domestic legislations relating to most business 
services, with the exception of some sensitive sectors S0 They made little progress on the 
clarification of "unbound" entries and they did not begin to record autonomous liberalisation 
measures in their schedules on an ongoing basis. Nor did State Parties manage to make any 
progress on the elimination of restrictions to the commercial presence of foreign service 
suppliers. On this latter point, they began the task of listing all the existing restrictions but 
they did not even manage to complete the inventory process because of a lack of consensus on 
44 Res 85/99. 
46 Res 36/00. 
46 Ibid. Art. 1. 
47 Ibid. Art. 2. 
+8 Ibid. Art. 3. The automatic inclusion of autonomous liberalisation measures on the schedules of commitments, 
known as the "ratchet effect', constitutes a CATS plus commitment, but until now, State Parties have not been 
recording autonomous liberalisation measures in their schedules of commitments on an ongoing basis. 
as Ibid. Art. 6. In compliance with this provision, the GS adopted a working programme including the following 
tasks: a) listing all restrictions on Market Access and National Treatment on Mode 3, to be completed by 
December 2000; b) setting up a timetable for the elimination of Market Access and National Treatment restrictions 
other than those included in State Parties' constitutions, to be completed by 2002; d) setting up a timetable for the 
elimination of Market Access and National Treatment restrictions included in State Parties' constitutions, to be 
completed during 2003. 
50 See schedules of specific commitments approved by Dec 56/00. State Parties' commitments remained unbound 
for all modes of supply in the following business service sectors: Medical relating services, Research and 
Development services, investigation and Security Services and Services incidental to Agriculture, Hunting and 
Forestry, Fishing, Manufacturing, Mining and Energy Distribution. 
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the methodology to be used. At least, the initial listing attempts served to illustrate that many 
restrictions to the commercial presence of foreign suppliers were embedded in legislative acts 
and even in constitutional provisions. 
The Guidelines also instructed the Group on Services to draft terms of reference for the 
adoption of secondary legislation on the movement of natural persons supplying services. " 
This mandate kicked off a legislative action plan which led to the adoption of international 
agreements such as the MERCOSUR Visa Agreement and secondary legislation on the 
temporary provision of professional services. 52 
4. Third Round 
The third negotiation round took place between January and December 2001. The negotiation 
mandate called for a restricted multisectoral negotiation round on a limited number of 
sectors" and for the completion of the process of consolidation of the status quo and the 
clarification of "unbound" entries initiated during the previous round. 54 
State Parties exchanged requests and offers but despite some moderate progress they failed to 
complete the restricted multisectoral round of negotiations. They neither managed to make 
significant progress on the consolidation of the status quo or the clarification of "unbound" 
entries. " Amongst other difficulties, State Parties failed to agree on a common methodology 
on what type of measures should be recorded in a schedule and how should they be recorded. 
51 Res 36/00, Art. 4. 
52 See below Ch V, Section C, Numeral I. 
53 Business Services, Distribution Services, Educational Services and Tourism and Travel Related Services. The 
idea of restricted multisectoral negotiations was put forward by Brazil. In its view, by narrowing down the sectors 
where requests and offers could be made, should increase the chances of successful exchanges. Brazil also 
suggested to subject the residual sectors not liberalised through the restricted multisectoral negotiations to a 
compulsory "adjustment" regime or liberalisation period to be completed within a specific period of time to be 
agreed. 
54 Res 76/00,7/12/00. 
55 See schedules of specific commitments approved by Dec 10/01,20/12/01. The new schedules replaced State 
Parties' previous commitments on Business Services, Communication Services (except Telecommunications), 
Construction and Related Engineering Services, Distribution Services, Educational Services, Environmental 
Services, Health related and Social Services and Tourism and Travel related Services, while horizontal restrictions 
on Modes 3 and 4 and specific commitments on Telecommunications and Financial Services remained 
unchanged. 
173 
Discrepancies amongst State Parties were particularly relevant in relation to the scheduling of 
"unbound" entries and on the classification of sub-sectors corresponding to the 
Telecommunications and Financial Services sectors. 56 To unblock the situation a Decision 
was adopted stipulating a harmonised methodology on how to record commitments in the 
schedules 57 State Parties continued the inventory process of restrictions to the commercial 
presence to foreign service supplier, but failed to agree on a time schedule for their 
elimination. 
5. Fourth Round 
The fourth negotiation round took place between April 2002 and December 2003. During 
2002 the region was hit by a severe financial crisis, particularly in Argentina and Uruguay, 
which forced State Parties to focus on tackling their internal problems at the expense of 
integration matters. 58 The negotiation mandate called, once again, for the completion of the 
restricted multisectoral round and the process of consolidation of the status quo and 
clarification of "unbound" entries. 59 
The negotiation round was supposed to be completed by the end of 2002, but lasted until 
December 2003. By the end of the round, all State Parties added to their schedules 
commitments on Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services and Transport Services 60 Brazil 
also added to its schedule commitments on Postal Services, Audiovisual Services and 
Environmental Services. However, the new commitments did not include preferential 
concessions for MERCOSUR service providers, but merely consolidated the status quo of 
domestic legislation. Overall, the new schedules of commitments provided for broader 
coverage and greater clarity but, again, State Parties did not manage to complete the process 
of consolidation of the status quo and clarification of unbound entries for all service sectors 
and no progress was made on the elimination of existing restrictions on Market Access and 
National Treatment for any service sector. 
56 The lack of compatibility between the classification of sub-sectors in the Telecommunications and Financial 
Services, made it particularly difficult for State Parties to compare their commitments and to engage on reciprocal 
bargaining. 
57 Dec 11 /01, Art. 2. 
58 Not surprisingly, MERCOSUR bodies' activity was drastically reduced. The Group on Services was not an 
exception to this trend, meeting only once in 2002 compared to a previous average of five to six meetings per year. 
59 Res 13/02. 
60 See schedules of specific commitments approved by Dec 22/03. 
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During this round, another stumbling block on the negotiation process emerged. Considering 
that State Parties were at the same time engaged on negotiations with external trading partners 
(MERCOSUR - FTAA, MERCOSUR - EU), Brazil ref ained from consolidating the current 
status of its legislation and fully disclosing information relating to the unbound entries - in 
particular on the Financial Services sector - on its MERCOSUR schedule on the basis that that 
could weaken MERCOSUR's negotiation position vis-a-vis the EU or in the context of the FTAA 
negotiations 61 
6. Fifth Round 
The fifth negotiation round took place between January and December 2004. As usual, the 
negotiation mandate called State Parties to conclude the process of consolidation of the status 
quo and clarification of "unbound" entries for all service sectors and modes of supply 62 It also 
instructed the Group on Services to submit to the CMG proposals for the elimination of 
Market Access and National Treatment restrictions and for the harmonisation of the regulatory 
framework in specific service sectors, including a methodology and a timetable for the 
completion of such tasks 63 For the first time an express reference to positive integration 
appears in a negotiation mandate, clearly suggesting an acknowledgment by diplomats about 
the limitations of the negotiation of specific commitments as an instrument of liberalisation. 
In compliance with the mandate, State Parties put forward different proposals on how to move 
forward. The wide differences between the proposals revealed the lack of a common sense of 
direction amongst State Parties on how to advance on the liberalisation of trade in services. 
Argentina proposed to focus on the elimination of Market Access and National Treatment 
restrictions to MERCOSUR service providers on a limited number of service sectors " 
61 See minutes GS meeting 02/03. 
62 Res 52/03, Art. 3. 
63 Ibid. art 2. 
64 See Argentina's Proposal (Annex III, minute GS meeting 01/04). The proposal suggests focusing on the 
elimination of MA and NT restrictions on the Advertising, Audiovisual, Financial Services and Telecommunications 
sectors. It provides a number of examples of measures imposed by Brazil that restrict Market Access or National 
Treatment on the Advertising and Audiovisual sectors. In terms of actions to be taken, the proposal suggests, as a 
first step, that each State Party should review their own legislation and list all domestic measures including 
restrictions on MA and NT, differentiating between restrictions included in decrees or other regulations of an 
administrative nature and restrictions included in legal or constitutional provisions. As a second step, the Executive 
Power in each State Party should eliminate the restrictions contained in regulations of an administrative nature and 
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Paraguay supported Argentina's proposal with some qualifications, most notably, that the 
process of eliminating restrictions had to be sensitive to the existing regulatory asymmetries 
between State Parties' legal systems. 65 Brazil, by contrast, proposed to focus on the 
development of secondary legislation relating to very specific issues. In its turn, Uruguay 
suggested a combination of actions aimed at the elimination of restrictions and the 
harmonization of regulations on sectors of strategic importance for the overall economic 
integration of State Parties' economies. 7 
In the end, it was decided to take actions aimed at both, the elimination of existing restrictions 
and the harmonisation of regulations in specific service sectors. The type of actions that 
followed appear to indicate that State Parties simply opted for accumulating individual 
proposals instead of amalgamating them in a coherent action plan with clear priorities for any 
one action over the other. On the one hand, State Parties carried out an inventory of all the 
Market Access and National Treatment restrictions included in their legislation irrespective of 
the service sectors and modes of supplied affected, classifying them according to their legal 
nature. 68 Like previous inventory exercises, the findings confirmed that only few restrictions 
were embedded in regulations of an administrative nature, the bulk of them being included in 
statutes or constitutional provisions. 69 On the other hand, State Parties worked towards the 
harmonisation of rules relating to the registration, establishment and functioning of companies 
and the movement of business persons, drafting an "Agreement for the Facilitation of 
Business Activities in MERCOSUR", which was submitted to the CMG for its 
consideration. 70 
submit to congress proposals to amend statutes or constitutional provisions that restrict Market Access or 
discriminate against MERCOSUR service providers. 
65 See Paraguayan comments on Argentina's Proposal on the Liberallsation of Specific Service Sectors. For 
instance, Paraguay held that it was currently discussing proposals for regulating the advertising and audiovisual 
sectors, which prevented them from adopting new commitments on those sectors. See Annex VI to minutes GS 
meeting 02/04. 
66 Brazil suggested focusing on the harmonisation of rules governing the registration of companies or professional 
bodies' memberships in those service sectors where foreign companies or foreign professionals were facing 
difficulties. It also suggested to work on the harmonisation of rules relating to Real Estate Services, Sporting 
Services (in particular the harmonisation of quotas for foreign sportsmen on collective sports), and on the mutual 
recognition of the contractual records of civil-engineering construction companies. See Brazilian Proposal on the 
Harmonisation of Regulatory Frameworks, Annex V to minutes GS meeting 01/04. 
67 Uruguayan Proposal on Services, Annex V to minutes GS meeting 02/04. 
68 See CMG mandate to the GS to minutes GMC LIV ordinary meeting. 
69 See State Parties' lists of restrictions in Annex IV to minutes GS Meeting 03/04. 
70 See below Ch V, Section C, Numeral I. 
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State Parties made some progress on the clarification of "unbound" entries corresponding to 
the Financial Services. 7' They also improved the clarity, precision and comparability of their 
horizontal commitments on Mode 4 by accommodating them to a common classification of 
types of natural persons supplying services used in the GATS context. 72 
During this round, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay exercised their right conferred by Article 
XX of the Protocol to modify specific commitments contained in their schedules as a result of 
the introduction of new legislation and notified the modifications to the CMG. 73 The 
negotiation round concluded, as planned, in December 2004.74 
7. Sixth Round 
The sixth negotiation round took place between January 2005 and July 2006. Once more, the 
negotiation mandate called State Parties to conclude the process of consolidation of the status 
quo and clarification of "unbound" entries and "to make progress" on the elimination of 
restrictions on all service sectors and modes of supply. 75 It also instructed the Group on 
Services to submit to the CMG proposals for the harmonisation of domestic regulations and 
for the harmonisation of horizontal commitments, in particular, horizontal commitments on 
Mode 4.76 
For the third time since the launch of the negotiation rounds in late 1997, State Parties 
exchanged requests and offer lists for the elimination of Market Access and National 
Treatment restrictions contained in their domestic legislation. On this occasion, State Parties 
prepared comprehensive and detailed lists, requesting the removal of restrictions or the 
71 See Annex VIII to minutes GS meeting 03/04. 
72 See Communication from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
Thailand and Uruguay on Categories of Natural Persons for Commitments under Mode 4 of GATS, 17 February 
2005 (Document TN/S/W/31). 
73 See Annex XXXVII - MERCOSUL/LVI GMC/DI N° 28/04, LVI meeting of the CMG, November 2004 including 
notifications from Argentina (modifying commitments on services relating to Maintenance and Repair of Vessels); 
Paraguay (introducing new horizontal restrictions on international money transfers) and Uruguay (modifying 
commitments on Pharmacy Services). 
74 See schedules of specific commitments, approved by Dec 29/04,16/12/04. Paraguay's new schedule replaces 
horizontal commitments on Mode 4 and specific commitments on Financial Services and Maritime Services. 
Uruguay's new schedule replaces horizontal commitments on Mode 4. 
75 Res 33/04, Art. 2. 
76 Ibid. Art. 3. 
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clarification of unbound entries in almost every service sector. 77 The exchange of request and 
offer lists contributed to the elimination of a small number of restrictions by Brazil78, 
Paraguay79 and Uruguay80, however, in general terms, it failed to brake through domestic 
regulatory barriers and to secure a preferential treatment for MERCOSUR service providers. 
As in previous occasions, State Parties declined to make concessions arguing the lack of 
reciprocal concessions from the requesting State or the fact that the sector where concessions 
were requested was not yet regulated or regulatory reforms were under way. 
Although some progress was made on the harmonisation of a common criterion for the 
scheduling of commitments on particularly complex sectors and modes of supply, State 
Parties did not complete the process of consolidation of the status quo and clarification of 
"unbound" entries. Current schedules of commitments still include "unbound" entries for all 
or some modes of supply in various service sectors. 8' 
Finally, State Parties continued to analyse the possibility to harmonise rules relating to 
specific service sectors. Discussions were focused on the harmonization of rules relating to the 
registration of companies and the establishment of mutual recognition systems for real estate 
companies and for the contractual records of civil-engineering construction companies. 
Overall, discussions remained on a purely exploratory level and apart from exchanging ideas 
and sharing information on domestic regulations in these areas, no concrete actions were 
77 See State Parties' request lists included in Annex IV to minutes GS meeting 03/05. 
78 The new schedule introduces a slight relaxation of the requirements to obtain a licence from ANATEL to provide 
Telecom Services. On Legal Services, the new schedule removes the prohibition to Brazilian or foreign lawyers 
whose place of residence is not Brazil to register at the Brazilian Bar. On the Placement and Supply Services of 
Personnel, the new schedule removes the restriction, which limited the commercial presence to firms formed by 
Brazilian national partners. On Freight Transportation - Road Transport Services, the requirement of a percentage 
of capital with voting rights owned by Brazilian nationals for the establishment of a commercial presence is 
reduced from 80% to 50%. 
79 The new schedule eliminates the restrictions on Market Access for the commercial presence of foreign service 
providers on Mobile Phone Services. 
00 In the previous schedule, commitments on Photographic Services were disaggregated on 8 sub-sectors up to 5 
digits of the CPC classification. In the new schedule, commitments are divided in two sub-sectors: photographic 
services (no restrictions on MA and NT for all modes of supply except for the horizontal commitment notes) and 
specialised Photographic Services (unbound on MA and NT for all modes of supply). 
81 See, e. g., State Parties' commitments on Research and Development Services, Investigation and Security 
Services, Services incidental to Fishing, Mining and Energy Distribution, Postal Services, Educational Services, 
Health Related and Social Services, News Agency Services, Air Transport Services. 
178 
taken. The negotiation round concluded in June 2003, six months later than the deadline 
prescribed by the negotiation mandate 82 
8. Seventh Round 
The seventh round was launched on 21 June 2007, calling State Parties to negotiate new 
schedules of specific commitments, which should be approved by the CMC during the first 
semester of 2008 8.3 This is the first round to be launched after the entry into force of the 
Protocol of Montevideo on 7 December 2005, which formally triggered the ten years term for 
the completion of the Programme of Liberalisation-84 The CMC instructed the CMG to 
formulate a negotiation mandate for the seventh round of negotiations and to develop an 
action plan for the completion of the Programme of Liberalisation by December 2007.85 
The GS is currently preparing the negotiation mandate for the seventh round and the action 
plan for the completion of the Programme of Liberalisation, based on a report submitted to the 
CMG in December 2006.86 The report contains the GS's view on the challenges and obstacles 
to advance on the liberalisation of trade in services in MERCOSUR and proposes some lines 
of actions to complete the Programme within the prescribed term. The report's proposals 
revolve around two main ideas. First, the need for a renewed political mandate, at the highest 
level, supporting the liberalisation process. The report clearly states that a strictly technical 
approach to the liberalisation process is insufficient to handle the political implications that 
the liberalisation process brings along with. 87 Second, that in order to ensure an effective 
liberalisation of trade in services it is necessary to move beyond the negotiation of specific 
commitments. In this vein, the report highlights the importance of regulatory co-operation 
among domestic regulators, the harmonisation and mutual recognition of domestic 
regulations, and initiatives aimed at the promotion of trade an investment in services based on 
the competitive advantages of the different service sectors. 88 
C. The Current Status of Commitments 
82 See Dec 01/06. 
83 Res 16/07,21/06/07. 
64 PM, art XIX. 1. 
es See Dec 30/06 and 24/07. 
86 See Annex VII to minutes GMC LXVI ordinary meeting. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
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This section examines State Parties' current schedules of specific commitments, which 
arguably offer a snapshot of the current degree of liberalisation of trade in services within the 
bloc. 89 
Schedules specify the sectors and sub-sectors where commitments have been consolidated. 
For each service sector or sub-sector there are eight entries: one entry fore each mode of 
supply (cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence and presence of 
natural persons) under a Market Access column and one entry for each mode of supply under 
a National Treatment column. Schedules also include a third column reserved for "Additional 
Commitments" not subject to scheduling under the Market Access or National Treatment 
columns 90 
The level of commitment in a specific sector for each mode of supply can range from a full 
commitment to a commitment with limitations or no commitment at all 91 A full commitment 
on Market Access means the State Party does not maintain for that mode of supply any of the 
types of measures listed in Article IV. A full commitment on National Treatment means the 
State Party accords to foreign services and service suppliers' conditions of competition no less 
favourable than those accorded to its own like services and service suppliers. 2 Full 
commitments are recorded in the schedule with a `NONE' entry, which stands for no 
restrictions. The fewer the number of `NONE' entries, the lower the level of liberalization for 
that service sector. A State Party can also make commitments with limitations, inscribing in 
the schedule a concise description of the measure inconsistent with Articles N or V it wishes 
to maintain. Finally, a State Party may opt not to consolidate any commitment whatsoever for 
a specific mode of supply, i. e. to remain free to adopt measures inconsistent with Articles IV 
or V. The absence of commitments is recorded in the schedule with an 'UNBOUND' entry. 
The State Parties' schedules of specific commitments approved by the last round of 
negotiations was analysed using Hoekman's method93 with a view to provide a quantitative 
89 See schedules of specific commitments approved by Dec. 1/06. 
90 Ibid. Art. VI. Additional commitments could be, e. g., commitments relating to qualifications, standards or 
licensing matters. 
91 Ibid. Art. VII. 1. 
92 Ibid. Art. V. 
93 See BERNARD HCEKMAN, 'Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services', in Martin Will & Alan Winters 
(eds) The Uruguay Round and the Developing Countries (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York 
1996). 
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estimation of the degree of liberalisation in the various service sectors 94 The data gives a 
rough idea about the degree of liberalisation achieved and allows for making comparisons 
between States Parties' specific commitments. It has to be borne in mind, however, that 
Hoekman's method does not take into account the effect of horizontal limitations included in 
the schedules, which affect all service sectors. 
Since the current schedules have not been incorporated into national legal systems, they are 
not legally binding upon State Parties. Nevertheless, State Parties have pledged to make their 
best efforts to observe the commitments consolidated in their schedules. 95 
1. Horizontal Limitations 
Schedules of specific commitments include a horizontal section where State Parties may 
record restrictions on Market Access or National Treatment for one or more modes of supply, 
which are applicable to all sector-specific service sectors. 
All State Party's schedules include a horizontal limitation on the entry and temporary stay of 
natural persons supplying services (Mode 4). Restrictions on Mode 4 take the form of a 
commitment to allow the entry of only certain categories of natural persons and only for 
limited periods of time. In other words, each State Party specifies the categories of natural 
persons allowed to come into their territory to supply services and for how long they can stay. 
This type of limitation constitutes a significant restriction on the liberalisation of trade in 
services, in particular for those service sectors where the presence of natural persons 
constitutes the main modality for the supply of the service, such as Professional Services. 
During the negotiation rounds, State Parties unsuccessfully tried to remove the restrictions on 
Mode 4 through the exchange of requests and offers. The only achievement so far has been an 
approximation of their horizontal commitments on Mode 4 to a reference document, which 
prescribes a common set of categories of natural persons providing services and a common set 
of market access conditions for them-96 The political sensitivity underlying issues relating to 
the right to regulate the entry and stay of foreigners and the asymmetries between State 
Parties' domestic regulations on this issue emerged as obstacles too difficult to overcome 
simply by the negotiation of reciprocal concessions. State Parties realised that the way 
94 See Appendix III Degree of Liberalisation of Service Sectors by State Parties - July 2006. 
95 See above Ch III footnote n11. 
96 See above footnote n78. 
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forward required setting up a common regulatory framework on the movement of natural 
persons across national borders and launched a number of legislative initiatives in this 
direction. 7 
The Argentinian, Brazilian and Paraguayan schedules include the following horizontal 
limitations on the commercial presence of foreign service suppliers (Mode 3): no 
commitments on Market Access and National Treatment in relation to the acquisition of land 
in border areas (Argentina and Paraguay); foreign service suppliers wishing to supply a 
service as a legal person in Brazil or Paraguay must be organized as a legal entity foreseen by 
domestic legislation; on state-owned enterprises subject to privatisation, the government 
reserves its right to retain shares with special voting rights and to give employees preferential 
treatment for the acquisition of shares (Paraguay); foreign capital invested in Brazil must be 
registered with the Brazilian Central Bank for the purpose of authorising transfer of funds. 
The Central Bank establishes special procedures for the remittances and transfer of funds 
abroad. 
In addition, the Brazilian schedule stipulates that the national congress is considering the 
adoption of a regulatory framework for electronically deliverable products, which could 
include restrictions on the cross-border supply of services (Mode 1) and on the consumption 
of services abroad (Mode 2). Therefore, sector-specific commitments on Modes 1 and 2 could 
be affected once the bill under consideration is adopted and enters into force. 
2. Professional Services 
Paraguay has not undertaken any commitment on Professional Services. Its schedule simply 
indicates that the national congress is considering a bill on Professional Services and that once 
the statute is approved commitments will be adopted, recording the restrictions on Market 
Access and National Treatment that may correspond. 
By contrast, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have consolidated commitments covering all the 
Professions included in the Services Sectoral Classification List. At first glance, such 
commitments appear to indicate a relatively high level of liberalisation of Professional 
Services. However, an in-depth examination of the schedules unveils a much more fragmented 
scenario. 
97 See below Ch V, Section C, Numeral 1. 
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First, the Argentinian and Uruguayan schedules include a horizontal limitation applicable to 
all the professions indicating that the persons seeking to provide professional services must first 
obtain recognition of their professional degree, licensing with the relevant professional 
association in the host State and establish legal domicile in the country. The fact that the 
Brazilian schedule does not include this type of horizontal reference does not mean absence of 
qualifications, licensing and professional membership requirements. It simply indicates that 
from the Brazilian perspective only restrictions or discriminatory measures against foreigners 
must be recorded in the schedules but not purely domestic regulatory measures such as those 
relating to qualifications and licenses to provide Professional Services 9B 
Secondly, State Parties have not consolidated commitments on Mode 4- probably the most 
relevant mode of supply of Professional Services - except as indicated in the horizontal section. 
In general, State Parties allow the presence of foreign independent professionals in their 
territories but subject to specific requirements and only during a limited period of time. 99 
Thirdly, the Uruguayan and, in particular the Brazilian schedule, include specific Market Access 
and National Treatment restrictions for the provision of certain professional services, including 
nationality requirements, commercial presence requirements and prohibition of foreign 
investment. 100 
98 During the sixth negotiation round Brazil expressly requested Argentina and Uruguay to remove from their 
schedules the horizontal limitations relating to qualifications, licensing and professional membership requirements, 
arguing they were purely domestic regulatory measures and not Market Access or discriminatory measures 
against foreigners. 
99 For Instance, Argentina's schedule indicates that independent professionals may enter the country by request 
submitted by a natural or juridical person established in Argentina, to perform professional or technical activities, 
whether or not remunerated. The maximum period of residence granted to the foreigners that enter the territory to 
perform professional activities is 15 days, which can be extended for 15 additional days. When the professional is 
hired to supply services to a natural or juridical person established in Argentina, under a written labour or civil 
service contract the initial maximum period of stay is 1 year. This period can be extended indefinitely for equal 
periods as long as the status of hired worker remains. 
100 For instance, the Uruguayan schedule includes nationality and residency requirements for the provision of 
Legal Documentation and Certification Services and a quantitative restriction on the establishment of Pharmacies. 
Similarly, according to the Brazilian schedule, foreign lawyers cannot represent parties in court but they may 
provide consultation services on their own legal system previous registration with the Ordern dos Advogados do 
Brazil (i. e. Brazilian law society). For the provision of Accounting, Auditing and Taxation Services, the commercial 
presence of the service provider is required and non-residents cannot participate in legal persons controlled by 
Brazilian nationals. An entity wishing to hire the temporary service of foreign engineers or architects must, at the 
same time, hire a Brazilian assistant to work alongside the foreign professional during the term of the contract. The 
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During the last negotiation round, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay unsuccessfully requested 
Brazil to remove most of its Market Access and National Treatment restrictions affecting the 
Architecture and Engineering professions. The inability to remove even overt Market Access 
and National Treatment restrictions against MERCOSUR service providers, clearly illustrates 
the limitations of the request and offer approach for advancing the liberalisation of 
Professional Services. What State Parties (except Paraguay) have achieved so far through the 
negotiation of specific commitments is, at best, the partial consolidation of the status quo of 
their Professional Services' legislation. 1°' This is far from sufficient to provide foreign 
professionals with effective market access in other State Parties. For this to be possible, in 
addition to the removal of specific Market Access and National Treatment restrictions, it is 
essential to develop a common regulatory framework addressing, amongst other things, the 
mutual recognition of qualifications, standardised licensing procedures and professional 
bodies' membership policies. 
3. Telecommunication Services 
Specific commitments on Telecommunication Services are characterized by important 
asymmetries among State Parties, with a relatively high level of liberalisation in Argentina 
and a significantly lower level of liberalisation in the other three State Parties. 
In Argentina, the privatisation of the state-owned telecom company along with the 
dismantlement of the monopoly regime that occurred during the early nineties paved the way 
for the establishment of a fairly open telecom market. This is reflected in Argentina's 
schedule, which does not include horizontal limitations nor specific measures restricting 
market access or discriminating measures against foreign service providers. The schedule does 
participation of foreign capital on entities providing Medical, Dental, Midwifery and Nursing services is prohibited, 
while foreign Doctors, Dentists, Midwifes and Nurses can only provide services to the Brazilian Government on a 
temporary basis. 
101 It is important to highlight that it is extremely difficult to include In a schedule of specific commitments a 
comprehensive inventory of all domestic measures including market access and national treatment restrictions on 
trade in services. A detailed schedule should always include at least a reference to the most notorious restrictions. 
However, in heavily regulated sectors such as the professions, the task becomes increasingly difficult. For 
instance, a review conducted by the Uruguayan government on domestic regulations affecting trade in services, 
identified ten statutes and seven decrees including provisions governing the provision of Professional Services 
which were not even referred to in the Uruguayan schedule. See Annex IV to minutes GS meeting 03/04. 
Therefore, the schedules' contribution to transparency and to the lock in effect of current legislation is limited. 
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refer to the administrative authority's power to restrict the number of suppliers per operating 
area in some telecom sub-sectors (Mobile Services, Paging, Trunking) in light of present and 
future needs. However, an eventual decision of the authority to restrict the number of 
suppliers would affect domestic and foreign service providers alike. 
Brazil also conducted a regulatory reform aimed at eliminating the state monopoly on the 
telecom sector which involved an amendment to the constitution in 1995102 and the adoption 
of a new Telecommunications law in 1997103. The new regulatory framework established a 
regulatory body (ANATEL) and privatised the federal telecom companies. Accordingly, the 
Brazilian schedule does not include Market Access or National Treatment restrictions on 
any mode of supply for the provision of any type of telecom services. However, the impact 
of its sector-specific commitments is watered down by two important horizontal limitations. 
First, the Executive Branch is entitled by law to establish limits regarding foreign 
participation in the capital composition of telecommunications service providers. 104 In 
addition all service suppliers need to obtain a license to operate from ANATEL. The 
schedule stipulates that licenses shall be granted only to suppliers duly constituted according 
to Brazilian legislation, which requires head office and management located in the Brazilian 
territory and ownership of the majority of the voting shares by natural persons resident in 
Brazil or companies duly constituted according to the Brazilian legislation, which requires 
head office and management located in the Brazilian territory. 
The Paraguayan schedule includes a horizontal note stipulating that each telecommunication 
service provider in Paraguay requires a government licence granted by CONATEL'°5 
according to a transparent and non-discriminatory procedure. The licenses are granted 
exclusively to legal persons incorporated in Paraguay, with headquarters and representation in 
the Paraguayan territory and with at least fifty per cent of their capital owned by Paraguayan 
nationals. The schedule also prescribes that assemblies, facilities and maintenance for the 
sectors and sub sectors committed have to be done by professionals and companies registered 
with CONATEL. On Telephone Services, Paraguay has not consolidated commitments on any 
102 See Emenda Consätucionai n°. 8 de 1995, e com a Lei n°. 9295, de 19 de juiho de 1996 (Lei Minima). 
103 see - Lei n°. 9472, de 16 de juiho de 1997. 
104 Argentina and Paraguay requested, unsuccessfully, the removal of this horizontal limitation. Brazil argued that 
the regulatory regime prevents the Executive Branch from exercising Its power in a discriminatory fashion. It also 
argued that the Executive Branch did not exercise its power during the privatisation process of fix and mobile 
telephone services and that the current participation of foreign capital in the telecom sector is significant. 
im Comisibn Nacional de Telecommunicaciones, established by Ley No 642 de Telecomunicaciones, 25 May 
1995. 
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mode of supply. By contrast, on Value-added Services (electronic mail, electronic data 
interchange, etc. ) it has made commitments on all modes of supply, subject to the horizontal 
limitations already mentioned. 
Uruguay has consolidated commitments without restrictions on all modes of supply for most 
Value-added Services (electronic mail, electronic data interchange, etc. ), but Basic 
Telecommunication Services are provided under monopoly conditions by a state-owned 
enterprise (ANTEL). During the last negotiation round, Argentina and Paraguay requested 
Uruguay to assume an additional commitment stating that in case of privatisation or de- 
regulation of the sector, MERCOSUR service providers will be subject to a National 
Treatment standard, but the request was not met. 
The Argentinian, Brazilian and Uruguayan schedules include a reference document with 
additional commitments on basic Telecommunication Services. The document includes 
commitments on minimum domestic regulatory disciplines relating to the prevention of anti- 
competitive practices, interconnection with a dominant supplier, universal service, public 
availability of licensing criteria, independence of the regulatory body and minimum criteria 
for the allocation and use of scarce resources (e. g. frequency bands, numbers and rights of 
way, etc. ). 106 
Overall, after six rounds of negotiations, the telecom sector remains fragmented, without any 
kind of preferential treatment accorded to MERCOSUR suppliers or consumers. Even though 
all State Parties have liberalised or are in the process of liberalising the telecom sector, the 
reforms have been entirely domestic, rather than co-ordinated or, at least, encouraged by 
MERCOSUR negotiations. 
4. Financial services 
Financial Services are highly regulated industries. Not surprisingly, State Parties' 
commitments on all modes of supply of Financial Services are conditioned by horizontal 
limitations aimed at preserving their regulatory autonomy for the adoption of prudential 
measures, which, overall, provide for a low level of liberalisation. Commitments on the cross- 
border supply or the consumption abroad of Financial Services are limited by measures 
106 Based on the WTO Reference Paper for Telecommunication Services adopted on 24 April 1996. 
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controlling the cross-border transfer of funds. 107 Commitments on the supply of services by a 
service supplier of a State Party through the commercial presence in the territory of any other 
State Party are subject, amongst other conditions, to the incorporation of the foreign company 
into the domestic legal system, the constitution of the company according to a particular type 
of legal person and the need to obtain an authorisation to operate from the competent 
authority, which normally enjoys wide discretion to decide whether or not to allow 
newcomers to the market. t08 Commitments on the supply of services by the presence of 
natural persons providing services remain unbound except for those specific categories of 
natural persons indicated in the horizontal section. 
On Insurance Services, State Parties' commitments on the cross-border supply and 
consumption abroad remain unbound for most types of services with the exception of 
commitments on Maritime and Aviation Transport Risk Insurance, Reinsurance and 
Retrocession and some Services Auxiliary to Insurance. 109 By contrast, the provision of most 
types of Insurance Services through the commercial presence of the foreign service provider is 
allowed - or more precisely, it is required"° by all State Parties, albeit subject to strict 
horizontal limitations. "' Finally, State Parties have not yet made commitments on the 
107 For instance, Brazil's schedule indicates that each cross-border transfer of funds and assets must be registered 
with the Central Bank. As a general rule, transfers are permitted when a rule allows the specific operation or upon 
individual authorization. Residents acquiring assets abroad must inform the Central Bank ("Banco Central do 
Brasil") and the Federal Revenue and Customs Secretariat ("Secretaria da Receita Federal"). 
108 The Uruguayan schedule stipulates that any Financial Services supplier wishing to engage in operations in 
Uruguay may not do so without prior authorizations from the competent authorities. Applications to operate may be 
rejected on precautionary grounds, including economic considerations such as the current state of the market. 
109 Paraguay only liberalised the cross-border supply and consumption abroad of Retrocession and Reinsurance 
Services. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay also liberalised the cross-border supply and consumption abroad of 
Maritime and Aviation Transport Risk Insurance and some Services Auxiliary to insurance such as Consultancy 
Services (Argentina), Consultancy, Actuarial, Auditing Services, Broking and Agency Services (Brazil and 
Uruguay). In Uruguay, for the competent authority to allow the insurer to deduce the reinsurance or retrocession 
placed abroad, the foreign companies that provide the service must be registered. Brazil also allows the placing of 
insurance abroad against risks not covered within the country. However, the placing of insurance and reinsurance 
abroad will be made, exclusively, through the competent agency (IRB-Brasil Resseguros). Guarantee reserves 
corresponding to insurance and reinsurance effected abroad shall remain retained in Brazil. 
110 The Argentinian Schedule expressly indicates that it is prohibited to insure abroad any insurable interest subject 
to national jurisdiction, including persons and goods, which must be covered only by companies established in 
Argentina. Similarly, the Uruguayan schedule expressly requires the commercial presence of the service provider 
for most type of insurance. 
111 The Uruguayan schedule stipulates that in order to have a commercial presence in Uruguay, enterprises must 
be incorporated as public limited companies with registered shares, subject to the limitations laid down by the 
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presence of natural persons providing services, a mode of supply particularly relevant for the 
provision of services auxiliary to insurance like Broking and Agency Services. Labour Risk 
Insurance is the least liberalized of all. In Uruguay it can only be provided by a state-owned 
company under monopoly conditions, while Brazil and Paraguay have made no commitments 
on any mode of supply for the provision of this type of insurance. 
On Banking and other Financial Services, there are significant asymmetries between State 
Parties' commitments. The Paraguayan schedule provides for the lowest level of 
liberalisation. Its commitments remain unbound on all modes of supply for all type of services 
with the exception of Acceptance of Deposits and Lending Services, where there are no 
restrictions on the commercial presence of foreign service suppliers other than the need to 
obtain authorisation from the Central Bank. The presence of branches of foreign banks is 
allowed, although incorporated firms must adopt the form of public limited companies with 
their capital represented by nominative shares. 
The Brazilian schedule limits the scope of its commitments to certain type of financial 
institutions and stipulates that each of them may perform only those activities permitted by 
Law, the National Monetary Council (Conselho Monetärio Nacional - "CMN"), the Central 
Bank (Banco Central do Brasil - "BACEN") and/or the Securities Commission (Comissäo de 
Valores Mobiliärios - "CVM"). It further stipulates that management staff of senior level 
must be permanent residents in Brazil and that representative offices may not engage in 
commercial business. 
Brazilian commitments on the cross-border supply remain unbound for almost all type of 
Banking and other Financial Services except for Financial Advice Services, which are 
completely liberalised. Commitments on consumption abroad are subject to horizontal 
limitations on the cross-border transfer of funds for most type of services with the exception 
of Settlement and Clearing Services for Financial Assets and the Provision and Transfer of 
Financial Information, which remain unbound. The commercial presence of foreign service 
suppliers is subject to important limitations. In particular, the establishment of subsidiaries or 
agencies of foreign financial institutions is subject to prior authorisation by means of a 
Presidential decree, which is issued on a case by case basis. Specific conditions may be 
existing legislation. Similarly, the Paraguayan schedule stipulates that for the provision of insurance services, firms 
must be set according to Paraguayan legislation and duly authorised to operate by the competent authority. For 
some services, the firms' legal representatives and managers must reside in Paraguay. The Brazilian schedule 
stipulates that the commercial presence of foreign service providers is subject to prior authorization by the 
competent authority. 
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requested from interested investors. Authorisation by means of a Presidential decree is also 
required for the increase in foreign capital on authorised institutions or for the participation of 
natural or legal persons domiciled abroad on national financial institutions. 
Argentina excludes financial operations carried out by the Government and State companies, 
from the commitments specified in its schedule. Its commitments on cross-border supply 
remain unbound for almost all type of Banking and other Financial Services except for 
Financial Advice Services and for the Provision and Transfer of Financial Information, which 
are completely liberalised. Commitments on consumption abroad, by contrast, are liberalised 
for all type of Banking and other Financial Services although the outflow of capital is subject 
to strict controls by the Central Bank. ' 12 The commitments on the commercial presence of 
foreign service suppliers are also quite open, with no specific Market Access or National 
Treatment restrictions on any type of services, other than the usual requirements of prior 
authorisation from the competent authority (Central Bank or National Securities 
Commission). 
Uruguay imposes no restrictions on the cross-border supply of Banking Services although it 
has not consolidated its commitments on this form of supply for Securities-related Services, 
Foreign Exchange Brokering, Asset Management and Settlement and Clearing Services. 
Uruguay neither imposes restrictions on the consumption abroad of Banking and Investment 
Services except for Settlement and Clearing Services, where commitments remain unbound. 
Banks wishing to become established in Uruguay must be incorporated as Uruguayan public 
limited companies with registered shares or as foreign banks' branches. The authorisation for 
establishment of branches or agencies of companies organised abroad is subject to the 
requirement that their bylaws or regulations do not prohibit Uruguayan citizens from being 
part of their management, administrative board, board of directors, or any other senior post, 
job or position in the institution within the territory of Uruguay. The commercial presence of 
banks is subject to the following quantitative limit: in any one year the number of 
authorizations for the operation of new banks to operate may not exceed ten percent of the 
number operating in the year immediately preceding. Representatives of foreign financial 
institutions must register themselves on the Central Bank. 
112 The Central Bank control over the outflow of capitals by non- residents has been lighted since 2002 as part of a 
wide range of new measures aimed at recovering the financial system from the financial crisis that hit the country 
in 2001. 
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In summary, it stems from the above findings that State Parties' financial service markets are 
partitioned by a wide range of discriminatory measures (e. g. caps on the total amount of 
foreign equity participation, local residence requirements, prohibition of consumption abroad, 
etc. ) and non-discriminatory measures (e. g. licensing, authorisation or type of legal entity 
requirements). 
5. Transport Services 
State Parties' schedules are fraught with Market Access and National Treatment restrictions 
on all type of Transport Services. ' 13 The negotiation rounds have not managed to remove 
existing restrictions, but at least they have contributed to consolidate the status quo of 
domestic legislation affecting Transport Services. In addition, State Parties are also part to a 
wide range of bilateral, plurialteral and multilateral agreements signed prior to the entry into 
force of the Protocol of Montevideo, which remain unaffected. The Protocol's Annexes on 
Land and Waterway Transport Services and on Air Transport Services expressly state that the 
agreements concluded prior to the entry into force of the Protocol shall not be affected by 
State Parties' specific commitments on Transport Services. In other words, the negotiation 
rounds have managed neither to remove existing restrictions nor to secure the convergence of 
State Parties' commitments with third countries. 
On Maritime and Waterway Transport Services, the Argentinian, Brazilian and Uruguayan 
schedules include Market Access restrictions on Maritime Cabotage Transport and Inland 
Waterway Transport (reserved for vessels flying the national flag). ' 14 The Brazilian schedule 
also includes restrictions on transport of governmental cargo (reserved for vessels flying the 
national flag) and on the transport of petroleum of national origin and its derivates (subject to 
a national monopoly). Similarly, the Paraguayan schedule specifies that the whole of maritime 
and inland waterway transport for import and export freight is reserved for vessels flying the 
Paraguayan flag. 
113 For studies on barriers to transport integration see, e. g., RICARDO J SANCHEZ & GEORGINA CIPOLETTA 
TOMASSIAN, Identificaci6n de obstaculos al transporte terrestre intemacional de cargas on el Mercosur (CEPAL, 
Santiago de Chile 2003); AZITA AMIADI & ALAN WINTERS, Transport costs and "Natural" integration in MERCOSUR 
(World Bank, Washington D. C. 1997) and NEWTON DE CASTRO & PHILIPPE LAMP, Aspectos institucionais e 
regulat6rios da integragäo de transportes do Mercosul (IPEA, Rio de Janeiro 1996). 
114 For a vessel to fly the Brazilian flag, it is necessary that the captain, the engineer and 2/3 of the crew to be 
Brazilian nationals. 
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On Air Transport Services, State Parties have not consolidated commitments on any mode of 
supply for both freight and passenger transportation. On Maintenance and Repair of Aircraft 
Services, the Argentinian schedule includes no restrictions on any mode of supply, while the 
Brazilian schedule stipulates that foreign service suppliers must require a presidential 
authorisation to operate. 
On Rail Transport Services, the Argentinian schedule stipulates that opportunities for the 
supply of freight and passenger transportation services are subject to tendering processes. 
Selected bidders must provide the service under concession regimes which specify the 
conditions under which the service must be provided. The Brazilian schedule specifies that 
governmental authorization is required for the provision of these types of services and that the 
granting of new authorizations is discretionary. Uruguay and Paraguay have not consolidated 
commitments on any type of Rail Transport Services. 
On Road Transport Services, Uruguay has not consolidated any commitments on any mode of 
supply. Argentinian, Brazilian and Paraguayan schedules specify that for the provision of 
Freight and Transport Services, firms must be incorporated under domestic legislation. The 
three schedules refer to the Agreement on International Road Transport and specify the main 
requirements for the provision of international Transport Services that stem from that 
Agreement (e. g. more than half of the capital and voting rights of the firm must be owned by 
nationals from the State party to the Agreement, which issues the license to operate). 
Argentinian and Paraguayan schedules reserve the provision of local freight transportation for 
local firms. Brazilian and Paraguayan schedules stipulate that the provision of passenger 
Transport Services is subject to governmental authorization and that the issues of licenses are 
discretionary and may be limited. On Road Freight Transportation, the Brazilian schedule 
restricts the commercial presence of suppliers to firms incorporated as public limited 
companies according to Brazilian legislation and where at least 50% of the voting rights are 
owned by Brazilian nationals and management positions are occupied by Brazilian nationals. 
On Pipeline Transport Services, Paraguay has not consolidated commitments on any mode of 
supply, while Brazil has not consolidated commitments on the transport of hydrocarbon 
products. The Argentinian and Uruguayan schedules specify that Pipeline Transport Services 
must be provided under concession regimes, subject to the conditions stipulated on the 
licenses to operate. 
6. Other Services 
191 
In other type of services, State Parties' commitments vary significantly according to the type 
of service in question. On the one hand, there are services completely liberalised where most 
or all State Parties apply no Market Access or National Treatment restrictions on any mode of 
supply except as indicated on the horizontal limitations. That is typically the case for Courier 
Services''s, Distribution Services116, Tourism Services'17 and some types of Business 
Services' 18. On the other hand, there are services where none or most State Parties had either 
failed to consolidate commitments on any mode of supply or maintain significant Market 
Access and National Treatment restrictions against foreign service providers. That is typically 
the case for Postal Services119, Audiovisual Services120, Environmental Services (including 
Sewage, Refuse Disposal, and Sanitation Services) 121, Educational Servicesl12 and some types 
115 All State Parties but Paraguay have consolidated the liberalisation of all modes of supply except Mode 4. 
116 Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have made commitments with no restrictions on any mode of supply for almost 
all type of Distributional Services except Wholesale Trade Services and Retailing Services of fuel and fuel related 
products. The Uruguayan schedule also includes restrictions on the commercial presence of foreign Commission 
Agents and on the establishment of new commercial premises occupying great surfaces. Paraguay, by contrast, 
has made no commitments on the cross-border supply and on the movement of natural persons providing 
services, whereas it did made unrestricted commitments on the consumption abroad and on the commercial 
presence of foreign service providers except for Wholesale Trade Services. 
117 Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay have consolidated commitments without restrictions on all modes of supply 
with the exception Paraguayan Market Access and National Treatment restrictions to the commercial presence of 
foreign providers of Travel Agencies and Tour Operators Services. Brazil, by contrast, has consolidated fewer 
commitments limited by some restrictions. On Hotel and Restaurants, the Brazilian government provides fiscal 
incentives for Brazilian firms located in specific regions and for firms with the majority of capital of Brazilian origin, 
which constitutes a discriminatory measure against the commercial presence of foreign service suppliers. On 
Travel Agencies and Tour Operators and Tourist Guide Services, Brazil imposes no restrictions on the commercial 
presence of foreign suppliers, but has not made commitments on the other modes of supply. 
718 See Computer and Related Services, Management Consulting Services, Market Research and Public Opinion 
Polling Services, Placement and supply of Personnel Services, Photographic Services and Convention Services. 
119 Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay have not consolidated commitments on any mode of supply, while Brazil has 
consolidated current restrictions on Market Access, which accord to the °Uniao" exclusivity on the provision of pick- 
up, transport and delivery of letters, postcards, grouped correspondence and telegram services. 
120 All State Parties' schedules include restrictions on Market Access (e. g. quotas on foreign films, preferences for 
state owned companies on the assignation of TV and radio frequencies) and National Treatment (e. g., national- 
ownership requirements for TV and radio companies, nationality requirements for film producers or requirement to 
set up partnerships with local producers) affecting one or more modes of supply. 
121 All State Parties include Market Access restrictions to the commercial presence of foreign service suppliers. 
According to State Parties' schedules, this type of services is usually provided by state-owned enterprises under 
monopoly conditions. In some cases, local government authorities allow private contractors to enter the market 
under concession regimes but, overall, trade tends to be highly restricted. 
192 
of Business Services'23 
D. Critique of the Negotiation Rounds 
Sections B and C above provided a detailed description of the evolution of the negotiation 
process and its achievements over the last nine years. This section critiques the results 
achieved so far and discusses the efficacy of the negotiation of specific commitments as an 
instrument for the liberalisation of trade in services. 
One benchmark that can be considered for making a value judgment about the results 
achieved so far by the Protocol's Programme of Liberalisation are State Parties' GATS 
schedules of specific commitments, which back in 1998 were taken as the baseline for starting 
the negotiations under the Protocol's umbrella. 124 A comparison of State Parties' 
MERCOSUR commitments with their GATS' commitments clearly illustrates that the former 
are far more advanced than the latter in terms of coverage, depth and transparency. 125The 
following comments are valid for all State Parties' schedules. First, contrary to GATS 
schedules, MERCOSUR schedules include commitments on almost all sectors of the Service 
Sector Classification List. 126 Secondly, MERCOSUR commitments are much closer to State 
Parties' current status of domestic legislation than the GATS commitments. 127 In other words, 
122 State Parties have either not consolidated commitments on any mode of supply or have subject their 
commitments to strict horizontal limitations. 
123 See Research and Development Services, Investigation and Security Services and Services incidental to 
Fishing, Mining and Energy Distribution. 
124 For an analysis of State Parties' GATS commitments see JULIO BERLINSKY, 'GATS Commitments and Policy 
Issues of MERCOSUR and NAFTA Countries', in Fernando Lorenzo & Marcel Valliant (eds) MERCOSUR and the 
Creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 2003). For a 
comparison between GATS commitments and MERCOSUR commitments up to the fourth round of negotiations 
see DA MO rA VEIGA, 'EI MERCOSUR frente a los acuerdos y negociaciones sobre servicios e inversiones', In . 
125 This statement is valid whether one takes as a benchmark State Parties' original GATS commitments or current 
GATS commitments. In fact, State Parties made little changes to their GATS' concessions since the launch of 
multilateral negotiations in 2000. 
126 For instance, MERCOSUR schedules include commitments on Postal Services, Audiovisual Services, 
Educational Services, Environmental Services and Health Services, which are not included in the GATS 
schedules. 
127 For instance, on Road Transport Services, Brazil's GATS schedule includes a cap on the commercial presence 
of foreign equity, equivalent to 20% of the voting rights, whereas under its MERCOSUR schedule the cap is 
equivalent to 50% of the voting rights in line with what the legislation actually prescribes. On top of that, 
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they consolidate the satus quo of domestic legislation leaving no buffer zone between the 
commitment and the legislation, what in goods parlance is known as the gap between the 
"bound" and the "applied" tariff. Finally, commitments under the MERCOSUR schedules are 
recorded in a much more precise way, providing more information about the nature of existing 
Market Access and National Treatment restrictions and following a consistent methodology, 
which increases the degree of transparency of existing restrictions and facilitates the 
comparisons between State Parties' commitments. 
At first sight, the MERCOSUR - GATS comparison appears to indicate that the Protocol's 
Programme of Liberalisation has been a resounding success. However, a closer examination 
of MERCOSUR current schedules of commitments clearly reveals that the results achieved so 
far are simply not good enough. The disappointment increases if one bears in mind the 
advantages of a negotiation forum of four neighbouring developing countries over a 
multilateral forum of over one hundred and forty nations. 
To put it crudely, six rounds of negotiations spanning over the last nine years achieved no 
more than the (partial) consolidation of the status quo of State Parties' domestic legal systems, 
failing miserably to eliminate the discriminatory measures embedded in those systems and 
ensure a preferential treatment for MERCOSUR services and service suppliers. Moreover, the 
main advantage of the consolidation of the status quo of domestic legislation, i. e. the "lock in" 
effect that prevents State Parties from adopting more restrictive measures than those recorded 
in their schedules, is watered down by the fact that current schedules of commitments have 
not yet entered into force. As things stands today, the observance of the commitments 
recorded in the schedules depends on a sort of `gentleman's agreement' between State 
Parties. '28 
State Parties' schedules of specific commitments are clogged with Market Access and 
National Treatment restrictions. Local residency requirements, nationality requirements, 
commercial presence requirements, economic needs tests, quantitative restrictions on service 
providers, foreign ownership restrictions, discriminatory financial incentives, monopolies and 
restrictions on the cross-border transfer of funds are just some of a long list of overt 
protectionist barriers that State Parties did not agree to disapply to MERCOSUR service 
suppliers. There is a plethora of measures which, at least on their face, are not discriminatory 
MERCOSUR commitments are far more disaggregated on sub-sectors and sub - sub sectors up to seven and 
eight digits of the UN's Central Product Classification. 
128 See above Ch III footnote n11. 
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such as licensing or qualification requirements, which have, nonetheless serious trade 
restrictive effects. On top of that, there are strong asymmetries in the level of commitments 
between State Parties', sectors and modes of supply. 129 The landscape that stems from State 
Parties' schedules is one of fragmentation between domestic service sectors, whether that is 
Professional Services or Financial Services, Telecommunications or Transport. 
State Parties' schedules of commitments include some sectors which are naturally more open 
to foreign competition (and not opened to foreign competition as a result of the negotiations) 
such as Computer and Related Services, Management Consulting Services, Courier Services 
and Tourism, but even in these sectors trade is affected by severe restrictions on the 
movement of natural persons supplying services included as horizontal limitations in all State 
Parties' schedules. 
The evidence is conclusive in signalling the failure of the rounds of negotiations of specific 
commitments in making any significant contribution to the elimination or reduction of Market 
Access or National Treatment restrictions against MERCOSUR services or service suppliers. 
It also suggests various reasons that explain the inefficacy of the Protocol's Programme of 
Liberalisation as an instrument for the liberalisation of trade in services and cast a shadow of 
doubt about the negotiability of barriers to trade in services. 
First of all, trade negotiators have a very constrained manoeuvring room to make concessions 
over measures affecting trade in services, because, as it has been revealed, such measures are 
on many occasions embedded in statutes or even in constitutional provisions. By any 
standards, it is unreasonable to assume that a tiny group of medium-rank diplomats that meet 
every now and then could succeed in bringing forward the necessary changes for removing 
such restrictions. Clearly, the only way to remove them is through fully fledged legal reform 
processes led by national parliaments. 
Secondly, the bargaining of reciprocal concessions on National Treatment and Market Access 
restrictions is constrained by the fact that it is very difficult to measure the value of 
concessions. For instance, has the offer to lift a cap on foreign equity participation on 
domestic banks a value comparable to, say, an offer to remove nationality requirements on 
media company owners? Another problem linked to this one is the lack of knowledge or 
sufficient information to make decisions about complex regulatory systems. This requires 
lengthy and cumbersome consultation processes that seem incompatible with the modus 
129 See Appendix III Degree of Liberalisation of Service Sectors by State Parties - July 2006. 
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operandi of trade negotiations, which are characterised by intense exchanges of requests and 
offers over a short period of time. 
A third problem that has been identified is the degree of regulatory asymmetries between 
some State Parties' service sectors. For instance, the fact that Paraguay does not have a 
regulatory framework for Professional Services comparable to that of other State Parties has 
put this State off making commitments that could constrain its right to introduce regulations in 
the future. 
Finally, the evidence confirmed that the logic underlying the negotiation of specific 
commitments tends to prioritise short-term interests and individualistic strategies over long- 
term interests and co-operative actions necessary for the establishment of a common market. It 
happened on a number of occasions during the negotiation rounds that some State Parties 
offered to eliminate or reduce restrictions in certain sectors or modes of supply but, 
ultimately, they decided to withdraw their offers on the grounds that they were not matched 
by comparable offers from other State Parties. Similarly, Brazil refrained from consolidating the 
current status of its legislation and fully disclosing information relating to the unbound entries - in 
particular on the Financial Services sector - on its MERCOSUR schedule on the basis that that 
could weaken MERCOSUR's negotiation position vis-a-vis the EU or in the context of the FTAA 
negotiations. 
During the negotiation rounds, State Parties themselves became aware of the limitations of the 
request and offer of concessions to advance the liberalisation of trade in services, in particular 
on sectors such as Professional Services, where the real challenge lies more on the mutual 
recognition of qualifications and licenses to operate than on the removal of Market Access or 
National Treatment Restrictions. These limitations lead State Parties to start looking at 
positive integration as an alternative path to further the liberalisation of trade in services. 
E. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter examined the rounds of negotiations of specific commitments conducted under 
the umbrella of the Protocol's Programme of Liberalisation and assessed its contribution to 
the liberalisation of trade in services in MERCOSUR. The analysis provided compelling 
evidence suggesting that barriers to trade in services cannot be removed by diplomatic means 
alone. 
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To begin with, an argument was put forward questioning, on grounds of principle, the 
suitability of the negotiation of reciprocal concessions as a mechanism for the liberalisation of 
trade in services in MERCOSUR. There is no doubt about the need for a gradual opening of 
domestic service markets to foreign competition, in particular when the process occurs in a 
context conditioned by unstable macroeconomic circumstances and sharp structural and policy 
asymmetries among participant States. It is equally clear that the Programme's "positive list" 
approach guarantees such gradualism by according to each State Party the right to choose the 
sectors and the conditions under which they are prepared to observe the agreement's main 
obligations (National Treatment and Market Access). It was argued, however, that a GATS' 
like Programme was not the best option for securing the gradual unfolding of the liberalisation 
process that MERCOSUR needs. First, State Parties to the Treaty of Asuncion, by contrast to 
GATS Members, already agreed, from the outset, to establish a common market involving the 
free movement of services across national borders, without a priori limitations. Secondly, as 
comparative integration experiences show, there are better alternatives for securing a gradual 
liberalisation process. Finally, the logic underlying the negotiation of specific commitments 
tends to prioritise short-term interests and individualistic strategies over the long-term 
interests and co-operative actions necessary for the establishment of a common market. 
The analysis of State Parties' current schedules of specific commitments confirmed the 
Programme's inefficacy as an instrument for the liberalisation of trade in services. Six rounds 
of negotiations spanning over the last nine years achieved no more than the (partial) 
consolidation of the status quo of State Parties' domestic legal systems, failing miserably to 
eliminate the discriminatory measures embedded in those systems and ensure a preferential 
treatment for MERCOSUR services and service suppliers. Moreover, the main advantage of 
the consolidation of the status quo of domestic legislation, i. e. the "lock in" effect that 
prevents State Parties from adopting more restrictive measures than those recorded in their 
schedules, is diluted by the fact that current schedules of commitments have not yet entered 
into force. 
The findings pointed at various factors explaining the inefficacy of the Protocol's Programme 
and casting a shadow of doubt about the negotiability of barriers to trade in services: a) the 
trade negotiators' constrained manoeuvring room to make concessions over measures 
affecting trade in services. Most restrictions are embedded in statutes or even in constitutional 
provisions, meaning that they are far beyond the reach of what diplomats can offer in the 
context of a negotiation process; b) the difficulty to measure the value of concessions 
necessary for enabling the exchange of requests and offers; and c) the lack of sufficient 
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information to make decisions about complex regulatory systems, which requires lengthy and 
cumbersome consultation processes. 
On 21 June 2007, the seventh round of negotiations was launched. This is the first round to be 
launched after the entry into force of the Protocol of Montevideo on 7 December 2005, 
triggering the ten years term for the completion of the Programme of Liberalisation. But in 
light of the findings, a successful and timely completion of the Programme of Liberalisation 
by December 2015 is highly unlikely. There is no evidence to suggest that State Parties' 
governments have the political will to push forward the necessary reforms to remove from 
their legislation those Market Access and National Treatment restrictions that hinder trade in 
services with their partners. Instead, they should aim at completing the process of 
consolidation of the status quo, with a view to ensuring that each schedule of specific 
commitments records - in an exhaustive and detailed fashion - all discriminatory restrictions 
embedded in State Parties' domestic legislation. . It seems more realistic to aim at the 
consolidation of the status quo, which prevents the introduction of future discriminatory 
measures against MERCOSUR service suppliers, than at the complete removal of existing 
restrictions. 
Ideally, State Parties should also commit themselves to a schedule of reforms for the adoption 
- in the medium or long term - of those measures necessary for removing Market Access and 
National Treatment restrictions from domestic legislation. But for this to be possible it is 
necessary to ensure a more active involvement of national parliaments on the negotiations 
and, above all, secure a renewed political mandate, supporting the liberalisation process at the 
highest possible level. However, there is no evidence to suggest that high political circles 
would be prepared to provide this kind of support. 
Even assuming a best case scenario, where State Parties consolidate in their schedules the 
status quo of domestic legislation for all service sectors and modes of supply and commit 
themselves to future legal reforms aimed at the elimination of overt Market Access and 
National Treatment restrictions, this will not be sufficient for ensuring effective market access 
conditions for MERCOSUR service suppliers and levelling the playing field to compete 
against domestic incumbents. To secure an effective degree of liberalisation, more subtle 
barriers to trade such as discriminatory practices and the trade restrictive effects caused by the 
overlap of indistinctly applicable regulatory requirements should also be addressed. This 
requires more advanced legal mechanisms that go beyond State Parties' commitment not to 
discriminate against foreign service suppliers including, inter alia, harmonisation or mutual 
198 
recognition initiatives and co-operation mechanisms between domestic regulators. That is 
precisely what the next chapter looks at. 
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Chapter V 
Secondary Legislation on Services 
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This chapter focuses on the liberalisation of trade in services through positive integration. It 
examines MERCOSUR secondary rules on specific service sectors and modes of supply, 
discusses their contribution to the liberalisation of trade in services and puts forward some 
suggestions for improving the quality of MERCOSUR legislation. The chapter is divided into 
six sections. First, it analyses the concept of positive integration (Section A). It then outlines 
the process for the adoption of secondary rules in MERCOSUR (Section B), examines the 
secondary rules that have been adopted so far on specific service sectors and modes of supply 
(Section C) and critically assesses the legislative practice on services (Section D). Finally, 
some suggestions for better regulation are put forward (Section E), ending with some 
concluding remarks (Section F). 
A. What is Positive Integration? 
The dichotomy "negative integration" and "positive integration" first appeared in the 
economic literature to illustrate different modalities for the liberalisation of trade. In 1954, 
focusing on the European Communities, Jan Tinbergen described "negative integration" as the 
removal of discrimination and restrictions on the circulation of goods between member states 
and "positive integration" as the creation of new institutions and their instruments or the 
modification of existing instruments, so as to enable the market of the integrated area to 
function effectively and to promote other broader policy objectives in the union. ' Pinder 
adapted Tinbergen's terminology to the evolution of the European Community, using 
`negative integration' to refer to the removal of discrimination and `positive integration' to 
refer to the formation and application of coordinated and common policies in order to fulfil 
economic and welfare objectives other than the removal of discrimination. Pelkmans uses 
"negative integration" to refer to the "removal of discrimination in national economic rules 
and policies under joint and authoritative surveillance", and "positive integration" to refer to 
the "transfer of public market-rule-making and policy-making powers from the participating 
. polities to the union levels" 
3 
I See JAN TINBERGEN, International Economic Integration (North Holland, Amsterdam 1954), p 75. Tinbergen's 
examples of positive integration include the institution in charge of the redistribution of incomes between countries, 
or the regulation of unstable markets such as the common agricultural policy. 
2 See J PINDER, 'Positive Integration and Negative Integration: Some Problems of Economic Union in the E. E. C. ' 
(1968) 24 World Today 79, p 88. 
3 See JACQUES PELKEMANS, 'The Institutional Economics of European Integration', in Mauro Cappelletti, et al. (eds) 
Integration Through Law, Vol 1 Methods, Tools and Institutions (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York 1986), p 321. 
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The legal literature also employs this dichotomy when referring to the different type of legal 
instruments used for the liberalisation of trade. On European law, for instance, Weatherhill 
differentiates `negative harmonization, ' which he understands as the elimination of 
obstructive national laws through judicial rulings, from `positive or legislative 
harmonization, ' by which he refers to the introduction of community rules to govern a 
particular area in partial or total replacement for national rules. 4 Similarly, Ziller argues for 
the need to complement the abolishment of barriers to the movement of goods, services, 
labour and capital, necessary to set up the common market, with more sophisticated forms of 
regulation necessary to manage the market once it is set up, "both because of the recurrent 
temptations of governments to restore protectionism, and because market failures have to be 
corrected by regulatory intervention. "5 Ortino introduces a more subtle categorisation that 
differentiates between `judicial positive integration' and `legislative positive integration' or 
positive integration strictu sensu, according to the body responsible for defining or 
implementing the integration instrument in question. The literature on WTO law also refers 
to negative and positive integration! 
To put it simply, positive integration refers to the adoption of rules by treaty-based decision 
making bodies endowed with rule-making power. Commentators usually refer to these rules 
as `secondary legislation' or `derived law' as opposed to treaty provisions, which are referred 
to as `primary legislation' or `original law'. It must be noted that not all regional trade 
4 See STEPHEN WEATHERILL, 'Why harmonise? in Paolisa Nebbia & Takis Tridimas (eds) European Union Law for 
the 21st Century (Hart, Oxford, Portland 2004). 
5 See JACQUES ZILLER, The Challenge of Governance in Regional Integration. Key Experiences from Europe 
(European University Institute, Florence 2005), pp 36-37. 
6 Under "judicial positive integration", the author includes those general principles (non-discrimination, 
reasonableness, etc. ) imposed by the transnational legal system on its Members, for whose definition or 
implementation recourse to the judiciary is indispensable. Under "legislative positive Integration" the author 
includes secondary legislation adopted at the transnational level which is "... sufficiently detailed to avoid having to 
recourse, at least on a constant basis, to adjudicative bodies for their implementation. See FEDERICO ORTINO, 
Basic legal instruments for the liberalisation of trade :a comparative analysis of EC and WTO law (Hart, Oxford 
2004), p 25. 
7 See, e. g., ERNST ULRSICH PETERSMANN, 'From 'Negative' to 'Positive' Integration in the WTO: Time for 
'Mainstreaming Human Rights' into WTO Law? ' (2000) 37 CMLR 1363 and THOMAS COTTIER & PETROS MAVROIDIS, 
'Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in WTO Law: An Overview ', in Thomas Cottier, at al. 
(eds) Regulatory Barriers and the Principle of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law Vol 2: Past, Present and 
Future (University of Michigan Press, 2000); J JACQUES BOURGEOIS, 'On the Internal Morality of WTO Law', in 
Armin von Bogdandy, et al. (eds) European Integration and International Co-ordination Studies in Transnational 
Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlennan (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002). 
202 
agreements include built in mechanisms for the creation of new rules that can further specify 
treaty-based commitments. Some agreements simply lay down State Parties rights and 
obligations in the treaty itself and the only way for changing those rights and obligations is by 
going through the treaty amendment procedure governed by public international law. 
The composition, regulatory competence and decision making system for the adoption of 
secondary rules may vary from treaty to treaty. Different models involve different degrees of 
transfer of regulatory power from domestic to regional bodies. When State Parties want to 
exert strict control over the development of secondary rules they tend to opt for decision 
making bodies consisting on government officials, who adopt rules by consensus. By contrast, 
other models like the EU include the participation of non-governmental actors in the rule- 
making process and envisage the possibility of adopting decisions through qualified majority 
voting. Another important variation is the way in which secondary rules make their way into 
national legal systems. Sometimes they are directly applicable in domestic legal systems 
whereas in other contexts State Parties must adopt specific measures for their incorporation 
into their national legal systems. 
The possibility to adopt secondary rules provides State Parties with a flexible and cost- 
effective mechanism for adjusting their commitments to the ongoing challenges of the 
integration process. This is particularly relevant for trade in services, where the regulatory 
framework must be regularly adjusted in accordance with the permanent changes and 
innovations the service sector is subject to. g In particular, positive integration offers an 
unrivalled mechanism for tackling the trade restrictive effects caused by the diversity of 
domestic regulations affecting the production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of 
services. There are many ways and degrees in which secondary legislation can be used for 
handling regulatory diversity, ranging from the harmonisation of disparate domestic rules to 
the mutual recognition of domestic standards, qualifications or licenses or the setting up of co- 
operation mechanisms between domestic regulators. 
8 As Ehlermann and Campogrande put it with respect to the EC's services liberalisation process: "It would have 
been inconceivable, even in a relatively homogeneous group such as the Six, to construct from the outset a 
complete Community system for trade in services, even if intended to be implemented in stages as was the 
liberalisation of trade in goods. " See GIANLUIGY CAMPOGRANDE & CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN, 'Rules on Services in 
the EEC: A Model for Negotiating World-Wide Rules? ' in Emst-Ulrich Petersmann & Hilf Meinhard (eds) The New 
GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations - Legal and Economic Problems (Kluwer Law, 1991), p 490. 
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By providing a mechanism for tackling the trade restrictive effects caused by "lawful"' but 
disparate domestic regulations, positive integration paves the way for reaching a level of 
integration deeper than that resulting from the mere removal of overt discriminatory measures. 
However, its contribution to the liberalisation of trade will ultimately depend on the capacity 
of the institutional framework laid down by the treaty to ensure the right amount of 
intervention of regional institutions on domestic affairs, the timely and complete 
implementation of secondary rules by State Parties and the effective protection of the 
individual rights created by them. 
B. MERCOSUR Legislative Process 
The MERCOSUR legislative process is of a predominantly intergovernmental nature, 
conferring State Parties strict control over the development of secondary rules. 1° As 
mentioned in Chapter II, MERCOSUR institutions include three intergovernmental bodies 
with decision making power: the CMC which adopts Decisions, the CMG which adopts 
Resolutions and the MTC which adopts Directives. All these bodies consist of government 
officials only and adopt decisions by consensus in the presence of all State Parties. " 
The legal basis for the CMC and the CMG to adopt secondary rules is not defined with 
precision and clarity. The Treaty of Asuncion refers, rather vaguely, to the State Parties' 
commitment to "harmonize their legislation in pertinent areas to strengthen the integration 
process" but it does not give further indications about which areas should be considered 
"pertinent" to harmonise. '2 The Protocol of Ouro Preto enumerates in a more clear and 
detailed way the duties and powers of the CMC and CMG, which contributes to further 
specify the scope of their regulatory competence, but it still fails to specify with precision on 
what areas they must (or must not) regulate. By contrast, the duties of the MTC are more 
specific and clearly defined, leaving less room for misunderstandings about its scope of 
13 regulatory competence. Treaty provisions neither include any standard relating to the 
9 "Lawful" measures meaning measures that are in conformity with the basic standards of treatment prescribed by 
international trade agreements, i. e. market access, national treatment and most favoured nation treatment. 
10 See, generally, ALEJANDRO DANIEL PEROTTI & DAISY VENTURA, El Proceso Legislatho del MERCOSUR 
(Fundaci6n Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Montevideo 2004). 
I' POP, Art. 37. 
12 ToA, Art. 1. 
13 POP, Arts. 16 and 19. 
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opportunity for adopting secondary rules or the extent to which secondary rules could 
interfere with the autonomy of domestic regulators. 14 
The right of legislative initiative lies exclusively in the hands of decision making bodies. 
While the CMC is the highest body of MERCOSUR, the CMG and the MTC are not simply 
auxiliary bodies to the CMC. They too have autonomous regulatory power for adopting rules 
within their sphere of competence. In other words, there is a plurality of legal production 
centres, which can lead to overlaps and inconsistencies. `s 
The CMC receives initiatives or recommendations to adopt Decisions from the MCPR16, the 
FCES (through the CMG), the FCPA (through the CMG)'7, the CMG'8 and the Parliament19. 
The CMC is not bound to follow the initiatives or recommendations received, but it may be 
bound to express its views on them, depending on the body that submits them. For instance, 
the CMC must "express its views" on proposals submitted by the CMG20 and on the 
Agreements submitted by Ministerial Meetings? ' In addition, when it receives a draft 
Decision from the Parliament, the CMC is under an obligation to report back to the Parliament 
every six months on how it is dealing with such proposal 22 
The CMG receives recommendations to adopt Resolutions from the various Sub-working 
groups, specialised meetings, groups and ad hoc groups operating under its umbrella. 23 It also 
receives recommendations from the FCES24, draft Decisions (to be forward to the CMC) from 
14 By way of comparison, under EU law, the regulatory competence of community institutions is rigorously shaped 
in accordance with the principles of attributed competence, subsidiarity and proportionality. See EC Treaty, Art. 5, 
and Protocol on the Application on the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 
O. J. (C 340)1. 
15 See above in Ch II, Section E the proposals suggested for minimising this risk. 
16 The MCPR may present initiatives to the CMC on matters relating to the integration process, MERCOSUR 
external negotiations or the establishment of the common market. See Dec 11/03 Art. 4(a). 
17 See FCPA Internal Regulation, Art. 3(f) and Dec 2/02 Art. 5. 
18 POP, Art. 14.11. 
19 PMP, Art. 4.13 and 4.14. 
20 POP, Art. 8. V. 
21 Ibid. Art. 8. VI and CMC Internal Regulation Art. 17, which stipulates that the Ministerial Meetings will express 
themselves through Agreements that must be approved by the CMC (emphasis added). 
22 PMP, Art. 4.13. 
23 CMG Internal Regulation, Art. 21. 
24 POP, Art. 29. 
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the FCPA25, and draft Resolutions on customs and trade matters from the MTC26. Like the 
CMC, the CMG is not bound to follow these recommendations, but it must express its views 
on any proposals or recommendations submitted to it by other MERCOSUR bodies, within 
their scope of competence? ' In its turn, the MTC receives opinions and recommendations 
from the various Technical Committees that operate under its umbrella, but it is not bound to 
follow them. 28 
Once adopted by the competent decision making body, Decisions, Resolutions and Directives 
are binding upon State Parties 
29 However, they are not directly applicable in national legal 
systems. To make their way into national legal systems, State Parties must adopt the necessary 
W measures to 
implement them. 30 
Finally, the MERCOSUR legal system does not provide any specific mechanism for the 
judicial review of the decisions adopted by the CMC, CMG or the MTC on grounds of 
infringement of their regulatory competence, omission of procedural requirements, misuse of 
power or infringement of any other treaty provision or secondary rule governing the exercise 
of the decision making power conferred to them. 31 
C. Analysis of Secondary Legislation on Services 
25 Dec 2/02, Art. 5. 
26 POP, Art. 19. VII. 
27 Ibid. Art. 14. VI. 
28 MTC Internal Regulation, Art. 17. 
29 POP, Arts. 9,15 and 20. 
30 See Ch II, Section D, Numeral 1. 
31 In the EC context, by contrast, the ECJ plays a key role in controlling the validity of Community measures. 
Community institutions, Member States, legal persons and individuals have standing before the ECJ to challenge 
the validity of Community Measures. See EC Treaty, Arts 230 - 233. 
206 
The MERCOSUR legal system already includes a voluminous body of secondary rules 32 The 
bulk of them consist of Resolutions aimed at the harmonisation of technical, sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations. There are, however, a considerable number of rules concerning 
specific service sectors or horizontal service matters. The legislation on services also includes 
a number of international agreements concluded within the framework of the Treaty of 
Asuncion which have been "approved" by Decisions of the CMC. But, as already mentioned, 
this is nothing more than an unnecessary formality, since it is not the CMC but the State 
Parties themselves who have negotiated and concluded these agreements. Strictly speaking, 
these agreements are not secondary law but primary law. 33 
1. Secondary Legislation on the Movement of Natural Persons Supplying 
Services 
Not long after launching the rounds of negotiation on specific commitments, State Parties 
became aware of the difficulties inherent in the removal of barriers to the free movement of 
natural persons supplying services. The asymmetries between domestic regulations and the 
political sensitivity associated with the right of entry and stay of foreigners soon proved to be 
obstacles too difficult to overcome through diplomatic negotiations. 34 The limited progress 
achieved by the negotiation rounds prompted a legislative action plan by which the CMG 
entrusted the Group on Services with the task of developing the terms of reference for 
secondary rules aimed at facilitating the movement of natural persons supplying services. " In 
compliance with the CMG mandate, the Group on Services prepared three draft rules on the 
movement of natural persons supplying services: the Agreement for the Creation of a 
32 By the end of 2007 MERCOSUR decision making bodies had adopted 500 Decisions, 1,257 Resolutions and 
190 MTC Directives. However, the following must be borne in mind: a) these figures Include many "rules" that are 
merely administrative decisions with no regulatory value whatsoever (e. g. designation of arbitrators, approval of 
the MERCOSUR Secretariats budget, etc. )"; b) they do not take into account the fact that many rules have been 
repealed by subsequent ones and c) they do not take into account whether the rules have been incorporated by 
State Parties into their national legal systems. As mentioned, there is a significant gap between adopted rules and 
those which are actually in force. See above Introduction footnote n7. 
33 For a critique on the use of primary law for regulating on specific trade disciplines and other non-constitutional 
aspects of the integration process see above Ch II, Section D, Numeral I. 
34 Even after six rounds of negotiations, State Parties' specific commitments on the presence of natural persons 
supplying services are currently restricted to a limited number of categories of natural persons and subject to strict 
limitations on the maximum period of time the foreign service provider is allowed to stay in the host State. 
35 Res 36/00 Art. 4 instructs the GS to draft the terms of reference for the negotiation of secondary legislation on 
the free circulation of natural persons supplying services. 
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MERCOSUR Visa, the Mechanism for the Temporary Provision of Professional Services and 
the Agreement for the Simplification of Business Activities, which are considered below. 36 
1.1 Agreement for the Creation of a MERCOSUR Visa 
The Agreement for the Creation of a MERCOSUR Visa37 seeks to harmonise rules concerning 
the issuing of visas for certain categories of natural persons supplying services. 38 Though 
limited, the categories of natural persons that can benefit from this agreement is wider than 
those included in State Parties' schedules of specific commitments. 
The length of stay granted under this agreement is subject to a maximum period of two years, 
which, generally speaking, is more beneficial than that stipulated by State Parties' schedules 
of specific commitments 39 According to the agreement, the issuing of the Visa will not be 
subject, to economic needs tests, proportionality requirements in terms of nationality or 
remuneration or any type of previous authorisation. 4° In addition, the Agreement stipulates a 
36 For some doctrinal studies on the movement of natural persons in MERCOSUR see, e. g., CARLA FISCHER DE 
PAULA CONCEIcAO, 'A livre circularäo de pessoas no MERCOSUL', (2006) 2 Revista de Derecho Intemacional y 
del MERCOSUR 48; JA LINARES FIGUEROA, 'Condiciones Para la Circuiaciön de Personas an el MERCOSUR y 
Chile', (2002) 6 Revista de Derecho Intemacional y del MERCOSUR 235; GUALTIERO MARTIN MARCHESINI, 'Libre 
circulacibn de la mano de obra en el Mensur, (1999) 3 Revista de Derecho del MERCOSUR 20; CARLOS 
ECHEGARAY DE MAUSSION, 'Libre Circulaci6n de Trabajadores y Profesionales', in Miguel Angel Ciuro Caldani (ad) 
Del MERCOSUR: Aduana. Jurisdk; cion. Informßtica. Relaciones lntercomunitarias (Ciudad Argentina, Buenos 
Aires 1996) and HECTOR BABACE, 'La libre circulacibn de los trabajadores an el MERCOSUR', in Estudios 
multidisciplinarios sobre el MERCOSUR / Universidad de la Republica (Uruguay). Facultad de Derecho 
(Fundacibn de Cultura Universitaria, Montevideo 1995). 
37 See Dec 16/03,15/12/03 "approving' the Agreement for the Creation of a MERCOSUR Visa. This is not a Dec of 
the CMC. it is an international agreement concluded within the framework of the Treaty of Asuncion. According to 
Art. 10, the Agreement will enter into force 30 days after the date of deposit of the fourth instrument of ratification 
with the Government of the Republic of Paraguay. So far, it has been approved by Paraguay (see Ley N° 2556, 
31/03/2005) and Uruguay (See Ley No 18110 de 16 de abrii de 2007), whereas It is still under consideration by the 
Argentinian and Brazilian parliaments. It must be highlighted that there was a previous attempt to create a 
MERCOSUR Visa in 2000 but in never entered into force (See Dec 48/00 "approving' Agreement for the Waiver of 
Visas between MERCOSUR State Parties). 
38 The Agreement is aimed at Executives, Managers, Directors, Legal Representatives, Scientists, Researchers, 
Professors, Artists, Sports Men, Journalists, Specialists and Professionals, who are nationals from a State Party, 
wishing to supply services for remuneration on a temporary basis on the territory of another State Party. 
39 Agreement for the Creation of a MERCOSUR Visa, Art. 2.1. 
40 Ibid. Art. 2.3. 
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harmonised list of requirements for the issuing of the visa41, but it does not lay down a 
common procedure nor does it limit the amount that can be charged for issuing a visa. It 
merely compels State Parties to implement the quickest and cheapest procedure possible. 2 
1.2 Mechanism for the Temporary Provision of Professional Services 
The market for professional services is partitioned by domestic regulations including 
nationality or residency requirements, compulsory professional membership requirements 
and, for some professions, even quantitative restrictions. 3 Foreign professionals wishing to 
provide services in the territory of other State Parties must either apply for the recognition of 
their qualifications (tying their destiny to the unilateral and undisputable will of the host 
state's authorities) or face the cost of re-training locally. On top of that, there are significant 
asymmetries on the degree of development and regulatory strategies for governing the 
professions among State Parties. Not surprisingly, the negotiation rounds yielded no 
significant results on the liberalisation of professional services beyond the consolidation of the 
status quo of domestic regulations. It became apparent that if any progress was to be achieved 
in this area, it should be through positive integration. 
The Protocol of Montevideo compels State Parties to encourage the competent authorities and 
professional associations in their respective territories to work together with a view to 
developing mutually acceptable standards and criteria for the practice of relevant services and 
professions and to make recommendations on the mutual recognition of licences, registers and 
certificates to the CMG. 44 In addition, some professional bodies have been lobbying for the 
development of a regulatory framework ensuring effective market access for foreign 
professionals. 45 These two factors have particularly influenced the development of secondary 
legislation on professional services. 
41 Ibid. Art. 3. 
42 Ibid. Art. 4. 
43 For barriers to trade in Professional Services in MERCOSUR see above Ch IV, Section C and also see, 
generally, GEZA FEKETEKUrv, Trade in Professional Services. An Overview', in JH Jackson, et al. (eds) Legal 
Problems of International Economic Relations. Cases, Materials and Text on the National Regulation of 
Transnational Economic Relations (West Pub. Co., St. Paul Minn 1995). 
44 PM, Art. XI. 2. 
45 See the Commission for the integration of the Agronomy, Architecture, Engineering, Geology and Surveyance 
Professions in MERCOSUR. It consists of representatives from State Parties' professional bodies responsible for 
controlling and supervising the supply of this type of Professional Services. It is an entirely private, initiative, which 
has been lobbying MERCOSUR decision making bodies since 1991 for the harmonisation of national legislations 
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In 2003, as a result of intense work carried out by the Group on Services with a significant 
input from professional bodies, the CMC adopted a Mechanism for the Temporary Provision 
of Professional Services'6 This Mechanism consists of three separate instruments: a) 
Guidelines for the adoption of framework agreements on the mutual recognition of 
professional bodies and for the development of common disciplines on the issuing of 
temporary licenses for the supply of professional services (Annex I); b) Functions and Powers 
of Information and Management Focal Centres (Annex II); c) Functioning of the System 
(Annex III). None of these instruments includes rules related to specific professions. Together 
they lay down a regulatory framework for the future development of licensing systems and 
supervision mechanisms for the temporary provision of professional services within 
MERCOSUR. 
The mechanics of the system can be summarised as follows. First, it is necessary to set up a 
Working Group ("WG") consisting of representatives from professional bodies or national 
authorities responsible for regulating the profession in question. The WG must request the 
Group on Services to be recognised as such. Once recognised, the WG should draft a mutual 
recognition agreement by which the host professional body is responsible for monitoring the 
foreign professional while he or she provides temporary services in its territory. The WG must 
also draft common disciplines for the issuing of temporary licenses for the supply of 
professional services. Both the mutual recognition agreement and the disciplines must be 
drafted in accordance with the guidelines laid down by Annexes I of the "mechanism". Once 
drafted, the agreement and the disciplines must be submitted to the Group on Services which, 
after revision, will submit it to the CMG for approval. Once both instruments are approved by 
the CMG, a professional from State Party A should be able to provide services on a temporary 
basis on State Party B. It is for the professional bodies to issue the licenses and to monitor the 
professionals' compliance with the professions' standards and regulations while providing 
services abroad. 
on the professions with a view to ensure the free movement of professionals within MERCOSUR and, at the same 
time, guarantee high standards on the provision of Professional Services. Further information about this body is 
available at htta: //www. cPi. orQ. ay/v2/ciam. htmi (in spanish), last visited 24/08/07. 
46 Dec 25/03,15/12/03. So far, only Uruguay has incorporated this Decision into its domestic legal system (See 
Ley 18.105 de 5 de enero de 2007). Delegates to the Group on Services from Argentina and Brazil have stated 
that Dec 25/03 is being considered by their parliaments. The Paraguayan delegation informed that the 
incorporation of such norm does not require parliamentary approval. See minutes GS meeting 04/06. 
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Compared to most MERCOSUR secondary rules, the characteristics of the Mechanism for the 
Temporary Provision of Professional Services are quite original in the sense that it involves 
the direct participation of professional bodies on the development and implementation of the 
regulatory standards applicable to the temporary provision of professional services. This 
should result in more accurate rules capable of addressing the particular demands of each 
profession for ensuring high standards of protection without creating unnecessary barriers to 
trade in services. It should also elicit the market participants' sense of ownership of the 
regulatory framework that applies to them, enhancing its legitimacy and thus, fostering better 
compliance. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Mechanism for the Temporary Provision of Professional 
Services has not yet entered into force, the Group on Services has already received a number 
of requests for the creation of Working Groups from various professions, which indicates the 
degree of interest shown by some of the professions in the liberalisation of professional 
services. 7 
1.3 Agreement for the Simplification of Business Activities 
The purpose of the Agreement for the Simplification of Business Activities48 is to remove 
obstacles to the establishment of businessmen from one State Party on the territory of another 
State Party. Its main provision starts with a grandiloquent sentence "Businessmen who are 
nationals from the State Parties shall be entitled to establish themselves in the territory of any 
other State Party for the purpose of carrying out their activities... ", whose legal impact is 
subsequently curtailed by the following caveat "... without any other restrictions than those 
stemming from the host State Party's legislation applicable to the activity in question. "49 
47 So far, the following groups have requested their official recognition by the CMG: Commission for the integration 
of the Agronomy, Architecture, Engineering, Geology and Surveyance Professions in MERCOSUR; MERCOSUR 
Committee on NUTRICIONISTAS; MERCOSUR Council on Nurses; MERCOSUR Confederation of Estate 
Agencies; MERCOSUR Conference on the Regulation of Chemistry Professions and Integration Group on 
Accounting, Economy and Administration (in Spanish Grupo de Integraci6n del MERCOSUR -Contabilidad, 
Economia y Administraci6n- GIMCEA. ) 
48 See Dec 32/04 "approving" the Agreement for the Simplification of Business Activities. Again, this is not a 
Decision of the CMC. It is an international agreement concluded within the framework of the Treaty of Asuncion. It 
came into force on 27 December 2007 being ratified by Argentina (Ley 26105,6/09/06), Brazil (Decreto Legislafivo 
298/07,29/10/07) and Uruguay (Ley 18069,11/12/06). 
49 Agreement for the Simplification of Business Activities, Art. 1 (Author's translation). 
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Thus, like many other secondary rules, it fails to provide for any meaningful degree of 
harmonisation or at least co-ordination between disparate domestic regulations. 
State Parties commit themselves to speed up the procedures for the issuing of residency 
permits, working documentation and identity cards for foreign businessmen and to grant 
foreign businessmen national treatment in relation the procedures for the setting up of 
companies 50 They also commit to co-operate towards the harmonization of their domestic 
legislation with a view to enable businessmen from one State Party to carry out their activities 
in the territory of another State Party. 5' In addition, the agreement provides for a partial 
harmonization of non personal requirements that immigration authorities can (and cannot) 
request for the application of business visas or residency permits for the purpose of carrying 
out business in the host State 52 But it clearly states that it is for each State Parties' legislation 
to determine the personal documentation necessary for the issuing of visas. " 
Another characteristic of the Agreement is the fact that it was modelled in accordance to a 
pre-existing -almost identical- agreement between Argentina and Brazil for the facilitation of 
business activities54, clearly suggesting that the development of MERCOSUR legislation 
follows the results of bilateral negotiations previously conducted by the two larger partners 
outside MERCOSUR. 55 
50 Ibid. Art. 3. 
51 Ibid. Art. 4. 
52 For instance, for issuing an investor visa, the immigration authorities cannot require the applicant to certify a 
deposit of more than USD 30.000 in the host State. 
5Ibid. Art. 4, last paragraph. 
54 See Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federal Republic of Brazil for the facilitation of 
business Activities done on 15 February 1996 and coming into force on 10 November 1998, available at 
htto: //www2. mre. qov. br/dailbiaraent. htm (in Portuguese). 
55 It is interesting to note the difficulties already faced by Argentina and Brazil in implementing the bilateral 
Agreement. As it stems from Annex IV to minutes GS Meeting 02/04, the Argentinian delegation claimed that 
different Brazilian consulates in Argentina and elsewhere interpreted the Agreement in different ways. They also 
claimed that the consulates gave contradicting information on the procedures and on the requirements for the 
application of business visas and for the setting up of companies in Brazil by foreigners and that they even 
requested requirements expressly forbidden by the bilateral agreement. In addition, the Argentinian delegation 
complained that the procedure for requesting the business' and investor's visas were cumbersome, lengthy and 
costly. These difficulties illustrate how difficult it is to set up a workable regulatory framework that effectively 
facilitates market access and fair conditions of competition between foreign and domestic service providers. 
Clearly, the passing of legislation aimed at harmonizing disparate domestic regulations is not enough. No matter 
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1.4 Additional Rules on the Movement of Natural and Legal Persons 
The MERCOSUR legal system includes some other rules aimed at facilitating the movement 
of natural persons in general, not just for the purpose of supplying services. Most of these 
rules have been developed by the Meeting of Home Affairs Ministries and provide for a 
minimum degree of harmonisation of State Parties' immigration rules concerning residency 
requirements and the issuing of visas for study and tourism purposes. 56 The scope of the 
preferences conferred by these rules to MERCOSUR nationals as compared with the treatment 
accorded by State Parties to third country nationals is minimal. It is nevertheless worth 
mentioning these rules, not necessarily because of their practical relevance but perhaps as 
evidence of the lack of co-ordination between two policy-making bodies (Group on Services 
and Meeting of Home Affairs Ministries), with overlapping competences, which work 
independently from each other. 
The Group on Services is currently working on the preparation of proposals for the 
harmonisation of domestic services' regulatory frameworks in the following areas57: a) 
proposal for the harmonisation of rules and procedures concerning the setting up and 
registration of companies; b) proposal for an agreement on the mutual recognition of 
construction companies' records for the purpose of participating inn tenders at a MERCOSUR 
level58, and c) proposal for a mutual recognition agreement for the temporary provision of 
Real Estate Services 59 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that in parallel to the Group on Services' activity, 
Brazil and Argentina have recently set up their own bilateral law-making forum extra 
MERCOSUR (a "high level group" consisting of representatives from the Ministries of 
how laudable their purposes can be in terms of facilitating market integration, the impact of the legislation can be 
easily undermined by its poor implementation. 
56 See, amongst others, Agreement about Free Visas for Students and Teachers from MERCOSUR State Parties 
approved by Dec 21/06; Agreement on a Ninety days length of Stay for Tourists Nationals from MERCOSUR State 
Parties and Associate State Parties approved by Dec 10/06; Agreement on Residency Requirements for Nationals 
from MERCOSUR State Parties, approved by Dec 28/02. 
57. See Annex X to minutes GMC LVIII ordinary meeting, 9/06/05. 
58 This initiative is negotiated with an active participation of the Commission for the integration of the Agronomy, 
Architecture, Engineering, Geology and Surveyance Professions in MERCOSUR. 
59 This initiative is negotiated under the Dec 25/03' umbrella with an active participation of the MERCOSUR 
Confederation of Real Estate Agencies. 
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Foreign Affairs, Justice, Home Affairs, Finance, Education, Labour and Health) aimed at 
analysing and developing an action plan for the establishment of the free movement of 
persons between Argentina and Brazil within a ten years term. 60 This provides further 
evidence that the largest partners pursue their own agenda outside MERCOSUR and agree on 
certain issues, which later on may or may not be incorporated in the MERCOSUR decision 
i making bodies' agenda. 
2. Secondary Legislation on Financial Services 
Policy making on financial integration corresponds to SWG4 on Financial Issues, an auxiliary 
body to the CMG, whose ultimate goal is the establishment of a common market on banking, 
insurance and capital markets. 2 SWG4 consists of representatives from State Parties' central 
banks and financial regulators. Its structure consists on a national coordination and four 
commissions: Capital Markets' Commission, Commission on the Financial System, Insurance 
Commission and Commission on the Prevention of Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism63 Ma 
2.1 Secondary Legislation on Investment Services 
60 See Protocol for the establishment of a High Level Group for the implementation of the free movement of 
persons between Argentina and Brazil, done in Puerto Iguazü, Argentina on 30/11/2005, available at 
http: //www2. mre. gov. br/dai/b amt 401 5638. htm (in Portugese). This agreement has been concluded as part of 
the commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Iguazü Declaration. 
61 See above Ch I, Section B, Numeral 3. 
62 SWG4 on Financial Issues was created by Res 20/95. Previous to that, financial issues were dealt by SWG 4 on 
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Related to Trade, established by the Treaty of Asuncion, Annex V. 
63 The purpose of the Commission on the Prevention of Money Laundering is to develop appropriate legal 
instruments for preventing the hiding of assets obtained from illegal activities and combating the financing of 
terrorism. Though praiseworthy, these objectives have nothing to do with market integration and it is difficult to find 
on the Treaty of Asuncion or the Protocol of Ouro Preto a legal basis to legislate on this area. Nonetheless, thanks 
to the Commissions' work, MERCOSUR decision making bodies have been actively legislating in this area. So far 
they have created the "Task Force' group for the exchange of experiences and methodologies on the prevention 
and combat of money laundering within MERCOSUR (Res 82/99); adopted a co-operation agreement between 
central banks (Dec 40/00), and approved a set of minimum regulatory guidelines to be implemented by State 
Parties' Central Banks for the same purpose (Res 53/00). 
64 Minutes of the meetings of the SWG4 and of its various Commissions as well as their annual working plans are 
available at www. bcb. oov. br/? MERCOSUL (in Portuguese or Spanish). 
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Responsibility for the development of policies for the integration of capital markets lays on 
the Capital Markets' Commission, which consists on representatives from each State Party's 
securities regulatory agencies. Its long-term goal is to lay down the regulatory conditions 
necessary for the establishment of a regional capital markets. This goal has been on 
MERCOSUR's agenda since the very beginning of the integration process65, but other 
priorities and the intrinsic difficulty inherent in the harmonization of securities regulations 
have prevented policy makers from making any substantive progress on this issue. 
Decision 8/93, not yet in force, provides for a minimum degree of harmonisation of securities 
regulations, covering the following topics: issuing of securities, mutual investment funds, 
stock exchanges and brokers, payment, execution and custody systems. In relation to the 
public offering of securities, the scope of application of the norm is limited to international 
operations executed within MERCOSUR with securities issued by companies incorporated in 
any of the State Parties, although it also recommends State Parties to apply its provisions to 
domestic securities operations. According to this Decision, a company registered in a State 
Party that wishes to sell its securities in any other State Party must first register as an issuer 
with the relevant authority of the host State Party. 67 In addition, it must register the particular 
security it wishes to market prior to sale 68 The Decision lists the requirements that the issuer 
must satisfy for the host regulatory agency to authorise its registration and approve the offer. 
The list of minimum requirements is not exhaustive, leaving the door open for the host 
regulatory agency to request additional requirements if it so wishes. 9 The Decision also 
stipulates that domestic legislation must provide for minimum standards of protection of 
shareholders, including right of information, right of preference and right to withdraw. 70 
Finally, the Decision lays down minimum corporate governance and disclosure of information 
requirements for the operation of mutual investment funds at a regional level and encourages 
State Parties to negotiate the harmonisation of regulations on the supervision of these 
entities. " With respect to brokers wishing to operate internationally within MERCOSUR, the 
65 Res 8/91 conveying representatives from State Parties' for the negotiation of consultation and technical 
assistance mechanisms on securities regulations with a long-term objective to facilitate the establishment of a 
regional capital market. 
66 Dec 8/93 on Minimum Regulations on Capital Markets, complemented by Dec 13/94 on the harmonisation of 
disclosure of information requirements for capital markets. 
67 Ibid. Annex, Art. 1.1. 
68 Ibid. Annex, Art. 1.2. 
69 Ibid. Annex, Arts. 1.1.2 and 1.2.3. 
70 Ibid. Art. 1.4. 
71 Ibid. Art. 2. 
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Decision stipulates that they must act under the direct or indirect supervision of the 
appropriate governmental regulator in each State. 72 
In addition to the adoption of Decision 8/93, the Capital Markets Commission has been 
negotiating the regulatory conditions necessary for the establishment of a common capital 
markets. Various initiatives have been considered (e. g. a framework agreement for clearing 
and settlement of investment transactions, adoption of minimum requirements for the issuing 
of prospectuses based on IOSCO principles, establishment of a common market for public 
securities, etc. ), but so far none of them has been crystallised on new secondary rules. 73 At 
least the Capital Markets Commission provided a forum for hands-on regulators from each 
State party to discuss with their counterparts best regulatory practices and exchange 
information about changes to their domestic regulations on a regular basis. ''' 
Parallel to the Capital Markets Commission, there is a separate SWG on Investments. 75 This 
body is responsible, inter alia, for analysing the difficulties faced by State Parties for the 
ratification of the Protocol of Colonia for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of 
Investments in MERCOSUR76 and the Protocol of Buenos Aires for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments Originating from Third Parties" and to analyse the influence of 
portfolio investment and foreign direct investment on the restructuring of firms in the regional 
market and to make recommendations to this effect. Despite the obvious overlap between the 
sphere of competence of the Capital Markets Commission and the SWG on Investments, they 
work independently from each other and there are no formal mechanisms in place to facilitate 
the co-ordination of their work. 
72 Ibid. Art. 3.2. 
73 The European experience illustrates the scale of complexity and sophistication of the regulatory arrangements 
necessary for the functioning of a truly integrated capital markets, in particular, the multilevel governance system 
established by the Lamfalussy Report. See Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of 
European Securities Markets, Brussels, 15 February 2001. 
74 See the Commission's working programme for 2007 available at www. bcb_. oov. br/? MERCOSUL. Basically, it is 
focused on the exchange of statistical information on the operation of capital markets, information on new 
regulations and examination of regulatory asymmetries. The agenda includes only one legislative initiative under 
negotiation, i. e. the adoption of minimum requirements for the issuing of prospectuses based on IOSCO principles. 
75 See SWG12 created by Res 13/00, amended by Dec 59/00. 
76 See above Ch II, footnote n210. 
77 Ibid. 
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2.2 Secondary Legislation on Banking Services 
The development of policies for the integration of banking services falls within the 
Commission on the Financial System's remit. 78 Its overall purpose is to review State Parties' 
regulations on the banking industry, identify regulatory asymmetries and make 
recommendations for their harmonisation, with a view to facilitate market access and ensure 
fair conditions for competition between foreign and domestic banks. The task involves 
harmonising not only a wide range of disparate domestic banking regulations but also 
disparate supervisory practices and standards responsible for their supervision and 
enforcement. 
The Commission's capacity to put forward proposals to harmonise banking rules has been 
constrained by the political sensitivity and complexity underlying this type of rules. In 
addition, there are deep asymmetries between State Parties' regulations relating to banking 
secrecy and other legal provisions protecting the confidentiality of information about financial 
undertakings' operations 79 Moreover, some State Parties' banking legislation, in particular the 
Brazilian and Uruguayan legislation, include overt market access restrictions against the 
commercial presence of foreign service providers, which are still in place notwithstanding six 
rounds of negotiations 8° 
The scale of the obstacles against the harmonisation of banking rules has led the Commission 
to play down its objectives. Instead of aiming at the establishment of a fully fledged 
harmonised banking system, the Commission put forward proposals merely aimed at 
compelling State Parties to align domestic legislation to international principles and standards 
widely accepted by the international financial community. 
Decision 10/93 compels State Parties to align their banking legislation to the International 
Standards on Capital Adequacy developed by the Basle Committee. 81 At the time the Decision 
78 Includes a sub-commission on Accounting Statements working towards the harmonisation of financial 
undertakings' accounting statements. 
79 See EVA Holz, 'Legislative Asymmetry and the Integration of Banking in MERCOSUR: A Preliminary Approach', 
in Ernesto Aguirre & Joseph Jude Norton (eds) Reform of Latin American Banking System (Kluwer Law 
International, London 2000). 
80 See above Ch IV, Section C, Numeral 3. See also OTAVIANO CANUTO & GILBERTO TADEU LIMA, 'Regulagbo 
bancbria no Mercosul', in Renato Baumann (ed) Merosur avanros e desaflos da integracco (IPEA/CEPAL, 
Brasilia 2001). 
81 Dec 10/93 has been incorporated by all State Parties. 
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was adopted, there were significant disparities between State Parties' prudential regulations on 
capital adequacy. By 1999 all State Parties managed to incorporate these standards into their 
banking legislation, reducing the degree of regulatory disparities between domestic banking 
rules. Similarly, to address asymmetries regarding credit risk ceilings, limits on credit 
concentration and classification of debtors and provisions for bad debts, Resolution 1/96 
compels State Parties to align their banking legislation to the basic principles and rules 
developed by the international financial community. 82 
In terms of supervisory practices, Decision 12/94 compels State Parties to ensure that their 
supervisory authorities comply with the principles on consolidated supervision recommended 
by the Basle Committee, which basically encourage co-operation and exchange of information 
between home and host supervisors. 83 Finally, Resolution 20/01, not yet in force, compels 
State Parties to align their banking legislation to the Rules on Transparency of Information of 
Financial Services recommended by the Basle Committee to tackle, at least partially, the 
obstacles against more substantive co-operation between supervisory authorities stemming 
from the asymmetries of domestic regulations on the protection of the confidentiality of 
84 financial information. 
Currently, the Commission does not have harmonisation plans in the agenda for any specific 
banking regulation. By contrast, it is focused on assessing the implementation by domestic 
supervisory authorities of the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision; examining 
and discussing the possible implementation of the new international standards on capital 
adequacy (Basel II); assessing State Parties' legislation on disclosure of information 
requirements relating to financial products; monitoring the evolution of State Parties' banking 
markets, updating State Parties about changes to their banking legislations, and exchanging 
experiences on the supervision of the banking industry including the realisation of joint 
training events. 5 
2.3 Secondary Legislation on Insurance Services 
Responsibility for the integration of insurance markets belongs to the Insurance 
Commission. 86 Two sub-commissions operate under its umbrella: the sub-commission on 
82 Res. 1/96 has been incorporated by all State Parties. 
83 Dec 12/94 has been incorporated by all State Parties. 
84 So far, no State Party has incorporated this Resolution into its domestic legal system. 
85 See the Commission on Financial Systems' working plan for 2007 available at www. bcb. aov. br/? MERCOSUL 
86 Created by Res 7/92. 
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solvency margin and the sub-commission on Reinsurance Services. Over the past years, the 
Insurance Commission's work has been focused on the harmonisation of domestic rules on the 
right of establishment of foreign insurance undertakings, the development of co-operation 
mechanisms between State Parties' insurance supervisory authorities and the establishment of 
a compulsory motor insurance and a multimodal transport operator's insurance. 
With respect to the harmonisation of domestic rules on the right of establishment of foreign 
insurance undertakings, the Insurance Commission drafted the Framework Agreement on 
Market Access Conditions for Insurance Undertakings with Emphasis on Branches, which has 
not yet entered into force. 
7 The Agreement's core provision on market access provides as 
follows: 
"State Parties shall not establish market access restrictions or restrictions that 
undermine competition between companies or branches authorised to operate in the 
same business sector, other than authorisation requirements to operate or to 
expand the company's business activities included in State Parties' domestic 
legislations". 88 (emphasis added). 
This is one of the few secondary rules on services that include an express prohibition on 
imposing market access restrictions against the establishment of foreign suppliers' branches, 
but its contribution to the liberalisation of insurance services, provided it comes into effect, 
will be limited by the nature of the caveat to such prohibition. Indeed, the market access 
prohibition is subject to the authorisation requirements to operate or to expand the company's 
business activities included in the host State legislation, which deprives the prohibition from 
any meaningful liberalisation effect. Insurance companies established in one State Party 
wishing to operate in the territory of another State Party, will still have to request 
authorisation from the host State authority, and, meet the requirements included in the host 
State legislation. 
The agreement goes on to lay down a list of common requirements that the host regulatory 
authority must request from the applicant to issue an authorisation to operate. The degree of 
harmonisation secured by the norm on this issue is limited. For some requirements, such as 
87 See Dec 9/99 'approving' the Framework Agreement on Market Access Conditions for Insurance Undertakings 
with Emphasis on Branches. This is an international agreement concluded within the framework of the Treaty of 
Asuncion. So far, no State Party has ratified it. 
88 Framework Agreement on Market Access Conditions for Insurance Undertakings with Emphasis on Branches, 
Art. 11.1 (Author's translation. ) 
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the technical and moral qualifications of the undertaking's managers and controlling 
shareholders, the norm expressly delegates their specification to the host State's legislation, 
achieving no harmonisation at all 
89 For other requirements, the agreement lays down a 
minimum threshold, achieving a partial degree of harmonisation. For instance, on solvency 
margin requirements, the agreement prescribes that insurance companies must certify the 
ownership of a minimum amount of capital to be authorised to operate and must keep it at all 
times during its operations in accordance with the form, limits and terms laid down by the 
host States' legislation. 90 At the same time, the agreement prescribes that for branches the 
minimum capital to operate must be USD 500,00091. This is complemented by a "ceiling 
provision" prohibiting State Parties from conditioning the authorisation to operate on 
additional economic or financial requirements other than those prescribed by the agreement. 92. 
In terms of supervision, the agreement compels the regulatory authority where the company's 
head office is based to keep the regulatory authority where the branch operates informed about 
any issues that may affect the head company's authorisation to operate 93 
In terms of co-operation for the supervision of insurance undertakings, the Insurance 
Commission drafted the Cooperation Agreement between Supervisory Authorities of 
Insurance Companies from MERCOSUR State Parties, approved by Decision 8/99. 
According to this agreement, State Parties' supervisory authorities undertake the commitment 
to supervise in their respective territories the organisation, management, internal control, 
risks, solvency margin, reinsurance and in general, all significant aspects relating to the 
solvency and stability of MERCOSUR's insurance business groups. The agreement expresses 
the supervisory authorities' commitment to co-operate with each other by exchanging the 
information necessary for the supervision of the insurance undertakings, subject to the 
standards of confidentiality that may apply in accordance to each State Party's legislation. The 
supervisory authorities express their commitment to exchange lists of companies authorised to 
operate in the domestic market at least once a year. They also commit to exchange 
information relating to the insurance market, insurance regulations and supervision policies 
89 Ibid. Arts. 111 6 e) and t). 
90 Ibid. Art. V. 1. 
91 Ibid. Art. V. 2. This amount is currently under review by the sub-commission on solvency margin. But what is not 
under review is the right of the host state regulator to require the foreign supplier to certify the holding of assets in 
the host State's territory to meet local solvency margin requirements. 
92 Ibid. Art. X. 
93 Ibid. Art. VII. 
94 See Dec 8/99 approving the signature of the Co-operation Agreement between Supervisory Authorities of 
Insurance Companies from MERCOSUR State Parties. 
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and to exchange experiences and techniques on the supervision of insurance undertakings on a 
regular basis. Overall, the agreement merely provides for a series of programmatic 
commitments without imposing rights or obligations on States, domestic regulatory agencies 
or individuals. At least, however, the co-operation between supervisors is a topic well 
established in the financial integration agenda and the Commission on Insurance provides a 
forum for supervisors to meet on a regular basis and to continue discussing ways for 
improving the quality of co-operation-95 
Finally, the Commission contributed to the adoption of Resolutions establishing compulsory 
motor vehicle insurance and multimodal transport operator's insurance 97 Resolution 120/94 
imposes an obligation on the owner or driver of a motor vehicle registered in one State Party 
to be covered against third party civil liability when entering into the territory of another State 
Party98 and lays down the general conditions for such type of insurance. 99 It specifies in great 
detail the risks that the insurance must cover, the terms of the insurance and the amount to be 
insured. 10° It also specifies the characteristics of the insurance policy certificate. 1°' Similarly, 
Resolution 62/97, not yet in force, prescribes the conditions that must be met by the 
multimodal transport operator's insurance against civil liability caused by damages to the 
freight. It specifies in great detail the risks covered, the terms of the insurance and the amount 
to be insured. 
These two Resolutions share some characteristics which clearly differentiate them from other 
secondary rules on services. First, the legislator goes far beyond the harmonisation or co- 
ordination of disparate domestic rules. It regulates directly on individuals' rights and 
obligations by compelling certain individuals to be covered against certain risks in a certain 
95 More recently, the Insurance Commission has prepared a draft Decision that compels State Parties to ensure 
that their supervisory authorities comply with the Insurance Core Principles on Insurance Supervision prescribed 
by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, which has not yet been adopted by the CMC. See 
Insurance Core Principles and Methodology, IAIS, available at www. iasweb. org. 
96 See Res 120/94, partially modified by Res 63/99, on the owner's or driver's insurance against civil liability in 
respect of damages caused during an international trip by a vehicle registered in one State Party to persons or 
objects not carried by the vehicle. It has been incorporated by all State Parties. 
97 See Res 62/97,13/12/97 on the conditions of the multimodal transport operators' insurance against civil liability 
caused by damages to the freight. This Resolution has not yet entered into force. So far, it has only been 
incorporated by Argentina and Brazil. 
98 Res 120/94, Art. 1. 
99 Ibid. Annex I. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. Annex II. 
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way and, by implication, enhancing third parties protection against road accidents. Secondly, 
these Resolutions create clear, specific and unconditional obligations. However, they cannot 
apply to private persons until State Parties adopt the necessary measures for their 
incorporation into their national legal systems. 
The Insurance Commission's current working programme102 includes on the agenda the 
renegotiation of the solvency margin prescribed by art 5 of the Agreement on Market Access 
Conditions for Insurance Undertakings with Emphasis on Branches; the revision of Res 
120/94 on compulsory motor insurance; the implementation by domestic supervisory 
authorities of the Insurance Core Principles on Insurance Supervision; monitoring the 
evolution of State Parties' insurance regulations and accounting principles and monitoring the 
performance of insurance markets. Barriers to the cross-border provision of insurance 
services, which have remained untouched despite six negotiation rounds, are not on the 
Commission's agenda. 
3. Secondary Legislation on Communication Services 
The development of secondary rules on communication services falls within the sphere of 
competence of Sub-working I on Communications ("SWG1"), an auxiliary body to the CMG 
created in 1995, with policy-making competence in postal services and telecommunication 
services. '03 SWG1 consists of representatives from State Parties' postal and telecom 
regulatory agencies and includes four commissions: Commission on postal Issues, 
Commission on Public Telecommunication Services, Broadcasting Commission and 
Commission on Radio Communications. '" 
3.1 Secondary Legislation on Postal Services 
102 Available at www. bcb. oov. bri? MERCOSUL, last visited 07/0707. 
103 SWG1 on Communications was created by Res 20/95. Previous to that, there was a Commission on 
Telecommunications operating under the umbrella of SWG3 on Technical Regulations, established by the Treaty 
of Asuncion, Annex V. This Commission started working on the harmonization of technical regulations concerning 
telecommunications in 1992. 
104 Minutes of the meetings of SWG1 are available at 
www. anatel. gov. br/COMITES_COMISSOESICBC/MERCOSUL/DEFAULT. ASP (in Portuguese or Spanish). 
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Postal markets are highly regulated in all State Parties, with competition restricted or even 
prohibited by legal or constitutional provisions. 105 The negotiation rounds yielded no 
significant progress on the liberalisation of this sector. 106 Against this regulatory background, 
there is not much that should be expected from a commission consisting of one or two 
government officials from each State Party that meets twice a year. Like in many other service 
sectors, the liberalisation of Postal Services will not be possible unless domestic parliaments 
are directly involved in the liberalisation process. 
Notwithstanding its limited manoeuvring room, the Commission on Postal Issues pursues an 
ambitious agenda. It aims to harmonise disparate domestic postal regulations, improve the 
postal services' quality standards, facilitate the interconnection between domestic postal 
networks and foster the growth of the industry by sharing know-how and experiences on the 
technology applicable to Postal Services. 107 So far, the Commission on Postal Issues has 
managed to secure the approval of four secondary rules (two of them not yet in force) on three 
peripheral aspects to the operation of this service sector: a) two Resolutions harmonising the 
procedures for postal exchanges between cities situated on border areas with a view to speed 
up the service and reduce its cost108; b) a Resolution harmonising quality standards for the 
delivery of letters of up to twenty grams within specified areast09, and c) a Resolution 
harmonising the transport conditions and custom control procedures of post parcels 
transported by coach. "° Clearly, the liberalisation impact of these measures is minimal, but at 
least the mere existence of the Commission on Postal Services provides a forum where 
specialised regulators can meet and share information and experiences and gradually advance 
the harmonisation of measures affecting the operation of this sector, even when it is about 
measures of minimal impact for the operation the sector. 
3.2 Secondary Legislation on Telecommunications 
In spite of the wave of privatisations that took place during the nineties and early 2000, the 
telecoms market remains partitioned, amongst other factors, by a duplication of licensing 
106 See SUeGRUPO DE TRnsAjO No 1, Estudio sobre el Establecimiento de un Mercado Ünico de Servicios Postales 
en is Region del MERCOSUR (MERCOSUR, Montevideo 2002), available at 
www. cnc. gov. arlcit/pdf/libroverde_esp. pdf. , last visited 09/01/08. 
106 See above Ch IV, Section C, Numeral 3. 
107 See Res 32/04, negotiation mandate for SWG 1. 
108 See Resolutions 29/98 and 21/99,10/06/99, both incorporated by all State Parties. 
109 See Res 49/0710/12107, not yet incorporated by State Parties. 
110 See Res 28/05 so far, only incorporated by the Republic of Paraguay. 
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requirements, the existence of administrative agencies' entitled to restrict the number of 
telecom suppliers, the lack of interconnection and interoperability of national networks and 
pervasive access restrictions to such networks. Not surprisingly, State Parties' schedules of 
specific commitments failed to include any kind of preferential treatment for MERCOSUR 
service providers. "' In Brazil, the largest market of the bloc, the Executive Power may 
establish limits on the participation of foreign capital on telecom operators. ' 12 So far, the 
Commissions responsible for telecom policy-making have not managed to put forward 
significant regulatory proposals capable of overcoming these hurdles and paving the way for 
the integration of telecom markets. 
The Commission on Public Telecommunication Services is closer to an experience-sharing 
and monitoring forum than to an active policy-making body capable of developing a common 
telecommunications policy and the integration of domestic telecommunications markets. "3 Its 
main tasks include: a) compilation, monitoring and exchange of information relating to 
taxation, fares and mechanisms for determining the price of public telecom services; b) 
compilation of information about the performance of telecom markets; c)"permanent exchange 
of information about State Parties' legislation on the telecom sector, with a view to its future 
harmonisation; d) development of a mutual recognition agreement on State Parties' 
conformity assessment standards for the quality assessment of telecommunications' 
equipment and e) harmonisation of principles concerning the interconnection of public 
networks. 114 
Although this Commission has managed to secure the approval of a reduced number of 
secondary rules, none of them deal with the core regulatory barriers that currently block the 
liberalisation of Public Telecommunication Services in MERCOSUR. 115 Clearly, there is still 
a great deal of work to be done to ensure the effective liberalisation of this sector. 
M See above Ch IV, Section C, Numeral 3. 
112 Ibid. 
113 See Res 32/04, negotiation mandate for SWG 1. 
114 Ibid. 
15 See Res 66/97, which lays down basic principles on the interconnection of telephone networks for the provision 
of Public Voice Telephone services in border areas; Res 43/93 modified by Res 25/94, which prescribes some 
specifications on digital interfaces for the transmission of digital information with a view to facilitate interconnection 
between digital networks, Res 06/06, which lays down some general provisions on the use of basic telephone 
services and data on integrated control areas; and Res 44/99, which harmonises the telephone numbers for 
emergency services in the MERCOSUR area. 
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The Broadcasting Commission is focused on the co-ordination of the allocation of frequency 
bands to broadcasters with a view to ensure an optimal use of the radio frequency spectrum 
and to avoid interferences, particularly on border areas. The Commission has contributed to 
the adoption of some co-ordination agreements, which have been successfully incorporated 
into State Parties' legal Systems. 116 The Commission plays an active role in monitoring State 
Parties' implementation of these agreements. It also serves as a forum for the exchange of 
information about State Parties' administration of frequency bands for various broadcasting 
systems: audio (AM/FM), TV (VHF/UHF), digital TV systems, digital audio broadcasting and 
satellite broadcasting. 
Similarly, the Commission on Radio Communications is concerned with the harmonisation of 
technical and administrative procedures relating to the assignment of frequencies and usage of 
frequency bands by telecom operators other than broadcasters (mobile phone service 
providers, paging and trunking service providers, maritime mobile services, terrestrial 
stations, etc. ). The goal of the Commission is also to ensure an optimal use of the radio 
frequency spectrum and to avoid interferences, particularly in border areas. The Commission 
managed to secure the adoption of quite a few Resolutions aimed at harmonising the technical 
features of radio stations, the frequency on which they are allowed to operate, the 
administrative procedures for the allocation of frequencies and so forth. "' The majority of 
these Resolutions have been successfully incorporated into State Parties' legal systems. 
SWG1 is also responsible for developing and enhancing the telecommunications' 
infrastructure at a regional level and fostering State Parties' co-operation on technological 
116 See Res 17/94 harmonising the use of frequency bands by various telecommunications services; Res 6/95 co- 
ordinating the allocation and use of channels by broadcasting TV stations operating on VHF on border areas and 
Res 15/00, which lays down a procedure for the consideration of broadcasters' applications operating In border 
areas which require the co-ordination between State Parties' for the allocation of frequencies. 
117 See, inter elia, Res 90/94, co-ordinating satellite earth stations; Res 146/96, Mutual Recognition Agreement of 
licenses for mobile radio stations used by transport undertakings; Res 60/01, Handbook harmonising the technical 
and administrative procedures for the co-ordination of frequencies of terrestrial stations; Res 19/01, Handbook 
harmonising the procedures for the co-ordination of frequencies used by mobile phone services; Res 68/97 and 
69/97 adopting a common frequency band for the provision of paging services in MERCOSUR; Res 68/97 and 
69/97, adopting a common frequency band for the operation of trunking systems; Res 71197, adopting a 
Multichannel, Multipoint Distribution System for MERCOSUR; Res 30/98, Provisions co-ordinating the operation of 
radio channels assigned for maritime mobile services on VHF: Res 23/99, Handbook harmonising the procedures 
for the co-ordination of frequencies used by paging systems; Res 06/02, Allocation of frequencies for mobile radio 
stations. 
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research and development. "8 Though not of a legislative nature, these tasks are nevertheless 
important for ensuring the effective integration of telecommunications markets, in particular, 
for the interconnection and interoperability of national telecommunications networks. 
However, like the rest of the auxiliary bodies to the CMG, SWG1 lacks any kind of resources 
to support this kind of activity and, as a result, State Parties have not managed to implement 
any infrastructure or research and development project concerning the telecommunications 
industry. 
There is one secondary rule in particular that is worth highlighting. 19 It concerns State 
Parties' right to regulate "new technologies". 120 The purpose of this rule, which has just 
recently entered into force, is to force the disclosure of proposals for new regulations as early 
as possible on the understanding that the earlier a State Party's rule-making plans on new 
technologies are known by its counterparts, the easier it will be to avoid regulatory disparities 
and, if necessary, to reach harmonisation or mutual recognition agreements. 12' Considering 
that the information technology revolution is fuelling a constant innovation of 
telecommunications services, which requires a permanent update of their regulatory 
framework, an adequate implementation of this secondary rule should be able to promote, in 
the long term, the convergence of State Parties' regulations on new technologies. Based on 
recent State Parties' practices, however, there is no evidence to suggest that this will be the 
case. 
One of the most recent examples that illustrate the weakness of SWG1 to shape a common 
policy on Telecommunications is the way State Parties have chosen their digital TV 
systems. `22 In December 2005, Brazil signed a bilateral agreement with Argentina aimed at 
118 See Res 32/04, negotiation mandate for SWG 1. 
119 See Res 24/94,3/08/94. This norm entered into force on 18111/06. 
120 See, inter alia, Synchronous Digital Hierarchy, Asynchronous Transfer Mode, Mobile Digital Systems, Intelligent 
Networks, High Definition TV. 
121 In the same vein, Dec 11/01 prescribes that when a State Party decides to regulate on sectors currently not 
regulated it shall exonerate the other State Parties from the Market Access or National Treatment restrictions that 
the new regulation may include. Also note 8.3 PM, which requires State Parties to inform promptly and at least 
annually the introduction of any new, or changes to existing laws, regulations, administrative guidelines, which it 
considers affect significantly trade in services. 
122 There are three main digital TV systems, the Japanese (ISDB), the European (DVB) and the American (ATSC). 
The choice for any of them will have huge economic and regulatory implications far beyond the broadcasting 
industry, including the manufacturing and trade of telecommunications' equipment, the mobile phones industry and 
other industries which provide services using digital information. 
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encouraging co-operation between the two parties on the development and implementation of 
a single terrestrial digital TV system, outside SWG1, leaving the smaller MERCOSUR State 
Parties no chance to participate at all . 
123 By June 2006, Brazil unilaterally decided to opt for 
the Japanese standard, regardless of Argentina's considerations. Since digital technology 
requires a certain scale, Brazilian choice will no doubt reduce other State Parties' range of 
options, in particular the smaller neighbours' one. 
4 Secondary Legislation on other Service Sectors 
SWG5 on Transport is probably one of the most active auxiliary bodies to the CMG, 
responsible for harmonising State Parties' transport legislation, minimising the asymmetries 
associated with the transport sector, and identifying and promoting projects on transport 
infrastructure and road interconnection. SWG5 has contributed to the adoption of various 
rules on Transport Services, most of them already incorporated into State Parties' legal 
systems, covering issues relating to multimodal transport, transport of hazardous substances, 
access to the transport profession, road transport safety, vehicles' inspection and civil liability 
on road transport. Yet, this is a far cry from the regulatory changes necessary for ensuring the 
effective liberalisation of Transport Services and the co-ordination of transport policies 
mandated by Article 1 of the Treaty of Asuncion. '24 
Because of their particularity, it is worth pointing out the main features of some pieces of 
MERCOSUR legislation on Transport Services. For instance, the Agreement on the Transport 
of Hazardous Substances in MERCOSUR125 stipulates an extremely detailed and exhaustive 
regulatory framework for the transport of hazardous substances. Its purpose, however, is not 
to combat the trade restrictive effects of disparate domestic regulations with a view to 
facilitate the liberalisation of Transport Services, but to lay down minimum safety standards 
123 See Co-operation Agreement between Brazilian Ministry of Communications and Argentinian Ministry of 
Federal Planning, Public Investments and Services on Terrestrial Digital TV, signed in Puerto Iguazü on 30 
November 2005, available at htto: Hwww2. mre. aov. br/dai/b arat 410 5647. htm (in Portuguese). 
124 See above Ch IV, Section C, Numeral 5. 
125 See Agreement on the Transport of Hazardous Substances, "approved" by Dec 32/07 and registered in LAIA 
Secretariat as PSA No 7. Despite the Decision "approving" this instrument, it is a fully fledged international 
agreement concluded by the State Parties within the framework of the Treaty of Asuncion and, more broadly, 
under the Treaty of Montevideo's umbrella. 
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capable of ensuring a high level of protection for the people and the environment. 126 The 
agreement imposes clear, specific and unconditional obligations and responsibilities on the 
manufacturer of vehicles, equipment and products, the transport operator, the person that hires 
the transport service and even on the addressee of the freight. It also includes a list of 
sanctions that must be applied should any of these individuals infringes the provisions of the 
agreement. In other words, it is an international instrument directly aimed at regulating the 
conduct of individuals rather than the conduct of States. 
On Energy Services, by contrast, secondary rules' patterns are completely different from those 
described above. The CMC adopted two Decisions approving two memorandums of 
understanding (Memorandum of Understanding on Electric Exchanges and Electric 
Integration in MERCOSUR127 and the Memorandum of Understanding on Gas Exchanges and 
Gas Integration128) prepared by SWG9 on Energy. The provisions of these memorandums are 
exclusively addressed to State Parties. They prescribe broadly defined standards of treatment 
to be observed by State Parties with a view to facilitate trade in energy. For instance, the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Electric Exchanges and Electric Integration in 
MERCOSUR compels State Parties inter alia, to avoid the use of subsidies, administrative 
price fixing and discriminatory measures that could impair competitive conditions on the 
electric market; to allow distributors and wholesale consumers of electrics energy to freely 
chose their own suppliers regardless of their location; to avoid discriminating between energy 
producers and consumers on grounds of their geographical location and to ensure companies' 
effective access to distribution networks. 
On Education and Health, the MERCOSUR legal system includes some protocols and 
secondary rules, but in neither of these two sectors has the legislative practice been solely, or 
even primarily driven by the purpose of tackling barriers to trade in services. On Education, 
the Meeting of Education Ministers has been actively negotiating international instruments 
whose overall purpose is to facilitate the harmonisation between State Parties' educational 
systems, encourage the exchange and co-operation between educational institutions, promote 
high standards of education and promote awareness about the relevance of the integration 
process. 12' As a result, MERCOSUR legislation includes various Protocols to the Treaty of 
126 The Agreement compels State Parties to upgrade their domestic regulations on a regular basis in line with the 
latest international safety standards stipulated by the United Nations' Recommendations on the transport of 
hazardous substances. 
127 See Dec 10/98. 
128 See Dec 10/99. 
i2q See Dec 13/98 approving the Triennial Plan and Measures for the Education Sector, 
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Asuncion on the mutual recognition of certificates, diplomas, and studies at primary, 
secondary, and university levels negotiated by the Meeting of Education Ministers. 
Finally, on Health, SWG 11 has been concerned with the harmonisation of regulations and the 
co-ordination of State Parties' actions on health issues with a view to "... promote the 
protection of people's life and health and to eliminate obstacles to regional trade". 130 The 
multifunctionality of this mandate is clear, but the way to make the necessary trade-offs is not. 
Trade liberalisation is just one component of a broader mandate that may well justify the 
adoption of rules aimed at raising health protection standards even at the expense of further 
liberalisation. So far, a few number of secondary rules have been adopted focusing on setting 
minimum standards for the provision of certain medical services13' and on the adoption of 
measures aimed at the establishment of a common registry for health professionals, with a 
view to facilitate the free movement of health professionals within MERCOSUR132. 
D. Critique of Secondary Legislation on Services 
So far, the contribution of secondary legislation to the liberalisation of trade in services has 
been limited. The following paragraphs provide a critique of MERCOSUR legislative practice 
relating to services, first from a cross-sectoral perspective and secondly from a sector-specific 
perspective. 
In terms of their purpose, there are rules primarily aimed at promoting trade liberalisation 
(e. g. rules prohibiting market access baniers, 133 harmonising standards and procedures134, co- 
ordinating domestic disparities through mutual recognition agreements 135, establishing co- 
operation mechanisms between financial regulators136), that stand along with rules which, at 
best, seek to establish some trade-offs between free trade and non trade values (e. g. the 
130 See Res 06/05, negotiation mandate for SWG11. 
131 See, e. g., Regulation 42/00, harmonising technical regulations concerning the authorisation and functioning of 
haematology centres; Res 25/04, stipulating minimum requirements for the authorisation of mobile units for the 
provision of emergency services; Res 65/06, stipulating general guidelines concerning the authorisation and 
functioning of units providing intensive care services. 
132 See Res 27/04 complemented by Res 66/06 on the harmonisation of the minimum information to be gathered 
for the registration of health professionals in MERCOSUR. 
133 Dec 9/99. 
134 Dec 8/93. 
135 Dec 25/03. 
136 Dec 08/99. 
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protection of human health or safety standards on road transport 137) or which simply pursue 
purposes not even remotely connected with the liberalisation of trade (e. g. rules aimed at 
combating financial crime138 or promoting high standards of education'39). 
In terms of the opportunity to regulate and the extent to which regulate, MERCOSUR 
decision making bodies failed to follow consistent patterns, adopting rules which prescribe for 
broadly defined commitments (e. g. memorandums of understanding by which State Parties 
agree on broad principles and standards of treatment to be accorded foreign service 
providers14°), that stand along with rules providing for a detailed and substantive degree of 
harmonisation of domestic rules '4'. Similarly, there are rules addressed to State Parties that 
stand along with rules that stipulate clear, specific and unconditional rights and obligations on 
individuals. 142 These examples reveal the lack of a common criterion about the extent to 
which secondary rules should interfere with the autonomy of domestic regulators. 
In terms of the rules' subject matter, the evidence suggests a rather unfocused and eventful 
legislative practice, which follows no priority criteria, regulating either service sectors with 
comparatively low trade relevance or relevant sectors but addressing peripheral issues with 
low liberalisation impact-143 
In terms of the nature of the rules, it must be noted that many of them are not actually 
secondary rules but primary rules, i. e. international agreements concluded between States in 
written form and governed by international law. '44 As such, they are subject to the more 
cumbersome requirements at public and domestic law for the entry into force of international 
137 See Agreement on the Transport of Hazardous Substances. 
138 Dec 40/00. 
139 Dec 13/98. 
140 Dec 10/98. 
141 Res 38/2004. 
142 See Res 120/94. 
143 The lack of political leadership on policy-making has been eloquently described by the following quote from 
Didier Oppertti, former Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Relations: For those of us who have been involved with 
MERCOSUR, we get the feeling of participating in a game some what automatized in decision making in which 
technical will in many cases acquires a marked autonomy or a certain dimension of its own that carriers along with 
it the risk of distancing it, or even of divorcing it, from the political will" (cited by Pena and Rozenberg, ob cit, p 7). 
144 See, e. g., Agreement for the Creation of a MERCOSUR Visa, Agreement for the Simplification of Business 
Activities, Framework Agreement on Market Access Conditions for Insurance Undertakings, Agreement on the 
Transport of Hazardous Substances. 
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obligations. This is not good legislative practice because it confers an undesirable level of 
rigidity to legislation that deals with very specific and changing circumstances. 145 
With respect to their implementation, the majority of secondary rules and international 
agreements referred to have been successfully incorporated into State Parties' legal systems 
and are currently in force or in the process of being incorporated. However, incorporation 
does not equate to effective implementation. Incorporation merely requires a discrete action to 
incorporate the MERCOSUR rule into the domestic legal book, e. g. passing on a decree or, 
less frequently, adopting an act of parliament. Implementation, by contrast, requires from an 
ongoing effort by all domestic regulatory agencies with competence on the subject matter, to 
ensure that the rule's provisions are observed in a timely, effective and impartial way. 146 
There is evidence to suggest that secondary rules on trade in services are not being effectively 
implemented. 147 
Secondary rules on the movement of natural persons have contributed only to a very 
limited extent to liberalise the movement of service suppliers across national borders. Though 
moderately harmonised, visa requirements for the supply of services are still in place and the 
stay of foreigners abroad continues to be subject to limited periods in accordance with the host 
State's legislation. Similarly, secondary rules adopted so far do not accord companies a fully 
fledged right of establishment, but merely provide some mechanisms to simplify the 
procedures for their registration abroad. As they currently stand, secondary rules on the 
movement of natural persons are not anywhere close to limiting State Parties' right to regulate 
the entry of stay of foreigners and the establishment of foreign companies in their territory. 
145 See above Ch II, Section D, Numeral 1. 
+46 In the EC context, the ECJ has issued various judgments stating that Member States' obligation to implement 
EC Directives does not end with the adoption of legislative measures but that the obligation also binds all the 
agencies (administrative, adjudicative, etc. ) responsible for their implementation on an ongoing basis. See, inter 
alia, cases C-14/83 von Colson and Kaman [1984] ECR 1891; C-106/89 Marleasing [1990] ECR 1-4135; C-168/95 
Arcaro [1996] ECR 1-4705; C-334/92 Wagner Miret [1993] ECR 16911; Case C-62/00 Marks & Spencer v 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise [2002] ECR 1-6325. 
147 See, e. g., the two reports on the application by domestic courts of MERCOSUR law prepared by the 
MERCOSUR Secretariat. They include plenty of examples of rules incorporated by State Parties which are 
subsequently disapplied by domestic courts. For instance, the Uruguayan Executive Power successfully 
incorporated the Agreement on Multimodal Transport by adopting Decree 299/995,08/08/95, published on the OJ 
29/08/95. However, two years later, the "Tribunal de lo Contencioso Administrativo" (highest court for judicial 
review actions) adopted an interim measure suspending the application of the Decree (See TCA ruling N° 237/97, 
2/4/97). See also the contradictions incurred by Brazilian consulates in Argentina about the interpretation of the 
Agreement for the Simplification of Business Activities, above, footnote n55. 
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The Mechanism for the Temporary Provision of Professional Services, which provides for a 
sui generis regulatory framework aimed at allowing members of certain professions to obtain 
a license to provide services abroad for limited periods of time, could be an exception. Since 
this mechanism has not yet entered into force, it remains to be seen how it will work in 
practice. 
Secondary rules on Financial Services have failed to sort out the dual regulatory burden 
problem faced by banks, insurers, investment funds, stock exchanges, brokers and other 
investment service providers wishing to operate at a MERCOSUR level. They have neither 
been able to tackle market access restrictions against the commercial presence of foreign 
service providers or the cross-border supply of services, which, more than a decade after the 
creation of SWG4 on Financial Issues remain intact. On top of that there has been no progress 
whatsoever on the liberalisation of the movement of capital, a crucial prerequisite for an 
effective liberalisation of Financial Services. SWG4' major achievements are to align - or at 
least encourage the alignment - of State Parties' domestic legislation to principles and 
standards developed by international financial setters and to set up a forum where State 
Parties' financial regulators meet on a regular basis and update each other about regulatory 
changes introduced to their financial systems and exchange information and experiences 
concerning financial regulation and supervision of financial undertakings. '48 
Finally, secondary rules on Telecommunication Services are mostly focused on narrow 
technical issues with low liberalisation impact such as the co-ordinated allocation and joint 
administration of frequency bands, particularly in border areas. But they achieved nothing in 
terms of addressing more systemic obstacles to the establishment of a common telecom 
market such as the lack of interconnection of national networks, access restrictions to 
networks, duplication of licensing requirements, the possibility to impose quantitative 
restrictions on foreign ownership of telecom service providers and even monopolies on public 
telecommunication services. The scale of the measures necessary for developing a modern 
148 For further analysis about the degree of integration (or lack thereof) in Financial Services see JOSE MARIA 
FANELLI (Coord. ) MERCOSUR: Integraci6n Y Profundizaci6n de los Mercados Financieros (S XXI Red 
MERCOSUR, Buenos Aires, 2008); EVA HOLZ, Intemacionalizaci6n y acuenios de liberaci6n en servicios 
financieros; el caso de los passes del MERCOSUR (Fundaci6n de Cultura Universitaria, Montevideo 2003); 
JENNIFER HERMMANN & ROGERIO STUDART, '0 Desenvovimento Financeiro eo Processo de Integracao Financeira 
no MERCOSUL: Tendencias e Perspectivas', in Renato Baumann (ed) MERCOSUL Avancos e Desafios da 
lntegracao (IPEAICEPAL, Brasilia 2001); MANUEL DOMPER, 'MERCOSUR: Financial Services Integration', (1999) 1 
Journal of International Banking Regulation 154; MARCELO DE PAIVA ABREU, 'Financial Integration in the 
MERCOSUR Countries', (1997) 1 Integration and Trade 85. 
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and efficient telecommunications' infrastructure at a regional level and establishing a common 
regulatory framework for an integrated telecoms market is far beyond what SWGI has done 
or could eventually do. Recent unilateral decisions by the bloc's largest partner on key policy 
issues have revealed the limited incidence that SWG1 has on State Parties' 
telecommunications policy. Resolution 24/94, which compels any State Party to disclose 
proposals for the regulation of new technologies to its partners, should be able to promote 
convergence of regulations in this area. The norm has entered into force in November 2006, 
so it remains to be seen how effective will it be in fostering the harmonisation of regulations 
on new technologies, but based on State Parties' recent conduct there is not much room for an 
optimistic forecast. 
E. Proposals for Improving Secondary Legislation on Services 
The following paragraphs put forward some proposals for improving the quality of 
MERCOSUR legislation that complement the more general suggestions aimed at streamlining 
the operation of MERCOSUR institutions put forward in Chapter II . 
149 The measures hereby 
proposed, like those suggested in Chapter II, seek to improve the transparency, accountability 
and efficiency of the existing legislative process within the boundaries of the predominantly 
intergovernmental character of MERCOSUR institutional framework. 
1. Regulatory Co-operation 
The limitations of secondary legislation on services specified supra must not overshadow one 
important achievement, namely, the establishment of an extensive network of auxiliary bodies 
with competence either on specific service sectors'so or on horizontal issues cutting across all 
service sectors-151 These bodies convene hands-on regulators from State Parties, who meet 
together on a regular basis, update each other about regulatory changes and exchange 
information and experiences, joint seeking best regulatory practices for the service sector or 
horizontal issue that falls under their sphere of competence. 
The strategic importance of these auxiliary bodies for the effective liberalisation of trade in 
services is crucial. It has been mentioned that barriers to trade in services are essentially 
las See above Ch II, Section E. 
150 See SWG1 Communications, SWG4 Financial Issues, SWG5 Transport, SWG9 Energy, SWG11 Health, 
Specialised Meetings on Tourism and on Film and Audiovisual Authorities. 
151 SWG3 Technical Regulations, SWG6 Environment, SWG12 Investment, Specialised Meetings on E-commerce 
and on Regional Infrastructure, Group on Public Procurement, Technical Committee 7 on Consumer Protection. 
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regulatory in character and thus, more complex and less obvious than barriers to trade in 
goods. The highly regulated character of service markets means that trade in services are 
particularly vulnerable to the dual regulatory burden problem and the risk of discriminatory 
regulatory practices. As it was shown in Chapter IV, these types of barriers cannot be 
removed by diplomatic negotiations alone. Instead, a long-term effort of regulatory co- 
operation is necessary to address the trade restrictive effects of regulatory diversity and bring 
about a gradual convergence of domestic legal systems. 
Of course, the functioning of these auxiliary bodies is far from perfect. They are under- 
resourced and have serious co-ordination difficulties, to name just a few problems. 152 But 
perhaps the most important thing that is currently missing is a clear political signal from all 
State Parties recognising these forums as valid instruments for regulatory co-operation on 
services, specially if one takes into account the existence of parallel bilateral forums between 
Argentina and Brazil. From a theoretical perspective, regulatory co-operation is called to play 
a strategic role in the liberalisation of trade in services and therefore no effort should be 
spared in supporting the role that these auxiliary bodies could play. 
2. Definition of Decision Making Bodies' Regulatory Competence 
The lack of a clear and precise definition of decision making bodies' regulatory competence 
and the absence of clear standards about the opportunity to legislate and the extent to which 
secondary rules should interfere with the autonomy of domestic regulators, increases the risk 
of adopting excessively intrusive rules. It also opens the door for legislative hyperactivity, i. e. 
the adoption of too many rules, whose connection with the agreement's core objectives 
becomes increasingly blurred. '53 
To minimise these risks, it is essential to define with greater precision the legal basis for 
decision making bodies to adopt legislation, introducing clear standards on what subject 
152 See above Ch II, Section E, Numeral 2.1. 
153 This problem has not been unheard in the EC context, even with a treaty providing a much more precise 
allocation of regulatory c ompetenoes as between domestic and regional bodies and a specific mechanism for 
controlling the validity of community measures. Weatherhill notes this difficulty when analysing the reasons 
underlying harmonisation efforts. In theory, the process of generating common rules should be primarily aimed at 
advancing market integration, but in practice, the author notes, the legal basis authorising harmonisation has been 
'borrowed' to pass non-market common rules in the fields of consumer protection, environmental protection and 
labour market regulation. See Weatherhill, ob cit, p 11. The leading case in this area is C-376/98 Germany v 
parliament and Council (Tobacco case) [2000] ECR 1-8419. 
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matters decision making bodies can regulate, for what purpose and to what extent, i. e. clearer 
rules on the allocation of regulatory competence as between domestic and regional decision 
making bodies. This should be done by way of amending the pop. 154 Now, it is much easier 
to suggest this idea than to implement it. The decision of who should regulate what is an 
extremely delicate one. If State Parties get it wrong it may undermine the efficacy (too 
deferential to domestic regulatory autonomy) or the legitimacy (too intrusive) of the 
integration process. For the purpose of this thesis, suffices to highlight the need for a more 
accurate definition of decision making bodies' regulatory competence. '55 
3. Control of Legislative Practice 
As mentioned, the MERCOSUR legal system does not provide any specific mechanism for 
controlling the validity of the decisions adopted by the CMC, CMG or the MTC. Clearly, the 
status of the integration process is not yet ripe for the establishment of an independent 
adjudicative body to have the last say on policy measures adopted by MERCOSUR decision 
making bodies. '6 However, the PRT, the Secretariat and the MERCOSUR Parliament could 
and should play a more active role in controlling decision making bodies' legislative practice, 
without the need to go all the way on to confer any of these bodies the right to annul or block 
the adoption of secondary rules on legal or merit grounds. As it is explained below, it is 
simply a matter for these institutions to exercise the powers they were conferred. 
3.1 Permanent Review Tribunal 
154 The drafting of a proposal to amend the POP in these lines would be benefited by reviewing the EU debate on 
subsidiarity during the 1990s, which led to the amendment of Art. 5 of the EC Treaty and the adoption of the 
Protocol on the Application on the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O. J. 
(C 340)1. 
is Rollo and Winters' reflections on whether the EU subsidiarity model could be exportable to the WTO are quite 
useful to illustrate the underlying complexities and political sensitivities of this issue. See JIM ROLLO & ALAN 
WINTERS, 'Domestic Regulation and Trade: Subsidiarity and Governance Challenges for the WTO', in, WTOIWodd 
Bank Conference on Developing Countries in a Millennium Round 1999). 
156 This view is not undisputable. FESUR's report on MERCOSUR institutional challenges suggests the need for 
establishing an annulment procedure against secondary rules adopted in contravention of primary law provisions, 
although it does not specify how this procedure should look like. See FESUR, Desafios institucionales pare el 
MERCOSUR. Las Relaciones entre Estados, Institucfones Comunes y Organizaciones de la Sociedad (FESUR, 
Montevideo 2006). 
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Domestic courts can request the PRT an Opinion on the interpretation of MERCOSUR law. '57 
Although the PRT's Opinions are not binding and its jurisdiction is limited to interpreting 
MERCOSUR rules and not to considering their validity, they could nevertheless contribute to 
controlling decision making bodies' legislative practice. Indeed, in its first Opinion, the PRT 
has asserted jurisdiction to declare the inapplicability of a secondary rule to the case at issue 
when it "manifestly contradicts" MERCOSUR primary law. 158 The Tribunal further 
distinguished between the Opinion itself, which has no binding effect for the domestic court 
that requested it, and a declaration of inapplicability which should be binding on 
MERCOSUR institutions. 159 The Tribunal argued that giving the relevance of a declaration of 
inapplicability, it is "absolutely necessary" for it to have binding effects on MERCOSUR 
decision making bodies. To deny this effect, the Tribunal claimed, could have serious 
institutional implications. 160 
The PRT's Opinion contains, no doubt, a strong message in favour of the rule of law. It takes 
a bold step by setting objective and rule-based limits to decision making bodies' rule-making 
power. It makes a strong point reminding these bodies that their rule-making power is not 
absolute but subject to the rules and standards laid down by MERCOSUR primary law. Here 
we have clear evidence that the PRT could exert an effective control of MERCOSUR 
legislative practice without the need for any kind of treaty amendments. Now, it remains to be 
seen how effective can the PRT' Opinions be in shaping that legislative practice. So far, a year 
after the Opinion was adopted, the CMC has not amended Decision 02/07, nor has it taken 
any other type action signalling an acknowledgment of the Tribunal's Opinion. 
3.2 MERCOSUR Secretariat 
157 See above Ch il, Section E, Numeral 3. 
158 See Opinion 1/2007, p 10. The Opinion severely criticised the Rules of Procedure for the Request of 
Consultative Opinions approved by Dec 02/07 and the Tribunal reserved its right to declare the inapplicability of a 
secondary rule to the particular case at issue when it "manifestly contradicts" primary law. However, in the 
operative part of the ruling, only one arbitrator, voting in-dissidence, declared the inapplicability of arts 1,6 and 11 
of the Rules of Procedure for the Request of Consultative Opinions with binding effect. It must be noted that a 
couple of months later this arbitrator resigned as a result of a bitter row with MERCOSUR diplomats over the 
PRT's budget and the appointment of the PRTs Secretary. See article published on line in EL Pais (Uruguayan 
newspaper) on 18 October 2007 at www. diarioelpais. com. uy. 
159 Ibid, p 13. 
160 Ibid. 
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As mentioned, Dec 30/02 entrusted the TAS, inter alia, with the task of controlling the 
consistency of draft rules proposed by auxiliary bodies with existing rules. 16' The Decision 
stipulates the consistency control is not compulsory, meaning that the decision making body 
can adopt the proposed rule without that control or even against the TAS recommendations. '62 
What is worse, the CMG has recently decided to suspend the consistency control procedure 
and not resume it until an exhaustive assessment and further regulation of its procedure is 
carried out. '63 
In line with the considerations put forward in Chapter II aimed at Strengthening the 
MERCOSUR Secretariat, the need for the full implementation of the TAS' consistency 
control procedure is hereby reinforced. '" Moreover, the possibility to replace the consistency 
control with a more comprehensive consultation requirement, whereby the Secretariat could 
also have a say on the merits of adopting any given draft rule, should also be considered. 165 
In addition, the TAS should also contribute to improve the drafting style of secondary rules. In 
particular, the TAS could help in drafting better preambles, capable of establishing the 
underlying rationale of the rule, its legal basis and its connection with the overall objectives of 
the integration process in a clearer and detailed way. Hopefully, this exercise should force 
decision making bodies to think more carefully why they are adopting a particular rule and 
should discourage the adoption of rules whose purposes fall squarely outside the Treaty of 
Asuncion's remit. 
3,3 MERCOSUR Parliament 
The MERCOSUR parliament has some monitoring powers over the CMC, CMG and MTC. 166 
None of these monitoring powers are expressly designed to control the validity of 
MERCOSUR rules. Nor do they confer on the Parliament any power to modify rules that have 
been found to be adopted in violation of other MERCOSUR rules. However, by introducing 
some degree of decision making bodies' accountability to the Parliament, they confer the 
latter the right to express its views, among other things, on how MERCOSUR legislation is 
being developed. 
161 See above Ch il, Section C, Numeral 2.3. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 See above Ch II, Section E, Numeral 2.2. 
165 Ibid. 
166 See Ch II, Section C, Numeral 2.1. 
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An open and transparent institution such as the Parliament, closer to the interests of 
MERCOSUR people, and thus less likely to be co-opted by specific domestic protectionist 
lobbies, should be able to air a more independent voice on what should constitute best 
legislative practices. It could also put pressure on decision making bodies to take into account 
the PRT's opinions. It is therefore very important to have in place a strong Parliament, which 
actively uses its monitoring powers over the decision making bodies. 
4. Regulatory Techniques 
4.1 Making Use of Primary and Secondary Law 
The review of secondary legislation on services has revealed quite a few examples of using 
primary law for regulating issues other than institutional arrangements. It is vital for rule- 
makers to understand the different purposes of primary and secondary law and to use them 
accordingly, namely, reserving the former for the regulation of constitutional aspects of the 
integration process and the latter for regulating more specific trade issues and non-trade 
cooperation matters. 167 
4.2. Cost-Benefit Analysis, Consultation and Transparency 
The current process for the adoption of Decisions or Regulations is not supported by any kind 
of consultation requirements, impact assessment studies, cost-benefit analysis, audit or post- 
regulation evaluation. This contrasts with the complexities inherent in seeking the 
convergence of highly regulated markets such as financial markets or telecom markets. But it 
is something which should not come as a surprise since the decision making bodies and their 
auxiliary bodies only meet a couple of times during the year, they are not staffed by full-time 
personnel, and they lack any kind of resources to support the legislative activity. Thus, an 
obvious way to improve the quality of the legislative practice is, as already mentioned, to 
allocate more administrative, human and technical resources to support the activities of 
decision making bodies and their auxiliary bodies. 169 In addition, the Secretariat should also 
play a key role in providing decision making bodies with technical support for better 
167 See RAMON TORRENT, 'Una Aproximacion a la Anatomia del MERCOSUR Real', in Julio Berlinsky, et al. (eds) 
15 Allos de MERCOSUR, Comercio, Macroeconomia e Inversiones Extranjeras (Siglo XXI Red MERCOSUR, 
Buenos Aires 2006), pp 58-59. 
168 See above Ch II, Section E, Numeral 2.1. 
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regulatory practices. An impartial and technical body is the best placed institution for 
undertaking consultations, cost-benefit analysis, impact assessments and other technical 
studies, but again, its capacity to make any significant contribution depends on its budget, 
which until now, is insignificant. 169 
Efforts should also be made to bring the rule-making process outside diplomatic enclosures, 
encouraging the participation of industry representatives and the wider civil society. The input 
from the industry is vital for the regulation of complex and changing environments. A fluent 
participation of the civil society on the law-making process contributes to short distances 
between the regulator and the regulatees and elicits a sense of ownership of secondary rules, 
which should result in better compliance and a strengthened legitimacy of the integration 
process as a whole. 10 
The MERCOSUR legal system already contemplates some degree of participation for private 
persons in the policy-making process, which should be strengthened. 171 For instance, on some 
SWGs (particularly Transport and, to a lesser extent Telecommunications and Finance) there 
is a well established practice, which allows industry representatives to participate during the 
preparatory stage of the meetings until the deliberative stage begins. This practice should be 
further encouraged and extended to all auxiliary bodies with competence on specific service 
sectors. In addition, it is vital to increase the overall transparency of the rule-making process 
by making as much information as possible available to the public about the date, venue and 
agenda of auxiliary bodies' meetings. 
The evidence suggests that when given the opportunity, the industry and the wider civil 
society are ready and willing to participate on the rule-making process. The best example is 
that of the Mechanism for the Temporary Provision of Professional Services, which allows for 
the participation of professional bodies on the development and implementation of the 
regulatory framework applicable to the temporary provision of professional services. As 
mentioned, although the Mechanism has not yet entered into force, various professional 
bodies have already expressed their interest in participating. '72 
169 See above Ch II, Section C, Numeral 2.3. 
170 For a general analysis of the benefits of a transparent rule-making process see OECD, Strengthening 
Regulatory Transparency: Insights for the GATS from the Regulatory Reform Country Reviews (OECD, Paris 
2000). 
171 See above Ch II, Section E, Numeral 2.3. 
172 See above footnote n45. 
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4.3 Comparative Regulatory Practices 
It is worth looking at other regulatory experiences outside MERCOSUR for lesson-drawing 
purposes provided, of course, that the particularities of the institutional, political, economic 
and cultural settings underlying each integration process are not overlooked. In this vein, a 
review of the EU regulatory experience, the most advanced and successful integration process 
so far, is unavoidable. 113 Under the community pillar the EU regulatory practice evolved, 
broadly speaking, from rather basic top-down policymaking and enforcement mechanisms to 
more sophisticated multilevel governance arrangements that involve ongoing co-operation 
among national regulators and supervisors. 14 Since the MERCOSUR legal system is 
unfamiliar with the hallmark features of Community law (primacy, direct effect and, 
eventually, direct applicability), it is worth also considering the EU regulatory experience on 
the other two pillars. 17' Because these two pillars deal with more politically sensitive and 
complex areas, the policymaking process is influenced by a stronger intergovernmental 
approach, closer to MERCOSUR' own institutional settings. A regulatory technique used in 
this area that should be carefully considered for lesson-drawing purposes is the Open Method 
of Coordination. 16 
Another experience to bear in mind is the EU/US Framework Agreement for Advancing 
Economic Integration, which provides a mechanism for EU/US consultations on trade, 
173 See in particular the work done by the European Commission on "Better Regulation" at 
htta: /Iec. euroDa. eulaovemance/better regulation/index en. htm, last visited April 2008. The website includes a vast 
amount of information about the EC's strategy to improve the regulatory environment in Europe. Also, for a good 
summary of the EU approach to regulation see FRANK VIBERT, Regulation in the European Union RIIA: 
MERCOSUR Working Group Paper (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002). 
174 There is a vast literature on positive integration in the EU. Suffices to mention for this purpose two key policy 
documents elaborated by the European Commission, which summarise the key features for regulating at 
community level: Commission's Principles for Better Regulation COM(2005)535 final, and Commission's White 
Paper on European Governance COM(2001)428 final. See also FRANCESCA. BIGNAMI, The Administrative State in 
a Separation of Powers Constitution : Lessons for European Community Rulemaking from the United States The 
Jean Monnet Working Papers (NYU School of Law, Cambridge, MA 1999). 
175 For a thorough analysis of the intergovernmental pillars of the EU see EISEEN DENZA, The Intergovernmental 
Pillars of the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford New York 2002). 
176 See, e. g., SABRINA REGENT, The Open Method of Coordination: A 'New Supranational Form of Governance? ' 
(2003) 9 European Law Journal 190; SUSANA BORRAS & KERSTIN JACC+BSSC+N, 'The open method of co-ordination 
and new governance patterns in the EU', (2004) 11 Journal of European Public Policy 185 and CLAUDIO M 
RADAELLI, The Open Method of Coordination: A new governance architecture for the European Union? (Swedish 
Institute for European Policy Studies, Stockholm 2003). 
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competition and regulation. The aim in the regulatory area is to encourage early and regular 
consultations and to share regulatory approaches, without interfering on each others regulatory 
autonomy. "? 
4.4 Difference between Rules and Administrative Decisions 
Decisions, Resolutions and, to a lesser extent, Directives are used for both legislative and 
administrative purposes. For instance, the CMC follows the same procedure for, say, 
approving the contents of a training programme on MERCOSUR law 178 than for approving a 
strategic plan for overcoming asymmetries between State Parties. 179 By any standard, this is 
not good regulatory practice. It gives the impression that decision making bodies are actively 
legislating when, in fact, the majority of the "rules" adopted are simply administrative 
decisions disguised as legislative measures. From an organizational perspective, there is no 
need to add administrative issues to decision making bodies' already stretched agendas. 
Neither it is reasonable to subject the adoption of administrative decisions to the same 
procedural requirements as those necessary for the adoption of legislative acts, i. e. the need 
for consensus and the presence of representatives from all State Parties. In other words, it is 
necessary to create new decision making categories different from Decisions, Resolutions or 
Directives, subject to more flexible procedures, for the adoption of administrative decisions. "' 
E. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter was focused on the analysis of the liberalisation of trade in services through 
positive integration. It examined MERCOSUR secondary rules on specific service sectors and 
modes of supply and the process for their creation and implementation. It discussed secondary 
legislation's contribution to the liberalisation of trade in services and put forward some 
suggestions for enhancing the quality of MERCOSUR legislative practice. 
As mentioned, positive integration provides State Parties to an integration process with an 
unrivalled instrument for addressing the more subtle barriers to trade liberalisation such as the 
restrictive effects caused by the duplication of non-discriminatory but disparate domestic 
177 See further information at httD: //ec. euroDa. eu/extemal-relations/us/new transatlantic aqenda/index. htm., last 
visited 26/03/07. 
178 Dec 35/07. 
179 Dec 33/07. 
180 See Perotä and Ventura, ob cit, p 25. 
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regulations. Thus, in principle, positive integration should pave the way for reaching a level of 
integration deeper than that attainable by the negotiation of reciprocal concessions, which, at 
best, can result in the removal of overt discriminatory measures. 
In practice, however, positive integration has contributed only to a limited extent to the 
liberalisation of trade in services. Various rules have been adopted on the movement of 
natural persons, Financial Services, Telecommunications, Transport, Energy, Health and 
Education, but the analysis suggests a rather unfocused and eventful legislative practice, 
which follows no priority criteria, focusing on peripheral issues with low liberalisation 
impact. Decision making bodies failed to follow consistent regulatory patterns in terms of the 
opportunity to regulate or the extent to which secondary rules should interfere with the 
autonomy of domestic regulators. As it stands today, MERCOSUR body of secondary rules 
on services is no where near to providing an effective regulatory framework capable of 
dealing with the dual regulatory burden problem and the risk of discriminatory regulatory 
practices that affects most service sectors. 
There is, however, an important achievement that must not be overlooked, namely, the 
establishment of an extensive network of auxiliary bodies with competence either on specific 
service sectors or on horizontal issues cutting across all service sectors. Barriers to trade in 
services are essentially regulatory in character and, as it was shown in Chapter IV, they cannot 
be removed by diplomatic negotiations alone. Instead, a long-term effort of regulatory co- 
operation is necessary to address the trade restrictive effects of regulatory diversity and bring 
about a gradual convergence of domestic legal systems. These auxiliary bodies, which 
convene hands-on regulators from State Parties, meet together on a regular basis, update each 
other about regulatory changes and exchange information and experiences, joint seeking best 
regulatory practices, should play a strategic role in the liberalisation of trade in services and 
therefore no effort should be spared in supporting their role. In particular, a clear political 
signal from all State Parties recognising these forums as valid instruments for regulatory co- 
operation is needed. 
This chapter also put forward other proposals to improve the overall quality of MERCOSUR 
legislative practice. They complement those put forward in Chapter II and like them seek to 
improve the transparency, accountability and efficiency of the existing legislative process 
within the boundaries of the predominantly intergovernmental character of MERCOSUR 
institutional framework. The proposals include, inter alia, suggestions for strengthening the 
role of the PRT, the Secretariat and the Parliament in controlling decision making bodies' 
legislative practice; amending the POP with a view to define the regulatory competence of 
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decision making bodies with greater precision and clarity; and introducing more sophisticated 
regulatory techniques. 
243 
Conclusions 
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The liberalisation of trade in services is a good example to illustrate how complex and 
demanding it is to achieve deep economic integration among States. Unlike tariffs or quotas, 
barriers to this type of trade are essentially regulatory in character, and thus, less obvious and 
more dispersed. Apart from typical protectionist measures (e. g. quantitative restrictions and 
discriminatory measures against foreign suppliers), service markets are highly regulated, 
which means that those suppliers wishing to operate abroad must face the cost of complying 
with a whole range of regulatory requirements (licenses, prudential requirements, 
qualifications and technical standards, etc. ) twice. The various modalities for trade in services 
(cross-border supply, commercial presence, consumer movement, supplier movement) can be 
affected not only by regulations on services but also by measures restricting the cross-border 
movement of capital, persons or information. Furthermore, due to the intense and ongoing 
relationship between the regulator and the industry that characterises many service sectors, 
there are higher risks for governmental discriminatory practices. Also, the possibility of 
opening some service sectors to foreign competition generates anxieties among people 
because of the nature of the public interest issues at stake (financial stability, cultural 
diversity, access to health or education, etc. ), fuelling strong protectionist interests. 
Comparative integration experiences show that States willing to advance economic integration 
among them and, in particular, to integrate their service markets, can choose from a wide 
range of institutional alternatives. There is a continuum of choice for channelling inter-state 
cooperation that stretches from predominately intergovernmental to predominantly 
supranational legal frameworks, rather than binary options between purely intergovernmental 
or purely supranational models. In theory, the more policy-making and enforcement power 
that is transferred from domestic to regional institutions, the higher the chances for achieving 
deeper levels of economic integration. But in practice, each integration process is underlined 
by ad hoc socio-economic, political and even cultural circumstances that constrain the extent 
to which regulatory autonomy can be redistributed between domestic and regional bodies. 
At the multilateral level, the GATS is yet to deliver any meaningful result in the opening of 
service markets. At the regional level, only the European Union has managed to achieve a 
noticeable degree of integration. But even in the EU, with the most advanced institutional 
framework for regional integration designed so far, there is still much work to be done to 
ensure an internal market on services, encompassing all service sectors and modes of supply. ' 
Rather than one-size-fits-all formula, the key for success appears to consist on setting up a 
' See Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the State of the Internal Market 
for Services COM (2002) 441 final. 
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legal framework for inter-state co-operation capable of securing a realistic degree of 
liberalisation without compromising domestic sovereignty to a level unacceptable to State 
Parties. 
For MERCOSUR, success remains elusive. Eighteen years after the Treaty of Asuncion 
launched an ambitious integration process aimed at the establishment of a common market, 
MERCOSUR can be described, at best, as an incomplete free trade area, with a partially 
implemented common external tariff and with no co-ordination of macroeconomic policies. 
There is a worrying gap between State Parties' commitments and State Parties' conduct, 
which is undermining the bloc's credibility and raising concerns about the possibility that 
MERCOSUR could soon become another pearl on the collar of failed Latin American 
integration initiatives. The degree of trade liberalisation achieved is just moderate for trade in 
goods and almost negligible for trade in services. Most barriers to trade in services remain in 
place and there is still a long way ahead before suppliers and consumers can move freely 
across national borders. 
Against this background, this volume examined the legal framework for the liberalisation of 
trade in services in MERCOSUR, discussed the reasons for the current state of affairs and 
proposed some alternatives for unlocking the integration process as far as its deep economic 
integration objectives are concerned. 
A careful examination of primary sources of information revealed that none of the three 
instruments specifically provided by the MERCOSUR legal system for facilitating trade in 
services has made any significant contribution to improving the current fragmentation 
between domestic service markets. 
The Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in Services does not provide the ideal regulatory 
framework for trade in services within the bloc. It is an instrument almost entirely modelled 
according to the GATS, with very minor adjustments. The import of a multilateral agreement 
for the establishment of the free movement of services at the sub-regional level creates 
inconsistencies that affect the overall coherence of MERCOSUR law. A "negative integration 
contract"' primarily concerned with the elimination of discrimination and mindful not to 
interfere with State Parties' right to regulate, becomes an integral part of an agreement whose 
ultimate goal is the establishment of a common market involving, amongst other things, the 
2 See PETROS C MAVROIDIS, 'Highway XVI Re-visited: the Road from Non-discrimination to Market Access in 
GATS', (2007) 6 World Trade Review 1p 11. 
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free movement of goods, services and factors of production and the co-ordination of 
macroeconomic and sectoral policies. 
It is difficult to reconcile the Protocol's adamant protection of State Parties' regulatory 
autonomy on the entry and stay of foreigners in their territory with the long-term objective to 
establish a common market involving the free movement of service suppliers. Equally 
difficult is to reconcile the broad protection of State Parties' right to regulate financial markets 
for prudential reasons (and the potential disparity of prudential requirements that the exercise 
of this right may generate) with the objective to ensure effective market access to foreign 
suppliers and a levelling playing field to compete against domestic incumbents. There are also 
clear overlaps and inconsistencies between the Protocol's regulation of the commercial 
presence of foreign service suppliers and other instruments specifically designed for the 
protection of investments. Having said that, it is also fair to say that the Protocol's general 
obligations and disciplines are broadly defined and thus, if properly enforced, could still make 
a valuable contribution to the liberalisation of trade in services. 
The rounds of negotiations of specific commitments failed to remove Market Access and 
National Treatment restrictions embedded in domestic legal systems. Clearly, MERCOSUR 
commitments are more advanced than State Parties' GATS commitments in terms of 
coverage, depth and transparency. Yet, the results achieved at MERCOSUR level are simply 
not good enough. Six rounds of negotiations spanning over the last nine years achieved no 
more than the partial consolidation of the status quo of State Parties' legislation, including 
Market Access and National Treatment restrictions, without getting anywhere close to 
securing a preferential treatment for MERCOSUR service suppliers. There is no evidence to 
anticipate a successful and timely completion of the Programme of Liberalisation by 
December 2015. On the contrary, there is compelling evidence pointing at the inefficacy of 
diplomatic negotiations as a mechanism for the removal of barriers to trade in services. 
There are various factors that limit the efficacy of the negotiation rounds. For instance, trade 
negotiators' manoeuvring room to make concessions over measures affecting trade in services 
is severely limited since most restrictions are embedded in statutes or even in constitutional 
provisions. Contrary to what happens in the goods context, where the value of, say, a ten per 
cent reduction on the tariff on an industrial good is self-explanatory for all interested parties, 
in the services context, it is very difficult to objectively measure the value of a trade 
concession such as, say, the removal of collateral requirements to authorise foreign insures to 
operate in the domestic market. Also, trade negotiators do not always have enough 
information available to make decisions on complex regulatory issues, forcing them to go 
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through lengthy and cumbersome consultation processes. Last, but not least, the logic 
underlying trade negotiations tends to prioritize short-term interests and individualistic 
strategies over the long-term interests and co-operative efforts necessary for the establishment 
of a common market. 
The contribution of secondary legislation to the liberalisation of trade in services has also 
been limited. Various rules have been adopted on the movement of natural persons, Financial 
Services, Telecommunications, Transport, Energy, Health and Education, but the analysis 
suggests a rather unfocused and eventful legislative development, which follows no priority 
criteria, focusing on peripheral issues with low liberalisation impact. Decision making bodies 
failed to follow consistent regulatory patterns in terms of the opportunity to regulate or the 
extent to which secondary rules should interfere with the autonomy of domestic regulators. As 
it stands today, the body of secondary rules on services is nowhere near of providing an 
effective regulatory framework capable of dealing with the dual regulatory burden problem 
and minimising the risk of discriminatory regulatory practices that affect most service sectors. 
Having diagnosed the current situation, it seems pertinent to ask about the reasons for the 
current state of affairs and consider what can be done about it. Part of the specialised literature 
blames the institutional framework for MERCOSUR's underachievement and calls for a major 
institutional overhaul aimed at replacing MERCOSUR's predominantly intergovernmental 
framework by a supranational one, including the creation of an EC Commission type of 
permanent body, independent from national governments with policy making and enforcement 
power 3 
This line of argumentation rightly points out that there is an imbalance between a 
predominantly intergovernmental institutional structure and deep integration objectives such 
as the establishment of a common market. State Parties opted for a minimalist institutional 
structure. Decision making bodies consist of government officials only who adopt decisions by 
consensus, there is no technical bureaucracy independent from national administrations, and to 
reach private persons, MERCOSUR law must be incorporated into national legal systems. There 
is no supranational enforcement machinery. Once MERCOSUR rules make their way into 
national legal systems, they become subject to State Parties' domestic enforcement machinery 
like any other domestic rule, while disputes between State Parties are sorted out through 
arbitration. 
3 See Ch II, footnote n357. 
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Originally, it was assumed that conferring policy-making competence to hands-on 
government officials rather than to integration bureaucracies de-linked from domestic policy 
makers should result in the formulation of more realistic integration policies, increasing the 
chances for their effective implementation at national levels, and providing State Parties with 
a flexible and cost-effective mechanism for adjusting the integration process to its ongoing 
challenges. During its early stages, MERCOSUR's lean institutional framework satisfied the 
demands for an integration process characterised by a low level of economic interdependence, 
concerned with border issues (i. e. the elimination of tariffs) and operating in a low contentious 
environment. But since the tariff elimination process was concluded, giving way to more 
sensitive and complex barriers to economic integration, MERCOSUR institutions have 
repeatedly failed to deliver effective solutions for its core problems. 
For instance, MERCOSUR institutions have failed to bridge the growing gap between the 
secondary rules adopted by decision making bodies and those rules effectively incorporated 
into State Parties' legal systems. The lack of incorporation hits directly at the efficacy of the 
MERCOSUR legal system. It prevents MERCOSUR law from penetrating national legal 
systems, aborting its applicability to natural and legal persons. Even when secondary rules 
confer clear, precise and unconditional rights to private persons, they cannot be invoked before 
national courts unless and until they have been duly incorporated into the national legal system. 
In the same vein, the dispute settlement system is a far cry from what should be an effective 
enforcement mechanism capable of preventing State Parties from violating their 
commitments. So far, only ten arbitration awards have been issued under the Protocol of 
Brasilia, and six under the Protocol of Olivos, four of which were awarded by the Permanent 
Review Tribunal. Certainly not impressive figures for a dispute settlement system with more 
than fifteen years in existence, particularly when one takes into account the proliferation of non- 
tariff barriers and unilateral actions that continue to distort intra-regional trade. If anything, these 
figures confirm State Parties reluctance to forfeit control over the management (or 
mismanagement) of their trade disputes to a rule-based adjudicative mechanism. 
There is no doubt about the weakness of the institutional framework, however, it does not 
necessarily follow from this that the institutions themselves are the cause for MERCOSUR 
4 See ROBERTO BOUZAS & HERNAN SOLTZ, 'Institutions and Regional Integration: The Case of MERCOSUR', 
in, Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Political Economy of Open Regionalism (Institute 
of Latin American Studies, London 2001), p 103. 
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failures, let alone that their supranationalisation could be of any use to solve MERCOSUR 
problems. 
The institutional deficit must be understood in the context of an integration process 
characterised by the sharp structural asymmetries between State Parties. Brazil represents over 
eighty percent of the region's GDP and for the last eight years the ratio of MERCOSUR exports 
to its total exports has been under eleven percent. ' Since access to its partners' markets is just of 
marginal importance for its national interest, Brazil is understandably not willing to pay the 
price associated with supranational institutions in terms of sovereignty curtailment. The costs for 
Brazil to subject itself to powerful centralised institutions, capable of constraining domestic 
policy makers' discretion are too high in light of the modest benefits expected in return. In this 
context, results that from a treaty based perspective could be regarded as a failure, from a 
narrower State Party's national interest perspective could be seen as the desired outcome. An 
intergovernmental structure, according government officials strict control over the scope and 
pace of the integration process and a relatively weak dispute settlement mechanism fits much 
nicer with Brazilian interests, than strong regional institutions and a strictly rule-based policy- 
making and enforcement mechanisms. 
Not surprisingly, Brazil has always favoured plans for widening MERCOSUR's agenda (e. g. 
welcoming new members like Venezuela, a country who is moving in a direction opposite to 
trade liberalisation and to all the liberal reforms necessary for enabling economic integration) 
rather than deepening it. Outside MERCOSUR, Brazil has been at the forefront in sponsoring 
grandiloquent integration initiatives fraught with rhetoric but shallow on binding 
commitments such as a South American Free Trade Area, then a Community for South 
American Nations (2005), and most recently a Council for South American Defence and a 
Union of South American Nations (2008). Moreover, one should not forget that MERCOSUR 
was mainly the result of bilateral negotiations between Argentina and Brazil. Paraguay and 
Uruguay joined the negotiations at the very last minute, and since then they have had no 
opportunity to exert any significant influence on the management of the integration process. 
The existence of formal negotiation forums parallel to MERCOSUR6, where Argentina and 
Brazil negotiate conditions for their bilateral trade, sometimes in line with MERCOSUR 
5 See Appendix II MERCOSUR Statistical Information, Tables 1 and 9. 
6 See, e. g., the LAIA Partial Scope Agreement number 14 and the Protocol for the establishment of a High Level 
Group for the implementation of the free movement of persons between Argentina and Brazil. 
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objectives, sometimes in stark contrast with them', raises questions about the very need of an 
agreement like MERCOSUR, at least as an instrument for economic integration! 
There are powerful economic and political factors that condition the performance of any 
integration process and MERCOSUR is not an exception to this rule. The legal system and its 
institutions can contribute to unravel a pre-existing integration dynamic, but such integration 
dynamic cannot be generated by law. It must be built over a matrix of converging national 
interests, where the benefits of integration for each State Party should outweigh its costs. But 
for MERCOSUR it has always been problematic to find this matrix of converging national 
interests. State Parties' interests in MERCOSUR differ and so do the demands for the 
formalisation of the integration process. In other words, while the black letter of the law 
speaks about the common objective to establish a common market, co-ordinate 
macroeconomic policies and harmonize domestic legislations, it is not apparent that 
MERCOSUR means what it claims. 
In light of the particular economic and political circumstances underlying the integration 
process, the best - if not the only- path available for reform is to streamline the operation of the 
current institutional system. There is plenty of room for improving the efficacy and efficiency of 
existing policy-making and enforcement mechanisms without the need to move away from a 
predominantly intergovernmental approach to integration. The idea is to introduce minor 
institutional re-arrangements and procedural requirements aimed at fostering a more rule-based, 
transparent and accountable framework . for the development of policy measures and the 
enforcement of trade disciplines without compromising domestic sovereignty to a level 
unacceptable for State Parties. 
In this vein, a series of measures have been suggested for improving the functioning of decision 
making bodies (e. g. concentrate the rule-making power on the Common Market Council's 
hands9, streamline the number and competence of auxiliary bodies and adopt a single working 
programme at the highest political level, that sets goals and allocates tasks to policy-making 
7 See, e. g., the Mechanism for Competitive Adjustment between Argentina and Brazil, which enables State Parties 
to use safeguards against imports, above, Ch 11, footnote n79. 
8 There are, of course, reasons other than economic integration that may justify the case for inter-state co- 
operation between MERCOSUR members that are not questioned here such as co-operation on infrastructure 
development, research and innovation, judicial matters and home affairs and so forth. 
9 RAMON TORRENT, 'Una Aproximacibn a la Anatomia del MERCOSUR Real', in Julio Bedinsky, et al. (ads) 15 
AP os de MERCOSUR, Comemio, Macroeconomic e Inversions Extranjeras (Siglo XXI Red MERCOSUR, Buenos 
Aires 2006), p 47. 
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bodies in a clear, detailed and coherent way), strengthening the role of the MERCOSUR 
Secretariat (e. g. decision making bodies' duty to consult the Secretariat about the merits of new 
legislative initiatives; Secretariat's right to make non-binding recommendations to decision 
making bodies and to receive a reply from them with their views about those recommendations; 
specific powers to request information from State Parties about incorporation of secondary 
rules; independence to set a research agenda in accordance with the most problematic challenges 
of the integration process; more resources, etc. ) and empowering individuals' participation in the 
integration process (increase the degree of transparency of the decision-making process, confer 
on individuals the right to attend meetings of decision making bodies and to air their views; 
strengthen the role of the Economic and Social Consultative Forum; limit government officials' 
discretion to decide whether or not to pursue a private person's claims before MERCOSUR 
tribunals; full implementation of the right to request Consultative Opinions from the Permanent 
Review Tribunal on the interpretation of MERCOSUR law, introduce private persons' right to 
submit amicus curiae during the inter state dispute settlement process and more training on 
MERCOSUR law). 
In addition, some proposals were put forward specifically aimed at improving the transparency, 
accountability and efficiency of the existing legislative process, also within the boundaries of 
a predominantly intergovernmental institutional framework. The proposals include, inter alia, 
suggestions for strengthening the role of the Permanent Review Tribunal, the Secretariat and 
the Parliament in controlling decision making bodies' legislative practice; amending the 
Protocol of Ouro Preto with a view to define the regulatory competence of decision making 
bodies with greater precision and clarity; and introducing more sophisticated regulatory 
techniques. 
Finally, considering the strategic role that adjudicative bodies play in an the integration 
process, no efforts should be spared in supporting the functioning of MERCOSUR ad hoc 
tribunals, the Permanent Review Tribunal and, in particular, in ensuring the full 
implementation of the mechanism for requesting Consultative Opinions from the Permanent 
Review Tribunal. All this should be complemented with the provision of sufficient human, 
technical and financial resources to support the activities of both decision making and 
adjudicative bodies. 
The measures aimed at strengthening the role of the Secretariat, the Permanent Review 
Tribunal and the individuals are crucial for maintaining the credibility of MERCOSUR's deep 
economic integration objectives. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how a common market could 
be built exclusively from the ministries of foreign affairs' corridors. While currently there is 
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no room for big-bang reform plans seeking to implant EC-type institutions, there is of course 
room and need for a gradual opening of MERCOSUR institutions to the direct participation of 
individuals, instead of relying exclusively on government officials' intermediation. 
One of the best placed institutions for shaping this much needed reform is the Permanent 
Review Tribunal and, in particular, its jurisdiction over Consultative Opinions on the 
interpretation of MERCOSUR law requested by domestic courts. In its first Opinion, the 
Tribunal already stated that in case of conflict, MERCOSUR rules incorporated into national 
legal systems prevail over other internal rules. It remains to be seen whether the Tribunal will 
be able to lead a "silent revolution" like that carried out by the European Court of Justice 
through the adoption of hallmark decisions such as of Van Gend en Loos or Cassis de Dijon. 
At least there is a mechanism in place for private persons to seek an interpretation of 
MERCOSUR law directly from an impartial body, independent from the short-term concerns 
of national administrations. 
Bearing in mind that the integration of service markets requires a sophisticated institutional 
framework, the chances for success are slim. But there is still plenty of room for improving 
the efficacy and efficiency of the existing instruments specifically designed for this purpose. 
In this vein, State Parties should focus their efforts on three main areas for advancing - to the 
extent possible - the degree of trade liberalisation: consolidation of the status quo, gradual 
convergence of State Parties' legal systems through regulatory co-cooperation and promotion 
of an open debate about the implications of the liberalisation of trade in services. 
I Consolidation of Status Quo 
State Parties should aim at completing the consolidation of the status quo of domestic 
legislation on their schedules of specific commitments, with a view to ensuring that each 
schedule records - in an exhaustive and detailed fashion - all Market Access and National 
Treatment restrictions on trade in services for all service sectors and modes of supply. Once 
the consolidation of the status quo is completed and becomes binding, State Parties should 
attempt to negotiate a schedule to introduce - in the medium or long term - those reforms 
necessary for removing the Market Access and National Treatment restrictions embedded in 
statutes or constitutional provisions. Certainly, a commitment to introduce reforms in the 
medium or long term should be more palatable to domestic constituencies than a commitment 
to grant immediate concessions for MERCOSUR service suppliers. In addition, it would 
constitute a significant step towards the liberalisation process, sending a clear message to 
253 
economic agents about forthcoming changing of circumstances and giving them time to adjust 
their behaviour accordingly. 
II Gradual convergence of State Parties' legal systems through regulatory co-cooperation 
In parallel to the negotiation rounds, State Parties should also embark on a long-term effort 
towards regulatory co-operation aimed at bringing about a gradual convergence of domestic 
legislation affecting trade in services. Regulatory co-operation can contribute to gradually 
smooth out disparities between domestic rules through the ongoing dialogue and mutual 
understanding between hands-on regulators with competence on specific service sectors. 
MERCOSUR institutional structure already includes a network of auxiliary bodies to the 
Common Market Group with competence on specific service sectors that should take the lead 
in carrying out this task. The idea is to maintain appropriate mechanisms for domestic 
regulators to meet with their national counterparties on a regular basis with a view to 
exchanging information and experiences, ensuring consistent application of rules, consulting 
each other about the merits of introducing regulatory changes and jointly seeking best 
regulatory practices. 
Regulatory co-operation should enable State Parties to identify and understand their 
regulatory disparities and, eventually, it should prompt legislative initiatives aimed at 
harmonising them. Initially, minimum harmonisation initiatives encouraging the alignment of 
domestic rules to international standards should be prioritised over maximum harmonisation 
or sophisticated mutual recognition agreements. This sort of soft liberalisation approach may 
look fainthearted considering the scale of the challenges ahead, but in the long run it can be 
more effective than vain attempts to negotiate ambitious short-term commitments to 
deregulate service markets which State Parties will, more likely than not, fail to implement. 
To maximise synergies between auxiliary bodies and avoid overlaps and inconsistencies, it is 
necessary to formulate a single and coherent policy agenda on trade in services identifying 
short, medium and long-term objectives for each service sector, setting priorities between 
them according to the costs and expected outcomes of the liberalisation process. It seems 
reasonable to prioritise efforts in those sectors where there are less regulatory asymmetries or 
where there is a strong interest in their liberalisation such as Advertising, Distributional 
Services, Information Technology Services, Tourism and the cluster Architectural - 
Engineering - Construction Services. It is equally important to pay attention to strategic 
sectors whose liberalisation may contribute to reduce production costs and promote trade in 
goods such as Transport, Telecommunications and Finance. Finally, policy-makers should try 
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to improve existing rules aimed at facilitating the movement of natural persons providing 
services, with a view to providing individuals and small and medium enterprises with tangible 
opportunities for experiencing the benefits of the liberalisation process. 
III. Promotion of an open debate about the implications of the liberalisation of trade in 
services 
Last, but not least, it is necessary to promote an open debate about the costs and benefits of 
the liberalisation of trade in services. Despite its strategic economic importance and its wide 
potential implications for the majority of people, trade in services in MERCOSUR remains an 
arcane topic which conveys little interest. So far, this issue has been mostly dealt within 
diplomatic circles, with some input from sector-specific regulators. Save from some 
exceptions, the services industry has not been actively participating in the design of policy 
measures on trade in services and the civil society tends to react against liberalisation with 
anxiety and fear. The academic community has done little to contribute to the understanding 
of the potential costs and benefits of the liberalisation process. 
Successful liberalisation will not be possible unless this situation is reversed and a broad 
consensus about the need for the liberalisation of trade in services is forged. To go for it, the 
civil society at large must be convinced that there is a case for the liberalisation of trade in 
services. It must be borne in mind that State Parties will have to undergo major legal reforms 
which will not prosper unless the public is duly informed about the need for them. Thus, it is 
imperative to promote an open debate about the implications of the liberalisation of trade in 
services for the society at large. One way in which this could be done is by seeking a closer 
involvement of the MERCOSUR Parliament on the process. Members of the MERCOSUR 
Parliament are also members of domestic parliaments and therefore could act as conduits to 
place the topic on the domestic political agenda. 
To finalise, it is worth mentioning two factors that could, to a limited extent, facilitate the 
liberalisation of trade in services. The first one is the bloc's negotiations with third parties. 
MERCOSUR is already engaged in negotiations for the establishment of free trade areas with 
many countries and regional blocs, including with the EU and India. A fruitful negotiation 
process with third parties could act as a catalyst for the completion of the customs union, 
including the removal of main barriers to trade in services, since third parties will condition 
their concessions to MERCOSUR on its functioning as an effective custom union. It is 
difficult to predict though how these negotiations will evolve. Negotiations with the EU, the 
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most significant third party, are frozen waiting for the results of the Doha round at the 
multilateral level. 
The second factor that could facilitate the liberalisation of trade in services in spite of 
MERCOSUR's fragile institutional framework is the information technology revolution. In 
this vein, it is not unreasonable to foresee a medium-term scenario where new inventions will 
continue to bring down costs for cross-border transactions, creating new trade opportunities 
on service sectors which not long ago were considered non-tradable. Such changes could 
facilitate the circumvention of existing regulatory barriers to trade in services and force a de 
facto liberalisation, although, needless to say, technology advances alone will not suffice to 
ensure effective market access conditions for MERCOSUR service suppliers and levelling the 
playing field to compete against domestic incumbents. 
Whatever the way in which these factors may influence MERCOSUR's future development, 
there must be no doubt about the complexities of liberalising trade in services. The 
establishment of a regulatory framework capable of securing the free movement of suppliers 
and consumers of services across national borders is an extremely demanding task. The 
challenge is even more difficult in a context where regional institutions are weak and domestic 
regulatory practices are far from perfect in terms of transparency, impartiality and due 
process. MERCOSUR will require far more than the ten years period prescribed by Article 
XIX of the Protocol of Montevideo before suppliers and consumers of services can move 
freely across national borders. And still it is not unreasonable to wonder whether this 
objective could ever be achieved. At the end of the day, perhaps MERCOSUR State Parties do 
not mean what they claim. 
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Appendix I Decisions Common Market Council 
Number Date Title 
04/91 17/12/91 Approves CMG Internal Regulation 
01/92 27/06/92 Las Lenas Working Programme 
01/93 1/07/93 Amends Las Lenas Working Programme 
8/93 17/01/94 Minimum Regulations for Capital Markets 
10/93 17/01/94 Adoption of Basle Rules 
Consolidation of the Customs Union and 
13/93 17/01/94 
Transition to a Common Market 
05/94 5/08/94 Final Adjustment Regime 
Consolidation of the Customs Union and 
07/94 5/08/94 
Transition to a Common Market 
12/94 5/08/94 Basle Principles on Consolidated Supervision 
Harmonisation of Disclosure of Information 13/94 5/08/94 
Requirements for Capital Markets. 
Consolidation of the Customs Union and 
22/94 17/12/94 
Transition to a Common Market 
24/94 17/12/94 Final Adjustment Regime 
Safeguard Regime on Imports from Third 
17/96 17/12/96 
Countries 
11/97 15/12/97 Antidumping Measures 
02/98 24/07/98 Approves CMC Internal Regulation 
Memorandum of Understanding on Electric 
10/98 24/07/98 Exchanges and Electric Integration in 
MERCOSUR 
Memorandum of Understanding on Gas 10/99 7/12/99 
Exchanges and Gas Integration 
Approves Triennial Plan and Measures for the 13/98 10/12/98 
Education Sector 
Creates the Forum of Consultation and Political 18/98 10/12/98 
Agreement 
Dissemination of Information about the Status of 03/99 15/06/99 
Incorporation of MERCOSUR rules 
Co-operation Agreement between Supervisory 
8/99 7/12/99 Authorities of Insurance Companies from 
MERCOSUR State Parties 
23/00 29/06/00 Incorporation of MERCOSUR Rules 
32/00 29/06/00 Negotiations with Third Countries 
Entry 
into 
Force 
17/12/91 
27/06/92 
01/07/93 
17/01/94 
26/10/98 
17/02/95 
25/08/99 
10/02/95 
9 
9 
24/07/98 
10/12/98 
10/12/98 
15/06/99 
29/06/00 
270 
Co-operation Agreement between Central Banks 
40/00 14/12/00 ? 
for Combating Money Laundering 
55/00 14/12/00 Incorporation of MERCOSUR Rules 15/12/00 
Restructure of auxiliary bodies to the CMG and 59/00 14/12/00 14/12/00 
MTC 
Duty to Exonerate State Parties from 
11/01 20/12/01 20/12/01 
Restrictions Included in New Regulations 
02/02 18/02/02 Co-ordination between CMG and FCPA 18/02/02 
Adopts the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
14/02 5/07/02 5/08/02 
Countervailing Measures 
18/02 06/12/02 Regulation of Claims before the MTC 6/12/02 
20/02 06/12/02 Incorporation of MERCOSUR Rules 6/12/02 
Transformation of MERCOSUR Administrative 
30/02 06/12/02 6/12/02 
Secretariat into a Technical Secretariat 
Direct Applicability of MERCOSUR Rules into 07/03 17/06/03 17/06/03 
National Legal Systems 
Procedure for the Derogation of MERCOSUR 08/03 17/06/03 17/06/03 
Rules 
MERCOSUR Commission of Permanent 
11/03 6/10/03 6/10/03 
Representatives 
23/03 15/12/03 Approves FCPA Internal Regulation 15/12/03 
Mechanisms for the Temporary Provision of 
25/03 15/12/03 -- Professional Services 
MERCOSUR Working Programme for 2004 - 26/03 15/12/03 15/12/03 
2006 
30/03 15/12/03 Regulation of MTC 15/12/03 
37/03 15/12/03 Regulation of the Protocol of Olivos 02/03/04 
22/04 07/07/04 Incorporation of MERCOSUR Rules 07/07/04 
Model Regulations for the Functioning of Ad- 30/04 16/12/04 16/12/04 
Hoc Arbitration Tribunals 
Incorporation of rules relating to the 
31/04 16/12/04 MERCOSUR Common Tariff Classification and 16/12/04 
Common External Tariff 
45/04 16/12/04 Structural Funds 16/12/04 
Elimination of double charges and establishment 
54/04 16/12/04 of a mechanism for the redistribution of the ? 
CET's proceedings 
21/05 8/12/05 MERCOSUR Institutional Reform 8/12/05 
Special Procedure for Disputes relating to 26/05 8/12/05 -- Ministerial Agreements 
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30/05 8/12/05 Rules of Procedure of the PRT 8/12/05 
Instructs CMG to formulate a negotiation 
mandate for the seventh round & to develop an 30/06 15/12/06 15/12/06 
action plan for the completion of the Programme 
of Liberalisation by December 2007 
Rules of Procedure for the Request of 02/07 18/01/07 18/01/07 Consultative Opinions 
27/07 28/06/07 Non Tariff Restrictions 28/06/07 
Source: MERCOSUR Secretariat ("-": not in force; "? ": no information available) 
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Appendix II MERCOSUR Statistical Information 
1. General Data 
Year 2006 Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
Population (millions) 39.1 189.3 6.0 3.3 
Surface area (thousand sq. km) 2780 8515 407 176 
GDP (current US$ millions) 214241 1067472 9275 19308 
Exports of goods and services (% GDP) 25 14.7 49.2 29.9 
Trade to GDP ratio (2004-2006) 44.3 26.4 114.3 59.1 
Source: World Bank/WTO 
2. GDP Composition (%) 
Year 2006 Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
Agriculture 8.4 5.1 21.0 9.2 
Industry 35.6 30.9 18.3 32.4 
Services 56.0 64.0 60.7 58.4 
Source: World Bank 
3. Structure of the Total Employed Population, by Sector of Economic Activity 
Year 2006 Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
Agriculture 0.8 18.6 31.1 4.6 
Industry 23.7 21.6 16.1 22.0 
Services 75.5 59.8 52.8 73.4 
Source: ECLAC 
4. Rule of Law 
Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
Citizens compliance with the law1° 16.7 20.8 10.5 44.5 
Confidence in the Judiciary" 26.0 40.9 29.1 51.4 
Impartial Courts" 2.6 3.6 1.5 5.2 
Judicial Independence" 2.2 2.8 1.6 4.9 
Efficiency of the Legal Framework" 2.6 3.1 2.9 4.3 
Corruption Perception Index15 2.9 3.3 2.6 6.4 
Civil Liberties'6 2231 
Intellectual Property Protection'? 2.9 3.5 2.3 3.9 
Source: IADB based on various sources identified in footnotes 
10 Percentage of persons surveyed that believe that citizens comply with the law very much or a fair amount - Latinbarometro 
" Percentage of persons surveyed that have a lot or some confidence in the judiciary - Latinbarometro 12 The indicator is normalized from 0 to 10. Higher values indicate more impartial courts - Index of Economic Freedom 
13 The judiciary in your country is independent from political influences of members of government, citizens or 
firms: I= no, heavily influenced; 7= yes, entirely independent - World's Economic Forum's Executive Opinion 
Survey. 
14 Survey to Business Executives (1 = is inefficient and subject to manipulation; 7= is efficient and follows a clear, 
neutral process) - World's Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Survey 
'S The (CPI) ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials 
and politicians. Scale ranges from 10 (highly transparent) to 0 (highly corrupt). Composite Index - IADB 16 Civil liberties, conceived of as freedoms to develop views, organizations and personal autonomy apart from the 
state, are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the 
lowest - www. freedomhouse. org 
17 Survey to business executives. Intellectual property protection in your country is: 1= weak or nonexistent; 7= 
equal to the world's most stringent. World Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Survey. 
273 
5. Ease of Doing Business 
Year 2007 Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay United States 
Startip a business 
Procedures (number) 14 17 17 10 6 
Time (days) 31 152 74 43 6 
Dealing with licences 
Procedures (number) 28 18 14 30 19 
Time (days) 338 316 292 234 40 
Trading Across borders 
Documents for export 
(number) 9 8 9 10 4 
Time for export (days) 16 18 35 24 6 
Cost to export (US$ per 
container) 
1,325 895 720 925 960 
Documents for import 
(number) 7 7 10 10 5 
Time for import (days) 20 24 33 23 5 
Cost to import (US$ per 
container) 
1,825 1,145 900 1,180 1,160 
Enforcing Contracts 
Procedures (number) 36 45 38 40 32 
Time (days) 590 616 591 720 300 
Cost (% of debt) 16.5 16.5 30 16.2 9.4 
Closing a Business 
Time (years) 2.8 4 3.9 2.1 1.5 
Cost (% of estate) 12 12 9 7 7 
Recovery rate (cents on 
the dollar) 
36 12 15 43 77 
Ease of Doing Business 
Rank 101 113 110 89 3 
Source: wona uamc 
6. Merchandise Trade - Main Indicators 
Year 2006 Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
Merchandise Exports, fob (million US$) 46569 137807 1906 3953 
Breakdown in economy's total Exports 
Agricultural products 45.8 28.8 83.0 64.9 
Fuels and mining products 19.5 19.2 1.1 4.6 
Manufactures 31.7 49.8 15.9 29.4 
Merchandise Imports, fob (million US$) 34158 95853 5879 4757 
Breakdown in economy's total Imports 
Agricultural products 4.1 6.2 6.8 11.1 
Fuels and mining products 8.6 24.3 13.5 29.0 
Manufactures 86.5 69.1 79.7 60.0 
Source: WTO 
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7. MERCOSUR Merchandise Trade 1991 - 2006 
Export. Intra Mercosur (million US$), 
Import. Intra Mercosu (million US$)rýý 
Source: Centro Economia Internacional 
8. Merchandise Trade Encapsulation 
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9. Merchandise Trade Encapsulation by Country (Regional Exports / Total Exports) 
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0. Merchandise Trade Encapsulation - (Regional Exports / Total Exports) 
omparison between Agreements 
90% - 
80% 
70% -- -- 
30°0 - 
20% - --- 
10°iä -- -- 
0°0 
NAFTA MERCOSUR -- -EU 
Source: WTO 
11. Commercial Services Trade - Main Indicators 
Year 2006 Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
Commercial Services Exports (million US$) 7542 17946 735 1259 
Breakdown in economy's total Exports 
Transportation 18.9 19.2 13.2 34.4 
Travel 43.9 24.0 12.3 47.5 
Other commercial services 37.3 56.8 74.4 18.1 
Commercial Services Imports (million US$) 8222 27149 405 863 
Breakdown in economy's total Imports 
Transportation 27.8 24.2 61.9 49.1 
Travel 38.1 21.2 22.5 24.7 
Other commercial services 34.1 54.6 15.6 26.2 
Source: WTO 
12. MERCOSUR - Trade in Commercial Services with the world (including 
MERCOSUR countries - millions of US$) 
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Source: WTO 
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13. MERCOSUR - Exports of Commercial Services with the world (including 
MERCOSUR countries - millions of US$) 
Source: WTO 
14. MERCOSUR Imports of Commercial Services with the world (including 
MERCOSUR countries - millions of US$) 
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Appendix III Degree of Liberalization of Service Sectors by State Parties18 
July 2006 
Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
Business Services 
Professional Services 63% 52% 0% 54% 
Computer and related services 75% 75% 75% 75% 
Research and development services 50% 42% 0% 50% 
Real Estate services 25% 75% 25% 75% 
Rental / Leasing services without operators 44% 50% 38% 50% 
Other Business Services 55% 54% 14% 48% 
Communication Services 
Postal Services 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Courier Services 75% 75% 0% 50% 
Telecommunications 74% 75% 36% 30% 
Audiovisual Services 25% 0% 0% 11% 
Constructing and Related Engineering 
Services 
50% 50% 25% 50% 
Distribution Services 75% 50% 38% 50% 
Educational Services 21% 75% 35% 25% 
Environmental Services 19% 13% 0% 10% 
Financial Services 
Insurance 24% 20% 7% 41% 
Banking and other Financial Services 53% 26% 0% 43% 
Health Related and Social Services 50% 25% 25% 25% 
Tourism and Travel Related Services 75% 25% 69% 75% 
Recreational, Cultural, & Sporting Services 62% 15% 31% 15% 
Transport Services 
Maritime Transport Services 32% 29% 8% 25% 
Internal Waterways Transport Services 38% 30% 4% 18% 
Air Transport Services 28% 10% 0% 0% 
Rail Transport Services 30% 55% 0% 15% 
Road Transport Services 31% 55% 17% 0% 
18 The degree of liberalisation is measured according to Hoekman's method. Hoekman's method gives a value of 
"1" for an entry of 'NONE' on both the Market Access and the National Treatment columns. Then, it calculates the 
ratio of 'NONE' entries on both the Market Access and National Treatment columns over the total number of 
possible entries for each service sector or sub-sector. The quantitative data gives a rough idea about the degree of 
liberalisation of the various service sectors and allows for making comparisons between States Parties' specific 
commitments. It has to be borne in mind, however, that Hoekman's method does not take into account horizontal 
limitations for specific modes of supply which are applicable to all service sectors. 
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Appendix IV Minutes of MERCOSUR bodies' Meetings 
Common Market Council Orinary Meetings I (17/12/91) to VI (25/10/07) 
Extraordinary Meetings I (6/08/96) to () 
Common Market Group Orinary Meetings I (18/04/91) to LXXI(15-16 April 2008) 
Extraordinary Meetings I (12/03/93 ) to XXXII(16/12/07) 
Ad hoc Group on Services 1/95 (21- 22 September 1995) 4/97 (12-14 August 1997) 
2/95 (28-29 November 1995) 5/97 (17-19 September 1997) 
1/96 (20-21 March 1996) 6/97 (29 Sept 1 October 1997) 
2/96 (9-10 June 1996) 7/97 (26-27 November 1997) 
3/96 (27-28 August 1996) 8/97 (9-11 December 1997) 
4/96 (23-24 September 1996) 1/98 (3-5 March 1998) 
5/96 (5-6 November 1996) 2/98 (13-16 April 1998) 
6/96 (1- 3 December 1996) 3/98 (5-6 May 1998) 
1/97 (11-13 March 1997) 4/98 (28-29 May 1998) 
2/97 (21-23 May 1997) 5/98 (1-2 July 1998) 
3/97 (8-10 July 1997) 6/98 (15-20 July 1998) 
Group on Services 1/98 (8-9 October 1998) 3/03 (17-19 September 2003) 
1/99 (16-18 March 1998) 4/03 (12-14 November 2003) 
2/99 (2-4 June 1999) 1/04 (13-15 April 2004) 
3/99 (26/27 August 1999) 2/04 (16-17 June 2004 
4/99 (13-14 October 1999) 3/04 (13 - 14 September 2004 ) 
5/99 (15-16 November 1999) 4/04 (10-12 November 2004) 
1/00 (29-30 March 2000) 1/05 (6-7 April 2005) 
2/00 (14-16 June 2000) 2/05 (21 May 2 June 2005) 
3/00 (2-4 August 2000) 3/05 (24-25 October 2005) 
4/00(9- 
,II 
October 2000) 4/05 (21-23 November 2005) 
5/00 (20-22 November 2000) 1/06 (25-27 April 2006) 
1/01 (12-14 March 2001) 2/06 (28-30 June 2006) 
2/01 (6-8 June 2001) 3/06 (16-18 August 2006) 
3/01 (6-9 August 2001) 4/06 (25-27 Octuber 2006) 
4/01 (1-4 October 2001) 1/07 (25-27 April 2007) 
5/01 (19-23 November 2001) 02/07 (4-6 September 2007) 
1/02 (18-20 March 2002) 03/07 (12-14 November 2007) 
1/03 (11-12 March 2003) 1/08 (23-24 April 2008) 
2/03 (21-23 Mayo 2003) 
Sub Working Group 1 1/95 (2-3 October 1995) 3/01 (19-23 November 2001) 
Communications 1/96 (13-15 March 1996) 1/02 (13-17 May 2002) 
2/96 (22-24 May 1996) 2/02 (28 Oct -1 November 2002) 
3/96 (24-25 October 1996) 1/03 (24-28 March 2003) 
4/96 (25-29 November 1996) 2/03 (4-8 August 2003) 
1/97 (17-21 March 1997) 3/03 (10-14 November 2003) 
2/97 (9-13 June 1997) 1/04 (12-16 April 2004) 
3/97 (15-19 September 1997) 2/04 (23/27 August 2004) 
4/97 (17-21 November 1997) 3/04 (8-12 November 2004) 
1/98 (16-18 June 1998) 1/05 (18-22 April 2005) 
2/98 (17-19 November 1998) 2/05 (29 Aug -2 September 2005) 1/99 (5-7 May 1998) 
2/99 (2-3 September 1999) 
3/05 (28 Nov -2 December 2005) 
1/06 (8-12 May 2006) 
1/00 (29-31 March 2000) 
2/00 (1-5 August 2000) 
2/06 (25-29 September 2006) 
1/07 (7-11 May 2007) 
3/00 (6-10 November 2000) 2/07 (10-14 December 2007) 
1/01 (16-20 April 2001) 
2/01 (6-8 June 2001) 
1/08 (12-16 May 2008) 
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Sub Working Group 4 1/94 (9-11 March 1994) 1/02 (9-11 October 2002) 
Financial Issues 2/94 (8-10 June 1994) 1/03 (21-23 May 2003) 
3/94 (23-25 November 1994) 2/03 (22-24 October 2003) 
1/95 (20 October 1995) 1/04 (12-14 May 2004) 
1/96 (8-10 April 1996) 2/04 (20-22 October 2004) 
2/96 (6-8 November 1996) 3/04 (8-12 November 2004) 
1/97 (28-29 August 1997) 1/05 (8-10 June 2005) 
2/97 (17-19 November 1997) 2/05 (9-11 November 2005) 
1/98 (4-6 May 1998) 3/05 (28 Nov -2 December 2005) 
3/98 (23-25 September 1998) 1/06 (10 -12 May 2006) 
1/99 (17-19 May 1998) 2/06 (23-27 October 2006) 
2/99 (20-22 October 1999) 1/07 (13-15 June 2007) 
1/00 (26-28 April 2000) 2/07 (20-22 November 2007) 
1/01 (9-11 May 2001) 1/08 (12-16 May 2008) 
2/01 (21-23 November 2001) 
Sub Working Group 5 1/95 (2-3 October 1995) '3/01 (19-23 November 2001) 
Transport 1/96 (13-15 March 1996) 1/02 (13-17 May 2002) 
2/96 (22-24 May 1996) 2/02 (28 Oct -1 November 2002) 
3/96 (24-25 October 1996) 1/03 (24-28 March 2003) 
4/96 (25-29 November 1996) 2/03 (4-8 August 2003) 
1/97 (17-21 March 1997) 3/03 (10-14 November 2003) 
2/97 (9-13 June 1997) 1/04 (12-16 April 2004) 
3/97 (15-19 September 1997) 2/04 (23/27 August 2004) 
4/97 (17-21 November 1997) 3/04 (8-12 November 2004) 
1/98 (16-18 June 1998) 1/05 (18-22 April 2005) 
2/98 (17-19 November 1998) 2/05 (29 Aug -2 September 2005) 
1/99 (5-7 May 1998) 3/05 (28 Nov -2 December 2005) 
2/99 (2-3 September 1999) 1/06 (8-12 May 2006) 
1/00 (29-31 March 2000) 2/06 (25-29 September 2006) 
2/00 (1-5 August 2000) 1/07 (7-11 May 2007) 
3/00 (6-10 November 2000) 2/07 (10-14 December 2007) 
1/01 (16-20 April 2001) 1/08 (12-16 May 2008) 
2/01 (6-8 June 2001) 
Minutes of MERCOSUR bodies' Meetings on line 
CMC www. mercosur. int 
CMG www. mercosur. int 
SWG 1 http: //www. cnc. gov. ar/internacionales/mercosur/index. asp 
http: //www. anatel. gov. br/COMITES_COMISSOES/CBC/MERCO SUL IDEFAULT. ASP 
www. conatel. gov. py 
www. ursec. gub. uy/R internacionales/r_internacionales. htm 
SWG 4 www. bcb. gov. br/? SGT4ESPANHOL 
SWG 5 www. transoorte. aov. ar/html/relacionesinst htm 
www. antt-gov. br/internacional/reunioes/reunioes. asp 
www. dinatran. gov. py/ 
www. dnt. gub. uy 
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Appendix V Useful Websites 
Name Ugt, 
MERCOSUR official Sites 
Main Official Site www. mercosur. int 
MERCOSUR Presidency www. Qresidenciamercosur. ors 
MERCOSUR Parliament www. parlamentodelmercosur. org 
State Parties' Governmental Agencies 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Argentina) www. mrecic. gov. ar 
Ministry of Finance and Production (Argentina) www. mecon. gov. ar/cnce 
Central Bank (Argentina www. bcra. og v. ar 
House of Representatives (Argentina) www. hcdn. gov. ar 
House of Senators (Argentina) www. senado. gov. ar 
Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (Brazil) www. mdic. gov. br 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Brazil) www. mre. gov. br 
Central Bank (Brazil) www. bcv. og vbr 
House of Representatives (Brazil) www2. camara. ov. br 
House of Senators (Brazil) www. senado. gov. br 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paraguay) www. mre. gov. py 
Ministry of Industry and Trade (Paraguay) www. mic. gov. uv 
Central Bank (Paraguay) www. bcp. goy y 
House of Representatives (Paraguay) www. camdiv. gov. r) v 
House of Senators (Paraguay) www. senado. gov. py 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Uruguay) www. mrree. gub. uy 
Ministry of Finance (Uruguay) www. mef. ub. uy 
Central Bank (Uruguay) www. bcu. gub. uy 
Parliament (Uruguay) www. parlamento. gub. uy 
Commission for MERCOSUR (Uruguay) www. mercosur-comisec. gub. uy 
Research Centres / Academic Networks 
Centro de Economia Internacional www. cei. gov. ar 
Centro de Investigaciones para la Transformaciön (CENPT) www. fund-cenit. org. ar/ 
Instituto Torcuato Di Tella (ITDT) www. idgt. edu 
Instituto de Estudos Para o Desenvolvimento Industrial www. iedi. org. br 
Instituto de Economia, Universidad Federal do Rio de Janeiro www. ie. ufrj. br 
Instituto de Economia, Universidad de Campinas www. eco. unicamp. br/indexie. html 
Fundacao Centro de Estudos do Comercio Exterior www. funcex. com. br 
Nucleo de Pesquisa em Relacoes Internacionais, University of www. nupri. prp. usp. br/nupri/nupri_ 
Sao Paulo fhtm 
Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA) www. ipea. gov. br 
Centro Brasileiro de Relacoes International is www. cebri. org. br 
Brazilian Institute of International Trade Law and Development www. idcid. org. br 
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales www. flacso. org 
Observatorio Politico Sul Americano 
Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales 
Latin American Trade Network (LATN) 
Observatorio de las Relaciones Union Europe America latina 
Instituto de Relacoes Internacionais - Univ Sta Catarina 
Instituto de Integracion Lationamericana 
Instituto de Comercio Internacional 
http: //observatorio. iuperj. br/index. 
htm 
www. clacso. org 
www. latn. org. ar 
www. obreal. unibo. it/Home. aspx 
www. iribr. com/ 
www. iil. org. ar 
www. fundacionbankboston. com. ar 
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Chaire Mercosur 
Instituto de Comercio Internacional - Fundacion Standard Bank 
Consejo Argentino pare las Relaciones Internacionales 
RAU Mercosur 
Red Mercosur de Investigaciones Economicas 
Centro de Analisis y Difusi6n de la Economia Paraguaya 
Centro de Formacion Pam la Integracion Regional 
Centro de Investigaciones Econ6micas 
Departamento de Economia, FCS, Universidad de la Republica 
Instituto de Economia, Universidad de la Republica 
Centro Iatinoamericano de Economia Humana 
The National Law Centre for Inter-American Free Trade 
The Dante B. Fascell North South Centre, University of Miami 
Centre for Study of Western Hemispheric Trade, Texas A&M 
International University 
Multilateral Organisations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
http: //chairemercosur. sciences- 
po. fr 
http: //www. fstandardbank. edu. ar/i 
nst/sec-ici/index. php 
www. caril. org. ar 
www. rau. edu. uy/mercosur 
www. redmercosur. org 
www. cadep. org. py 
www. cefir. org. uy 
www. cinve. org. uy 
www. decon. edu. uy 
www. iecon. ccee. edu. uy/ 
www. claeh. org. uy 
www. natlaw. com 
www. miami. edu/nsc 
http: //freetrade. tamiu. edu/index. ht 
m 
www. eclac. cl 
Latin American Economic System www. sela. org 
Interamerican Development Bank - Integration & Trade Division www. iadb. org/int/trade/ 
Institute for the Integration of Latin America and Caribbean www. iadb. org/intal 
Latin American Integration Association 
Business Organisations 
Exportar. Ar 
Federacao das Industrias do Estado do Sao Paulo 
Union Industrial Paraguaya 
Camara de Industrias del Uruguay 
Camara Uruguays de Teconologias de la Informacion. 
Union de Exportadores del Uruguay 
Camara Nacional de Comercios y Servicios 
Camara Mercantil de Productos del Pais 
Asociacion Rural del Uruguay 
Databases 
MERCOSUR instruments 
Legislative Database (Argentina) 
Legislative Database (Brazil) 
Latin American Network Information Centre 
MERCOSUR Statistics 
Uruguayan NGOs 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
www. aladi. org 
www. exportar. org. ar 
www. fiesp. com. br 
www. uip. org. py 
www. ciu. com. uy 
www. cuti. org. uy 
www. uruguayexporta. com 
www. cncs. com. uy 
www. camaramercantil. com. uy 
www. aru. org. uy 
www. mre. gov. ny 
www. infoleg. mecon. og v. ar 
https"//le islacao. planalto. ov. br/ 
www. lanic. utexas. edu 
www. cedep. ifch. ufrgs. brBem/index. html 
www. lasociedadcivil. org 
www. eui. com 
Indexes / Statistical Indicators 
MERCOSUR Trade Statistics 
WTO Trade Statistics 
World Development Indicators (WB) 
Doing Business Indicators (WB) 
Indicators Governance & Institutional Quality 
(WB) 
www. cei. gov. ar/html/mercosur. htm 
www. wto. org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_e. htm 
www. worldbank. orR/data/onlinedatabases/onlined 
atabases. html 
www. doingbusiness. org 
wwwl. worldbank. org/publicsector/indicators. htrn 
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Enterprise Surveys (WB) 
IADB Statistical indicators 
Global Competitiveness Report 
Index of Economic Freedom 
Corruption Indexes - Transparency International 
Centre for Global Development 
UNDP Report on human development 
MERCOSUR News 
MERCOSUR ABC 
Mercosur Press 
Abeceb. com - consultora eco sobre comercio 
regional 
www. enterprisesurveys. org 
www. iadb. org/m-, emh/data. cfin? language=en&p 
arid=2 
www. weforum. or¢ 
www. heritage. org/index/ 
www. transparency. org/ 
www. cgdev. org/section/topics/dataset 
http: //hdr. undp. org/en/ 
www. mercosurabc. com. ar 
www. mercopress. com 
www. abeceb. com 
,6 
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